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SUMMARY
OF THE
PRINCIPAL MEASURES
OF
THE VICEROYALTY
OF THE
EARL OF ELGIN AND KINCARDINE
IN THE
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT,
JANUARY 1894 TO JANUARY 1899.



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I

LORD ELGIN'S
ADMINISTRATION OF INDIA
IN
THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE EARL OF ELGIN AND KINCARDINE took his seat at Calcutta as Viceroy and Governor-General of India, on the 27th January 1894.

The business of the Foreign Department is conducted under the immediate orders of His Excellency the Viceroy. For the purposes of this summary, the affairs dealt with in the Foreign Department have been arranged under four heads—(a) North-West Frontier; (b) External; (c) Internal; and (d) Miscellaneous.

North-West Frontier.

(In half-yearly parts.)

Memorandum of principal events dealt with in the Frontier Branch of the Foreign Department during half-year ending 30th June 1894.

SHORTLY after his arrival in India, Lord Elgin announced to the Amir his assumption of office, and assured His Highness that, during his tenure of the Viceroyalty, it would be his earnest endeavour to preserve and strengthen the cordial relations existing between the Amir and the Government of India. His Highness acknowledged the letter in appropriate terms.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 39 (Frontier), dated the 14th March 1894.

Throughout the first-half of the year, the Amir remained at Kabul. Sir Salter Pyne, who received the honour of Knighthood and the Companionship of the Star of India for his services connected with Sir Mortimer Durand's mission to Kabul, and had proceeded to England at the end of 1893, was received by the Queen at Osborne in January. He informed Her Majesty of the Amir's wish to receive an invitation to England, and in July 1894, the invitation for His Highness reached the Government of India. It was at once made over to Sir Salter Pyne, who was in Simla, and he started for Kabul on the 7th of July. The Viceroy announced the despatch of the invitation by the hand of Sir Salter Pyne, in a cordial letter to His Highness. Several outstanding questions in which the Amir was concerned were discussed with

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 127 (Frontier), dated the 17th July 1894.

Sir Salter Pyne during his stay at Simla.

In March a party comprising Miss Hamilton, M.D., Mr. Clemence, the Englishman in charge of the Amir's horse-breeding operations, his wife and maid Mr. Walter, the Amir's master-tailor, and his wife, were permitted to proceed to Kabul, the English ladies being the first who have visited Kabul for half a century.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 56 (Frontier), dated the 28th March 1894.

On the 27th of March, the Viceroy announced to the Amir the intention of the Government of India to present to His Highness two 7-inch breech-loading rifled guns of 82 cwt. each, with carriages and ammunition. Two quick-firing Hotchkiss guns were ordered to be presented to the Amir, as a present from Sir Mortimer Durand and the officers of the recent Kabul Mission, in recognition of His Highness's numerous kindnesses to the party, during their stay in his country. Two million rounds of Snider and a like quantity of Martini-Henri cartridges were also sent to the Amir. In connection with this last gift, a misunderstanding arose, which was explained to His Highness through Sir Salter Pyne. His Highness wrote that he had been promised four million bundles (of ten) of cartridges instead of four million rounds. Arrangements were made for the removal of all restrictions on the purchase, import and transit through India of munitions of war for the Amir; and as a special and personal concession

His Highness was exempted from the payment of all customs duties on goods of every description imported through India for His Highness or members of his family.

Nawab Muhammad Afzal Khan, the British Agent at Kabul, was allowed to return to India in March 1894, and the work of the Agency was carried on for some months by a Munshi of the establishment. Notwithstanding that the Amir often spoke publicly of his friendly relations with the British Government, and widely published the settlement effected at Kabul, his suspicions and dislike of the Agency were by no means lessened; spies were set to watch the employés, and persons suspected of supplying news were put to death. When, therefore, in June it was reported that the Agency Hospital Assistant had entered into secret relations with the Amir, and was furnishing His Highness with information, it was decided to withdraw the whole establishment and to send up with the new Agent an entirely new staff.

The Amir continued to adopt a policy of conciliation towards the Afghan refugees in India, with the exception of the three or four principal ones. Among the many who have made their peace with His Highness, and either returned to Afghanistan or accepted an allowance from him in India, may be mentioned Sardar Ibrahim Khan, eldest son of the late Amir Sher Ali Khan; Abdul Ghafur, son of the late Mustaufi Habibulla Khan; Sardar Nur Ali Khan, son of the ex-Wali of Kandahar; and Sardar Ali Muhammad Khan, son of the late Sardar Wali Muhammad Khan.

In the early part of the year 1894, the Government of India entered into

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 55 (Frontier), dated the 28th March 1894.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 58 (Frontier), dated the 30th March 1894.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 104 (Frontier), dated the 12th June 1894.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 153 (Frontier), dated the 14th August 1894.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 179 (Frontier), dated the 3rd October 1894.

correspondence with the Amir on the subject of the demarcation of the Afghan frontier as decided in the agreement signed at Kabul on the 12th November 1893. In reply to a letter from Government His Highness expressed a desire that the work should be commenced as soon as possible after the Nauroz (21st March). This was agreed to; and the work was divided into three sections: it

was eventually decided that the line from the vicinity of Asmar to the Safed Koh should be demarcated by Mr. Udny and the Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan; that from the Safed Koh to the Laram peak south of the Kaitu Nullah by Mr. Donald and Sardar Sherindil Khan; that from Domandi to the Persian border by Captain McMahon and Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan. The demarcation of the Waziristan frontier was postponed till the autumn. At the end of June matters stood thus: Mr. Udny had issued a proclamation to the Mohmands announcing the frontier line agreed to by the Amir, and his nomination to demarcate it in co-operation with the Sipah Salar. He had also informed the Sipah Salar of his appointment, and had received a reply to the effect that he would be happy to meet Mr. Udny at Jalalabad, and would write later to fix a date for the meeting. Mr. Donald had met Sardar Sherindil Khan several times, and demarcation had actually commenced; but the work on the Kurram border had not progressed smoothly. An unfortunate incident had arisen in connection with the water-supply of the Kharlachi village, south of the Paiwar

Kotal; Afghan subjects had destroyed the dam which supplied the Turi canal taking off from the Kurram river, conflict had arisen and lives had been lost

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 158 (Frontier), dated the 28th August 1894.

on both sides. The Amir had addressed the Government of India on the subject, and matters were becoming strained. The

Government of India having satisfied themselves of the right of the Turis to the dam which had been destroyed, ordered its reconstruction and authorised Mr. Donald, if necessary, to maintain it by force.

Besides this regrettable occurrence, the Afghan representative had been obstructive; he had not been provided with a copy of the Kabul Agreement map, or of the Agreement, and evinced a desire whenever it suited his purpose, to evade the terms of the latter as explained to him by Mr. Donald.

Captain McMahon had had somewhat similar experiences on his section of the line. The Afghan representative did not arrive until Captain McMahon had been waiting for him two months on the frontier. When he did arrive, it was ascertained that he had been only provided with an old small scale map of Afghanistan, on which the frontier line was shown differently from that laid down by the Kabul Agreement. Difficulties at once arose, and work had to be deferred, pending a reference to the Amir by the Afghan representative. Captain McMahon had not personally met Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan; indeed the latter's instructions at first precluded him from meeting his British colleague, and communications had to be carried on through the medium of Khalipha Nur Muhammad, the Sardar's deputy.

To sum up, it may be said that no progress to speak of had been made in the work of delimitation up to the end of the half-year; while there were ample signs that the Amir's officials were prepared to be obstructive, and endeavour to evade the 1893 settlement whenever Afghan interests could be thereby benefited. Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar was reported to be openly in negotiation with those of the Mohmands who, by the Kabul settlement, had fallen within the British sphere of influence, and was inviting them to allow the Amir to construct cantonments and forts in their country.

In order to prepare the Waziris for the boundary demarcation in the

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 122 (Frontier), dated the 10th July 1894.

autumn, the Punjab Government was instructed in June to announce to the tribe the terms of the settlement concluded

with the Amir and to tell them that Joint-Commissioners of the British and Afghan Governments would proceed in October to mark off the line on the ground, pending which the tribes must respect it. After communication with the Amir it had been decided to place in Spin a British force of the strength of a brigade for the protection of the demarcation party. The important question of our future relations with the Waziri tribe now came under the serious consideration of the Government of India. During the previous year, a very large number of grave outrages had been committed by Waziri raiders, some well within the line of the British advanced posts. Partial reparation had

* Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 111 (Frontier), dated the 26th June 1894.

only been obtained in very few cases; and in some of the worst, namely, the murder of Mr. Kelly,* a Public Works

Department Overseer, in July 1893, the murder of a Jamadar* of Border Police

* Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 131 (Frontier), dated the 17th July 1894.

† Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 111 (Frontier), dated the 26th June 1894.

in Spiltoi on the 2nd January 1894, the murder of a sowar† in the Zam Pass on the 18th February 1894, the amount of punishment had been practically limited at the dictation of the Waziri Maliks. But in the majority of cases the offences remained unpunished altogether. The existing arrangements afforded no means of controlling the movements of bands of Waziris across the Gumal river, and gave little protection against their oft-occurring raids. The leading men among almost all sections of the tribe were indeed willing to deal fairly with us, but they were helpless to coerce its turbulent members. The Government of India held that by reason of the agreement come to by Sir Mortimer Durand with the Amir, they had assumed a measure of responsibility which had not hitherto been theirs, but which under present arrangements they had no adequate means of discharging, and they considered it incumbent on them to bring further under their influence the tribes whom the settlement concerned. In order to put an end to Waziri raiding, not only into the Zhob Agency, but also upon Powindah Kafilas using the Gumal route, and in order to be in a position to control raiding on the Amir's frontier, the Government of India considered that a strong military post should be held at some locality, perhaps in Spin or Wano, or in the country between, whichever might be decided to be the best, for dominating the country through which the marauding bands approach the river. It was proposed that, when the troops for the demarcation party entered the district in October, a Political Officer should be deputed to explain to the tribe the nature of the future relations which Government intended to establish with them, and to obtain, if possible, their consent to the establishment of a British post in or near Spin, on a permanent footing, after the conclusion of the work for which the Commission's escort had been provided. The new arrangements would necessitate the grant of increased service allowances to the headmen and the enlistment of inferior men for service in levy posts; and the Political Officer entrusted with the negotiations was to be authorised to draw up a scheme of this description. A despatch submitting proposals on these lines was addressed to Her Majesty's Government on the 10th of July 1894, the Hon'ble Sir Charles Pritchard, the Hon'ble Sir A. P. MacDonnell, and the Hon'ble Mr. Westland dissenting. Her Majesty's Government approved of the proposals of the Government of India.

Arrangements for the management of Kurram internal affairs made con-

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 114 (Frontier), dated the 3rd July 1894.

siderable advance during the half-year. Sanction was given to the organisation of the Kurram Militia, comprising 800 infantry and 50 sowars; British officers in the posts of Commandant and Adjutant were attached to the force, the total annual cost of which is estimated at about a lakh and a quarter of rupees. Cantonments were being built at Para Chinar, the head-quarters of the administrative staff, and settlement work made good progress. A civil medical establishment was sanctioned, and village schools were started.

The peace of Bajaur was greatly disturbed by the proceedings of the Khan of Jandol. This Chief is the one man of importance who has always turned a deaf

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 110 (Frontier), dated the 26th June 1894.

ear to overtures from the Amir and is consequently hated by His Highness with extreme bitterness. Early in March, he attacked the Bashgal Kafirs with a large force, but was driven off with considerable loss. About the same time, he invaded Chitral territory, some of his men advancing as far as Ashreth. Both the Amir and the Mehtar of Chitral complained to the Government of India, and warnings were sent to the Khan that he would forfeit the good-will of Government if he committed aggression on Afghan or Chitral territory. The Khan replied that he had given up his intention of attacking the Kafirs, but he did not withdraw from the forts which he had meantime built at Barikot opposite the Arnawai valley, and at Narsat. The position, in fact, became critical and a conflict between the rival parties appeared imminent; but it was hoped that matters might improve if Umra Khan, as had been suggested to him, were to meet Mr. Udny, on his arrival on the Asmar frontier.

When a review of the position on the Chitral frontier was placed before

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 99 (Frontier), dated the 12th June 1894.

Her Majesty's Secretary of State in the summer of 1893, Lord Kimberley sanctioned the retention of the British Political Officer (Captain Younghusband) in Chitral as a temporary measure only and pointed to three possible contingencies which would materially affect the general aspect of affairs in that region :—

- (i) The abandonment by the Amir of all idea of bringing Chitral under his control;
- (ii) The successful conclusion of the negotiations with Russia for the determination of boundaries in the Pamir tract; and
- (iii) The mitigation, through the mediation of our frontier officers, of the irritation and suspicion of the frontier tribes.

At the close of 1893, the first of the above conditions had been attained by the agreement concluded between the Amir and Sir Mortimer Durand; there were indications that a Pamir settlement might before long be arrived at; and the attitude of the tribes was fairly satisfactory. In these circumstances, orders were issued in January 1894 for the withdrawal of the Political Officer when the winter was over, if no fresh complications had meanwhile arisen. The events of the spring and early part of the summer did not, however, tend to facilitate the execution of the policy thus projected: the actual demarcation of the Afghan frontier had not made any progress; the situation on the southern border of Chitral was complicated by the aggressive proceedings of the Khan of Jandol, and the Pamir negotiations had again taken an unfavourable turn. The Government of India considered the moment inopportune for taking a step which would not improbably be regarded as a definite withdrawal and which would deprive them of their look-out post for affairs beyond the Hindukush, and they therefore decided that the position in and towards Chitral must remain for another year on its present footing. They deprecated the policy of activity and extension advocated by Captain Younghusband and Colonel Bruce, the Officiating British Agent at Gilgit, and requested that those officers should be reminded that there was no intention of permanently maintaining a British officer in Chitral, and that the Mehtar should be taught as soon as possible to rely on, and act for himself.

The Government of India further declined to allow the head-quarters of the Political Officer to be transferred from Mastuj to the capital, or to sanction the formal deputation of native non-commissioned officers to Chitral for long periods to give musketry training to selected bodies of Chitralis, though they did not object to temporary instruction being given by men of Captain Younghusband's escort on the occasion of his visits to the Mehtar's capital, provided that no scheme of military organisation was attempted, and that instruction was only given to such levies as the Mehtar had already entertained.

As regards the regiment of Bengal Infantry (Pioneers) in the Gilgit Agency, it was decided, subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State, not to withdraw it without its being relieved, at least until an agreement had been concluded with Russia on the Pamir question. The views of the Government of India were generally approved by Her Majesty's Government.

Notwithstanding frequent rumours to the contrary, the spring of 1894 passed without any fresh rising of the tribesmen in the vicinity of Chilas. The Chilas fort was completed on the 10th of May.

During the summer, Lieutenant Cockerill commenced a systematic examination of all the Hindukush passes from the Baroghil to the Dorah, and of every valley leading from the passes into Chitral.

The state of affairs in Hunza and Nagar continued to be satisfactory. As noted above, the negotiations with the Russian Government regarding the frontier in the direction of the Pamirs took an unfavourable turn. On the 22nd of January, Lord Rosebery had accepted as a basis of settlement, subject to certain conditions, the proposals put forward by the Russian Government in December 1893. On the 7th of April, the Russian Ambassador communicated his Government's reply to Lord Rosebery's note of the 22nd January. It completely changed the basis of negotiation, limiting the British spheres of influence and of actual military occupation, while extending their own, in a manner which it was impossible to accept. Russia's object was clearly to gain the command of roads running to Hunza, Wakhan and Sarikul. The Government of India expressed a strong opinion that the proposal was totally inadmissible, and Her Majesty's Government, on the 28th April, replied to the Russian Government pointing out the obvious objections to it. Up to the end of June, no answer had been received. Reports and rumours from Chinese Turkistan pointed to preparations by the Russians for a move in the Pamir direction from Osh, but Russia had given a pledge to China not to send troops into the disputed tract, until the conclusion of negotiations, and no actual advance of Russian troops was made on the Pamirs during the summer.

Negotiations upon which Mr. Macartney, the Assistant for Chinese Affairs

to the Resident in Kashmir at Kashgar, had entered in 1893 with the Chinese officials for the release of slaves in Chinese Turkistan, subjects of Kashmir, Hunza, Nagar, &c., proceeded satisfactorily, and he reported in May that over sixty had been set free, and that arrangements were

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 49 (Frontier), dated the 21st March 1894.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 113 (Frontier), dated the 3rd July 1894.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 157 (Frontier), dated the 21st August 1894.

Secret despatch to H. M.'s Secy. of State for India, No. 206 (Frontier), dated the 7th Nov. 1894.

in progress for releasing about fifty more.

Telegraphic communication between Kashgar and the interior of China was completed at the end of March.

Colonel Yate, the Agent to the Governor-General of India, made a prolonged tour in Kain and Seistan from December 1893 to April 1894, and

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 137 (Frontier), dated the 24th July 1894.

submitted proposals for extending British influence in that direction. They were, however, for the most part rejected on the score of expense and because it was considered impolitic to attempt to establish British influence in a country so far in advance of the Indian frontier where it would be impossible for us to uphold it. Colonel Yate's tour was promptly followed by the deputation of Russian officers to go over the same ground and counteract as far as possible such good results as might reasonably have been expected to accrue from the visit of the Governor-General's Agent.

An incident occurred on the Herat frontier during March, which might

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 71 (Frontier), dated the 25th April 1894.

have had serious consequences. Mahmud Beg, the interpreter of the Governor of Panjdeh, who had often tried to enter Herat, was sent to the Governor of Herat by the Panjdeh Governor to prefer a complaint about alleged petty frontier disputes. Having on a previous occasion been refused permission to visit Herat by the direct route, he went by the Persian border in disguise. His party exchanged shots with an Afghan picket, but he was allowed to proceed to Herat, where he was detained for some time. The Governor of Panjdeh wrote to the Governor of Herat asking for the release of his employé, whom, he admitted, he had sent to Herat about certain frontier disputes. General Kuropatkin made a representation to Colonel Yate by telegraph, through the Russian Consul-General at Meshed, to the effect that the man had been deputed on frontier work and had either accidentally or deliberately and without permission crossed the frontier and been seized by the Afghan guards. He requested that the man's release should be obtained, and said that if he had wilfully crossed the frontier he would be punished. The Governor of Herat released Mahmud Beg, sending his employer a protest against Russian subjects entering Afghan territory by proscribed routes, and the incident was closed.

**Memorandum of principal events dealt with in the Frontier Branch
of the Foreign Department during half-year ending
31st December 1894.**

DURING the half-year ending the 31st December 1894, relations with the Amir of Afghanistan continued satisfactory. On the 14th of October, news, dated the 8th, was received from Sir Salter Pyne that His Highness was most dangerously ill, and hourly expected to die. His Highness's complaint was said to be hemorrhage of the kidneys; and his sufferings were intense. A few days later, news was received that the critical stage of the illness had passed; improvement continued, and by the 1st of November the Amir was sufficiently recovered to leave the Babar Garden, where he had been throughout his illness, and make a public entry into the Kabul city. The news of the Amir's illness created considerable sensation in India, but there was no great excitement in Afghanistan, where, however, His Highness's recovery was as rapidly and widely published as his illness had been kept secret. It was rumoured in various quarters that the Amir had nominated Sardar Habibulla Khan as his successor; but such rumours were not officially confirmed.

At the end of August, the Amir acknowledged the Viceroy's letter of the 6th July, regarding the invitation of His Highness to England by Her Majesty's Government. He expressed great pleasure at being invited, and stated that he had long wished to visit England, but he added that he was unable at present to write a reply, because he was "perplexed by the proceedings of the Indian Commissioners on the borders of Afghanistan and the continual distress which they caused to the minds of the people of Afghanistan." His Highness gave no indication of what the sense of his reply would be, nor had he done so up to the end of the year. Sir Salter Pyne remained firm in his belief that His Highness intended going to England in the spring of 1895, and the Hon'ble George Curzon, who visited Kabul as the Amir's guest at the end of 1894, was said to share the same conviction.

The delimitation of the British-Afghan frontier made somewhat slow progress. The Kurram border and the Afghan-Baluch section from Domandi to the vicinity of Chaman were indeed concluded, but on the sections from Asmar to the Khyber, the Waziristan frontier, and from Chaman to the Persian border actual demarcation had not been commenced at the end of the year.

It will be interesting to give a few details regarding this important question of frontier demarcation.

Mr. Udny, the British Commissioner for the demarcation of the frontier from the vicinity of Asmar to the Khyber, crossed the frontier at Landi Khana on the 16th August. He was met by an Afghan escort, which escorted him to Jalalabad, where he arrived on the 19th. The Sipah Salar himself came out some distance to meet him, and conducted him to the Amir's palace outside the city, which had been prepared for his reception. Mr. Udny took with him only Surgeon-Captain Macnab and two native officers, as, in view of

the obstructive attitude of the Amir's Agents with the other delimitation commissions, it was intended that he should, in the first place, hold a preliminary discussion with his Afghan colleague at Jalalabad, before the Commission was finally committed to starting for Asmar. Mr. Udny soon found that his colleague intended adopting an attitude similar to that which had characterised the proceedings of the Amir's Commissioners on the other sections of the frontier. The Sipah Salar had not been provided with a copy of the map attached to the Kabul Agreement, but with a small scale map on which the frontier line was marked differently; and he, moreover, denied that the facsimile of the settlement map produced by Mr. Udny was the same as the one accepted by the Amir, and annexed to the agreement. He proceeded to claim the whole of Mohmand territory as Afghan, and stated that Sir Mortimer Durand had told him at Kabul that the tribe indisputably belonged to the Amir. In short, the Sipah Salar, disregarding all arguments based on the Kabul Agreement and map, insisted upon a boundary based on tribal limits, a proposal which, when put forward by the Amir, had been consistently refused by Sir Mortimer Durand. It being clear that, owing to the divergent instructions under which Mr. Udny and his colleague were acting, no progress in demarcation could be looked for, Mr. Udny was instructed to inform the Sipah Salar that the Government of India wished him to return, and he left Jalalabad for Peshawar on the 28th of August.

During the next few weeks, the Sipah Salar continued to act as if the whole of the Mohmands belonged to Afghanistan. Subsequently, in reply to a letter of inquiry from Mr. Udny, he said that he had received from the Amir a genuine map for the purposes of demarcation, and on the 4th of December, the British Commissioner again proceeded to Jalalabad. On this second occasion, he was accompanied by Colonel Holdich, R.E., and Lieutenant Coldstream, R.E. (survey officers), Mr. C. G. Hastings (lately Officiating Political Officer in the Khyber), Surgeon-Captain Macnab, and a native establishment.

The party reached Jalalabad on the 7th of December, and were cordially received by the Sipah Salar. On the 10th, the united British and Afghan camps started their march up the Kunar Valley, and reached Asmar on the 16th. On the 20th, they marched to Nashagam, two or three miles below Chanduk, where they remained till the end of the year, engaged in the survey of the adjacent country.

On the Kurram border, Sardar Sherindil Khan, the Afghan Commissioner, for some time maintained his unreasonable and obstructive attitude. The Amir in a letter to the Viceroy stated that he had given orders for the Kharlachi dam to be rebuilt on the site agreed upon in 1893 by Mr. Merk and the Afghan authorities; but the Sardar evaded giving effect to the orders until towards the end of the year. In August work had come to a dead-lock; the Afghans were establishing posts on what they considered to be their side of the boundary line, in spite of Mr. Donald's protests, and the two Commissioners, pending result of a reference to Government, were disposing of tribal disputes which had been pending between Kurram people and Afghan subjects for two years previously. During September and October matters remained as before; less than 20 miles had been demarcated, the Sardar totally disregarded the line

drawn on the Kabul Agreement map, and declined to accept the proposals of the British Commissioner. In November things suddenly changed for the better. The Afghan Commissioner who, up to now, had never been furnished with a copy of the Kabul Agreement map, received one from the Amir; he accepted, with only a few minor alterations, the whole of the line proposed by Mr. Donald, and by the end of the month, demarcation by pillars was completed.

Vexatious delay and obstruction continued to characterise the proceedings of Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan, Captain McMahon's colleague on the Afghanistan-Baluchistan section of the frontier. The Sardar did not possess the most elementary knowledge of reading a map, and while he persisted in maintaining that he was bound by the only one in his possession—an obsolete map of Afghanistan on a much smaller scale than the one attached to the Kabul Agreement—he persisted in putting forward complaints and claims which even his own map did not support. At his instigation, the Nasir and Suleiman Khel Maliks laid claim to places 40 miles within the British frontier, and a reference to the Amir became necessary. The Amir, himself, through Sir Salter Pyne, complained that Captain McMahon was transgressing the frontier, and further wrote that the lithographed reproductions of the agreement map, which the Government of India had sent to His Highness for the use of his Commissioners, were inaccurate. The letter was regarded as a mere excuse for not having supplied the Boundary Commissioners with the right map, and His Highness was accordingly told that wherever in the printed maps the coloured line appeared so placed as to indicate a boundary less advantageous to His Highness than that shown on the agreement map, the British Demarcation officers would found no claim upon the position of the colour. Nevertheless, it was not until the 17th of September (after the British party had been five-and-a-half months on the frontier) that the Sardar signed an agreement, fixing the Kundar and Kundil rivers as the boundary for the first few miles of the long line to be demarcated between Domandi and Chaman. From this time onwards, work progressed steadily but slowly. Though the personal relations between the Commissioners remained of the most friendly character, the Sardar and his agents continued to put forward claims utterly untenable, and that delimitation was continued at all was due to the great tact displayed by Captain McMahon. Within a few days of Christmas, and within a few marches of Chaman, work was again reported to have come to a stand-still, and a fresh reference to the Amir seemed to offer the only prospect of its resumption. Captain McMahon's steady determination, however, once more stood him in good stead; his Afghan colleague at the last moment gave way and in the first week of January Captain McMahon had the gratification of reporting that the boundary demarcation was actually completed to the vicinity of Chaman. On a reference to the Amir, proposing continuance of demarcation on the section between Chaman and the Persian border, His Highness replied that he would appoint a new Commissioner for this part of the line.

During July and August, the Waziris committed several fresh offences, the

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 165 (Frontier), dated the 11th September 1894.

most serious being the murder of three leading Mahsud Maliks who had rendered service in obtaining the surrender and conviction of the murderers of Mr. Kelly and other criminals. The Punjab

Government wished to demand the surrender of the culprits under threat of a punitive expedition, but the Government of India declined to authorise this course, considering that it would almost certainly prevent the fulfilment of our obligations to the Amir in the matter of demarcating the Waziri border. The Commissioner of the Derajat was instructed to inform the tribe of the intentions of Government, and meanwhile to continue his negotiations with the jirgas in view to procuring the punishment or surrender of the Maliks' murderers. A proclamation was issued to the tribes in August, informing them of the line of boundary fixed upon by the Government of India and the Amir, and of the arrangements for its demarcation in detail. They were told that the British Government desired that they should respect the line laid down, that there was no intention to interfere in their internal affairs, but that we only desired to establish peace and hoped that they would cordially co-operate in the attainment of these objects. Large jirgas assembled for consultation with regard to this announcement, and the majority were in favour of receiving the British Commission in a friendly spirit. Fresh offences, however, were reported during September; raiding and counter-raiding between the Waziris and Kharotis, Suleiman Khels, Nasirs were of frequent occurrence, and it was believed that a combination of these tribes to attack the Waziris in force was being arranged.

The British party, deputed to carry out the programme of Government in Waziristan, consisted of Mr. R. I. Bruce, C.I.E., Mr. L. W. King, C.S., Mr. A. Anderson, C.S., Mr. A. J. Grant, C.S., and three survey officers. It was settled that the actual demarcation party should be accompanied by an escort of about 400 men, and a force consisting of three regiments of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, a mountain battery and a company of sappers and miners should be encamped at Spin or Wano on a site to be determined by Mr. Bruce and the Officer Commanding the troops, in consultation. A brigade was also to be mobilised and held in readiness as a reserve.

The force under Brigadier-General Turner marched from Dera Ismail Khan in three columns, concentrating at Kajuri Kach on the 18th and reached Wano unopposed on the 25th of October.

The attitude of the Wano Maliks was described as most friendly, and they exhibited an eager desire for the British occupation of Wano and for service under Government. On the 19th of October, Mr. Bruce interviewed a large jirga at Kajuri Kach. He informed them of the intended movements of the escort in view to carrying out the programme of delimitation agreed to by the Amir; he told them that troops would be permanently stationed in the country at Wano or Spin, or such position as Government might deem best; that Spin and Wano and the adjacent tracts, through which the Powindah trade routes run, would in future be considered protected areas; and that strict reparation would be exacted for offences calculated to endanger the safety and peace of the country. He also impressed on them that raids across the boundary into Afghan territory were forbidden, and that should the tribesmen have any complaint against the Amir's subjects, they must lay it before the British officers, and not take the law into their own hands. The jirga gave in a written paper fully acquiescing in the proposals of Government.

The escort reached Wano on the 25th of October unopposed. The Mahsuds, having begged to be summoned to Wano, met Mr. Bruce there on

the day of his arrival. The attitude of both Mahsuds and Darwesh Khels continued to be generally friendly; but on the 28th of October, one Mulla Powindah was reported to have collected in the Khaisera Valley a thousand men belonging to the Shabi Khels and Abdullais. As a precautionary measure, an infantry battalion and two guns of the reserve brigade were moved up to Jandola to reinforce the post at that place. Mulla Powindah was advised to disperse his following, but made no attempt to do so, and while the question of despatching a flying column to Khaisera to break up the gathering was under consideration, the British camp at Wano was attacked at 5-30 A.M. on the 3rd of November. The attacking force, estimated to have numbered from 1,200 to 2,000, consisted entirely of Mahsuds, chiefly Shabi Khels and Abdullais of Makin, with a few Abdul Rahman Khels. Owing to the nature of the ground they were able to approach the camp through ravines, emerging from which the main body rushed past the pickets on to the left flank of the camp. Others attacked the rear. Favoured by the darkness some of the enemy succeeded in effecting an entrance into the camp and did considerable damage. After stubborn hand to hand fighting the camp was cleared of the enemy, who fled in the direction of Khaisera and Shakai, closely pursued by a force of cavalry, infantry and guns. The casualties on the British side were 1 British officer, 2 native officers and 18 men killed; 6 British officers (one of whom died of his wounds) and 38 native soldiers wounded. The followers also suffered severely, 23 being killed and 20 wounded. The enemy succeeded in carrying off 36 Martini rifles and carbines, 15 horses and 3,000 rupees in cash, besides killing and wounding numerous transport animals in the lines. The loss on the side of the tribesmen was very severe, being estimated at from 300 to 400 men killed and over 100 wounded.

Several outrages by small bands of raiders followed, such as cutting and carrying away telegraph wire, attacking and looting convoys, firing on postal horsemen. General Turner's brigade was at once reinforced by a battalion of British infantry, but orders were issued that no aggressive movement was to be undertaken without the sanction of Government. Mr. Bruce was informed that he must carry out the spirit of his former instructions, and he was instructed to re-open negotiations, if possible, on the footing that the Mulla's act was disapproved by the majority of the tribal Maliks. He was to demand the temporary banishment of Mulla Powindah, the surrender of certain leaders of the attack, the immediate return of every horse, rifle, and rupee stolen, or five hundred rupees for each horse or rifle; and, if after a reasonable interval there was no sign of submission, he was authorised to name the 1st of December as the date after which Government would take action to enforce their demands.

Nearly all the Mahsud Maliks came in on the 18th November to Mr. Bruce, who explained to them the Government demands, and gave them till the 26th November within which to comply. The jirga started back forthwith to the hills, promising, in writing, to do everything in their power to enforce the Government terms, and in the event of failure to return to Wano with a full jirga by the 26th, and to co-operate with Government in punishing rebellious sections or individuals. At their own request, the names of five men were added to the list of those whose surrender was to be demanded.

On the 24th November, the Mahsud deputation returned to Wano, and stated that they could see their way to obtaining restitution of all Government property stolen, but not the surrender of the men demanded, or the banishment of the Mulla. They asked that their hands might be strengthened by allowing them to take back with them to Kanigoram certain Suleiman Khel and Darwesh Khel Maliks who were with the Commissioner, and Mr. Bruce agreed to this, giving them time up to the 28th November within which to bring their final answer. At the end of the month, the Government terms had not been complied with, but the Maliks represented that it had been impossible to secure compliance within the time allowed, and engaged to fulfil all demands, if Government would give them up to the 12th of December. This further extension was agreed to, but arrangements were completed for an advance into the Waziri country of the whole force under Lieutenant-General Sir William Lockhart from three separate points, *viz.*, Wano, Jandola and Bannu, should the terms be still uncomplied with on the date fixed.

Up to the 10th of December it seemed possible that the terms would be fulfilled; but the Maliks now sent in a letter asking for further time, and on this being refused, the friendly Maliks came in to Mr. Bruce and admitted their inability to coerce the recalcitrant sections. Accordingly on the 15th of December, Lieutenant-General Sir William Lockhart was instructed to assume the chief military and political charge, to punish those responsible for the attack on Wano, and to enforce the Government terms.

The force under Lieutenant-General Lockhart's command was divided as follows :—

(1) Wano brigade, under command of Brigadier-General Turner.

1 Squadron, 1st Punjab Cavalry.
No. 8 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery.
2nd Battalion, Border Regiment.
3rd Sikhs.
1st Battalion, 1st Gurkha Rifles.
1st Battalion, 4th Gurkha Rifles.
No. 2 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
Rough total 3,400 men and 6 guns.

(2) Jandola brigade, under command of Brigadier-General Symons.

1 Squadron, 1st Punjab Cavalry.
1 " 2nd " "
No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery.
38th Dogras.
4th Punjab Infantry.
33rd " "
1st Battalion, 5th Gurkha Rifles.
No. 5 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
Rough total 3,400 men and 6 guns.

(3) Bannu column, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Eger-ton.

3rd Punjab Cavalry.
No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery.
1st Sikhs.
2nd Punjab Infantry.
6th " "
Rough total 2,700 men and 6 guns.

The objectives of the three columns were respectively Kanigoram, Makin and Razmak.

On the 16th of December, Sir William Lockhart issued a proclamation announcing that he was authorised to punish the sections of the tribe who attacked the British camp at Wano, to enforce the conditions demanded by Government, and any other terms which renewed opposition might necessitate; that it was his intention to secure the carrying out of the boundary demarcation; and that resistance or non-compliance with his demands might compel him to stay in the country longer than the Government had any desire that he should stay. Arrangements were made for the safety of well-disposed persons and their belongings, and everything possible was done to confine the operations to the offending sections, and to prevent the punitive expedition from developing into one against the whole tribe.

The commencement of delimitation having thus for a time been postponed, the Amir was informed of the cause, and that, until the recalcitrant sections had made complete submission, Mr. Bruce would not be able to take up the work.

The Bannu column advanced on the 17th, and the Wano and Jandola Brigades on the 18th of December; a regiment of native infantry, two guns, and a few cavalry were left to hold Wano.

The Jandola Brigade reached Makin on the 21st December, destroying towers belonging to recalcitrant sections and Mulla Powindah's village *en route*. It experienced no real opposition, but the rear-guard was fired on, pickets were fired at at night, some camels killed, and a few followers wounded. The Bannu column reached Razmak on the 21st and Makin on the 22nd. It also had met with no opposition, though the camp and rear-guard had been fired on, and a sepoy and some followers wounded. The Wano column arrived at Kanigoram on the 21st. General Turner's experiences were similar to those of the others. Two of his sepoys were wounded by men on the line of march. While he was destroying the towers in the village of Karam on the 22nd, the tribesmen opened fire from a sangar, and wounded two officers and four sappers. On the 25th December, the force divided into six columns, and commenced to follow up the hostile party in the valleys round Pirghal, where they were said to have retreated. The columns returned on the 27th, having met with practically no opposition; and several head of cattle and some sheep were captured, and numerous towers were destroyed. Mulla Powindah himself fled to Dawar. Up to the end of the year, the troops had been unopposed, and the enemy succeeded in keeping well out of reach.

The attitude of the adjacent tribes continued satisfactory. The Waziris tried to induce the Mangals, Makhils, Jajis and other Afghan tribes to join them, but peremptory orders were issued by the Amir's Governor of Khost, forbidding all Afghan subjects from aiding the Waziris in any way.

During the early part of August, reports were received from more than

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 159 (Frontier), dated the 28th August 1894.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 177 (Frontier), dated the 28th September 1894.

one source that a fresh expedition of three hundred Russian troops under Major-General Yonoff had started for the Pamirs. From Chitral it was reported that the objective of the expedition was believed to be Shighnan. The Russian Government, to whose notice the report of the starting of the expedition was brought, denied that any movement on the Pamirs was impending. Nevertheless, before the end of the month, several letters were received from the Amir, enclosing correspondence from his officials in Badakhshan and Shighnan, and letters to them from Major-General Yonoff, from which it appears that Major-General Yonoff, with a party of Russian troops, had marched into Shighnan, and in writing demanded the immediate evacuation of trans-Oxus Shighnan by the Amir's troops. On the 9th of August, a few Russian troops, locally reported to number 100, though that was doubtless an exaggeration, with some Kirghiz and men of Shakh Darra, suddenly attacked an Afghan post at Sar-i-Pul, but they retired on the Afghans taking to their entrenchments. The Afghan officer reported that the two forces were within half a gunshot of each other at Rewak, that the Russians had captured Chaharsim, and that

further conflict was imminent. In September some Russian sowars came to the ruby-mine in Gharan and took away as prisoners the Afghan in charge and two miners, leaving their own men in charge. The Amir told the General Commanding in Badakhshan to recall all Afghan troops at present north of the Oxus, and place them in the fort of Shighnan, and to avoid fighting the Russians as far as possible. His Highness was told that Her Majesty's Government had been informed by telegram of the Russian proceedings, and that His Excellency the Viceroy approved the prudent orders which His Highness had issued for the guidance of his frontier officers. The matter was brought to the notice of the Russian Government. M. de Giers stated that he was at a loss to understand how the incident could have taken place, and gave a positive assurance that the Russian Government had no intention of departing from the understanding with Her Majesty's Government that the *status quo* should be maintained pending the settlement of the whole question. The Russian Government subsequently recalled their troops and gave strict orders that they should not pass the Murghab river. The incident caused considerable excitement in Chitral, and many leading Chitralis are said to have advised the Mehtar to open up negotiations with the Russians.

The negotiations in Europe for the settlement of the Pamir question progressed but slowly. On the 18th of July, after having received certain fresh proposals from M. de Staal, the Earl of Kimberley drew up a formal note of the points upon which Her Majesty's Government understood that the two Governments were agreed. These were—

(1).—The spheres of influence of Great Britain and Russia to the east of Lake Victoria (Zor Koul) were to be divided by a line which, starting from a point on that lake near to its eastern extremity, should follow the crests of the mountain range running somewhat to the south of the latitude of the lake as far as the Bendersky and Orta-Bel passes.

From thence the line would run along the same range while it remained to the south of the latitude of the said lake. On reaching that latitude it would descend a spur of the range towards Kizil Robat on the Aksu river, if that locality were found not to be north of the latitude of Lake Victoria, and from thence it would be prolonged in an easterly direction so as to meet the Chinese frontier.

If it were found that Kizil Robat was situated to the north of the latitude of Lake Victoria, the line of demarcation would be drawn to the nearest convenient point on the Aksu river south of that latitude, and from thence prolonged as aforesaid.

(2).—The line to be marked out, and its precise configuration settled by a joint commission of a purely technical character, with a military escort not exceeding that which might be strictly necessary for its proper protection.

The commission to be composed of British and Russian delegates, with the necessary technical assistance.

Her Britannic Majesty's Government to arrange with the Amir of Afghanistan as to the manner in which His Highness should be represented on the commission,

(3).—The commission should also be charged to report any facts which could be ascertained on the spot bearing on the situation of the Chinese frontier, with a view to enable the two Governments to come to an agreement with the Chinese Government as to the limits of Chinese territory in the vicinity of the line, in such manner as might be found most convenient.

(4).—Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia engage to abstain from exercising any political influence or control, the former to the north, the latter to the south, of the above line of demarcation.

(5).—Her Britannic Majesty's Government engage that the territory lying within the British sphere of influence between the Hindukush and the line running from the east end of Lake Victoria to the Chinese frontier shall be placed under the suzerainty of the Amir of Afghanistan, that it shall not be annexed to Great Britain, and that no military posts or forts shall be established in it. They will further refrain from sending into it any British troops or military officers, except after special agreement with the Russian Government. The Russian Government engage on their side that they will under no circumstances allow their troops or officers to enter the said territory.

After the lapse of several months the Russian Government (in November) asked that the words "placed under the suzerainty of the Amir," in the 5th paragraph of the above note, should be replaced by the words "incorporated in the territory of the Amir," which would render unnecessary the words which followed, "that it shall not be annexed to Great Britain."

Negotiations had not been concluded at the end of the year.

During the summer, the new customs line in Central Asia was established by the Russian Government. While Persian and Afghan merchandise is subject to a duty of 5 per cent *ad valorem*, the importation of European and Anglo-Indian goods is prohibited, with the exception of certain specified articles, including tea, spices, some kinds of dried fruits, indigo, &c., all of which are heavily taxed. These new regulations, coupled with the illiberal fiscal policy of the Amir of Afghanistan, are sufficient to cripple the Indian Central Asian trade. The question, so far as it concerns the Amir, being a matter of internal policy, the Government of India have not been able to interfere.

The Hon'ble George Curzon was permitted to travel through Hunza, across the Kilik and Wakhijrui passes, returning by the Baroghil into Chitral and paying a visit to the Mehtar. From Chitral he returned to Gilgit and proceeded *via* Chilas to Peshawar whence he at once started for Kabul on a visit to the Amir. He arrived at the capital on the 20th of November and was well received. The Government of India were not supplied with any information regarding his visit. He returned to India *via* Kandahar on the 18th of December.

At the end of the year, Lieutenant-Colonel Muhammad Akram Khan left Peshawar to take up the duties of British Agent at Kabul. The whole of the establishment of the old Agency were withdrawn, and the new British Agent took up an entirely new staff. Lieutenant-Colonel Muhammad Akram Khan

was entrusted with the duty of presenting to the Amir the Insignia of the Bath, the decoration of G.C.B. having been conferred upon His Highness by Her Majesty's Government at the beginning of the year.

Mirza Muhammad Taki Khan, who had been Government news-writer at Kandahar for eight years, was withdrawn at the end of the year. He had for long been *persona ingrata* to the Amir, and his position at Kandahar was rendered very trying. The Amir objected to the first nomination made as successor to Taki Khan, on the ground that he was an atheist, but subsequently approved the appointment of Dilawar Ali Shah, a Saiyid of Lahore.

Several instances of desertion and flight into Afghanistan by sepoys of the Indian army occurred during 1894. Such men are always well received by Afghan officials, and get a good price for their arms; but the Government of India did not consider it advisable to address the Amir on the subject, or regarding the ill-treatment of Afghans employed in the British service on their returning to their homes on leave, both of which questions came under consideration during the year. Some sepoys who deserted from the 24th Baluchistan Regiment at Chaman were pursued several miles across the frontier by Native Police and the regimental authorities, but succeeded in evading capture: the pursuers were fired on at the Gatai Post. Under instructions from Government, the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan wrote to the Governor of Kandahar expressing regret at the violation of Afghan territory, and stating that he had taken steps to prevent the recurrence of such conduct.

Affairs in Bajaur required to be closely watched. Umra Khan and the Chief of Nawagai, who had for a long time been on bad terms, effected a defensive alliance, and commenced working together, when it became known that the Amir was debarred by the Kabul Agreement of 1893 from interfering in Bajaur. Umra Khan continued to hold the Narsat Valley, and the posts which he had occupied on the Chitral river north of Chanduk, to the great chagrin of the Mehtar of Chitral, who more than once expressed a wish to be allowed to expel him. The Sipah Salar also claims some of these posts as belonging to Afghanistan. A slight collision between some Afghan levies and men in Umra Khan's service took place in October near Sau; the former were the aggressors, and Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan is said to have written to Umra Khan disavowing their conduct.

Umra Khan for some time closed the Chitral road to traders, putting them to much trouble and expense, and even intercepted a consignment of medical stores going up to the British dispensary in Chitral. He continued to forward the post for which, however, he is paid; but his conduct on the whole has been unsatisfactory. Several of the Khans of Bajaur and their relatives have been putting out feelers to ascertain what prospect there is of getting allowances from the British Government.

The Kurram Militia made a great advance during the year. At the end of 1894 this force, which had only been started about twelve months, numbered close upon 800 men, and they were reported to be efficient for service.

The release of slaves in Chinese Turkistan, subjects of Kashmir, Hunza, Nagar, &c., continued to make good progress, the Chinese authorities behaving

very well in the matter. No less than 175 were released in Yarkand and Sarikol at the expense of the Chinese Government.

Affairs settled down in Chitral, and Nizam-ul-Mulk's rule was for the time firmly established. A British Political Officer remained at Mastuj during the half-year. Lieutenant Gurdon relieved Captain Younghusband in the autumn.

There was no fresh disturbance in the Indus valley, though the Jalkotis committed a few minor offences in the valleys near Chilas. In Hunza and Nagar affairs remained perfectly quiet. Much damage was done in these two States by exceptionally severe floods. The annual subsidy of Rs. 2,000 which was withdrawn by Government after the misbehaviour of Hunza and Nagar in 1891 was restored this year. A telegraph office was opened at Gilgit on the 12th of July, from which date the whole line from the frontier at Kohala to Gilgit, *viâ* the Burzil and Tragbal passes, was taken under the control of the Government of India Telegraph Department. An outbreak of rinderpest among the cattle on the Gilgit road occurred during the autumn, and a large number of animals died; the disease spreading in the Gilgit district, in spite of all precautions to prevent it.

Colonel Yate, Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in Khorassan, proceeded in the early autumn on a long tour through Deregez and Northern Khorassan, visiting parts of the Turkoman country and the vicinity of the Russian frontier. His proceedings were the subject of a representation by the Russian Government who had heard that he was accompanied by a large military escort.

3rd January 1895.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

HALF-YEAR WHICH ENDED ON THE 30TH JUNE 1895.

Chitral.

THROUGHOUT the whole of the half-year, affairs connected with the Chitral State claimed very special attention. At the end of 1894, Nizam-ul-Mulk had been Mehtar for two years; he had succeeded in holding his own, and had even obtained a certain degree of popularity. No dangerous opponents appeared to be left in the field. Sher Afzal, after his sudden descent on Chitral in November 1892, and his flight before Nizam-ul-Mulk in the following month, had been interned in Kabul, and it was understood the Amir would not allow him to again create disturbances in Chitral. Most of the sons of the late Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk had either been murdered or had fled the country. Of the latter, one was Amir-ul-Mulk, a youth of from 18 to 20 years of age, who, on the accession of Nizam-ul-Mulk, had fled to Bajaur, and taken refuge with Umra Khan.

In May 1894, Amir-ul-Mulk returned to Chitral professing to have escaped from Umra Khan's hands, and was kindly received by Nizam-ul-Mulk. On the 1st January 1895,* while the brothers were out hawking at Broz, a few miles from Chitral, Nizam-ul-Mulk was shot dead by a follower of Amir-ul-Mulk. The latter promptly seized the Chitral Fort, and proclaimed himself Mehtar. Two of Nizam-ul-Mulk's leading officials and some of his partisans were murdered at the same time, and others taken prisoners.

* Despatch to H. M. S. of S. for India, No. 16 (S-P.), dated the 6th March 1895.

The news was quickly brought into Gupis by refugees, and on the 5th of January, it was confirmed by Ghulam Dastgir, a half-brother (by a slave-mother) of the murdered Mehtar, who fled to the camp of Mr. Udny, Commissioner for demarcation in the Kunar Valley. Lieutenant Gurdon, Assistant Political Officer, was in Chitral when the murder took place, with an escort of 8 Sikhs. The nearest support of 100 men was at Mastuj, 63 miles north-east of Chitral. Fifty Sikhs from Mastuj were at once sent to Chitral upon Lieutenant Gurdon's requisition, and Mastuj was reinforced by 100 men. Ghizr was held by 200 men, and Mr. Robertson, the British Agent at Gilgit, started about the middle of January for Chitral to report on the situation. Mr. Robertson was cautioned not to commit Government to any change of policy in regard to Chitral, and not to recognise any candidate to the Mehtarship, or to conclude any permanent arrangement, without reference to the Government of India.

Pending Mr. Robertson's arrival, Mr. Gurdon, who remained in Chitral, acted with coolness and judgment; he occupied a house in an excellent position for defence, and commenced quietly laying in supplies. Amir-ul-Mulk sent more than one deputation to him, asking to be recognised as Mehtar, but Lieutenant Gurdon declined to commit himself to any other statement than that the orders of Government must be awaited.

The murder of Nizam-ul-Mulk is believed to have been brought about by an arrangement between the Sher Afzal party and Umra Khan of Jandol, the latter seeing an opportunity for his own aggrandisement in the disturbance which must necessarily follow in Chitral. Amir-ul-Mulk disclaimed all connection with Umra Khan, but he was probably acting in collusion with him at the time he was projecting Nizam-ul-Mulk's murder. He appears to have afterwards realised the danger of Umra Khan's presence and to have become anxious to get rid of him. Be this as it may, immediately after the murder, Umra Khan advanced into the southern end of the Chitral Valley with a large force. He sent a letter to the Governor of Darosh, in which he announced his intention of starting a *jihad* to punish the Kafirs, and requested that Amir-ul-Mulk would come to Ashreth to receive him. Amir-ul-Mulk did not fall in with his wishes, whereupon Umra Khan's force occupied Ashreth, and proceeded to advance on Kila Darosh.

Mr. Robertson was at Mastuj, 158 miles from a line of telegraph, when he heard that Umra Khan had invaded Chitral territory. In his opinion this effected a complete change in the situation. He knew that Lieutenant Gurdon could not withdraw from Chitral without help; and he determined to push on to his assistance. At the same time he wrote to Umra Khan on the 26th of January, demanding an explanation of the presence of his forces in Chitral territory, and advising him to at once retire, and so save himself from the consequences of the displeasure of Government. Under instructions from Government, Mr. Udny and Mr. Robertson further addressed Umra Khan early in February, demanding an explanation of his proceedings. Umra Khan replied on the 10th February that he had come to assist and strengthen Amir-ul-Mulk and to combine with him for an attack on the Kafirs; that Amir-ul-Mulk had acted in a hostile manner; but that he would leave Amir-ul-Mulk alone if he was willing to make peace, and that he hoped his friendship with the British Government would remain unbroken. Notwithstanding these professions of friendship, his agents at Sao and other places in the Kunar Valley did their utmost to prevent communications between Mr. Udny's camp and the British officers in Chitral.

Mr. Robertson arrived in Chitral on the 1st February. He had with him 290 men, and sufficient supplies to the end of April had been collected. There were 200 men at Mastuj whither 100 Sikhs of the British Agent's escort had also been despatched from Gilgit to Mastuj; and 100 Kashmir troops to Ghizr.

The Bajauris, estimated at 3,000 to 4,000 men, remained throughout February in the southern part of the Chitral Valley. The Chitrali force opposing Umra Khan numbered about 3,000 men. On the 25th January, the Chitralis were driven from their position before Kila Darosh with some loss on both sides; they continued, however, to hold Kila Darosh itself until the 9th February, when it was surrendered to Umra Khan by arrangement, under which the lives of the defenders were spared, and many breech-loading rifles and matchlocks were given up to him.

After the surrender of Kila Darosh, the Chitralis concentrated at Ghairat under Amir-ul-Mulk. In order to prevent a general stampede of the inhabitants

from Chitral proper, and to neutralize the open revolt of the Kushwakhtis against Amir-ul-Mulk, Mr. Robertson took over the Kushwakht country as a temporary measure; and, on his own responsibility without pledging Government to anything, he promised protection to the Kushwakhti headmen, and appointed Kushwakht Governors to Mastuj and Laspur. At this time Amir-ul-Mulk was with Mr. Robertson in the Chitral Fort, and Mr. Robertson hoped that, by showing that he and Amir-ul-Mulk were working in thorough accord, he might succeed in restoring confidence.

Mr. Robertson's situation was difficult. Before Kila Darosh was surrendered, he had reported that efforts were being made by the Chitralis to bring about a collision between himself and Umra Khan. He stated that the Chitralis had "no fight in them;" that they had undoubtedly called in Umra Khan, but desired to escape the consequences of their own acts; and that their attitude was so doubtful that, if he were to move back one yard, he would be mobbed by a crowd of refugees; the whole country would be open to Umra Khan and he would be harassed or permitted to retire according to the humour of Umra Khan and his fanatical following. In these circumstances it was evident that any further success would render Umra Khan a serious danger to the British Representative. Mr. Robertson was accordingly authorized by telegram on the 19th February, to give the Chitralis such material and moral support in turning Umra Khan out of Chitral territory as might be consistent with the safety of his own party, and to call up reinforcements if necessary.

On the 21st February, Mr. Robertson reported that everything was satisfactory, supplies plentiful, the men healthy and the Chitralis cheerful and helpful. But the situation now became seriously complicated by the appearance on the scene of the refugee Sher Afzal from Kabul. Mr. Robertson did not obtain reliable information of his arrival in Chitral territory until the 24th February, when he at once entered into communication with him. On the 27th February, Mr. Robertson received from Sher Afzal, through a confidential messenger, a demand that he should at once retire to Mastuj. Sher Afzal promised friendship, but his promise was coupled with a threat that, if his terms were not accepted, Umra Khan would at once advance. Mr. Robertson replied that Chitral was under the suzerainty of Kashmir, and neither Umra Khan nor any one else could impose a Mehtar on Chitral without the permission of Government; that Sher Afzal's message was wanting in respect to the Government of India; that he was informing Government of Sher Afzal's demands and would communicate their orders; and that, if in the meantime Sher Afzal attempted any overt acts of hostility, he must take the consequences on his own head.

At the end of February the Chitralis were still holding Ghairat, and Umra Khan was rapidly completing his preparations for the defence of Kila Darosh against an attack from the Chitralis which he believed to be imminent. A few Chitralis of the lower class had gone over to Sher Afzal, but the Adamzadas, though suspected of being partizans of Sher Afzal, had not yet openly espoused his cause. Of the 700 Sniders given by Government to Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk,

it was estimated that only 200 remained in Chitral, most of the others having found their way into the hands of Umra Khan.

At this time there was a considerable force of Afghan troops in the Kunar Valley. Subsequent events threw some doubt upon the share played by the Amir in these transactions, but there was no reason at the outset to doubt the loyalty of his co-operation, and it was easy to see that movement by his troops in the Kunar Valley might have the effect of drawing Umra Khan away from Chitral. At that particular moment the negotiations of the Demarcation Commission had led the Government of India to the conclusion that it was expedient to concede to the Amir possession of the Bashgal Valley and the district of Narsat. Mr. Udny communicated this decision to the Sipah Salar on February 21st, when the possibility of the intervention of Afghan troops in Chitral was discussed. The Sipah Salar expressed his belief that, if Umra Khan succeeded in getting to Chitral, the British officers would be in peril, and that the advance of Afghan troops into the Bashgal Valley would be the surest way of averting danger, by alarming Umra Khan for the safety of his line of retreat. He even said, of his own motion, that he would be ready to push his troops forward to Chitral itself, if necessary, to relieve the British officers there. It soon, however, became apparent that the Sipah Salar had no intention of creating a diversion in Mr. Robertson's favour; and the idea was abandoned.

On the 24th of February Mr. Udny dismissed Umra Khan's representatives who had been for some weeks in his camp, with a letter to Umra Khan, conveying a message from the Government of India to the effect that his advance into Chitral was an act of hostility against a State in subordinate alliance with the British Government, and calling on him to return to Bajaur. The letter further communicated the decision which had been arrived at by the Joint British and Afghan Commissioners as to the line of boundary in the neighbourhood of the Kunar Valley, and warned him that, if his people offered any opposition to the Afghan escort with the British survey party, they would be treated as enemies, and, if necessary, forcibly ejected. The Afghan Sipah Salar fully concurred in this warning, but two days later he declined to provide an escort for the survey party either in the Bashgal Valley or up the river above Chanduk. The strength of the force with Umra Khan at this time has been variously estimated at from 3,000 to 8,000 men. The former is believed to have been the force with which he originally advanced into southern Chitral, but on his circulating in Swat and elsewhere a call to *jehad* against the British, he is reported to have been joined by 5,000 more, including many Mullas from Dir and Bajaur.

The Assistant British Agent at Gilgit had already arranged, at Mr. Robertson's request, to send up 150 Hunza, Nagar and Punyal levies to reinforce Chitral; and he now called up 100 Kashmir troops from Chilas for duty in Gilgit, and desired the Officer Commanding the 32nd Pioneers to hold half his battalion in immediate readiness to march, if necessary, to Gilgit.

Despatch to H. M.'s
S. of S., No. 66 (S.F.),
dated the 17th April
1896.

Mr. Robertson, who had gone out with Amir-ul-Mulk to the Chitrali position of Ayun, on the river between Chitral and Darosh, returned to Chitral on the 1st March with the whole of his escort. He sent a message to Gilgit that no anxiety need be felt if communication with him were interrupted. This was the last direct communication received from Chitral; it came from Lieutenant Gurdon and was dated the 1st March. Mr. Robertson had with him in Chitral a fairly strong force and plenty of supplies, while Gupis, Ghizr, and Mastuj were also held by troops with British officers in each. It was clear, however, that, if communications with Gilgit were cut, Mr. Robertson's position would be full of risk so long as Umra Khan was north of the Lowarai Pass, and after a review of the situation, the Government of India decided that preparations should be made to operate against Umra Khan from Peshawar. It was believed that Mr. Robertson's garrison in Chitral Fort could resist attack from Umra Khan and Sher Afzal's forces, and hold out as long as ammunition and supplies lasted; but it appeared certain that his communications were interrupted on all sides, and that no effort should be spared to effect his relief by the end of April, if the investment was not otherwise raised by that date. To effect this, it was essential that a start should be made early in April.

On the 14th March, an ultimatum in the name of the Government of India was sent to Umra Khan through Mr. Udny and the Commissioner of Peshawar, and an attempt was also made to send a similar letter through the British officers in Chitral and Mastuj. The letter recounted the warnings given to him against interfering with Chitral affairs; mentioned his various acts of aggression; directed him to at once quit Chitral territory; and told him that, if by the 1st of April he had not withdrawn, the Government of India would compel him to do so. At the same time a proclamation was issued to the people of Swat and others on the Peshawar frontier, announcing the intentions and object of Government; declaring that Government did not intend to permanently occupy any territory through which the force might pass or to interfere with the independence of the tribes; and promising friendly treatment to all those who did not oppose the march of the troops. Mr. Robertson was also directed to inform Sher Afzal that the Government of India could not deal with him as long as he remained in alliance with Umra Khan, but these instructions never reached Mr. Robertson owing to the investment of Chitral Fort. The Amir was informed of the intentions of the Government of India in a letter, dated the 19th March.

Orders were issued at the same time for the mobilisation of Chitral Relief Force. Major Deane, Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar; Lieutenant Rawlinson; Mr. F. B. Spencer; Mr. Waterfield, Commandant, Peshawar Border Police; and Mr. W. S. Davies were appointed Political Officers with the Force, which was under the orders of Sir Robert Low, who was given supreme political authority, as well as military command. Later on, Mr. C. G. Hastings was appointed Political Officer with Major-General Stedman, on the line of communications. Major Deane at once commenced negotiations with the Swatis and other tribes concerned, and explained the situation to them. The Assistant British Agent at Gilgit reported that all the men of Tangir and Darel had been recalled

to their homes, which possibly indicated some excitement there, and he was authorised to explain to them the purport of the proclamation issued to the Swatis and Bajauris.

Interruption of communications beyond Mastuj continued, and on the 17th March, the Assistant British Agent, Gilgit, telegraphed that there was considerable local excitement, and that he was anxious concerning a small party of Sikhs and Sappers, which had left recently Mastuj for Chitral. He had requested Colonel Kelly to bring up to Gilgit the half battalion of the 32nd Pioneers held in readiness in Chilas; and two hundred men of this regiment with Colonel Kelly arrived at Gilgit on the 20th March, and 200 more on the 22nd.

On the 21st March, news reached Gilgit of a serious affair between Mastuj and Chitral. On the 1st of March, a Subadar started from Mastuj for Chitral with 40 men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles and sixty boxes of ammunition. He was compelled to halt at Buni, as the road was broken, and wrote to Mastuj that he expected to be attacked. On receipt of the Subadar's letter, Lieutenant Moberley, Special Officer with the Kashmir troops at Mastuj, requested Captain C. R. Ross, Commanding the British Agent's escort of 14th Sikhs, to make a night march in support of the Subadar. Captain Ross and Lieutenant H. J. Jones, with 50 men (25 of the 14th Sikhs and 25 of the 4th Kashmir Rifles), started on the evening of the 4th March. Finding the Subadar all right at Buni, and no enemy being visible, Captain Ross's party returned on the 5th to Mastuj. Lieutenants J. S. Fowler and S. S. Edwardes, with 20 Sappers and Miners, who had arrived at Mastuj on the 4th, left the next day, and joined the ammunition escort; and all went on to Reshun on the 6th March. On the following morning, on the party attempting to march, they were attacked by a large force, and after fighting all day, and losing several men in killed and wounded, determined to occupy an adjacent village. Captain Ross, hearing on the 8th that Lieutenants Fowler and Edwardes were in difficulties at Reshun, started with Lieutenant Jones and 60 Sikhs to their assistance. They reached the Karagh defile about noon and were there opposed by a strong body of the enemy; on trying to return, they found the road closed. As they had by this time lost 20 men, they took cover, holding out in caves all the next day. On the 10th, at 2 A.M., they started to cut their way back to Buni, where only Lieutenant Jones and 14 men arrived. Captain Ross, 46 of his men, 8 followers and a Hospital Assistant were killed. Lieutenant Jones and several of the survivors were wounded. In consequence of reports which had reached him Lieutenant Moberley made a reconnaissance from Mastuj towards Buni with 150 Kashmir troops and 53 Punyal levies on the 16th March, and joined Lieutenant Jones at Buni the next day. Hearing that the enemy were preparing to cut the bridge and hold the defile behind him, and recognizing that any further attempt to advance would be useless, Lieutenant Moberley, after consultation with Lieutenant Jones, decided to retire at once to Mastuj. According to Lieutenant Jones' information, there were some of Umra Khan's men in Drasan at this time. The fate of the Subadar's party, of the Sappers with Lieutenant Fowler and of Lieutenant Edwardes remained uncertain up to the end of March. After holding their own until the 15th of

March, the two British officers were treacherously made prisoners during a truce by Muhammad Isa Khan, Sher Afzal's foster-brother, and were handed over to Umra Khan, along with a Jemadar, 8 Muhammadan sepoy, 2 Dogras and a Sikh. The remainder of the party are believed to have been killed. The loss of the enemy in their attack on Captain Ross's party is said to have been heavy.

The intelligence received from Gilgit during March showed that Umra Khan and Sher Afzal had actually waged war upon our troops. The necessity for relieving Mr. Robertson's force in Chitral became more imminent, while there was no longer any reason for giving Umra Khan a period of grace within which he might withdraw. Orders were therefore issued for the advance of the Relief Force at the earliest possible date. General Sir Robert Low with the Divisional Head-quarters and the second and third brigades arrived at Mardan on the 30th of March; and the Malakand Pass was forced on the 3rd of April. It was exceedingly difficult and was stoutly held. The loss on the British side was 11 killed and 47 wounded.

On the following day the 1st Brigade of the Relief Force advanced towards Khar, and dispersed a large hostile gathering. The enemy's loss on the 3rd and 4th is estimated at about 1,000 men. The upper Ranizais, who were defeated on the 3rd April, at once submitted and set about collecting supplies. The Khan of Dir, who had joined the British Camp on the 2nd April, was well received by the people on his return to his country; the forts along the Panjkora river fell into his hands, he captured and disarmed a hundred of Umra Khan's men, and seized the family of Muhammad Shah Khan, Umra Khan's brother. Under orders from the Political Officer, he sent some of his headmen towards Chitral to render assistance to Mr. Robertson, if needed.

Despatch to H. M.'s
S. of S. for India, No.
113 (S.-F.), dated the
11th June 1896.

Everything possible had been done to secure the good-will of the tribes through whose country the Relief Force had to march. Safdar Khan of Nawagai and Muhammad Sharif Khan, the *ex*-Khan of Dir, both showed a friendly disposition. The Khan of Nawagai, on receipt of the Government proclamation, openly declared himself a friend of Government, and his Agents, who had come into British territory, produced a letter from the Khan in which he asked for permanent relations with the British Government. They were given a promise that the Khan should receive an allowance and arms and ammunition conditionally on the latter not being used against the Amir, and on good service. Muhammad Sharif Khan accompanied our troops to the Swat river, and gave valuable and loyal assistance throughout. The Mulla of Manki, the most influential Mulla on or within the Peshawar border, professed at first to intend to behave as a loyal subject, but he was afterwards reported to have advised the Swat jirga to oppose our force entering Swat. After the defeat and submission of the Swatis, the Mulla dismissed all deputations who attended on him with advice that they should not fight. The Mulla of Adda tried in vain to raise the Mohmands, and the Buner Mullas were directly threatened by the headmen of their tribe with punishment if they did not withdraw from opposition. On the whole it may be said that Mulla influence succeeded in organising opposition to the entry of our troops into Swat, but failed to raise a general tribal gathering against us.

Numerous offers of service were received from the States which maintain Imperial Service Troops and from other States as well, besides offers made by Chiefs and private persons to render individual services. The Jaipur and Gwalior transport corps were accepted, and started for the frontier 48 hours after receipt of notice—an excellent performance as all the carts had to be taken to pieces, and eleven trains were required for the conveyance of the corps.

Umra Khan left Kila Darosh towards the end of March for Barwa or Jandol, but 800 of his picked men remained at Kila Darosh and Chitral under his brother, Muhammad Shah Khan, and cousin, Abdul Majid Khan, respectively. Umra Khan took with him Lieutenants Fowler and Edwardes and 10 sepoy who had been taken prisoners in Chitral. He treated the British officers with kindness, but was at the same time writing letters to the surrounding tribes calling on them to join in a *jehad*. The Swat river was forced on the 7th April, in the face of strong opposition from the enemy who crowned the opposite heights, under the command of Umra Khan's brother, Muhammad Shah Khan. The enemy were dispersed and pursued by the cavalry, who inflicted heavy loss. On the 8th April, news was received that Umra Khan had recalled the men he had left in Chitral. Up to this time the tribal gatherings had been more or less local, and but few contingents had come in from long distances, thus showing that the prospects of a general *jehad* were not serious. The Khan of Nawagai, as far as is known, used his influence in preventing the clans from joining Umra Khan. The Bunerwals, who at the instigation of Mullas and in opposition to the advice of their Maliks, had collected in some strength, were sent back by the Swatis who had been given to understand that they would be held responsible for any gatherings allowed to enter their limits. On the 10th April, six of the Sapper sepoy released by Umra Khan arrived in camp at Khar, and brought news of the safety of Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler.

On the 12th of April, a flying bridge was built over the Panjkora river, and the Guides Infantry were sent across to burn a village, the inhabitants of which had fired on the troops. During the night, the bridge was broken by logs floating down the river. Next morning the Guides carried out the punitive operations which had been ordered, but were subsequently attacked by two large bodies of the enemy, and in withdrawing Lieutenant-Colonel Battye, Commanding, was unfortunately killed. The enemy suffered heavily on this occasion, and retired up the valley. The same morning Lieutenant Edwardes arrived in General Low's camp, with a letter from Umra Khan, enquiring what conditions Government intended imposing on him. General Low, in reply, demanded the release of Lieutenant Fowler and the native prisoners safe and sound, the unopposed march of the troops to Chitral, assistance in regard to supplies, a pledge of non-interference in future in Chitral affairs and the acceptance of any further conditions which the Government of India might impose in regard to the maintenance of a road to Chitral. If the Khan fulfilled these conditions and committed no further act of hostility, General Low assured him that he would not be disturbed in the possession of his hereditary country of Jandol, and that Government would no longer be angry with him. The Government of India were unable to approve this answer, as it was not in

accord with instructions issued on the General's advice, with a view to the best means of securing the safety of the prisoners; and it was moreover considered undesirable to guarantee any terms to Umra Khan before full information of his responsibility for events in Chitral had been received. Sir Robert Low was accordingly instructed to cancel these terms if Umra Khan delayed his answer, and to insist on the safe delivery of prisoners as an essential preliminary to any discussion of terms. The General wrote to Umra Khan accordingly on the 15th April. On learning that General Low had cancelled his letter, the Government of India informed him that they were not prepared to offer to Umra Khan any terms except upon his making unconditional surrender, when his life would be guaranteed if all his prisoners were given up safe and sound. Shortly after the despatch of the General's letter of the 15th April, a letter was received from Lieutenant Fowler, saying that Umra Khan was anxious to parley and wished the construction of the main bridge over the Panjkora, and the advance of the troops stopped. A letter was also received from the Khan practically admitting that, if the troops advanced through Jandol, he could not control the tribesmen. The messenger was dismissed without a reply, and on the 16th of April, Lieutenant Fowler and all the other prisoners arrived safely in camp at Sado. The bridge was completed the same day, and the advance was continued on the next. The gathering in Jandol, which at this time was estimated at several thousands, now began to disperse, and with the exception of slight resistance on the 17th near Miankilai, no further opposition was offered to General Low's force. On the 18th of April, the Government of India directed General Low to repeat to Umra Khan that the only terms he was authorised to offer were unconditional surrender, with an honourable asylum in India for Umra Khan himself, his family and a reasonable number of his supporters. Umra Khan, however, fled on the night of the 17th in the direction of the Asmar border.

On the 20th April, news reached General Low that on the 16th Mr. Robertson and his party in the Chitral Fort were very hard pressed, and that the enemy's mines had reached within a few yards of the walls. General Gatacre, who had reached Bar Baraul, was ordered to immediately push on with a small force to the relief of the garrison. The details regarding the situation in Chitral were subsequently shown to be correct; but fortune had already changed, and within a few hours of the arrival of the alarming report, news was received that the Chitral Fort had been relieved, and that Sher Afzal had withdrawn.

The relief had been effected by a force under Colonel Kelly, 32nd Pioneers, who, when the advance of General Low's Force was ordered, had been placed in charge of military operations in the Gilgit district. Colonel Kelly's instructions gave him a free hand, provided he undertook nothing which did not offer reasonable prospect of success. The relief of Chitral from the side of Gilgit was, however, considered improbable.

The utmost good and loyal feeling was shown by the Mirs of Hunza and Nagar. They both volunteered to furnish extra men for service; and when the Assistant British Agent, Gilgit, enquired through the Political Officer

in Hunza if any more men were willing to enlist temporarily as levies in addition to the 90 in Ghizr, the Mir of Hunza, Muhammad Nazim Khan, and Raja Sikandar Khan, the heir of the Khan of Nagar [who owing to his father's age is actually the Ruler of the State] themselves immediately responded by arriving in Gilgit with some 900 men of all ranks, ready to serve Government in any way required. Each man brought a fortnight's supplies, in order to avoid giving trouble. Two hundred were employed as levies, half to Colonel Kelly at Ghizr, and half to guard the Roshan nullah. Two hundred others were sent to Gupis with supplies.

Colonel Kelly with 200 Pioneers and 4 officers left Gilgit for Mastuj on the 23rd March, and reached Gupis on the 25th; 200 more of the Pioneers, with two guns of No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery, started for Ghizr on the 24th. Another 200 Pioneers were called up to Gilgit from the Indus Valley, and the remainder proceeded to Chilas, setting free 150 Kashmir troops to strengthen the posts at Buner and Ramghat bridge. Unfortunately, just at this time, heavy snow fell on the hills, and there was reported to be $4\frac{1}{2}$ feet on the Shandur Pass. This seriously impeded Colonel Kelly's advance, but he crossed the pass with two mountain guns which had in places to be carried by hand. He arrived at Laspur with 200 Pioneers and the guns on the 5th April, and a reconnaissance found the enemy in position about three miles beyond Gasht. He advanced to Gasht on the 8th. There were thirty cases of snow-blindness and twenty-six cases of frost-bite among his men.

On the 9th of April, the little force reached Mastuj after a sharp brush with a well-posted gathering of the enemy, armed with breach-loaders, a few miles out of Gasht. Muhammad Wali, Pakhtun Wali, Muhammad Rafi (who had been appointed Governor of Laspur by Mr. Robertson) and Abdulla Khan of Mastuj are believed to have been with the enemy on this occasion. Colonel Kelly found the garrison at Mastuj all well. On the 12th April, he reconnoitred to Nisagal, where the enemy were found in some strength. The following day he advanced with 640 men, including some from the Mastuj garrison, and, after two hours' fighting, drove out the enemy, inflicting a loss of not less than 50 killed and many wounded. From Nisagal he made for Kila Drasan by a détour through the hills, the regular road having been broken. He found the fort empty and villages deserted. On the 20th of April, the force arrived at Chitral.

The following brief account of affairs in Chitral from the date of Mr. Robertson's arrival there, till the British party were relieved, is taken from a telegram, dated the 20th April, despatched by Mr. Robertson immediately communication was restored :—

“Amir-ul-Mulk was merely temporarily and provisionally recognised as Mehtar of Chitral on the revolt of the Kushwaktis. The agreement between us was that he would be responsible for the Katuris, and I personally would be responsible for the Kushwaktis. Government was pledged to nothing. This point was distinctly and repeatedly insisted upon. On 2nd March, Amir-ul-Mulk practically resigned the Mehtarship; at the same time he made overtures to Umra Khan, promising to induce us to retire towards Mastuj and to attack

us on the road at the Baitaripari just this side of Kari. He has been in custody ever since. He is wanting in intellect, and was merely the tool of two young unscrupulous advisers who were exploiting him. On March 2nd, Shuja-ul-Mulk was made temporary and provisional Mehtar. It was absolutely necessary to have some nominal, though temporary, Mehtar to dissipate any fear in the minds of the Chitralis that we were annexing the country. Again it was most carefully explained to every one that the arrangement was temporary and provisional, and that the Government were not pledged to it in any way. Our position though very difficult was not hopeless until after the disaster of 3rd March. After that unfortunate event all Chitralis outside the fort were compelled from fear for their families to join Sher Afzal. They also believed he was supported by the Amir, and that Umra Khan, the Sipah Salar and Mohmands had joined in a religious war against us, and that our position was desperate, while they knew that, if in time we triumphed, they had still nothing to fear from us in the way of vengeance.

“3rd March 1895, Reconnaissance found Sher Afzal in strength; lost Captain Baird killed, Captain Campbell, C.I.H., wounded; General Baj Singh and Major Bhikam Singh of the Imperial Service Troops killed; 21 non-commissioned officers and sepoy of 4th Kashmir Rifles killed, and 28 wounded. 4th March, Siege commenced. 8th March, Enemy attempted to fire the water tower; fire extinguished. 14th March, Enemy attacked east side of fort, failed. 5th April, Enemy occupied summer-house in garden within 50 yards of gun-tower. 6th April, Enemy advanced sangar up to 40 yards from the main gate in the night. 7th April, Enemy attacked at 5 A.M. and set fire to gun-tower and made an attack on waterway, failed; fire in tower extinguished. British Agent wounded and several men killed and wounded by enemy's riflemen. 8th April, Enemy attempted to fire the gun-tower for the second time. 11th April, Enemy made an attack on all sides of fort, failed. 17th April, Sortie, summer-house taken and enemy's mine blown up: our loss 8 killed and 13 wounded, of which Sikhs had 3 killed and 5 wounded, and 4th Kashmir Rifles had 5 killed and 8 wounded: enemy's loss about 60, of whom 35 were bayonnetted. Summary of casualties: 101 wounded, 40 fatally. Sher Afzal, Abdul Majid Khan of Shina, Abdul Ghani Khan of Shaha, and large following retreated to Drosh last night (18th) abandoning siege of fort. Much sickness from bad food, excessive work and exposure; conduct of troops admirable; Campbell doing well as are all other wounded: Townshend, Gurdon, Harley and Whitchurch all well, in spite of excessive work and unceasing alarms. Our heavy casualty list due to wonderful marksmanship of enemy, to the fort being commanded on all sides, and to enemy's sangars being close up to walls. The discipline, devotion and fortitude displayed by all ranks, under circumstances which required all those qualities, is beyond all praise. Chitral at present denuded of inhabitants who have fled to the hills from fear of reprisals.”

On the news of the relief of the Chitral Fort being confirmed, the Government of India decided that the force under General Gatacre should continue to advance over the Lowarai Pass, though there was no longer any necessity for haste. The troops therefore marched more leisurely and constructed a road over the pass as they proceeded. The pass was crossed on the 26th April, the snow

being then at places two feet deep. On the 28th April, Sher Afzal and 300 men, including two of Sher Afzal's brothers and several men of importance, who had been captured at Patrak by the Khan of Dir, were brought to the British camp. Eighty-one breech-loading rifles were recovered. Sher Afzal's foster-brother, Muhammad Isa, who had been one of the chief leaders in the disturbances, effected his escape.

Throughout May and June, General Low's force continued to hold the country between the Malakand and the Chitral valley. Shots were frequently fired into the various camps, and several cases of attacks on camp-followers and sentries, and of cutting of the telegraph wire occurred. Fines were imposed on certain villages in the Jandol valley, and the general responsibility of the neighbourhood in which crimes were committed was enforced. Early in June, Sir Robert Low interviewed the jirgas of the Shamozaï and lower Salarzaï, and some of their members were sent to the upper Salarzaï, whose full jirga then came in also. All promised to guard their own borders and prevent Mamunds and Chaharmungis from coming across to commit acts of hostility. They gave in writing an acknowledgment of their pledge. On the 10th June, the Khan of Nawagai, with his sons and the Shamozaï, Salarzaï, Mamund and Chaharmung jirgas, all came in, and the two latter also accepted responsibility for their borders. Finding there was a general impression that Government had determined to annex the country, disarm the people and impose revenue, Major Deane explained that there was no such intention; and at the special request of the jirgas, he gave them written assurances that Government had no desire to interfere with their country, but added that, if the tribesmen failed to act up to their responsibilities, they would only have themselves to blame for whatever might befall them. The idea that Government intended annexation had been deliberately circulated with a view to stirring up hostility; there had undoubtedly been extensive intrigues with Nawagai and neighbouring tribes, and a combined outbreak was probably only averted by the action taken with the jirgas and the Nawagai Khan.

Sher Afzal, Kokand Beg, Yadgar Beg, Muhammad Afzal Beg, Danial Beg, Inayat Shah, Raza Khel, whose arrest by the Khan of Dir is noted above, arrived at Rawalpindi on the 6th of May, and were sent to Dharmasala, where they have been interned as prisoners of war. Amir-ul-Mulk, who was soon afterwards deported from Chitral by Mr. Robertson, has also been sent there. The rest of the captives brought in with Sher Afzal were allowed to return to their homes. Sher Afzal submitted a written representation disclaiming all responsibility for the recent occurrences in Chitral.

The state of affairs at Chitral soon after the relief of the garrison was, as might have been expected, unsatisfactory. The people were almost all in sympathy with Sher Afzal, and had acquired an extreme dislike of the British; but on hearing of the capture of Sher Afzal and his deportation to India, they soon began to settle down, and many of the Adamzadas came in to do homage to the young Mehtar, Shuja-ul-Mulk. The advance of British troops to Chitral through Swat quite cowed the people; they seem to have had no more idea of the power of Government to take such a step than Umra Khan had.

For some time after the relief of the fort, the force under Colonel Kelly remained halted at Chitral in an entrenched position on a ridge south of the fort. The Government of India did not consider this an adequate assertion of military supremacy, and General Gatacre was ordered to continue his march on Chitral, with one mountain battery, one British and two native battalions. Subsequently, on a warning from Mr. Robertson that a brigade visiting Chitral would endanger a famine by eating up the spring crops, it was decided only to send the 1st Battalion, East Kent Regiment, and a mountain battery, and that this force should only stay a few days at Chitral, the rest of General Gatacre's brigade being distributed along the road from Ashreth to Darosh. General Gatacre reached Chitral on the 11th May. Sir Robert Low and the Divisional Head-quarters arrived five days later, returning after a very brief stay. The troops belonging to the Gilgit Command were sent back to Mastuj and the Gilgit district, and the Chitral garrison and the escort of the Assistant Political Officer in Chitral were supplied by a wing of the 4th Gurkhas from the Relief Force.

Umra Khan, who had arrived at Asmar about the end of April, was detained there pending orders from the Amir, but was treated with respect and friendship by the Sipah Salar. Some 500 rifles were taken from the men of his party and lodged in the Asmar Fort. Eventually the Sipah Salar sent him under guard to Kabul, where he arrived on the 11th of May. The Amir received him the next day. The British Agent reported that His Highness abused Umra Khan and reminded him of his unfriendly attitude towards His Highness in the past, but added that, as Umra Khan was now His Highness's guest, he would be well treated. Umra Khan's family and servants were at first left in charge of his brother, Muhammad Shah Khan, in the Dangam valley in Asmar; but were subsequently sent to join him at Kabul. The Amir did not inform the Government of India of the arrival of the Khan at his capital. It is reported that a few days after his arrival at Kabul, Umra Khan was placed in jail, and public notice was given that any one communicating with him would be severely punished. Towards the end of June, however, the Amir is said to have explained to him that there had been a special reason for this harsh treatment, and that in future the Khan would be free and would receive an appropriate allowance.

The future policy to be adopted in regard to Chitral had not been decided at the end of the half-year.

Despatches to H. M.'s
S. of S., Nos. 59 and 94
(S.-P.), dated the 8th &
16th May 1899.

Indo-Afghan
frontier demar-
cation.

Throughout January Mr. Udny found it impossible to commence the actual work of demarcation owing to the claims of the Sipah Salar to draw the line in a manner opposed to the Kabul agreement. According to the latter and to the map attached to it, the Afghan frontier from Asmar northwards follows the Chitral river valley about 4 miles from the left bank of the river, as far as Chanduk, when it crosses the valley and river and proceeds along what was believed to be the southern watershed of the Bashgal basin, cutting off the whole of the Bashgal valley from Afghanistan. In our maps the stream which joins the Chitral river has hitherto been shown as the "Arnawai or Bashgal;" and as the two names were believed to be synonymous, a clause was

Despatch to S. of S.,
No. 40 (S.-P.), dated the
17th February 1899.

inserted in the agreement to the effect that the Amir would at no time exercise interference in Chitral, *including the Arnawai or Bashgal valley*. A further clause said:—"The British Government thus agree to His Highness the Amir retaining Asmar and the valley above it as far as Chanduk." The intention is clear; but local enquiry showed that Arnawai and Bashgal are not the same. The former drains into the Kunar not from the west, but from the east. The Sipah Salar not only claimed the valley on the east bank of the Kunar river up to Arnawai, which would have necessitated the evacuation by Umra Khan of his forts at Sao and Nari; but also claimed the entire Bashgal valley on the right bank, maintaining that Sir Mortimer Durand had arranged at Kabul that the Amir was to have the whole of Kafiristan, "to its last house." The Commissioners failed to come to an agreement between themselves, and referred the question to their respective Governments.

The Government of India, on considering Mr. Udny's reports, came to the conclusion that the Amir did perhaps believe that under the Kabul agreement the whole of Kafiristan pertained to Afghanistan, and Mr. Udny was accordingly authorized, rather than break off negotiations altogether, to concede the Afghan claim to the Bashgal valley. On the left bank of the Kunar river, Mr. Udny was permitted, as a very friendly concession to the Amir, to fix the Afghan boundary on the southern rim of the Arnawai valley. Mr. Udny announced these concessions to the Sipah Salar, but as previously noted, the latter after having expressed his readiness to send a strong force with a survey party to the Bashgal valley, suddenly withdrew the offer, declining to escort the survey party beyond the western watershed of the Bashgal valley. It was accordingly impossible to demarcate the boundary *in situ*, and the survey officers were only able to approximately fix the points where the Bashgal and Arnawai watersheds abut on the Kunar river.

Mr. Udny accordingly prepared an agreement declaring the boundary across the Kunar valley to be westward of the river, the eastern watershed of the Bashgal stream; and eastward of the river, the southern watershed of the Arnawai, subject to any slight modifications which might be found, at the time of actual demarcation, necessary to protect the local rights of frontier villages. The Sipah Salar accepted the line proposed, and agreed to meet a British officer from Chitral to demarcate *in situ* when he had completed his arrangements in the country on the Afghan side of the line.

A few days later, the Sipah Salar disclosed his view that the whole of the Mohmands belong to Afghanistan, and that if the Kabul convention map indicated anything else, it must be wrong. At the same time he declined to escort a survey party along the line which he claimed.

Despatch to S. of S.,
No. 84 (S.F.), dated
the 1st May 1898.

Early in March instructions were sent to Mr. Udny to remain in upper Kunar, if possible, in order to watch events in the Chitral direction. The Sipah Salar consented to Mr. Udny staying at Nashagam, while Mr. Robertson's communications with Gilgit were interrupted; and promised to arrange for supplies as long as Mr. Udny thought it necessary to remain. Notwithstanding this, Mr. Udny was of opinion that Umra Khan's advance on Kila Darosh had

Despatch to S. of S.,
No. 111 (S.F.), dated
the 11th June 1898.

been encouraged, if not suggested, by the Amir, and that Sher Afzal's escape from Kabul was part of a plan to entangle Government in difficulties as a counter-movement to the intrusion of a Boundary Commission into the Upper Kunar valley. Mr. Robertson, Major Deane, and many others in a position to judge share this opinion. As bearing on this, it is worthy of notice that Mr. Gurdon, writing from Chitral early in January, mentioned that a man who had just come from Kabul said Sher Afzal intended to escape. The British Agent at Kabul reported too, in February, that the Amir had written a friendly letter to Umra Khan, reminding him that they were of one religion and nationality, and advising him to establish friendly relations with His Highness. The local authorities at Peshawar were hindered in the collection of camels for the expedition by the action of the Amir's agents. The British Agent at Kabul, writing on the 3rd April, stated that certain Afghan troops had received orders from the Amir to go and help Umra Khan, but to pretend that they had gone of their own accord; that he had received news from several informants to the effect that Sher Afzal was advised by the Amir to attack Chitral; that Sher Afzal had written from Chitral to His Highness about his having seized the country and besieged the British Agent; and that His Highness was highly pleased with Sher Afzal and Umra Khan, and had ordered the Sipah Salar to secretly help them with munitions of war and money. A native informant at Peshawar stated that, shortly before the mobilisation of the Chitral Relief Force, the Amir's agent at Peshawar, acting on orders from His Highness, sent 6,000 gold tillas to Sher Afzal, and on the arrest of the latter, over a thousand gold pieces were found on his person. The Amir sent letters to the Mohmand Maliks to the effect that, as the Swatis and Bajauris had not listened to the voice of God or His Prophet, and had made friends with the English, the Mohmands should leave them to reap the fruit of their own deeds. Some Salarzai Maliks visited the Sipah Salar, after tribal consultation, to seek his advice as to working up a general attack against our troops. The Sipah Salar's answer is not known, but he is said to have dismissed the Maliks with presents. The firing into the camps in the Jandol valley is believed to have been the work of Mamunds, subjects of the Amir, and living close to the Sipah Salar's present camp. There were other signs which appeared to indicate that the Amir had encouraged the proceedings of Umra Khan and Sher Afzal.

After the middle of March, the Sipah Salar began to show irritation at the prolonged stay at Nashagam, and told Mr. Udny that, as soon as the demarcation party left that place, he intended to occupy the Bashgal Valley and seize Sao, and that the necessity of supplying the British party in Nashagam interfered with these operations. Mr. Udny was therefore instructed to tell the Sipah Salar that he was ready to postpone the completion of the demarcation work until a more convenient season, and to return to India, provided the Sipah Salar would sign an agreement defining the boundary already agreed to, and guarantee Mr. Udny a safe conduct back to the British frontier. Mr. Udny was specially cautioned to say nothing which would admit the right of Afghan troops to enter Bajaur or Chitral. On the 9th April, Mr. Udny and the Sipah Salar signed a joint agreement embracing the whole boundary from the Hindu Kush to the vicinity of the Nawa Kotal, and on the 11th, Mr. Udny started for India.

The British Mission arrived at Jamrud on the 22nd April. The question of the frontier line through Mohmand country will probably present considerable difficulty. The Sipah Salar strongly maintains that it was the intention of the Kabul agreement to leave the whole Mohmand tribe to Afghanistan, and that the marking on the agreement map is wrong and must be altered. Subsequent action taken by the Amir indicates that His Highness intends supporting the claim of the Sipah Salar.

The final agreement, with maps, recording the line of frontier from Domandi to Chaman, demarcated by Captain McMahon and Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan was confirmed by the Viceroy, and sent to the Amir for ratification on the 29th June. In January, the Amir informed the Government of India that he had nominated Muhammad Umar Khan, Nurzai, of Farrah, as his Commissioner for delimitation of the section of the frontier from Chaman to Koh-i-Malik-i-Siah. The great physical difficulties of demarcation in parts of this tract were explained to the Amir, and in view of the scarcity of water, he was asked to give the British party free access to the Helmand valley. This the Amir declined to agree to, on the ground that the inhabitants there were few, and that it would not be fair to impose on them the cost of both the Commissions. His Highness further wrote that he wished the boundary work to be finished speedily, but that the boundary officers held too many discussions on points of detail; and he requested the Viceroy to repeat the instructions already issued to the British officers "not to do anything which may wound the feelings of the frontier tribesmen of Afghanistan in trivial matters." In reply it was pointed out to His Highness that the great delay in concluding delimitation as far as Chaman had been due to the Afghan agent refusing to agree to the line being drawn in the neighbourhood of the Psha Kotal in accordance with the description distinctly given in the Kabul convention, the agent declaring that the Amir had not furnished him with a copy of the agreement for his guidance. With regard to the demarcation beyond Nushki, the great difficulties of the route were further explained, and the Viceroy repeated his request regarding access to the Helmand valley. It was added that there could be no question of imposing on Afghan subjects the cost of the British Mission, as the British officers would, of course, pay for everything they received in the way of supplies, cost of carriage of water, &c. The Amir replied (26th February) promising to refer to his Commissioner the question whether the British party could be allowed to march along the Helmand valley.

Despatch to H. M.'s
S. of S., No. 42 (S.-F.),
dated the 27th February
1895.

Despatch to H. M.'s
S. of S., No. 53 (S.-F.),
dated the 27th March
1895.

Sardar Muhammad Umar Khan did not meet Captain McMahon at Chaman till the 8th of March. He was accompanied by a large following, including several Durani Maliks of Kandahar. Prior to his meeting Captain McMahon, the local Afghan officials, who had before given much trouble in the settlement of the boundary between the Khwaja Amran and Chaman, had accompanied the Sardar to inspect the line already agreed to in the neighbourhood of the Sharobe spring. They succeeded in persuading the Sardar that the line was unfavourable to Afghanistan; and he wrote to the Amir stating that he did not at all approve of the settlement. A difference of opinion arose at the outset of the demarcation work from Chaman onwards, the Sardar

claiming a line which Captain McMahon found it impossible to accept. Six weeks were spent in settling the first thirty miles of the boundary from Chaman to Ghwaza owing to the attitude of the Afghan Commissioner, who on more than one occasion accepted a line proposed by Captain McMahon, but withdrew his acceptance before demarcation could be carried out, and days were lost in futile communications between the two camps. Captain McMahon was of opinion, from various remarks let fall by his colleague, that the Amir had given directions for the Kabul agreement map to be entirely disregarded.

In June, the Afghans withdrew their post from Reg Thana near Chaman, which is on the British side of the newly-demarcated frontier line. In its place a much larger outpost is to be built at the foot of the Spin Baldak hill: the garrison is to consist of a full regiment of infantry; and an extensive tract of land is to be brought under cultivation for the supply of the troops. The Afghan Delimitation Commissioner informed Captain McMahon that he had addressed the Amir on the subject of the orders prohibiting Afghan traders from railing their goods from New Chaman, and that he thought those orders would now be rescinded.

After the line had been eventually demarcated to Ghwaza, the Afghan Commissioner put forward a claim in regard to the tract between Ghwaza and the Sarlat range, which was not only opposed to our long established rights, but to the line defined in the Kabul agreement and map. He refused to accept a line involving a considerable concession which was offered by Captain McMahon, and work remained at a stand-still, while the two Commissioners referred to their respective Governments. Sardar Muhammad Umar Khan was supported in his attitude by a letter which he had received in April from the Amir, ordering him not to give up a single stone to which Afghanistan had rights, even though it might necessitate two years delay. The Afghans could give no grounds for their claim, but each of the Sardar's advisers was afraid to be behind the others in his demands; and the Afghan Commissioner himself, while admitting that the people who own the tracts now claimed by him have paid revenue to the British Government for the past two years, pleaded his inability to act in opposition to the counsels of the attendant Maliks and headmen. After waiting some time, in the hope that letters from the Amir might induce the Afghan Commissioner to withdraw his claim, Captain McMahon obtained the permission of Government to take back his party to Quetta for the summer, and himself proceeded to Simla early in June. On the 28th June, the Viceroy wrote to the Amir explaining the situation, detailing the line to which he was prepared to agree in order to meet the Amir's interests and to simplify the task of demarcation, and suggesting that demarcation should be resumed in the middle of October. Almost immediately after the withdrawal of the British Mission news had been received that an Afghan sowar and some Khassadars had arrived at Iltaz Karez on the east of the Sarlat range, a spot which for many years has been within British territory. The Amir was informed of this, and a hope was expressed that His Highness's people would be at once ordered to withdraw within the recognised boundary of the Shorawak district.

The joint agreement and map, defining the frontier of Kurram as demarcated by Mr. Donald and Sardar Sherindil Khan, were confirmed by the

Despatch to H. M.'s
S. of S., No. 114, dated
the 11th June 1895.

Viceroy and formally ratified by the Amir during May. The re-opening of the old Kharlachi canal, to which the Sardar on more than one occasion gave his assent, has not been carried out, and much loss has been thereby caused to the Turis. The Governor of Khost had paid no attention to Mr. Donald's letters on the subject, and it was accordingly decided to try and get the canal opened by paying a small annual sum to the Afghan officials or villagers through whose lands the canal passes.

Waziristan.

Despatch to H. M.'s
S. of S., No. 1 (S-F.),
dated the 2nd January
1895.

During the month of January, the troops in Waziristan were constantly on the move in the Mahsud country, and visited even the more inaccessible valleys. They captured large numbers of cattle, sheep and goats, and destroyed numerous towers and village defences belonging to hostile sections. The Waziris, though they refrained from anything like open opposition, continued to harass the British forces by firing at rear-guards and convoys, and cutting the telegraph line. Very bad weather and great cold were experienced, and there were numerous deaths from pneumonia among the native troops and followers.

Despatch to H. M.'s
S. of S., No. 35 (S-F.),
dated the 20th February
1895.

Early in the month, Sir William Lockhart reported that Mullah Powindah had left the country, two out of eighteen hostages had been surrendered, four of the fifteen Government horses and 25 out of the 36 rifles looted at Wano had been returned. He proposed to insist on the surrender of the remaining hostages and stolen property; or, if this were impracticable in any case, to substitute a money payment of a thousand rupees for each hostage and five hundred for each rifle or horse. Besides the above, in view of the opposition offered by the tribe and the delay in carrying out the Government conditions, he proposed to impose the following conditions: a fine of 50 breech-loading rifles, 200 matchlocks and 200 swords or knives; the actual payment of all outstanding fines; the opening up of the Shahur route from Jandola to Wano; the payment of a nominal tribute; the expulsion of Mulla Powindah until these terms had been carried out and demarcation completed. Sir William Lockhart's proposals were generally approved by Government, except the levy of tribute, which was rejected; he was instructed to place on the Mahsuds the obligation of keeping open the Shahur route, and was told that the establishment of a military post on the route would be contrary to the policy of Government. The General was also requested in making any communication to the tribe to avoid language which would commit Government to the payment of tribal allowances to those persons from whom fines and penalties were being demanded.

On the 21st January Sir William Lockhart received the Mahsud jirga at Kundiwan. He announced to them the Government terms, and gave them to the 1st of March within which to comply, informing them that until they did comply the troops would continue to occupy Mahsud country. At the end of January General Lockhart was able to report that considerable progress had been made. All the hostages demanded by Government, except three of minor importance, had been surrendered; Mulla Powindah had fled from Waziristan; almost all the rifles and Government horses and some of the money looted during the attack on Wano had been restored, and the tribesmen

were bringing in arms in compliance with the terms demanded. The tribe showed every indication of complete submission, and it was thought probable that the terms would be complied with before the date fixed.

Preparations for delimitation were now commenced. It had been decided to divide the work into two sections: (1) from Domandi northwards to Khwaja Khedar, and (2) from Charkiaghar southwards. Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan, who was understood to have been entrusted with the duty of superintending (though he was not actually to take part in) the demarcation of the southern portion of the Waziristan boundary, was still at Murgha Chaman, and there was at first some difficulty in getting the Afghan tribal Maliks to attend. However, after correspondence with Sardar Sherindil Khan and Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan, Mr. King was able to begin demarcation on the 28th January, in company with the Suleiman Khel and Kharoti Maliks. On the 12th of February, he had completed the first section as far as Khwaja Khedar; the Afghan representatives, including the Darwesh Khel Maliks of Birmal, expressed themselves perfectly satisfied with the boundary, and Mr. King returned with his escort to Wano.

The Mahsuds had now given up all the rifles looted at Wano except one, and had brought in about half the fine demanded in arms and cash; and Mr. Anderson started up the Tochi at the end of February to carry out the demarcation of the frontier between Charkiaghar and Khwaja Khedar. His escort consisted of a squadron of cavalry, a mountain battery, a company of sappers and six infantry regiments. The march of the force through upper and lower Dawar was unopposed, though a few shots were fired into camp and the telegraph line was occasionally cut. On the 7th March, the first boundary pillar was erected on the highest peak of the Charkiaghar mountain, and on the 19th, the last pillar was built at Khwaja Khedar. It had meantime been decided that it was desirable to link on the delimitation from Khwaja Khedar to Mr. Donald's demarcation at Laram, and Mr. Anderson started again on the 22nd March to take up this section which he completed on the 5th April. Some of the Amir's Sardars and Afghan Maliks accompanied him, and both sides appeared satisfied.

The Amir, on being informed of the completion of the first section by Mr. King in February, wrote to the Viceroy that he wished the delimitation of the remaining section postponed until Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan could reach the spot: but His Highness was told that, as work had been actually commenced, it could not now be delayed; and he was reminded that the demarcation by British officers without the presence or association of the Afghan frontier officers was strictly in accordance with the arrangements suggested by himself.

On the 4th of March, the three remaining Mahsud hostages who had found an asylum with the Darwesh Khel were surrendered and the terms of Government were thus fulfilled. The second brigade and the 1st and 4th Gurkhas from Wano were ordered down to Tank on the 8th of March, leaving at Wano two battalions of native infantry, one mountain battery, a company of sappers and a few cavalry. A wing of the 14th Sikhs was

Despatch to H. M.'s
S. of S., No. 90 (S.-F.),
dated the 9th May 1895.

Despatch to H. M.'s
S. of S., No. 61 (S.-F.),
dated the 20th March
1895.

also left at Barwand as a temporary measure until matters were settled, but they were soon afterwards moved a few miles to Sarwekai on the southern slopes of Kandighar owing to difficulties in regard to water-supply. By the 14th March, all the troops employed in the Waziristan expedition, with the exception of those left in Wano, Barwand, and the Tochi valley, had returned to India. Mr. Bruce resumed political charge in Waziristan on the 24th March, and Sir William Lockhart left Bannu for Abbottabad on the 26th.

On the completion of demarcation, Mr. Anderson and his escort returned to the Tochi valley, where it had been decided the troops should remain pending the settlement of the question of the allowances to be granted to the Dawaris and Darwesh Khels. The whole of the Maliks gave in a written paper expressing their willingness to remain under the British Government and requesting that the Tochi valley should be permanently occupied. Messrs. Bruce and Anderson both expressed their belief that the mass of the tribesmen desired our intervention, and would welcome any system that would afford security and open up their country.

Despatch to H. M.'s
S. of S., No. 100 (S.-F.),
dated the 21st May 1896.

* Despatch to H. M.'s
S. of S., No. 96 (S.-F.),
dated the 15th May 1896.

In a despatch, dated the 15th of May, the Government of India urged on Her Majesty's Government the desirability of extending military protection to the Tochi tribes. It was pointed out that the Maliks and people appeared to be genuinely in favour of the proposal, and that circumstances required a more decided measure of protection than could be afforded by the introduction of militia or levy posts. The knowledge of the country gained during Sir William Lockhart's operations tended to show that a post at or near Wano would protect the Gomal and prevent Waziri raids into Zhob, but would not be well placed for the exercise of an effective control over the Waziris as a whole. The Government of India accordingly proposed to establish a small post at Wano and a stronger one in upper Dawar, and thence to exert a restraining influence over the Waziris generally, and fulfil the obligations extended by our arrangements with Afghanistan. The permanent force proposed was (1) at Wano, 1 squadron of native cavalry, 4 guns of a native mountain battery, and 1 battalion of native infantry; (2) in the Tochi, 1 squadron of native cavalry, 1 mountain battery, and 2 battalions of native infantry; with small connecting posts at Shinkai Kotal, Idak, and Mumammad Khel, which might hereafter be held by local levies.

During May there was a series of murderous attacks on individuals in Waziristan, chiefly in the Tochi. Amongst others, on the 13th of May, Lieutenant Limond, of the 6th Punjab Infantry, was stabbed by a band of four fanatics, while on the march half a mile from Boya, the camp of the British troops in the Tochi, and died the following day. His syce and orderly were also dangerously wounded at the same time. Three of the fanatics were killed on the spot by the rear-guard of the 6th Punjab Infantry. The fourth man was captured alive, tried summarily and executed. Towards the end of May, Mr. Anderson reported that there were symptoms of growing discontent among the Dawaris, especially among the lower orders and Talib-ul-ilms, which he ascribed partly to the delay in fixing their tribal allowances, and partly to religious prejudice at the burning of the bodies of certain Ghazis who had attacked British subjects.

In June the distribution of a sum of ten thousand rupees to the Darwesh Khel and Dawar tribes was sanctioned, as an earnest of an intention to presently grant them service allowances, and the valley was reported to have again quieted down. The Maliks all assured Mr. Anderson that the occupation of the valley was not displeasing to them; all services demanded were freely rendered; where offences had been committed by Dawaris, the offenders had at once been surrendered, and the Maliks had quite recently asked that fines might be imposed in addition to the compensation awarded by jirgas in criminal cases.

The Government of India sanctioned the proposals of Mr. Bruce and the Punjab Government regarding the new scale of allowances to be distributed to the Mahsud Waziris. The financial effect of this is to raise the former annual total of Rs. 51,228 to Rs. 61,548. Temporary arrangements for the grant of service allowances to certain sub-sections among the Tochi tribes were also sanctioned, pending settlement of the general question.

Pamirs.

On the 11th March notes were exchanged between the British and Russian Governments concluding the Pamir agreement. The following is the complete English text:—

“1. The spheres of influence of Great Britain and Russia to the east of Lake Victoria (Zor Koul) shall be divided by a line which, starting from a point on that lake near to its eastern extremity, shall follow the crests of the mountain range running somewhat to the south of the latitude of the lake as far as the Bendersky and Orta Bel Passes.

“From thence the line shall run along the same range while it remains to the south of the latitude of the said lake. On reaching that latitude it shall descend a spur of the range towards Kizil Rabat on the Aksu River, if that locality is found not to be north of the latitude of Lake Victoria, and from thence it shall be prolonged in an easterly direction so as to meet the Chinese frontier.

“If it should be found that Kizil Rabat is situated to the north of the latitude of Lake Victoria, the line of demarcation shall be drawn to the nearest convenient point on the Aksu River south of that latitude, and from thence prolonged as aforesaid.

“2. The line shall be marked out, and its precise configuration shall be settled by a Joint Commission of a purely technical character, with a military escort not exceeding that which is strictly necessary for its proper protection.

“The Commission shall be composed of British and Russian Delegates, with the necessary technical assistance.

“Her Britannic Majesty's Government will arrange with the Amir of Afghanistan as to the manner in which His Highness shall be represented on the Commission.

“3. The Commission shall also be charged to report any facts which can be ascertained on the spot bearing on the situation of the Chinese frontier, with a view to enable the two Governments to come to an agreement with the Chinese Government as to the limits of Chinese territory in the vicinity of the line, in such manner as may be found most convenient.

"4. Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia engage to abstain from exercising any political influence or control, the former to the north, the latter to the south, of the above line of demarcation.

"5. Her Britannic Majesty's Government engage that the territory lying within the British sphere of influence between the Hindu Kush and the line running from the east end of Lake Victoria to the Chinese frontier shall form part of the territory of the Amir of Afghanistan, that it shall not be annexed to Great Britain, and that no military posts or forts shall be established in it.

"The execution of this agreement is contingent upon the evacuation by the Amir of Afghanistan of all the territories now occupied by His Highness on the right bank of the Panjah, and on the evacuation by the Amir of Bokhara of the portion of Darwaz which lies to the south of the Oxus, in regard to which Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia have agreed to use their influence respectively with the two Amirs."

The terms of the agreement were at once explained to the Amir (28th March). He was told that a small Joint Commission would meet during the summer to demarcate the line eastwards from Lake Victoria, and he was asked what arrangements he proposed for carrying on the administration of Eastern Wakhan, and what date would be convenient to him for the withdrawal of his troops and officials south of the river, as Her Majesty's Government wished to suggest the same date to the Russian Government for the evacuation of cis-Oxus Darwaz by Bokhara.

Despatch to H. M.'s
S. of S., No. 68 (S.F.),
dated the 17th April
1895.

The Amir replied expressing his pleasure at the settlement, and requested that he might be furnished with sanads in regard to the boundary with Russia in the north and with Chitral in the south. His Highness stated that he had withdrawn his troops to the south of the Oxus in June 1894; and that he had not since ordered the re-occupation of any territory across the river. With reference to the future administration of Wakhan, the Amir wrote that 400 sowars and 1,000 khassadars would be necessary, and that the cost would be great. He agreed to send an agent to represent him with the British Commission, and requested that cis-Oxus Darwaz might, when evacuated by Bokhara, be handed over to the General Commanding in Badakhshan.

The Amir's letter, which was dated the 11th* April, did not reach the Government of India until early in June. Meanwhile, a representation had been made by the Russian Government to the effect that the Russian officers on the Pamirs had reported the flight to Russian territory of certain inhabitants of the Ghund valley in Shighnan, who alleged that they had been pillaged by Afghan officials. The Russian Government announced that, as the arrival of large numbers of refugees might create embarrassment, the local officers had been authorized to send detachments of troops in the direction of the Ghund valley and of Kala-i-Wamar to ascertain what was actually occurring. The Amir was informed of this representation, and reminded of the great importance of exercising effective control over his subjects in the locality in question, so as to avoid any risk of a collision with the Russian forces on the border.

* See next page.

In reply, the Amir wrote that he believed there was no foundation for the complaint. He repeated the assurance that he had withdrawn all his troops to the south of the Oxus in June last year, and that they now never interfered with trans-Oxus Shighnan. On the other hand, His Highness referred to the high-handed proceedings of Russia in their advance into Shakhdarra last summer, and sent a letter from the General Commanding in Badakhshan, complaining that the Russians were placing posts on their bank of the Oxus opposite to all the posts on the Afghan bank, and that quite recently the Russian detachment at the Kakul ferry (near Rustak) had fired several shots at the post on the Afghan side. There seems some reason to doubt whether the Afghan withdrawal from trans-Oxus was as complete as the Amir appeared to believe. It was reported on the authority of a Kirghiz that during the past spring the Russians sent supplies to Shakhdarra under a Russian officer; that the Tajik Aksakal of the place informed the Afghans at Kila Bar Panjah, and that the Afghan General sent men to make the party withdraw, which they did without resistance.

The British Pamir Commission, under Major-General M. G. Gerard, C.B., as Commissioner, marched on the 21st June from Bandipur. The party included Colonel T. H. Holdich, C.B., C.I.E., and Major R. A. Wahab, R.E., of the Survey Department, with three or four Native Surveyors; Captain E. F. H. McSwiney, Surgeon-Captain A. W. Alcock, a Native Officer, a British Warrant Officer, and a few native subordinates. Two non-commissioned officers and eight men of the 20th Punjab Infantry formed the escort.

Despatch to H. M.'s
S. of S., No. 122 (S.-F.),
dated the 26th June
1895.

The Russian Government announced that their Commission would be composed as follows:—

Major-General Povallo Schweikowski, Principal Commissioner; Counsellor of State Panafidine, Delegate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Colonel of the Staff Galkine; a Geodesist and two topographers.

The escort would consist of sixteen Cossacks under an officer.

The Joint Commission was to meet at Bozai Gumbaz on, or soon after, the 22nd of July, and the Amir was requested to arrange that his representative should arrive at Bozai Gumbaz punctually. Major-General Gerard was instructed that, if before commencing demarcation he had not received information that the evacuation of cis-Oxus Darwaz had been at least commenced, he might invite assurances from the Russian Commissioner on the subject, and should make it clear that the work of the Commission would only become effective when all the stipulations of the agreement had been carried out. The Amir agreed to the return of the British Commission through Afghanistan to Peshawar, if they should be delayed until the routes by Gilgit were closed.

Visit of the
Amir's son to
England.

On the 20th of March, a letter was received from the Amir announcing his decision to depute his second son, Shahzada Nasrulla Khan, to visit England. His Highness said that his health preventing him from going in person, much as he would have wished to, and that Sardar Habibulla Khan could not be spared from his important and pressing duties. The Amir had been informed in February that the Queen would only be in London during the first three weeks in May, and that it was desirable, if His Highness intended visiting

Despatches to H. M.'s
S. of S.—
No. 10 (S.-F.), dated
16th Jan. 1895.
" 18 " 23rd " "
" 32 " 13th Feb. "
" 39 " 27th " "
" 67 " 17th April "
" 109 " 4th June "
" 127 " 26th " "

England, that he should reach India before the 10th of April; but in spite of this the Shahzada did not arrive at Peshawar until the 22nd of April. Under the circumstances it was impossible for the young Prince to visit the Viceroy at Simla; everything was done to expedite his journey to and departure from Bombay; and on the 29th April, he left for Europe on the Royal Indian Marine steamer *Olive*. The Sardar's suite of 79 persons did not include any officials of high rank or importance; Mr. Martin, the Amir's business agent in India, attended His Highness throughout the tour, and Miss Hamilton, the lady doctor in the Amir's service, was also of the party. Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Talbot, C.I.E., was sent in charge on the part of the Government of India, with Surgeon-Major Leahy in medical charge; and Captain Pollen, Aide-de-Camp to the Viceroy, accompanied the party to England as a personal compliment on the part of His Excellency. The Shahzada arrived in England on the 24th of May, travelling by sea direct, the Brindisi route having been abandoned, under orders from Her Majesty's Government. Her Majesty the Queen received him at Windsor on the 27th of May; and he was still in England at the end of the half-year. A letter was received from the Amir towards the end of May, saying that the Shahzada would return by Karachi and Kandahar. The heat of the journey through India was the reason ascribed for adopting this route.

Miscellaneous
Afghan and
Frontier
matters.

The British Agent at Kabul reports that the Amir's principal wife, the mother of Sardar Muhammad Umar Jan, has told His Highness that she recognizes Sardar Habibulla Khan as the heir to the Afghan throne, and has promised to loyally accept him as Amir on His Highness's demise. The Amir is reported to have announced, on the 6th June, to his principal courtiers that he had appointed Sardar Habibulla Khan his heir, and that he expected the Afghan nation to receive him as their ruler after his own death.

The two 7-inch breech-loading rifled guns of 82 cwt. each, presented to the Amir in 1894, reached Kandahar in February 1895. They lay for a long time at Chaman, as the Afghan officials sent to take delivery of them were entirely unprovided with any material for hauling them over bad roads. In April, Sir Salter Pyne represented that the Amir was expecting to be presented with fourteen or sixteen more of such guns. The Viceroy then wrote to the Amir that there was no record of any promise that more guns should be presented, but that if His Highness desired it, the Government of India were willing to present six more of the same description as the last, with 200 rounds of ammunition for each. The Amir replied that Sir Mortimer Durand certainly promised him fourteen; but that as it had been decided to send him six in addition to the two already furnished, they should be sent to Quetta, as he intended distributing them between Herat, the new fort at Deh Dadi in Balkh, and the new fort which is being built at Andarab, or Talikan close to Badakhshan. His Highness asked that the amount of ammunition should be increased, and it was decided to send 500 rounds for each gun.

Lieutenant-Colonel Muhammad Akram Khan, the new British Agent at Kabul, has not found more favour in the eyes of the Amir than his predecessors.

On more than one occasion the Amir has refused to grant him an interview, and His Highness's general demeanour towards him is haughty. The Agency is closely watched by Kotwali sepoy; Lieutenant-Colonel Muhammad Akram Khan wrote to His Highness about the annoyance thus caused, saying it was "as if Kabul were a jail in which the Agency establishment were prisoners;" the Amir replied that the men were intended as a guard for the protection of the Agency; that were they withdrawn there would be a risk of the recurrence of the Cavagnari incident: but that he was quite willing to withdraw the men if the Agent would in writing accept responsibility for what might happen.

Despatch to H. M.'s
S. of S., No. 98 (S.-F.),
dated the 21st May 1898.

The question of the coercion of the Saifali section of the Kabul Khel Waziris came under the consideration of Government. A sum of Rs. 8,054 in fines had accumulated against them, and they were still continuing to offend. In January, alarmed at the progress of affairs in Waziristan, their jirga came in to Thal and paid up Rs. 2,000 as an instalment. The balance, however, remained unpaid, and in March the Lieutenant-Governor recommended that a punitive expedition should be sent against them. The Government of India considered an expedition at that juncture inexpedient and requested that the matter should for the time be dropped.

Despatch to H. M.'s
S. of S., No. 99 (S.-F.),
dated the 21st May 1898.

The Punjab Government also proposed to send a punitive expedition against the Para Chamkanis for their misdeeds in Kurram. The Government of India declined to agree, holding that the provocation given was slight in comparison with the extent of the operations proposed, while the chance of arousing opposition among the neighbouring tribes appeared considerable. During the June, complete jirgas of the whole Para Chamkani tribe came in to the Political Officer in Kurram, and pledged themselves to commit no further offences, and to settle all outstanding cases.

A series of bloodthirsty outrages was perpetrated near Fort Sandeman by a small gang of men believed to belong to the Chuharkhel Bargha Sherani tribe. On the 6th of June, Lieutenant Home, R. E., Military Works Department, was attacked and killed, with a servant, near Dahna Sir. The murderers then proceeded to Lieutenant Home's camp at Manikhwah, where they burnt ten tents and everything they could destroy, and killed three sowars of the Zhob Levy Corps. The gang then proceeded towards Dahna Sir, and met a small party of the Zhob Levy Corps, with whom they first entered into friendly conversation and then treacherously fired, killing one Havildar and two sepoy. They seem to have subsequently attacked any one coming in their way, and killed four coolies, two munshis, a shop-keeper and a little girl two years old, besides wounding five other persons. A pursuit party was sent out, but was unable to capture any of the band, who have for the present made good their escape.

Some excitement was displayed by the Afridis of the Khyber and Orakzais in connection with the occupation of Swat by the Chitral Relief Force. Mullas spread reports that the British had seized and burnt the shrine of the famous Akhund of Swat, and some of the wilder spirits discussed the question of rising in a general "ghaza." The efforts of the Mullas failed and no trouble occurred in the Khyber or on the Samana. A few shots were fired

into Jamrud Fort on the night of the 23rd May, when a sowar of the 13th Bengal Lancers was killed and another wounded. This was ascertained to be the work of one section of the Kuki Khels who aimed at getting the other section into trouble.

During the half-year, the British News-writer at Kandahar has brought to notice several instances of harsh treatment of Afghans employed in Indian regiments, on their returning to their homes on leave. Deserters from Indian regiments, on the other hand, are treated with consideration.

A desperate outlaw, named Faiz Muhammad, who had since September 1894 killed nine persons, wounded four, and stolen much property in the Pishin district, was killed at the end of April. Faiz Muhammad was accustomed to take refuge in Afghan territory, where he was unmolested and even, it is said, encouraged and assisted by the inhabitants. On the 25th of April, Faiz Muhammad entered the Pishin district, shot an orderly and two private servants of Captain Bruce, wounded a camel sowar, killed one railway gangman and wounded another, stole a horse and rode back into Afghan territory. A party of levy sowars under Colonel Gaisford, Political Agent in Quetta and Pishin, went in pursuit. They eventually came upon him, fourteen miles across the Afghan frontier in an Afghan encampment. Several shots were fired by Faiz Muhammad at Colonel Gaisford's party who returned the fire, and mortally wounded him. The body was brought to Pishin and burnt. The Viceroy wrote to the Amir on the 10th June, expressing regret at the violation of the Afghan frontier by Colonel Gaisford.

Two native officers of the 24th Baluchistan Regiment, who had gone to Kandahar on leave, were arrested and placed in custody by the Kandahar officials. It is said that no charge has been brought against them, and that the Governor ordered their arrest in retaliation for the violation of the frontier by the pursuit party who killed Faiz Muhammad. They were subsequently released.

A further emancipation of slaves in Chinese Turkistan has been effected—8 more have been released in Sarikul, 833 in Karghallik and 7 in Yarkand. The Chinese authorities have met the entire expenses of liberating 617 of these slaves and half the cost for the release of the remainder.

The question of the appointment of an Afghan Agent at Meshed again came under consideration during the half-year. Mirza Yusuf Khan, the former Agent, having been dismissed by the Amir, His Highness appointed Abdulla Khan in his stead, offering to accept a Persian Agent at Herat if the Persians would accept his representative at Meshed. This was regarded as opposed to the Amir's engagement to have no political relations with any Foreign Power except through the British Government, and steps were taken in view to preventing the recognition of an Afghan Agent in Khorassan. The Persian Government behaved in a half-hearted manner over the matter: they declined at first to recognize Abdulla Khan, but made no serious attempt to remove him, and it seems probable that he will be allowed to remain, and gradually receive, the same unofficial recognition as his predecessor did.

The Government of India and the Kashmir Darbar agreed to the payment of four thousand rupees a year each to the Hunza and Nagar States as a subsidy; the cost to be equally divided between Kashmir and the British Government. The relations of those States with the Gilgit Agency have never been so thoroughly satisfactory as at present.

HALF-YEAR WHICH ENDED ON THE 31ST DECEMBER 1895.

Chitral.

ON the 18th of April, the Viceroy had telegraphed to the Secretary of State the opinion of the Government of India, that the military occupation of Chitral, supported by a road from the Peshawar border, was a matter of first importance; if a road were not opened from Peshawar, the Government of India were not unanimous in their conclusion in regard to the expediency of occupying Chitral, but they were unanimous in asking permission to enter into negotiations with the tribes with the view to obtaining their consent to the opening up of the road when opportunity should arise in connection with Sir Robert Low's advance, and in thinking it would be a serious mistake to lose the opportunity. Permission to enter into negotiations with the tribes was given by the Secretary of State, conditionally on Government not being committed to a policy of occupation; and the Government of India were requested to express their opinion whether the importance of Chitral was such as to render it desirable, in the face of the financial, political and military difficulties involved, to maintain the main objects of our past policy in Chitral, and whether any method of securing these objects could be secured less costly and less hazardous than that lately in force. In a despatch, dated the 8th of May 1895, reviewing the whole situation, the Government of India recommended that Chitral should be held by a garrison of British Indian troops, and direct communication established between it and Peshawar. Lord Rosebery's Government declined to adopt these views, and on the 13th June announced that they had decided that no military force or European Agent should be kept at Chitral, that Chitral should not be fortified, and that no road should be made between it and Peshawar; all positions beyond the frontier in our occupation were to be evacuated as speedily as circumstances allowed, and the Government of India were asked to telegraph the arrangements as regards the Chitral State which under these conditions they would recommend for the future. Proposals on this basis were duly made to Her Majesty's Government, and these were under consideration at the time when the Marquess of Salisbury's Ministry succeeded that of the Earl of Rosebery.

Despatch to S. of S., No. 172 (S.-F.), dated the 27th August 1895.

* Despatch to S. of S., No. 89 (S.-F.), dated the 8th May 1895.

The Chitral Relief Force continued throughout July to hold the country between Malakand and the Chitral valley, pending decision as to the future policy of Government. Sir Robert Low was authorized on the 10th July to make public, for the convenience of those concerned, that as Her Majesty's Government required time to decide on the details of the permanent settlement of Chitral, and the present season was unfavourable for the movement of large bodies of troops, the force occupying Chitral and the Dir road would not be withdrawn before September at all events. He was instructed to explain the continued occupation of the country in the manner least likely to arouse the suspicion of the tribesmen, and to make no disclosure which could be construed as implying that Her Majesty's Government were committed either to approving or disapproving the policy of complete withdrawal from Chitral.

Towards the end of July, the Panjkora route was reported practicable throughout, and was thereafter used as the main line of communication for transport of supplies. The Barawal valley between Janbatai and Chutiatur was evacuated and arrangements made for withdrawing the troops from Jandol to the east side of the Panjkora river.

In spite of the stringent measures taken to enforce local responsibility a number of cases of attacks on individuals, firing into camps, and cutting the telegraph line continued to be reported. Hardly a night passed without the latter offences being committed, the offenders being rarely captured. Major Deane reported that these offences were the work of Asmaris and men from Afghan territory, and that emissaries from the Amir were present in Swat inciting the tribesmen to acts of hostility.

During July, the Amir deported to Peshawar Mir Afzal Khan, Mir Hasan Khan and Zain-ulla Khan, brothers of Umra Khan; his three nephews, Sher Zaman Khan, Bahramand Khan and Subhan-ud-din Khan; his two cousins, Abdul Majid Khan and Abdul Ghani Khan, together with their families and servants; in all 114 persons. In a letter to the Commissioner, Peshawar, His Highness wrote that they had asked to be allowed to return to Bajaur, but that thinking this would create disturbances there, he had refused to agree and sent them to Peshawar. The whole party was sent on to the Officer Commanding the Chitral Relief Force in view to their settling down in Jandol, and Sir Robert Low was informed that the Government of India did not wish to impose these men, or any of them, on the Jandol valley, but that when the time came for withdrawing our troops, he should make over the administration to whoever was accepted as ruler, and should warn the Khan of Dir against trying to extend his authority over Jandol. The Viceroy thanked the Amir for the consideration shown by His Highness in not permitting the refugees to proceed direct to Bajaur, and at the same time informed him that he did not object to their return, that the whole party were being allowed to go back to their homes, and that similar permission would be given to Muhammad Shah Khan, if the Amir thought fit to send him to Peshawar: Umra Khan, however, had waged war against States friendly to, and in alliance with, the British Government, and it was inexpedient that he should return to Jandol; but if His Highness sent him to India, he would still receive the honourable asylum which was promised to him by Sir Robert Low in April last.

The Amir replied to the Viceroy's letter that he would send Muhammad Shah Khan to Peshawar, but that Umra Khan himself had not expressed a wish to go to India, and His Highness did not consider it necessary to order him to do so.

The decision of Her Majesty's Government to retain a garrison in Chitral territory and to open up the road from Chitral to the Peshawar border, was received in India on the 10th August. The garrison consists of two battalions of Native Infantry, with two guns of a Mountain Battery, two Maxim guns and a company of Sappers. Chitral itself is garrisoned by three companies of infantry with one of the Maxim guns; one company of infantry is posted

at Ghairat; and the remainder at Kila Darosh. The 32nd Pioneers were ordered to be withdrawn from Gilgit as soon as practicable, 200 men remaining at Gilgit as escort to the British Agent. It was decided that the Malakand should be held by a brigade and the crossing of the Swat river at Chakdarra by a regiment of Bengal Infantry and one squadron of Guides Cavalry, the road between the British frontier and Chakdarra and between the Swat river and Chitral territory to be held by levies.

Sir Robert Low was at once authorised to arrange with the Ranizais, Swatis, and the Khan of Dir, the terms on which they would keep open and guard the road, and for keeping the forces proposed on the Malakand and at Chakdarra without departing from the terms of the Proclamation issued when the operations for the relief of Chitral were initiated.

Sir George Robertson left Simla for Chitral on the 17th August, with instructions to formally instal Shuja-ul-Mulk as Mehtar in the name of the Maharaja of Kashmir as his suzerain, and with the authority and approval of the Government of India, as was done in 1892 in the case of the Chiefs of Hunza and Nagar. The Installation Darbar was held on the 2nd of September, and Sir George Robertson publicly enunciated the future policy of Government in regard to Chitral. The Mehtar's direct control will not extend beyond the Katur country as hitherto understood. The British Agent at Gilgit will, on behalf of the Kashmir State, appoint and pay the Governors and headmen of the Khushwakt country, and will maintain direct relations with them, except that as a matter of convenience the Governor of the Mastuj valley will, for the present, correspond with the Political Officer in Chitral. The internal administration of Chitral will be left in the hands of the Mehtar and of his advisers, but as Shuja-ul-Mulk is a mere boy, the Government of India leave at Chitral an experienced Political Officer, upon whom the Mehtar may always call for advice and assistance. Three persons, Raja Bahadur Khan, the Governor of Mastuj, Wazir Inayat Khan and Aksakal Fateh Ali Shah will be appointed to give the Mehtar help, instruction and advice in the management of his State and in the laws and customs of the people. Every Chitrali of position throughout the country west of the Shandur Pass attended the Darbar. A general pardon was proclaimed for all political offences committed during the recent disturbances.

Shuja-ul-Mulk will receive a subsidy of Rs. 1,000 a month; and, in consideration of the loss of revenue arising from the separation of the Khushwakt country, an additional sum of Rs. 8,000 a year will be allotted to him. Monthly stipends will be paid to the Governors of Mastuj, Ghizr, the Koh district and Yasin, and to the three advisers of the Mehtar. The postal line between Chitral and Gilgit will be maintained, and the bridges and the more difficult parts of the road between Chitral and Mastuj will be improved.

In announcing these arrangements, Sir George Robertson made it plain to all concerned that the Mehtar would be supported in dealing with crimes, such as murder and outrage, which constitute a public scandal, and that the Government of India would not countenance in a State under their

protection an administration which permitted murderous outrages, such as have been frequent in Chitral and led directly to the late disturbances. It was also announced that traffic in slaves would not be allowed in future.

The Kashmir Darbar expressed their cordial concurrence in this settlement.

About the middle of August the relations of Umra Khan, who had arrived in India from Kabul in July, were sent to Jandol by Sir Robert Low and settled down on the lands respectively assigned to them; Saiyid Ahmad at Barwa and Abdul Majid at Munda. Miskini was reserved for Muhammad Shah Khan's family.

The evacuation of the Jandol valley was completed on the 14th August without a shot being fired. The Reserve Brigade was broken up on the 17th August, and measures were taken to bring the several corps warned to form the Chitral garrison and Swat Brigades as near as possible to their ultimate destination, and to facilitate the withdrawal of the remainder of the force.

A reconnaissance along the left bank of the Chitral river from Mirkandi to the Afghan frontier at Arnawai was satisfactorily carried out during the month. Surveys of the passes leading from the Salarzai and Mamund countries into the Kunar valley were also carried out by trained men of the Intelligence Branch.

Khokand Beg, Inayatulla Shah, Muhammad Afzal Beg, and Yadgar Beg, four of the Chitralis interned at Dharmasala, escaped on the night of the 11th September. It had been decided to institute a formal enquiry into the alleged complicity of the two last named in the murder of sepoys and others at Koragh and Kalak, and the treachery practised against Lieutenants Fowler and Edwardes. Khokand Beg and Inayatulla Shah were recaptured before they crossed the frontier, and Muhammad Afzal Beg was seized at Chitral by servants of the Mehtar early in December and handed over to the British officers. Unfortunately he again effected his escape a few days later, and, like Yadgar Beg, is still at large.

The withdrawal of the Chitral Relief Force commenced on the 20th September, and by the end of the month the last of the returning troops had re-crossed the frontier. On the recommendation of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, who personally visited the Malakand Pass and the crossing of the Swat river, it was proposed to Her Majesty's Government to construct a strong post on the right bank of the river at Chakdarra, and to hold it with 200 Native Infantry and 25 Sabres, instead of with a regiment of Native Infantry and a squadron of cavalry, as originally proposed. The post will be armed with two Maxim guns and one smooth-bore, 9-pounder. It was further proposed that at the Malakand Pass a strong post should be built for 200 Native Infantry; and that the rest of the force there should be encamped about 1,500 yards north of the post, to form a movable column ready for immediate action if required. These proposals were approved. Brigadier-General Waterfield assumed command of the Malakand Brigade on the 27th September. Major Deane remained on special duty in connection with the arrangements for keeping open the road.

The tribes certainly do not regard the occupation of the Malakand as an infringement of the proclamation issued on the despatch of the Chitral Relief Force. On the contrary, the Ranizais and Swatis and others from the Peshawar border to the Panjkora petitioned for the retention of troops in their country to protect them and help them in protecting the road, and to maintain internal peace. The Adinzais, who occupy the Uch valley, were so earnest that they asked to be allowed to represent their case at Simla, if the local officers were unable to grant their request. All were informed in reply that the Government Proclamation announced that there was no intention of interfering with their independence, and that Government had no desire to depart from that policy, though for a time at all events troops would be left to help the Swatis and Ranizais in maintaining the road through their country.

The following arrangements were concluded for the maintenance of the road. The Khan of Dir signed an agreement promising to keep open and repair the road in his territory, to make postal arrangements, to protect the telegraph line when put up, and to rent sites for the accommodation of troops on Laram or Dosha Khel, should Government wish this at any time. The Khan receives, in addition to a present of 25,000 rupees for service and expenditure on our behalf during the past six months, 400 Snider rifles with some ammunition, and an annual allowance of 10,000 rupees, and a like sum in commutation of his rights to collect tolls throughout his country. A sum of 60,000 rupees a year was sanctioned for levies in Dir, including allowances to the tribes. There will be eight* posts held by 310 men. A sum of 28,000 rupees was sanctioned for the construction of the posts, which was speedily carried out by

* Kolandi.
Dir.
Darora.
Warai.

Rabat.
Sado.
Serai
Chakdarra.

tribal labour. A separate sum of 1,500 rupees a month was allowed for postal arrangements from Chakdarra to Chitral. A levy scheme for Swat and Ranizai, at an annual cost of 32,585 rupees, was also approved. The allowances enjoyed in the past by the Khans of Swat were raised from 7,700 to 11,500 rupees a year; and a further annual sum of 10,000 rupees was sanctioned for distribution among them in commutation of their rights to levy tolls. Agreements were signed by the Khans accepting terms similar to those agreed to by the Khan of Dir.

On the 10th of September, Major Deane interviewed Muhammad Shah Khan at Peshawar where he had arrived from Kabul on the 24th of August. The Khan represented that he was not responsible for the share he had taken in the recent disturbances, as he was in the hands of Umra Khan, while the latter merely carried out the Amir's orders. He refused at first to go to Bajaur and live at Miskini, which had been allotted to his family in the distribution in August, but subsequently became more reasonable and left Malakand for Miskini on the 14th September. There is a good deal of friction between parties in Jandol, and Major Deane finds it difficult to avoid being drawn into interference in the affairs of that State. Muhammad Shah Khan has admitted to Major Deane that he is in correspondence with the Amir and the Sipah Salar.

Colonel H. D. Hutchinson assumed command of the troops in Chitral on the 3rd of September. Sites were selected for the barracks at Chitral and Darosh, and for an entrenched post at Ghairat. At the end of the year the buildings were approaching completion. The suspension bridge over the river at Chitral, built by Major Aylmer, was opened to traffic on the 14th September.

The Amir wrote to the Viceroy on the 4th October, stating that Umra Khan had asked permission to proceed to Mecca with his family to perform the pilgrimage and reside there. His Highness said :—

“As Umra Khan has made this request, I have accordingly to ask Your Excellency, if you consider it expedient, to grant him the permission he asks for, and if the affairs of Bajaur have been duly settled, and if his going will cause no inconvenience to Government that Your Excellency will kindly write to me, so that I may allow him to go to Karachi by Kandahar, and he may make his mind easy about undertaking the journey to Mecca. If Your Excellency does not consider it expedient that he should proceed by Karachi, he will be allowed to go through Persia by Bunder Abbas; or if Your Excellency considers that it will not be convenient to Government that Umra Khan should go at all, he will be told that he is not to leave Kabul for any place.”

The Viceroy replied (23rd October) to the Amir thanking him for his friendly letter, and saying that there was no objection to Umra Khan and his family travelling to Mecca from Kandahar by way of Karachi. His Highness was asked to give notice of the date on which Umra Khan would reach the frontier, in order that arrangements might be made to facilitate his journey through India. No reply had been received to this communication up to the end of the year.

Affairs in Swat have progressed satisfactorily. The Khans of Thana and Alladand are most friendly, and ready to receive the visits of British officers, who are able to move about under tribal escort with complete safety in this part of Swat. The Sam Ranizais have built their towers for the protection of the road up the Malakand; good care is being taken of the bridge over the Panj-kora; and a constant stream of traders and pack animals passing along the route proves that the new order of things is fully appreciated. The levies have asked to be supplied with uniform, and arrangements are being made to provide them with distinctive lungis (head-piece) and belts. Trade along the route is largely increasing; the freedom from taxation being a great relief to traders.

The position is not, however, quite so promising in Dir, the weakness of character of the Khan making the carrying out of the recent settlement a matter of difficulty. None of the people have any confidence in the Khan, and all are desirous that the arrangements should be taken into our own hands. The Afghan Sipah Salar soon began working on the Khan; though up to the present his communications have been confined to verbal messages by confidential agents congratulating the Khan on recovering his State, &c.

On the 13th of November the Khan of Nawagai, with a large following, came in to Malakand to see Major Deane. He evinced great anxiety to get the allowance of Rs. 6,000 a year sanctioned for him raised to the same sum as

that granted to the Khan of Dir. He expressed his readiness to do any service required, and to open up a road through his country; but he appeared to be much afraid of the Amir and Sipah Salar, who, he said, has been recently instigating the Halimzai Mohmands to encroach on his borders.

Unfriendly attitude of the Amir. During the half-year, convincing proof was received by the Government of India of the unfriendly attitude adopted towards the British Government in connection with the advance of the Chitral Relief Force. Early in July, a firman addressed by the Amir to Mulla Najm-ud-din, known as the Mulla of Adda, a notorious firebrand in Bajaur, and a recognised Agent of His Highness in that country, fell into the hands of the Commissioner of the Peshawar Division. The firman was a direct encouragement to the Mulla to raise the people of Swat and Bajaur against the British troops. It was well known that the Amir had been in frequent correspondence with Mulla Najm-ud-din, and the firman not only bore the Amir's seal, but also the seal of Mirza Abdul Kasim and the signature of Mirza Bori, both of whom are in the Amir's employ at Kabul.

Secret despatch No. 194 (Frontier), dated the 9th October 1895.

While the genuineness of the firman was under enquiry, Major Deane obtained seventeen letters addressed by the Amir to Umra Khan of Jandol and Muhammad Said, Sahibzada, which had been obtained from the house of the latter, the Amir's confidential agent with Umra Khan. The majority of the letters, the genuineness of which cannot be questioned, were of an unimportant nature; one, however, proved that in November 1894 friendly relations existed between the Amir and Umra Khan, and another, dated the 25th January 1895, showed that Muhammad Said had written to His Highness informing him that Umra Khan, on pretence of raising a *jehad* against the Kafirs, had gone to Chitral in order to take that country, and that the Amir had replied that he fully understood, and that whatever the Sahibzada had to say should be communicated to the Sipah Salar.

A far more important document, as proving His Highness's attitude, was shortly afterwards obtained by Major Deane. This was a letter, dated the 23rd of May 1895, from the Amir to Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan, which Major Deane obtained from Asmar. His Highness writes:—

“If you are sure that they (the tribes) are in reality prepared for *jehad*, nothing can be better, and you (should) then encourage them (*lit.*, give them comfort and assurance) according to our previous firman which was written to you. As regards Mulla Najm-ud-din, you should act upon the former instructions, but you should be careful in dealing with the people for they are troublesome and unreliable, and the business is a delicate one. You should be careful, and you must deal only and directly with Mulla Najm-ud-din, who is a light of Islam.”

The Government of India were forced to the conclusion that the whole of the correspondence was undoubtedly genuine, but they deprecated dealing with the matter with a high hand. In addressing Her Majesty's Government on the subject, they expressed their belief that the Amir had thrown in his lot with us

against Russia, and might be counted upon as our firm ally against that Power ; but they recognized that they must equally count upon his opposition, when treating with, or engaged in military operations against, Muhammadan tribes beyond our northern frontier. They accordingly proposed not to take serious notice of the Amir's action, adding, however, that it might be possible to let him know that letters of his have fallen into our hands during the recent operations in Bajaur, to indicate their tenor and to point out that it is difficult to reconcile them with his friendly professions towards us ; but unless this suggestion commended itself to Her Majesty's Government, they preferred to postpone action for the present.

Her Majesty's Government replied that no useful purpose would be served at the present moment by acquainting the Amir with the fact that Government held proofs of his covert opposition to the policy which Her Majesty's Government have pursued in Swat, Bajaur, and Chitral, and, moreover, the present would be an inopportune moment to formulate such a charge, the Shahzada having just returned from England, and taken to the Amir letters and marks of the Queen-Empress's good-will and favour. But if reliable information should be received that the Amir is endeavouring to raise fresh opposition to the retention of the posts occupied by our troops, or to the measures which we have adopted or may adopt hereafter across the frontier in connection with Chitral affairs, it might then be desirable to address to him a remonstrance. In that case, it might be intimated to him that Her Majesty's Government are in possession of letters that are incompatible with the engagements into which His Highness had entered, and that they will regard seriously any further interference in the territories lying beyond the frontier of His Highness's dominions.

The Pamirs.

The British Pamir Mission under Major-General Gerard arrived at Gilgit on the 4th, and at Lake Victoria on the 22nd of July. The crossing of the Darkot Pass (15,000 feet) occupied fourteen hours, including five hours over glaciers covered with freshly-fallen snow. The Mission was met at Sarhad by some Afghan officials, who accompanied the camp, and gave every assistance. On the 20th July, General Gerard was met at Bozai Gumbaz by Captain Kukatinsky and six Cossacks.

Despatch to
H. M.'s S. of S.,
No. 164 (S.-F.),
dated the 18th
August 1895.

Ghulam Mohi-ud-din Khan and Mufti Ashur Muhammad Khan, the Afghan representatives with the Pamir Delimitation Commission, joined the Mission Camp at Lake Victoria on the 27th July. They were unprovided with any credentials or instructions from the Amir ; but General Gerard succeeded in inducing the Russian Commissioner to agree to provisionally recognize the Afghan representatives, conditionally on formal credentials being afterwards forthcoming. It was decided that they should attend as witnesses at meetings of the Commission (discussions at which were, however, to be conducted in French) and should sign protocols as accepting the views of the Joint Commissioners.

Writing on the 21st July, the Amir asked for a more detailed statement and map to be supplied for his information before demarcation was commenced. In reply a copy of the Blue Book containing the agreement of March 1895 and a

tracing of part of the Pamir map, showing the tract of territory in question, were sent to His Highness ; and it was explained to him that it was not possible to give any more definite information until demarcation was completed. The Amir was at the same time informed of the provisional arrangement come to between the two Commissioners, and was urged to send to his Agent, with the least possible delay, credentials showing that he was authorized to act in conjunction with General Gerard. In a letter, dated the 17th August, the Amir said that he had already given his representatives authority in regard to the evacuation of trans-Oxus territory and the occupation of cis-Oxus Darwaz, but that as regards the territory now being demarcated east of Lake Victoria, he could not give such authority until he had full information. It was again explained to the Amir that it was only necessary that his Agent should be furnished with a letter or sanad setting forth that he was duly appointed to attend the Commission, and it was added that unless some written authority could be shown to the Russian Commissioner, it was possible that he might consider himself unable to report to his Government that the work of the Commission had been carried out in accordance with the terms of the agreement made by the British and Russian Governments. The Amir, however, maintained his former arguments, and no credentials were sent to his representatives.

Meanwhile the work of delimitation had progressed. On the 28th July, the first pillar was erected at the eastern end of Lake Victoria ; and before the middle of August the line had been demarcated as far as the Orta Bel Pass. The Commissioners decided that Lake Sarikul should henceforth be known as Lake Victoria, the range to the south as the "Chaine de l'Empereur Nicholas II," and the peak nearest to the Lake as the "Pic de la concorde." Difficulties, however, arose regarding the line from the Orta Bel onwards. It appears that, while the latitude of Lake Victoria on hitherto existing maps had been rightly shown as $37^{\circ} 27'$, the positions assigned to Kizil Robat, the Orta Bel and Baiyik Passes were inaccurate and about 6' south of their true positions. Under these circumstances General Gerard found it impossible to adhere strictly to the terms of the Anglo-Russian Agreement and recommended the acceptance of a line proposed by the Russians, running southwards to the watershed of the Taghdumbash which the Russians acknowledged to be the Chinese frontier. This line was considered both by General Gerard and Colonel Holdich to be the only natural frontier south of the latitude of Lake Victoria, and though it leaves to Russia the command of the Baiyik Pass, General Gerard was authorized to accept it as a distinct concession. Accordingly, General Gerard, finding that no other settlement was possible on the spot, accepted the line proposed by the Russian Commissioner from the Orta Bel Pass to the Taghdumbash watershed, after receiving satisfactory assurances from his colleague that this watershed is the Chinese frontier. The final protocol was signed on the 10th September, and on the 13th the British Mission marched for Gilgit under Colonel Holdich, General Gerard starting the same day for Russia. The Mission re-crossed the Darkot Pass on the 21st September, experiencing great difficulty owing to recent heavy falls of snow, and reached Gilgit on the 29th of September. During the last few weeks before the return of the Mission, severe cold and heavy snow were experienced, over 20 degrees of frost being registered at the Mihmanguli Camp in August. The settlement now arrived at leaves the

Despatch to
H. M.'s S. of S.,
No. 173 (S.-F.),
dated the 27th
August 1895.

Despatch to
H. M.'s S. of S.,
No. 195 (S.-F.),
dated the 9th
October 1895.

Despatch to
H. M.'s S. of S.,
No. 217 (S.-F.),
dated the 13th
November 1895.

Baiyik Pass to Russia, but General Gerard is of opinion that, from a military point of view, this is of no moment. He points out that, whether left to the Russians by agreement or not, the pass must have remained in their power; it is 16,000 feet high, only open four or five months in the year, and the crest cannot be permanently occupied. A small Russian picket posted there during the past summer lost a man and two horses in ten days, and had to be withdrawn.

Mr. Macartney joined General Gerard's party on the 7th August after having been detained for two days at the Baiyik Pass by a Russian picket, who told him that they had orders to stop all English and Chinese. On the news of his detention reaching General Pavallo-Schveikovsky, he immediately sent a horseman to put matters right, and was profuse in his apologies for the *més-intelligence involuntaire*. The picket was subsequently withdrawn to Kizil Robat, owing to pneumonia amongst both the men and horses.

The personal relations between the British and Russian parties were of the most friendly description. The Russian mission comprised many more officers than the British; besides the three Commissioners, there were three officers of the Survey Department, a doctor, an interpreter, a French Secretary, and three junior military officers. Lieutenant Miles, an officer of the Gilgit Agency, who was invited by General Gerard to visit the Commission camp, received and accepted a cordial invitation from General Schveikovsky to visit Murghabi to make the acquaintance of his future "*camarades*" on the frontier. General Gerard was informed that it was intended to abandon the Murghabi outpost as soon as demarcation was completed, on account of its cost, but whether such is truly intended or not, it is a fact that new buildings were in course of construction when the English officers visited the place after the conclusion of delimitation.

The British Commissioner was informed that Russian Agents had advised the Kirghiz not to give the English party any information about the Taghdumbash, as arrangements were being made with China for the cession of this tract to Russia after two years. General Gerard found a picket of Chinese troops at Paik, on the Taghdumbash river; they told him they had been there three months, and that there were 300 Chinese troops at Tashkurgan. From Kasim Beg, Chief of the Taghdumbash, he ascertained that the whole Taghdumbash up to Wakhjroi belongs to the Chinese, who, with the Beg himself, alone receive taxes.

General Gerard arrived in London on the 4th of November, and has been detained there on duty, pending the ratification of the Pamir agreement. He was treated with the greatest kindness and distinction throughout his journey in Russian Turkistan.

Cis-Oxus Darwaz has not yet been evacuated by Bokhara, nor, up to the end of the year, had any date been fixed for its transfer to Afghanistan. The Russians promptly occupied the trans-Oxus tracts on their final evacuation by the Amir.

About the middle of September there were said to be over a thousand Russian troops at Shakhdarra, and about the same number at Suchan, opposite the Bar Panja Fort on the right bank of the river. Detachments were also posted at other places in Roshan and Gharan. Forts are being built at Suchan, Gharan, and at the head of the Shakhdarra valley. The Russians are said to have exempted the people of the trans-Oxus districts newly made over to them from all taxation for twelve years.

During the autumn, a petition was received by the Assistant British Agent at Chitral from certain inhabitants of Wakhan, representing their grievances against the Amir, and begging to be released from Afghan oppression. The Assistant British Agent told them that the Amir was an ally of the English, and that the British Government was not likely to listen to petitions from men who were Afghan subjects, or to interfere between them and His Highness. The Wakhis are said to have strong predilections in favour of the Russians.

Kashmir-Chinese
Turkistan
Frontier.

In connection with the efforts of the officials in Chinese Turkistan during recent years to advance their boundary in the region of the Karakoram to a point which the British Government consider beyond China's limit, the question was raised whether a formal demarcation of the frontier by Commissioners of both Powers would not be an expedient measure. The views of the British Government as regards the frontier in question had been communicated to the Tsungli Yamen, who in turn had explained their claims in a note addressed to Her Majesty's Minister at Peking. The boundary claimed was not in accordance with the view of the British Government, but it was resolved not to continue the discussion. The Government of India, however, suggested to the Secretary of State that the British Minister at Peking should call the attention of the Chinese Government to the fact that the boundary which had been drawn by their officials on a map furnished by Mr. Macartney was inaccurate. On Mr. O'Connor being instructed to this effect, he replied that he had several times mentioned to the Chinese Ministers that the map in question was inaccurate; he did not think it advisable to formally address the Yamen on the subject except with the object of signifying definitely India's acquiescence in the boundary claimed by China, in which case he thought we might demand as a *quid pro quo* that China should throw open the route over the Taghdumbash Pamir, which, though superior for trade to that over the Karakoram, had been closed against trade. This question having been fully examined, both by the local authorities and by military experts, during the present half-year, the conclusion arrived at by the Government of India was that, though the establishment of a regular trade route into Gilgit over the northern passes of Hunza offers prospective advantages to trade, it is prohibited by strategical considerations, and that it would be preferable to restrict trade between Chinese Turkistan and India to the Karakoram-Leh route.

As regards the question of the boundary, in a despatch to the Secretary of State, dated 25th September 1895,* the Government of India wrote:—

* Despatch to H. M.'s S. of S., No. 186 (S. F.), dated the 25th September 1895.

“Recent reports from Major-General Gerard and Mr. Macartney emphasize the possibility that Sarikul and Raskam may at a not far distant date pass into the possession of Russia, who might

then, unless the Taghdumbash were protected, overlap the boundary just demarcated. The present moment, when it may be possible to obtain concessions from China on account of her Treaty with France regarding trans-Mekong territory, appears favourable for settling the Chinese boundary with Kashmir, Hunza, and Afghanistan, and we invite earnest attention to the desirability of effecting an arrangement whereby a definite limit would be placed to possible extensions of Russian territory towards the Mustagh and Karakoram mountains, should that Power succeed the Chinese in the possession of the tracts referred to."

Mixed up with these questions is that of the relative claims of China and Hunza to the Taghdumbash Pamir. Her Majesty's Government consider that this Pamir is subject to the concurrent rights of China and Hunza. They do not, however, propose to assert any claim on account of Hunza except for the purpose of precaution against China ceding it to Russia. Accordingly Major-General Gerard, while engaged in the delimitation of the Pamirs, was instructed to collect information and repudiate any idea of Afghan or Russian claims, but not to commit himself. His Russian Colleague gave assurances that the watershed of the Taghdumbash was the Chinese frontier, but the Indian Government took the opportunity in the despatch to the Secretary of State above quoted to reiterate the necessity for guarding against the cession of the Taghdumbash to Russia.

Waziristan.

The head-quarters of the force in the Tochi moved on the 20th July from Dehgan to Boya, four miles down the valley. It had been proposed to move the troops from Dehgan fifteen miles up the valley to the Mazdak range, but the idea was abandoned as the Political Officer feared that such a move might cause suspicion among the tribesmen, who were gradually regaining confidence as to our intentions.

On the 31st July, Lieutenant A. M. Campbell, 3rd Punjab Cavalry, was wounded, and his horse was killed under him, when returning to Boya from a reconnaissance towards the Kharwala Pass. The assailants were concealed behind rocks, and effected their escape without being seen. The case was of no political importance, and only the individual offenders were involved.

On the 2nd of August, a sowar of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry, on grass-cutting guard, was shot dead about four miles from the camp at Boya, at the foot of the hills to the south-east. No trace of the assailants was discovered.

The sanction of Her Majesty's Government to permanently locate a military force in the Upper Tochi valley was received in August.

Some difficulty was experienced in selecting a site for the permanent military post, and the question was still undecided at the end of the year.

During the month of August, the Government of India had under consideration the result of the trial by jirga of five Shakaiwals suspected of the murder of three Zhob Levy sepoy between Girdao and Gulkach, on the 25th July 1894,

Despatch to
H. M.'s S. of S.,
No. 198 (S.F.),
dated the 9th
October 1895.

Despatch to
H. M.'s S. of S.,
No. 230 (S.F.),
dated the 25th
December 1895.

of killing one and wounding another Zhob Levy sowar on the 4th August 1894 near Khuni Burj, and of the murder of four sepoy near the Gwaleri Kotal on the 19th February 1894. The Shakai jirga, with the exception of the Shada-kais and Malikshahis, declined to take the oath of innocence; this is tantamount to pronouncing the guilt of the accused, and the prisoners were sentenced by Mr. Bruce to seven years' imprisonment each. The Government of India confirmed Mr. Bruce's proceedings. The local authorities reported that there were good grounds to apprehend that the leading Maliks who declined to take the oath of innocence would be in personal danger at the hands of the friends of the accused, and the Lieutenant-Governor recommended that Mr. Bruce should be permitted to announce to the Shakai jirga, if he found it necessary, that anything done to the Maliks, in retaliation for their share in the conviction, would be treated by Government as if done to their own servants. The Government of India declined to agree to a general announcement as to the action which would be taken if violence were offered to a Malik for assisting the local British officers in and on the borders of Waziristan. But the Government of India, while refusing to permit a public proclamation, had no objection to the local officers taking opportunities to let the tribes know that any outrage arising from the part played in a jirga by one of the members would be an offence for which the Government of India would be entitled to call the tribe concerned to account under the condition of the arrangement made with them, which provides for the surrender for trial and punishment of offenders against the State, or against persons working for Government. Threats were said to have been openly uttered by certain persons to injure one of the Maliks concerned, and the Government of India directed that the tribal Maliks should be encouraged to arrest or take security from men who used such language; the local officers were authorized to support the Maliks in this and, if necessary, to arrange for the confinement or surveillance of persons suspected of contemplating recourse to violence. These instructions were acted upon with satisfactory results.

Orders were issued in October regarding the future policy in the Tochi valley. The offer of the Dawaris that their country should remain under the British Government was accepted, and it was decided that some light revenue would be taken from them at once, in anticipation of permanent arrangements hereafter. A simple form of administration will be introduced, but will be limited to the country of the Dawaris, including any small Darwesh Khel patches that may be found within it. The tract, which is commonly known as Upper and Lower Dawar, lies along the road from Hyder Khel on the east to Pai Khel near Kanirogha on the west. The Darwesh Khel territory outside the Tochi will be subject only to the "political control" extended to Waziristan generally. It will be necessary to maintain a somewhat close relation with the tribesmen in the 16 or 17 miles of the Tochi valley beyond Kanirogha, through which the road runs: but even here there will be nothing of the nature of direct administration.

Allowances aggregating Rs. 47,872 a year have been granted to the Darwesh Khel, and Rs. 15,864 to the Dawaris, subject, in the case of the former, to

the same conditions* as those attached to the allowances granted to the Mahsud Waziris, and to the further condition that they will refrain from and prevent raids and other offences across the Afghan frontier. The allowances of the Dawaris are subject to the condition of good behaviour on the part of the tribe and of all individual recipients. Thirteen posts for occupation by levies will be built in the Tochi at a cost of Rs. 45,000.

The distribution of the allowances, when announced to the Dawaris, was well accepted by all sections.

The question of the redistribution of the allowances to the tribes of Waziristan is now practically disposed of. Besides the general redistribution of the allowances of the Mahsuds and Darwesh Khels, and the grant to the Dawaris, a sum of Rs. 6,840 a year has been added to the Rs. 10,980 formerly enjoyed by the Wano Ahmadzais, and Rs. 3,612 a year has been given to the Shakaiwals. At the end of the year there only remained to consider the grant of additional service for the maintenance of the Shahur route to Wano.

On the 31st of October, Mr. Anderson announced to the jirgas of Upper and Lower Dawar the decision of Government regarding the future policy in the Tochi valley as above defined. He further explained to them that they would not be allowed to levy fees from the Powindahs and others using the route, but that Government would demand grazing dues from the Powindahs and would grant a share to the villagers. The jirga represented that they were unaware what the total cultivated area of the country was, but they offered to pay for three years a sum of Rs. 6,000 a year in commutation of the Government right to revenue, and they agreed to the measurement of their lands thereafter and to revenue being assessed in kind at the rate of one-tenth of the gross produce. The jirga further offered to contribute a sum of two thousand rupees annually by way of remuneration to certain subordinates of the leading Maliks who will be employed in collecting the revenue and rendering village service. The announcement of the allowances sanctioned by Government to the Dawaris was received with every sign of satisfaction, and the attitude of the tribe throughout and their readiness to meet the wishes of Government are a convincing proof that their offer to remain under the British Government was spontaneous and unanimous.

The Powindahs moved down to India this year earlier than usual owing to the want of grass in the hills. Relying on the protection of Government against the Mahsuds, they have relaxed all the precautions which they were formerly compelled to adopt. They have shown great appreciation of the new arrangements, and there is every hope of a large increase of trade.

The force at Wano was reduced, on the 15th November, to the permanent sanctioned strength,† the rest of the troops returning to India by the Shahur route through Kundiwan, Barwand and

* (1) General good behaviour.

(2) Prevention of raids and other offences across the boundary of British India or in protected areas.

(3) Surrender for trial and punishment of tribesmen guilty of offences against us or those acting under or in support of our authority.

(4) Furnishing tribal escorts to officers visiting any part of their country under the orders of Government.

(5) Rendering the service for which they receive allowances in any part of their country most convenient to Government.

† 1 Battalion Native Infantry.

1 Squadron Native Cavalry.

4 Guns, Native Mountain Battery.

Jandola. It was decided to allow the wing of Native Infantry at Barwand to remain there until the completion of the tribal levy posts on the Shahur route, which were expected to be ready for occupation in the spring of 1896. The force in the Tochi will not be immediately reduced to the permanent strength, until the new arrangements now being organised by the Political Officers have had a short trial.

**Indo-Afghan
frontier demar-
cation.**

Despatch to
H. M.'s S. of S.,
No. 137 (S.-F.),
dated the 16th
July 1895.

In July, the Amir confirmed and ratified the agreement and maps executed by Captain McMahon and Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan, defining the Afghan-Baluch frontier from Domandi to Chaman.

Despatch to
H. M.'s S. of S.,
No. 159 (S.-F.),
dated the 6th
August 1895.

The Amir's reply to the Viceroy's letter of the 28th of June (*vide ante*) regarding boundary demarcation between Chaman and the Persian frontier was not received till the end of September. His Highness wrote that the delimitation already carried out between Chaman and Ghwaza was not in accordance with the terms of the Kabul Agreement and map; and that it deprived Afghanistan of 100 square miles of territory. In point of fact the line laid down lies well on the British side of the convention line throughout, and Captain McMahon surrendered certain lands which fell to us by the convention line, because he found they belonged to Afghan subjects. As regards the frontier from Ghwaza to the extremity of the Sarlat range, the Amir maintained the claim put forward by the Afghan Commissioner, which the Government of India had informed His Highness it was impossible to accept. From the Sarlat range to the Persian frontier, the Amir rejected the concession offered by the Viceroy: he affected to treat the concessions offered him here and elsewhere during demarcation as the result of errors in our maps, and proposed a line running a little north of Chageh, and about due west from the southern extremity of the Sarlat to Koh-i-Malik-Siah. The proposed line would be in places from 60 to 70 miles south of the Kabul Agreement line. The Amir contended that his officials have every right to be at Iltaz Karez on the Sarlat, under the clause of the agreement regarding the maintenance of existing local rights; and the Khassadars, who were apparently withdrawn last July or August, have been sent back there, and are now occupying the same house as the Levy Mohurir of the Baluchistan Agency.

Despatch to
H. M.'s S. of S.,
No. 144 (S.-F.),
dated the 16th
July 1895.

Despatch to
H. M.'s S. of S.,
No. 225 (S.-F.),
dated the 25th
December 1895.

A reply was sent to the Amir on the 1st December. His Highness was informed that the Government of India are not prepared to further discuss the question of the line from Chaman to Ghwaza already laid down by the Joint Commissioners, who have signed an agreement defining it. As regards the line from Ghwaza to the Sarlat range, the Amir's claims and arguments have been controverted and repudiated, and His Highness is asked to instruct his Commissioner to demarcate in accordance with the line defined in the Viceroy's letter of the 28th June last. With reference to the despatch of Khassadars to Iltaz Karez, on the eastern slope of the Sarlat range, the Amir had asserted that the locality had from olden times been included in the Shorawak district, that the people had annually paid revenue to the Afghan Hakim and never to British officials. These assertions have been directly refuted, and His Highness has been furnished with a copy of a document signed by the Afghan Hakim of Shorawak in 1883, which affords convincing proof that the crest of the Sarlat

range has long been recognized, even by Afghan officials, as the boundary. Referring to the Amir's claim to draw the line between the Sarlat range and the Persian frontier at a long distance south of the line accepted by His Highness in the Kabul Convention of 1893, a considerable concession has been made to His Highness. Subject to the withdrawal of the Amir's objections to the line from Chaman to the Sarlat, and to the reservation of existing rights of Baluch tribes on the British side of the boundary to graze in tracts north of it, the following line has been offered to the Amir: Following the crest of the Sarlat range to a point near Jari Mazar, it will then leave the crest and passing through Jari Mazar and Siah Sang, run thence in a straight line to a point 2 miles due south of Kani. From there as proposed by the Amir it should run in a straight line to the Sheban Kotal, and thence straight to the Mazar Kotal. From there it should run in a straight line to a point six miles due south of Robat, thence straight to a point 12 miles due north of Chahar Amir, and from there in a straight line to the highest point of the Koh-i-Malik-Siah. The desirability of commencing work as early as possible has been urged, and His Highness has been told that, should the Government of India not hear from him in time to enable the work to be begun by the 10th of January next, it will be concluded that His Highness is unwilling to carry out the delimitation in the manner proposed, and that he is not desirous that it should be effected during this winter.

A memorandum and map describing the boundary of Afghanistan, from Domandi to Laram, as demarcated by Messrs. King and Anderson in the early part of this year, was forwarded to the Amir for ratification on the 9th September. Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan arrived in Birmal in August with a strong force, for which he provided quarters by turning out the occupants of a number of villages near the frontier. He wrote to Mr. Grant, Political Officer, to the effect that the line fixed by Mr. King had not been accepted at certain places by the Afghan Maliks nominated by the Amir to accompany the demarcation party, and that he had been commissioned by His Highness to delimit the boundary afresh, with an officer of the British Government. He asked Mr. Grant to arrange an early meeting. Mr. Grant was instructed to reply that the Viceroy had sent the Waziristan demarcation papers and map to the Amir on the 9th of September for ratification, that no reply had reached the Government of India, and that until His Highness's answer had been received no question of revising the line laid down could be entertained. Pillars Nos. 27 and 28 on the southern section of the frontier demarcated were destroyed in the beginning of September: but it is not known whether this was done by the Darwesh Khel or by Afghan subjects.

Despatch to
H. M.'s S. of S.,
No. 187 (S.-F.),
dated the 25th
September 1895.

The Amir replied on the 9th of December to His Excellency the Viceroy's letter. He wrote that on the southern section of the boundary, between Pillar No. 20 at Larkhwah and Khwaja Khidr, the British Commissioner did not make proper enquiries, that he did not duly take into consideration the rights of the subjects of both Governments, and "has included, within British territory, some of the villages of Khaisar, Khojul and Suleiman Amadzai, together with their pasture lands and Zebu Ghar, the forest of chilghoza trees and the burial

grounds of the Kharoti people, which belonged to them from olden times, and are under the jurisdiction of the God-granted Government." The Amir explained that in his opinion the line should be drawn from Khwaja Khidr in a south-easterly direction to the crest of the Marwati range, and then southward along the watershed to a point opposite Larkhwah. His Highness requests that the map and agreement might be modified accordingly, when he would be prepared to ratify them. The matter is under consideration.

Asmar Boundary.

On the 7th of October, the Viceroy sent the Amir for formal ratification a copy of the agreement and map drawn up by Mr. Udny and Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan, recording their settlement of the Afghan frontier from Kafiristan to the vicinity of the Nawa Kotal. His Highness replied formally ratifying the agreement at the end of December.

Zhob.

During the summer, several collisions occurred between British and Afghan subjects in the newly-demarcated frontier tracts to the north of the Zhob district. These were not of serious importance in themselves, but the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan represented the desirability of establishing a post in Tirkhawar, south of the Kand river, with a view to preventing a recurrence of these quarrels. The Government of India agreed to the Zhob Levy post at Keshetu being transferred to Tirkhawar as a temporary measure, pending a decision whether the permanent post should be maintained there or at Keshetu.

Early in October, while workmen were engaged in building a shelter for the levies at Tirkhawar, Yar Muhammad Khan, Tokhi Ghilzai, crossed the frontier and attacked the workmen and levies with sticks and stones, and burnt some of the timber. The native officer in charge of the post wrote to the Amir's Munshi at Jabbar Kila, who replied that he was doing his best to restrain Yar Muhammad Khan, but that the latter paid no attention to him. The Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan instructed the officer in charge of the post to act in a conciliatory manner as far as possible, if Yar Muhammad Khan were again aggressive; but, if this failed, to take any steps necessary to prevent interference with the workmen and destruction of materials. The Government of India approved the action of the Agent to the Governor-General.

Some Psein Kakars, Afghan subjects, crossed the frontier near Loe Bund, and destroyed some new karezes which were being built by British subjects 3 miles within the border. A few levies were sent to the spot temporarily to keep the peace.

Mohmand.

The Amir and his officials continued to intrigue with those sections of the Mohmands whose lands are on the British side of the boundary settled at Kabul in November 1893. Indeed, it is certain that when this part of the line comes to be demarcated, His Highness intends claiming the whole Mohmand country, regardless of the Kabul Agreement. He has warned all sections of the tribe that he will discontinue the allowances of any who visit British territory.

The following is a translation of a letter of which His Highness the Amir addressed fourteen copies to the different sections of the Mohmand tribe on the 2nd of May last :—

“The people of Bajaur and Swat were in the habit of coming to Kabul and received presents and khilats. They professed themselves ready to sacrifice themselves and that their country would if necessary be sacrificed for us. When the time came I became aware that the people of Bajaur and Swat were receiving secretly allowances from the British Government. Aye Mohmands! Be it known to you that those two tribes who had received money from the King of Islam, and then were pleased with the English, and gave their country to them of their own free will, when the British prepared an expedition, sent word to the Mohmands and the King of Islam asking for help and assistance. They thought that Government would take their country by the time I could arrive, and they gave it up of their own accord. You Mohmands should be the tribe of the King of Islam, and we should not assist them (Bajaur and Swat). Think well that whoever be the friend of the King of Islam, should not assist them. It is certain that the King of Kabul is well pleased with the Mohmand tribes. Up till now I have found no shortcomings in you. Surely you will be the friends of the King of Islam. Be it known to you that the British Government also has hopes of the Mohmands.”

Visit of Shah-
zada Nasrulla
Khan to Eng-
land.

Reports received from several different sources tend to show that the Amir has formally nominated Sardar Habibulla Khan as his heir and the future ruler of Afghanistan. From information furnished by the British Agent, it appears that the Amir was persuaded by his principal wife, Umar Jan's mother, into sending Shahzada Nasrulla Khan to England, instead of his elder brother, and that His Highness now regards this as a mistake. Shahzada Nasrulla Khan left England on the 3rd of September for Paris, where he remained a fortnight, joining the *Clive* at Marseilles on the 19th. Short visits were paid to Rome and Naples, and the Shahzada arrived at Port Said on the 30th of September. Finding that he could not proceed to Medina without first obtaining the consent of the Sultan, he relinquished his project of making the pilgrimage and came on to Karachi, where he arrived on the 16th October. He left for Chaman by special train on the afternoon of the 18th. The Shahzada was received at Chaman by the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, who accompanied him to the border on the evening of the 20th. Sir Adelbert Talbot also took leave of the Shahzada on the border. The dignity of Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George has been conferred upon Sardars Habibulla Khan and Nasrulla Khan. *Miss Hamilton, Mrs. Daly, who is a trained nurse, and Mrs. Clemence, wife of the Amir's Veterinary Surgeon, who had come with the Shahzada on the *Clive*, went to Kabul *via* Peshawar. Mr. F. Martin accompanied the Shahzada to Kandahar and has since gone with him to Kabul.

* Despatch to
H. M.'s S. of S.,
No. 223 (S.-F.),
dated the 18th
December 1895.

On the occasion of the Shahzada's formal reception by Her Majesty the Queen at Windsor on the 20th July, he read a letter from the Amir asking permission to appoint an official Agent in London. This request was definitely refused in an autograph letter from the Marquess of Salisbury.

The Shahzada arrived at Kandahar on the 25th of October and remained there till the end of November, when he started for Kabul, arriving on the

15th December. The Shahzada held occasional Darbars, but took little part in public affairs. The British News-writer at Kandahar was not allowed to attend the Darbars held by the Shahzada, but after considerable difficulty he succeeded in once obtaining permission to pay his respects to His Highness.

**Murder of the
British Agent at
Kabul.**

Despatch to
H. M.'s S. of S.,
No. 27 (S.-F.),
dated the 6th
February 1898.

Despatch to
H. M.'s S. of S.,
No. 231 (S.-F.),
dated the 25th
December 1896.

On the 27th of October, Lieutenant-Colonel Muhammad Akram Khan, the British Agent at Kabul, was murdered by a chaprassie of the Agency establishment, named Yahya Khan. The murderer, a native of Hangu in the Kohat district, had during the morning been corrected for disobedience by Sultan Jan, the Agent's son (who was also the Mir Munshi of the Agency). A short time afterwards, while Colonel Akram Khan was in the verandah reading letters which had arrived by the Indian post, Yahya Khan armed with a revolver, which he had taken from the room of the Daffadar, came up and fired several shots at him and at Sultan Jan from a distance of a few feet. The Agent was shot dead by a bullet in the head; Sultan Jan received three bullets in the breast and died three days later. Yahya Khan fired several more shots at other members of the establishment, seriously wounding two more men. He was eventually shot down by the Agent's nephew and one of the sowars. The bodies of the Agent and his son were brought in to Kurram. The other wounded men recovered.

The Amir sent the Kotwal of Kabul to make enquiries and informed the Government of India of the occurrence. His Highness also wrote to the Hospital Assistant of the Agency that the incident was "solely owing to the foolishness and unworthiness of the British Agent himself and his silly son," and that the Hospital Assistant should carry on the Government work until a successor to Colonel Akram Khan arrived.

The nomination of a successor was under consideration at the end of the year.

Kurram.

The state of affairs in Kurram and among the surrounding tribes has been perfectly tranquil, and the reduction of the force in the valley to the sanctioned permanent* escort was carried out during the autumn. In September, proposals were submitted by the Punjab Government to surprise the Badda Khel sub-section of the Saifali Kabul Khel Waziris while passing through the Tochi, and to recover the fines aggregating Rs. 3,800 outstanding against them. The Government of India declined to sanction the scheme which could scarcely have been carried out without causing local excitement. In the following month, the Badda Khels came in to the Political Officer in the Tochi, paid down two hundred rupees, and promised to pay the balance of the fine in instalments of five hundred rupees a year. This settlement was confirmed.

* 2 Mountain guns.
1 Troop Native Cavalry.
250 Native Infantry.

During the summer a settlement was effected with the Khani Khel Chamkanis, without having recourse to a punitive expedition. On the 1st June, Mr. Donald interviewed certain sections of the Chamkanis, who took oath to abstain from crime in Kurram and not to give the Khani Khel a passage

through their country into the valley. On the 28th June, a complete Khani Khel jirga came in to Mr. Donald. They declared their friendship for Government and expressed their willingness to settle outstanding scores with the residents of Kurram, but they brought counter-charges against the Turis, which they wished to be taken into consideration. On the 24th of July, the Khani Khel jirga came in again. They brought forward a long list of complaints against the Turis, as a set-off to the charges against themselves; and though their complaints were greatly exaggerated, it was decided to accept their formal submission as a settlement and to wipe out all outstanding cases on both sides. The Khani Khel have behaved well throughout the past summer and autumn, and there is a reasonable hope that the settlement will ensure peace in future on this part of the Kurram border.

Afghan expedition against the Mangals.

A large force of Afghan troops under Sardar Sherindil Khan and General Mir Atta Khan has been engaged throughout the summer and autumn in subjugating the Mangal tribe, between Kurram and Loghar. The Amir demands that they shall make a complete submission, pay revenue, furnish recruits for the Afghan army, and allow posts to be built in their country. The Mangals held out for some months, but there was little actual fighting; and towards the end of the year, it was reported that they had agreed to the Amir's terms, and were enlisting 1,000 men for the Afghan army.

Kafiristan.

A strong force of troops and levies under Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan has been engaged in subjugating the people of Kafiristan. The Sipah Salar was supported by forces which advanced from the direction of Lughman and Badakhshan. The Amir demands that the Kafirs shall allow a road to be constructed through their country, from the Kunar valley to Badakhshan, that all members of the tribe shall embrace the Muhammadan religion and shall pay revenue. The Kafirs held out for some months, and there were several conflicts, the Kafirs harassing the Afghan camp at night. Towards the end of the year, however, the tribesmen began to feel that further resistance was hopeless. Many sections made their submission, and agreed to the Amir's terms. Several deputations of Kafirs came in to Chitral to seek the aid of the Mehtar, and to ask permission to take refuge in Chitral territory if defeated by the Amir's troops. Instructions were sent to the Political Officer in Chitral that, as the Kafirs are now Afghan subjects, it was very undesirable that they should be permitted or encouraged to hope for refuge in, or assistance from, Chitral, which should observe strict neutrality as between Kafirs and Afghans. On it subsequently transpiring that the Political Officer had interpreted these instructions as requiring refugees to be expelled, orders were sent to him that this was not the intention, and that while the Kafirs must not be permitted to use Chitral territory as a base of operations against the Afghan troops, there was no desire on the part of the Government of India that refugees who fled there before the Amir's forces should be driven back. The Amir wrote to the Viceroy complaining that the British officer in Chitral had instigated the Kafirs to fight and promised them a refuge in Chitral if defeated. His Highness requested that "the road of escape to the Kafirs on the Chitral side might be strictly closed, so that not a single Kafir might attempt to go there."

**Demarcation
of the Peshawar
border.**

In the early part of this year, the demarcation of the border between the Peshawar district and independent territory was satisfactorily concluded by Mr. L. Dane and Major H. A. Deane. The boundary was not determined on the annexation of the Punjab, and during the first regular revenue settlement no attempt was made to define it, from the wish to avoid raising questions likely to be disputed by independent clans. From time to time disputes have arisen, and attempts have been made to decide questions of political jurisdiction. The demarcation now effected has practically settled all outstanding disputes; and it has everywhere been carried out with the full knowledge and acquiescence of the trans-border clans concerned. The Government of India have approved the proceedings of the local officers.

**The Amir's
trade agents.**

Despatch to
H. M.'s S. of S.,
No. 202 (S.-F.),
dated the 16th
October 1895.

A somewhat important question came under consideration during the half-year regarding the Amir's agents who have been appointed in British territory to collect taxes on Afghan trade and to carry out His Highness's system of monopolies. Apart from the general objection to a practice so contrary to all international custom, the agents had been guilty of numerous illegal acts, seizing traders and confining them, forcibly taking possession of their property, and otherwise placing themselves within the reach of the criminal law. Such cases had generally been settled by compromise, no steps had been taken to enforce the law, and the matter had gradually developed into a serious nuisance. After giving due consideration to the facts before them, the Government of India addressed the Punjab Government expressing regret that matters had been allowed to go so far unchecked, and requested that an attempt should be made to enforce the law against the Afghan agents whenever justice appeared to demand it. The Viceroy was prepared to address the Amir on the subject, but considered the time inopportune for so doing. On the correspondence being sent to Her Majesty's Secretary of State, Lord George Hamilton replied (22nd November) that it appeared to be no longer necessary to delay a communication to the Amir, and suggested the nature of the representation which should be made to His Highness. Just about this time, a fresh case of illegal procedure by the Amir's trade agent at Peshawar was reported by the local authorities. Having heard of the sale in the Peshawar district of a consignment of fruit from Afghanistan, upon which the Amir's taxes had not been paid, the agent tried to seize the fruit by force: resistance was offered, and a fight ensued. The Afghan agent refused to obey the orders of the Deputy Commissioner and insulted the Commissioner. This brought matters to a head. The agent was arrested, and orders were issued that he must stand his trial. The Amir addressed the Government of India complaining of the action of the local authorities, and the case was undisposed of at the end of December.

Herat.

Little news of interest was received from Herat during the half-year. The Amir's system of monopolies is severely felt throughout the province, and the traders are in despair. The state of affairs prevailing is briefly expressed in the following report made to Mr. Ney Elias by the Herat News-agent on his visiting Meshed in November:—

“There is much discontent among the troops, who, though all Kabulis, have been stationed for some 12 years continuously at Herat. They receive

their pay, but cannot prevail on the Amir to relieve them, and this is their chief grievance; they also mistrust the Governor and his officials, and are ready to act against him whenever an opportunity occurs. As regards their own Commander (the Sipah Salar), he is thought to be personally loyal to the Amir, but he has little control over the troops and, in connection with an incident which occurred a few weeks ago, they set his orders at defiance. The Governor himself is apprehensive of what may happen should Sardar Nasrulla Khan come to Herat, as is expected, to examine his accounts and enquire into the administration, as he is now supposed to be doing at Kandahar. The Amir suspects the Governor, and any measure on the part of the former, which would publicly evince mistrust of the Governor, would probably furnish the troops and his other enemies with an opportunity to make trouble. On the northern frontier, the general feeling is very pro-Russian. The local officials from Maimena westward all have intercourse with the Russians at Panjdeh and neighbouring stations; they are disloyal to the Governor of Herat and do not carry out his orders. The nomad tribesmen too—the Jamshidis, Taimuris, Firozkuhis, and the Hazaras of the Kila Nao district—are constantly plied by Russian Agents and have become saturated with Russian ideas. They dislike the Afghan Government and would now take advantage of any trouble that might arise in Herat to migrate across the frontier and placed themselves under Russian protection.”

In a general way this state of discontent with the Amir's rule has been known for a long time past, but it has never been so intense as at present. In short, the News-writer regards the tension just now as very great, and compares the situation to that of 1887, when Sardar Ayub Khan was at large in Persia.

Treatment of
soldiers of British
regiments
in Afghanistan.

Several complaints were received during the half-year from the British News-agent at Kandahar, regarding his treatment by the Afghan officials. He stated that he was invariably treated with discourtesy; obstacles were placed in the way of his obtaining passports for British subjects, his messengers were abused and insulted by the Kotwal, and efforts made to induce his servants to leave him. A trivial false charge was trumped up against one of his men, who was chained by the neck, fined and flogged. Afghan subjects employed in the British army, who proceeded to Kandahar on leave, were always badly treated, arrested on paltry excuses, fined and prevented from returning. On the other hand, deserters from British Indian regiments were treated with every kindness and honour. The News-writer spoke to Sardar Nasrulla Khan regarding the grant of passports to servants of the British Government; but the Sardar refused to do anything in the matter, which he said was one for the Amir's decision. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief recommended that representation should be made to the Amir, regarding the treatment of Afghans belonging to our army, and that His Highness should be moved to issue such orders as would enable our soldiers to visit their homes in Afghanistan without molestation. The Government of India, however, were of opinion that it was undesirable to address the Amir on the subject; they held that by enlisting Afghans in our army, the Government of India did not acquire a right to interfere in the Amir's dealings with them on their return to their own country,

Despatch to
H. M.'s S. of S.,
No. 204 (S.F.),
dated the 18th
October 1896.

and that men who engage in our regiments must take their chance of whatever may happen to them if they go back to Afghanistan. It was accordingly ordered that all subjects of the Amir who enlisted in our service should be warned that, if they thereafter return to Afghanistan, the Government of India could be in no way responsible for the treatment they might receive there.

The view taken by the Government of India did not commend itself to Her Majesty's Government. They pointed out that the Amir had a direct interest in the efficiency of the British Indian army, and that while his own troops were equipped with war material provided by arrangement with the Government of India, and no objection was raised against his employing British Indian subjects in certain departments of his own military service, His Highness's treatment of British soldiers on leave was quite incompatible with the friendly relations which it was understood he desired to maintain with the Government of India. The question of addressing a remonstrance to the Amir was under consideration at the end of the year.

Khorassan.

The Prince Muaiyid-ud-Dowla, Governor-General of Khorassan, was dismissed from office in June last, and has been succeeded by the Shahab-ul-Mulk. The Khorassan province is in a state of bankruptcy.

Despatch to
H. M.'s S. of S.,
No. 219 (S.-F.),
dated the 13th
November 1895.

The Amir wrote to the British Minister at Tehran on the 13th of February regarding his wish to appoint an Afghan Agent at Meshed, and asking for an *exequatur* from the Shah. Sir Mortimer Durand replied through Mr. Ney Elias (15th June) that the Persian Government have strong objections to such a proceeding; that they have never made such an arrangement before, and see no reason for making it now, and that the result of their allowing the Amir's former Agent, Mirza Yusuf Khan, to remain in Meshed was exceedingly bad.

Subsequently, His Highness wrote to Sir Mortimer Durand that, if an Afghan Agent were not allowed to remain in Meshed, commercial transactions between Persia and Afghanistan would cease. Sir Mortimer Durand replied that the Persian Government, with whom he had communicated on the subject, could not see their way to meeting the Amir's wishes.

1st January 1896.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

HALF-YEAR

WHICH ENDED ON THE 30TH JUNE 1896.

THE experience of the first six months of the working of the arrangements for the opening up of the road from Peshawar to Chitral was generally satisfactory. The offences on the road as far as Chakdarra, or against British subjects, were four murders and one attempt to murder. A few shots were fired at night at sentries on the Malakand; there was an attack by thieves near the North Malakand Camp, in which one of the levies was wounded, and there were one or two small attacks on the levies between Chakdarra and Robat. The post worked exceedingly well and regularly, a considerable trade passed along the road, and only one report of interference with traders was received. Our relations with Nawagai, Jandol, the Utman Khels and Upper Swat were peaceful, confidence was encouraged by the free movements of officers within the lower part of the valley, and the Jandol Khans maintain the positions in which they were placed on our withdrawal from the Jandol valley. The discipline of the troops may be gauged by the fact that not a single complaint of any sort was made by the people against soldiers or followers throughout the half-year.

Dir-Chitral
road.

The Political Officer for Dir and Swat is directly under the orders of the Government of India. The Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar had previously complete freedom in dealing with the tribes on his border, but the new arrangements for keeping open the road to Chitral rendered it imperative that the officer in charge of them should deal directly with all the adjacent tribes with whom he is brought into continual contact. After discussing the question with the local authorities, it was determined, as a temporary and experimental measure, that the southern limit of the Political Officer's jurisdiction should be defined by a line drawn from Abazai to Boner, but excluding the Lower Utman Khel. The Bonerwals and other tribes lying outside of Swat continue under the control of the Deputy Commissioner.

There was at first a strong impression amongst the tribesmen that Government intended to take over the country to the east of the Peshawar district and included in their scheme an expedition against Boner. Major Deane did everything in his power to re-assure the people, and there is an excellent correcting influence in Swat, where the feeling in favour of Government is very strong. Major Deane has taken steps to extend cultivation in the Sam Ranizai country, and wells for irrigation purposes are being sunk.

The Chitral reliefs concentrated at Nowshera on the 23rd and 25th April, and were to have left the Malakand on the 1st May. Unfortunately, on the 19th April, heavy floods swept away all the bridges above Dir and slightly damaged the bridge over the Panjkora river at Chutiatan. Immediate steps were taken to repair the road and bridges, three thousand tribesmen being employed on the work, and though it was at first feared the starting of the reliefs would be delayed a fortnight, they were able to march from Chakdarra on the 7th May. The road as far as Sado was found to have been maintained in excellent order. The force reached Dir on the 12th of May, and the first party crossed the Lowarai on the

14th ; they found the road over the pass generally fair, but under snow in parts. The first party of the relieved troops reached Dir on the 18th May, and the 28th Punjab Infantry which had there awaited their arrival proceeded the next day towards Chitral, and reached Drosh on the 21st. The 25th Punjab Infantry started from Ashreth for India on the 23rd May, and the whole of the relieved force arrived at Chakdarra on the 31st.

Supplies for the different stages and such heavy baggage as the reliefs did not require with them on the road, were sent up a few days ahead under levy escort, making the march of the force much less laborious than it would otherwise have been. Major Deane's arrangements throughout worked admirably : his plans included not only tribal pickets within the territory in which the troops encamped, but on the other bank of the Panjkora river, and watching the passes from the Mamund and Salarzai country through Jandol. One of these distant pickets was attacked by a band of 40 or 50 men. Two men of the picket were wounded, but they succeeded in driving back the assailants. With the exception of the murder of a driver at Dir (in which it is doubtful whether any outsider was concerned), the relief of the Chitral garrison was carried out without any contretemps. Major Deane found that cultivation had increased at some points on the Panjkora, and that the crops were excellent. The people greatly appreciate the peace which they have lately enjoyed.

As soon as the relieved Chitral garrison had reached British territory, the question of the future political arrangements in Gilgit and Chitral and on the Punjab frontier generally came under the consideration of Government. The decision was—

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 161 (Frontier), dated the 1st September 1896.

- (i) That Major Deane should be continued as Political Agent for Swat and Dir in direct subordination to the Government of India, and that Chitral be added to his charge.
- (ii) That Major Deane's appointment and that of his Assistant at the Malakand should be brought into the list of the Political Department.
- (iii) That Gilgit should in future rank as a Political Agency of the 2nd Class, subordinate to the Resident in Kashmir, the western limit of the charge being fixed at the Shandur Pass.
- (iv) That, as regards the remainder of the Punjab frontier, the policy laid down in October 1889 should be reiterated, and the Punjab Government invited to offer suggestions for further regulating and strengthening the administration of the border, in order to give full effect to that policy.

The following extract from the letter of October 1889 indicates the policy which the Government of India desired to pursue :—

* * * * *

* * * * * The Government of India considers that, throughout that portion of the frontier region which borders on the Punjab, it should no longer be content to find itself face to face with an almost impenetrable wall of hostile tribesmen. It desires on the contrary to cultivate more friendly relations and more direct and frequent intercourse with them than at present exists, to increase its influence over them, to know what is passing within

the region which they inhabit and beyond it, to improve the frontier communications, to encourage the tribes to supply the Indian army with recruits under ordinary circumstances, and to look towards the British Government and not towards an invader in the event of foreign aggression. It would also welcome the removal of the obstacles which prevent the acquisition of a more intimate knowledge of the important Ghilzai tribes which stretch along the eastern flank of Afghanistan. In connection with this part of the subject, it is considered of great importance that British control should be thoroughly established in the Kurram Valley, and that frontier lines of communication, such as the roads through Dir to Chitral and through the Tochi and the Gumal Passes, should be thoroughly explored. I am to explain that, in order to give effect to the policy which I have described, nothing in the way of annexation is required, or should be attempted, nor should any step be taken likely to lead to a collision. The aim should rather be to enlist the interests of the tribes on our side, as is done in Baluchistan, and, while securing for British officers complete freedom of movement amongst them, to entrust the guardianship and protection of the passes to the tribes themselves."

* * * * *

The possibility of reducing the military expenditure in Gilgit, with a view to affording relief to the finances of the Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar, &c.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 35 (Frontier), dated the 19th February 1896.

under consideration. The Kashmir troops had hitherto been distributed in numerous posts, most of which were merely connecting links on the lines of communication. In the autumn of 1895, the Hon'ble Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Brackenbury visited Kashmir to consider on the spot the reforms and economies possible in Gilgit and Kashmir.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 104 (Frontier), dated the 2nd June 1896.

The main conclusions arrived at were—

- (i) that the troops should eventually be concentrated at Gilgit and other important points, the detachments on the lines of communications being withdrawn and replaced, wherever necessary, by levies ;
- (ii) that the six battalions of Kashmir Imperial Service Infantry, each 600 strong, should be re-organized in four battalions, each 700 strong, the two mountain batteries being retained as before ;
- (iii) that the garrison of the Gilgit Agency should be reduced to two battalions of Kashmir Imperial Service Infantry and one battery, the British Agent's escort of 200 rifles of Native Infantry from the regular army being retained.

It was calculated that the scheme, which was readily accepted by the Darbar, would immediately effect a saving to the Kashmir State of Rs. 84,000 a year, and relieve British India revenues of about Rs. 41,000 a year on account of charges for supply and transport, besides ultimately securing a considerable additional saving on the latter account, both to the Darbar and to the Government of India, through concentration.

The political separation of Chitral from Gilgit was expected not only to diminish the importance of the latter charge, but to admit of a very substantial saving through reduction in the number of officers employed in the Gilgit Agency.

During the week which ended on the 31st December 1895, the leading men

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 52 (Frontier), dated the 18th March 1896.

of Hunza, Nagar, Punyal, Mastuj, Laspur, Yasin, Chilas, Gor, Astor, &c., assembled at Gilgit and were entertained at Government expense. On the 31st a Darbar was held, at which the Chiefs of Hunza,

Nagar and Punyal were decorated with medals bestowed on them by His Excellency the Viceroy, and were presented with swords of honour and other special rewards for their services during the Chitral expedition. Sir George Robertson distributed khilats and presents to the darbaris and cash rewards to the Hunza, Nagar, Punyal and other levies. He reported that all went off successfully, and that the people returned to their homes in excellent spirits.

The agents of the Mir of Hunza left for Kashgar on the 29th January, with the customary annual presents to the Chinese Government. They returned to Hunza in April. The Mir had requested the Taotai to allow the Kanjutis to continue collecting taxes, as before, from the Taghdumbash Pamir, to permit the Hunza refugees now in Yarkand to return to Kanjut, and to cause the jagir in Yarkand, now in Safdar Ali's possession, to be transferred to Muhammad Nazim Khan, the present ruler of Kanjut. The Taotai practically agreed to the collection of taxes from the Taghdumbash, but represented that he was averse to the Kanjutis personally levying them, and had accordingly ordered the Amban of Sarikul to cause the taxes to be collected and made over to the Mir's agents. Those of the Hunza refugees, who had themselves no objection to return, were allowed to do so.

Towards the end of April, Sikandar Khan, Raja of Nagar, wrote to the Political Officer asking urgently for a guard of sepoy to be sent to Nagar, for his temporary protection, as he had discovered a plot against his life and had arrested the persons concerned. The evidence of the latter, the Raja said, pointed to Raja Khushru Khan, his nephew, as being the instigator of the plot. Sir George Robertson instructed the Political Officer that the case should be disposed of by the Raja, the sentences, if any were passed, being reported to the British Agent before being carried out.

The people of Yasin, encouraged by their large sales of grain to the Commissariat Department, applied themselves to extend cultivation, and the Political Officer reported that they appeared to be quite contented and amenable to their Governor's wishes.

Chitral.

Colonel Hutchinson, writing from Chitral on the 10th May, said :—

“Traders and carriers and bunniahs are coming in daily in increasing numbers from Peshawar and Bajaur, attracted by reports that business is to be done and money made in Chitral. All find employment here, and none go away empty. One man from Peshawar, a contractor of some substance, has arrived with a number of masons and carpenters, seeking work, and has offered to send for as many more as may be wanted. All these men seem to come and go freely without any apprehension of being molested on the road, a healthy and hopeful indication of the peace and order which prevail in these lately disturbed districts.”

There was, however, great scarcity of food in Lower Chitral, and prices rose considerably. Owing to scarcity of fodder in the Drosh district, it was found necessary to employ a thousand coolies from Upper Chitral to take fodder down to Ashreth and Drosh, to meet the wants of the transport accompanying the reliefs. This measure caused a good deal of discontent, and some of the people refused to obey orders. Difficulty was also experienced in providing milk and meat for the troops. The country was only beginning slowly to re-

cover from the losses in cattle from rinderpest and pleuro-pneumonia which had been very heavy during the past year.

Of the Chitralis detained at Dharmasala, eight of minor importance were allowed to return to Chitral, and only fourteen remained there. These included Sher Afzal and his daughter, Amir-ul-Mulk, Khokand Beg, Danial Beg, Inayat Shah, and eight attendants. It was in contemplation to remove the party further from the frontier, so as to guard against risk of escape, without the necessity of enforcing strict confinement.

Umra Khan, ex-Chief of Jandol, reached Quetta on the 4th February. He left on the 7th February, and started from Bombay for Mecca on the 3rd March. The authorities were instructed to treat the ex-Chief well and to facilitate his journey. He expressed his gratitude for the assistance given to him. While at Quetta, Umra Khan made a statement to the Governor-General's Agent, in which he endeavoured to justify his conduct during the hostilities in Bajaur and Chitral. He was emphatic in his assertion that he had never been, nor intended to be, anything but a friend of the British Government, whom, however, he accused of unjust dealings towards himself.

Umra Khan returned from Mecca on the 23rd of June. While away on pilgrimage, he had sent a message to the Political Officer for Dir and Swat that he would pledge himself to comply with any conditions if allowed to go back to Bajaur. Major Deane expressed a strong opinion that the ex-Khan should not be allowed to return to Jandol: he said that the people did not want him, and that they had been much disturbed by the idea that it was intended to allow him to return. The Government of India agreed with Major Deane; they also recognized that Umra Khan's presence at Kabul might be inconvenient should the Amir attempt at any time to interfere in Bajaur; but the considerations which led to granting Umra Khan a safe conduct on his way to Mecca, prevented any interference with his freedom of action as to the return journey. It was accordingly decided that Umra Khan could not be permitted to return to Jandol, and he was so informed and offered an allowance and honourable employment in Baluchistan. He declined the offer of Government, and on the refusal of his request for an interview with the Viceroy, elected to return to Afghanistan by Quetta. He had not left Bombay at the end of the half-year.

In March, the Russian Government accepted the line of frontier from Lake Pamirs, Shighnan, Wakhan, &c. Victoria eastwards demarcated in the previous summer by General Gerard and General Povalov-Schveikovsky. The Russian Ambassador, in January, put forward a proposal that the evacuation of cis-Oxus Darwaz by Bokhara should be postponed for a year, urging that the Russian occupation of trans-Oxus Roshan and Shighnan was not yet practically effective, and that the season of the year was inconvenient for carrying out the transfer. The Government of India strongly urged that this was not fair to the Amir, who had withdrawn from trans-Oxus Shighnan and Roshan more than a year previously; but, in recognition of the fact that it has been customary in Europe in cases of transfer of territory to allow one or more years within which the inhabitants could decide

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 133 (Frontier), dated the 7th July 1896.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 172 (Frontier), dated the 23rd September 1896.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 78 (Frontier), dated the 22nd April 1896.

whether to remain in the transferred territory or to change their residence, Her Majesty's Government agreed that the transfer of cis-Oxus Darwaz to the Amir should be deferred until the 13th October next, the Russian Government giving assurances that the Amir of Bokhara would, on or before the 13th October, notify the complete withdrawal of Bokharan troops and officials, so that the Afghans might occupy it on that day without any risk of collision and without the need of further correspondence. The Amir, who was informed

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 96 (Frontier), dated the 19th May 1896.

accordingly (18th April 1896), replied accepting the arrangement, but remarked that fifteen months had already elapsed since he withdrew from trans-Oxus Shighnan, and that this further delay in giving him possession of the tract ceded to Afghanistan would be productive of inconvenience, as the Bokharan officials were taking away the Government share of the grain crops, no supplies would be left for the Afghans when they entered the country, and consequently he would not be able to send as many troops as he thought desirable to hold the frontier posts.

The Amir was reported to have received a letter from the Russian Governor of Tashkend, requesting that all trans-Oxus Shighnanis who were in bondage at Kabul might be released and sent back to their homes. Though displeased at the request, His Highness complied with it.

In June it was reported that the Russians had made over to the Amir of Bokhara all trans-Oxus Shighnan and Roshan below Darmarakht, a village a few miles north of the ruby mines, which latter as well as the country eastwards they retained in their own possession. A thousand Bokharan troops had arrived in Roshan, and some of them had been sent to occupy Kila-i-Wamar; the new Bokhara Governor entered Kharigh, the head-quarters of trans-Oxus Shighnan, on the 24th of May.

Kafiristan.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 24 (Frontier), dated the 5th February 1896.

The Amir's operations for establishing his suzerainty over the Kafirs continued throughout the half-year.

In writing to the Viceroy on the 4th December, the Amir, while professing an intention to treat with justice and leniency all those Kafirs who tendered their allegiance, complained that a report had reached him that the Political Officer had instigated the Kafirs to fight, and promised them maintenance in Chitral in the event of their defeat; and His Highness asked the Viceroy to put a stop to such proceedings and to "keep the road of escape to the Chitral side strictly closed, so that not a single Kafir may attempt to go there." The Viceroy replied that there was no truth in the report made against the Political Officer, but that he could not issue the orders desired by the Amir. His Excellency quoted the Amir's own words to show that, in a similar position, His Highness would not consider himself bound to act in the way he requested, and had admitted the right of one Power to give shelter to refugees from another, so long as they were not incited to hostile acts.

In January, the Political Officer in Chitral reported that there were then about 150 refugee Kafirs in Chitral, and he explained that his request to the Mehtar to turn back Kafirs seeking refuge was only made with a view to discouraging refugees from entering Chitral in large numbers, but that it was understood that individual Kafirs who had special reasons for fearing to return

to their homes would not be driven out. He subsequently reported that he had taken steps to carry out the orders of Government to the effect that, while no encouragement should be given to Kafirs to take refuge in Chitral, those who did so should not be turned back; and that Chitral territory must not be used as a base of operations against the Amir or his troops. To those who took refuge in Chitral, the Mehtar gave small grants of land, and instructions were issued that no refugees should be prevented from having access to Chitral, and if their numbers increased beyond the power of the Mehtar to deal with them, the fact was to be reported, so that Government might consider what further steps were necessary.

In February, orders were given by the Amir that those places which had not been subjugated were to be attacked after the Nauroz (21st March). The Sipah Salar accordingly advanced and attacked the Waigul Kafirs, who offered but little resistance, accepted the Amir's suzerainty and agreed to become Muhammadans. A force which advanced from the Kabul side against the Ramgul Kafirs was stoutly resisted, but the Afghan troops, after sustaining considerable loss, eventually occupied the Ramgul country. One hundred and twenty Ramgul headmen were sent to Kabul in chains, but the Amir ordered them to be set free and permitted them to return to their homes. The Kafirs of Pech made their submission towards the end of March and were disarmed.

In March, the Sipah Salar allowed the Lutdeh headmen to return to their homes, and sent with them several Mullas to teach the people the principles of Islam. All was reported quiet in the Lutdeh and Munjash districts, and the Afghan troops were withdrawn. Some of the Kafir prisoners sent to Kabul were employed in the workshops and many were enlisted in the Afghan army, while others were deported to Turkistan. The Amir issued orders that the Kafirs were to be leniently treated; and that none of his subjects would be permitted to keep Kafirs as slaves; any person infringing this order was to be liable to a fine of seven thousand rupees.

Towards the end of May practically the whole of Kafiristan had submitted to the Amir, and the Political Officer in Chitral reported as follows:—"On the whole, the Kafirs seem to be fairly contented, and the Afghans appear to have shown a commendable moderation in their dealings with them."

The Amir's proceedings in Kafiristan attracted much attention in England and were the subject of representations to Her Majesty's Government from various philanthropic societies. The charges and arguments adduced in these representations were dealt with in a despatch, dated the 22nd April 1896, which was presented to Parliament.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 77 (Frontier), dated the 22nd April 1896.

Serious news regarding a rebellion of the Tunganis in Kansu reached the Government of India from an English traveller at Kashgar, under date the 23rd May. It was to the effect that the rebels were 40,000 strong, and were being joined by discontented Chinese soldiery in Khoten and Lobnor; there were only 3,000 Chinese troops at Kashgar, many of whom were disaffected, and it seemed probable that they and the population would join the rebels; the Chinese officials were stupefied with fear, and hesitated to send out troops against the Tunganis; the Russians were reported to be massing troops at

Chinese Tur-
kistan.

Narin, and a Russian occupation of the Kashgar province seemed probable; there were said to be 4,000 Russian troops at Narin, and 5,000 men and 32 guns at Farghana; telegraphic communication with Peking was interrupted; and the price of provisions had risen very high.

This news was to a great extent confirmed by the reports of the Kashgar news-writer of somewhat earlier date. He further mentioned that Mao Tajen, an officer of high rank formerly in military command in Ili, had with all his troops raised the standard of rebellion: that he had 10,000 fighting men with him, and was being joined by Tunganis and others, while half of the men and officers of the army in the New Dominion sympathised with him. It was locally considered that this new rising would be more serious than that of the Tunganis. The Tsungli Yamén at Peking denied that the rebellion was on the increase and professed to attach little importance to it.

On the 7th of May, a serious assault was committed by Chinese soldiers on the Munshi who, in the absence of Mr. Macartney on leave, was in charge of the Kashgar Agency. They attacked him with sticks, and beat him till he became unconscious. The Chinese officials expressed regret and promised that the Munshi's assailants, if apprehended, should be flogged in his presence. This promise was, however, evaded and the men were allowed to escape practically unpunished.

Waziristan.

An important question of principle concerning our position in Waziristan

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 58 (Frontier), dated the 18th March 1896.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 97 (Frontier), dated the 19th May 1896.

came under consideration in the spring, in connection with the establishment of levy posts on the Shahur route from Jandola to Wano. This route affords the shortest means of communication between Wano and the Punjab. A military post had been maintained at Barwand (Sarwekai) ever since the punitive operations undertaken by Sir William Lockhart in December 1894, but this was regarded as a temporary measure, and it had always been the intention of the Government of India to withdraw it after negotiations with the tribe were concluded and levy posts constructed. The local Political Officers advocated the permanent retention of the military garrison at Sarwekai, and the establishment of levy posts between Sarwekai and Wano through the Khaisera valley, in order to obtain a commanding influence in the country inhabited by the more unruly sections of the Mahsuds, and to support well-disposed Maliks against malcontent factions. The Lieutenant-Governor preferred the adoption of a shorter line turning west from Sarwekai by Karabkot which, in his opinion, without establishing an internal control, would interpose a barrier between the Mahsud country on the one side and the Gumal and Wano on the other, and would check raiding by the Mahsuds on the Gumal and caravan routes through Wano. As regards the military garrison at Sarwekai, the Lieutenant-Governor said he was always glad to see tribal arrangements supported by as strong a backing as possible of regular troops, and he thought it would be a decided advantage to retain it permanently, if the troops could be spared. The matter was referred to the Secretary of State for India who replied (8th May) that, until levy posts had been established in the Shahur valley and the arrangements tested by sufficient experience, he would leave it to the Government of India to decide whether the military post at Sarwekai

should be retained until further orders. He agreed with the Lieutenant-Governor that the objects of Government could be attained without locating posts in the Khaisera valley, and stated that the larger issues of policy would be determined after he had received a report of the total cost of the cantonments in Wano and the Tochi valley and of the military posts in the Shahur valley. He also requested the Government of India to consider whether the maintenance of the Wano cantonment was so necessary as to justify the expenditure. The Government of India decided to retain the military post at Sarwekai, informed the Punjab Government accordingly, and authorised the construction of a levy post or posts on the route recommended by the Lieutenant-Governor. As regards the Khaisera valley, up to Torwam, it was pointed out to the Punjab Government that, although no levies were to be placed in it, the Political Officers should be able to exercise considerable influence over it through the service allowances given to the Alizai Maliks, and that with the military and levy posts at Sarwekai so close to the head of the valley, it should not be difficult to give the well-disposed Maliks all the encouragement necessary for the maintenance of order. The Lieutenant-Governor was requested to instruct the Political Officers that they should lose no opportunity of extending their personal influence throughout the valley, that, while carefully abstaining from making themselves or the Government of India responsible for the actual administration of the country, they should endeavour to establish cordial and friendly relations with the headmen, and should give them the support which is usually so necessary at first to ensure the proper recognition of their authority.

Before the Government of India had time to dispose of the Amir's objections to that section of the Waziristan boundary which lies between Khwaja Khidr and Larkhwah, His Highness addressed the Viceroy again, and urged the appointment of a joint British and Afghan Commission to re-demarcate the portion objected to. He said that the Birmalis and Kharotis were constantly writing to him on the subject, and demanding that the land taken from them by the delimitation should be restored. Meanwhile some of the tribes on the Indian side of the boundary have been complaining to the British officials of the interference of Afghans in territory not belonging to them.

The Viceroy replied to the Amir on the 15th April. His Excellency said that it had from the first been his wish that an Afghan Commissioner should co-operate in the demarcation; that it was His Highness's own proposal that no Afghan officer should be present; and that, in accepting this proposal, the Viceroy had expressly stipulated that the boundary laid down by the British Commissioner should be accepted by the Amir in the same complete way as that of other parts of frontier, where Afghan and British officers had acted conjointly. It was explained that the Amir was wrong in thinking the line demarcated was not in accordance with the Convention map; and that, in suggesting that the boundary should be drawn along the crest of the Marwatti range, His Highness asked for a considerable tract of country on the British side of the frontier agreed upon. The Viceroy was satisfied that the British Commissioner had made all proper enquiries and listened to the statements of

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 92 (Frontier), dated the 13th May 1896.

the tribesmen, and that the boundary he fixed was not only in accordance with the map, but was a fair one as between the Governments of India and Afghanistan. Under these circumstances, and after the British Government had gone to the trouble and incurred the expense involved in carrying out the demarcation single-handed, it was not reasonable to ask them to go through the work again. The inclusion of Birmal in Afghan territory was in itself a large concession made to His Highness at Kabul by Sir Mortimer Durand, and the Viceroy was unable to make any further concession on this part of the boundary or to deviate from the map prepared in Kabul, in the way His Highness now desired. With the above explanation, the Viceroy asked the Amir to accept the demarcated line, in the same spirit of friendship which had brought about a settlement elsewhere, and to return duly ratified the memorandum and map sent to His Highness in September 1895. The letter concluded with an offer to secure and protect the rights of individual Afghan subjects on the British side of the boundary, and an expression of the Viceroy's confidence that His Highness would reciprocate in this respect.

The Afghan officials in Birmal had been ostentatiously asserting claims on behalf of the Amir to the territory referred to above, and trying to stir up the inhabitants to resist our authority. They succeeded in raising a certain amount of agitation among the Madda Khels, who own lands on both sides of the boundary, but the tribesmen did not seriously commit themselves. A few discontented Madda Khels went to Birmal to represent that they were not willing to remain under the British Government and desired to live in Afghan territory. The Afghan official told them that he could not act against the British Government, but would refer the matter to the Amir. About this time a letter, dated the 19th April, was received from His Highness, complaining that the Waziris continually raided in Khost and other Afghan districts, and that the British Political Officer not only failed to restrain them, but encouraged them to plunder and murder in Afghan territory.

On the 13th of March, Mr. Casson, Political Officer in the Tochi valley, was wounded by a tribesman near Hassu Khel. Mr. Casson was marching to Saidgi, with the Officer Commanding at Idak, Zaffar Khan, a Jemadar of Police, and a few cavalry sowars. The party had just dismounted at a ruined mosque outside Hassu Khel, when a man standing by drew a dagger, rushed at Mr. Casson and wounded him in the right side. Zaffar Khan closed with the would-be assassin, who struggled to use his pistol: it missed fire, and he was then killed by a sword cut. The attack was the work of an individual fanatic and not a symptom of any general disturbance in the Tochi valley, where, everything was quiet. Mr. Casson made a satisfactory recovery.

In January 1896 the Government of India ordered the reduction of the garrison in the Tochi valley to the permanent sanctioned strength, *viz* :—

4 mountain and 2 Maxim guns,		1 squadron of native cavalry,
		2 battalions of native infantry.

Sanction was accorded to political establishments, &c., costing Rs. 31,026 a year for the Tochi valley, and Rs. 38,681 for the Gumal and Southern Waziristan, including the salary of the two Political

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 109 (Frontier), dated the 9th June 1896.

Officers specially appointed to the tracts in question.

In April 1896, the interference of the Sipah Salar in the Mohmand coun-^{The Moh-}try reached a stage when it was no longer^{mand bound-}ary.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 100 (Frontier), dated the 19th May 1896.

possible to leave his proceedings unnoticed.

He complained to the Commissioner of Peshawar that British officials had commenced to construct a canal within the Afghan boundary. The canal in question was near Michni, in territory which had long been under British administration, and far to the east of the Afghan frontier as laid down in the Kabul Convention. But he went to much greater lengths than this in regard to the country near Mitai, which also, according to the same map, fell beyond the Afghan sphere of influence. It appeared that one Malik Ghairat, Musa Khel of Mitai, belonging to the party opposed to Afghan supremacy, had succeeded, with the countenance and aid of the Khan of Nawagai, in ousting Malik Sultanai, his rival, of the Afghan faction. Ghairat then wrote to the Sipah Salar, announcing his return to Mitai and declaring himself a servant of the King of Islam: the Sipah Salar threatened to take up Sultanai's cause. On the 2nd April, the Khan of Nawagai wrote to Major Deane that the Sipah Salar had ordered Malik Ghairat to come to him, threatening to attack Mitai unless he obeyed. Major Deane replied that the Khan should not interfere with the Mohmands or give them any advice in the matter. For some time it was believed that the Sipah Salar would limit his interference to giving moral and pecuniary assistance to Sultanai. It was even reported that he had the Amir's orders not to go beyond this; but on the 23rd of April Major Deane received an urgent letter from the Khan of Nawagai, asking what he should do, as the Sipah Salar was sending 400 khassadars to Mitai, and the Khan feared an attack even on Karkanoshah, which had long been in his possession. Two days later, news was received that the khassadars had occupied Mitai without resistance; that Ghairat had been taken prisoner and Sultanai reinstated; and that the Sipah Salar had ordered the Khan of Nawagai to withdraw from the Suran valley and the villages of Bar Chinarai and Inzarai which he had recently occupied; and also from Kuch and Karkanoshah which he had held for some years. Major Deane had already advised the Khan to relinquish the three places first named, but with regard to the latter he was instructed to tell the Khan that, if the Sipah Salar pressed him, he should reply that the question of his boundary was a matter for the British and Afghan Governments to settle, and that he, being on the British side of the boundary, could not yield places in his possession without the consent of Government.

The Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar was directed to write urgently to the Sipah Salar, requesting him to withdraw the khassadars from Mitai, and the Viceroy addressed a letter to the Amir in which this request was repeated. It was pointed out to His Highness that Mitai and the other villages claimed by the Sipah Salar were clearly on the British side of the boundary laid down by the Kabul Convention; that the Government of India were perfectly willing to co-operate in a friendly spirit with His Highness in demarcating this part of the boundary in accordance with the agreement and the map attached to it: but that, while a boundary settlement was in progress between two Governments, it was not a right or friendly act for either Government to send armed men across the boundary laid down in the agreement in accordance with which the settlement was to be carried out.

Therefore it was not possible to discuss this part of the boundary in a friendly spirit until the khassadars sent to Mitai were withdrawn. The Amir was also requested to direct the Sipah Salar to refrain from issuing orders to the Khan of Nawagai, who is a Khan of Bajaur, and therefore within the sphere of the British Government. The opportunity was taken of informing the Amir that for a long time past numerous reports had been received that the Sipah Salar had been interfering with, and giving unfriendly advice to, the tribes on the British side of the boundary, and His Highness was asked to warn him seriously to abstain from conduct which was likely to imperil the friendly relations between the two Governments.

The Sipah Salar replied to the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar that he could not relinquish any part of the Mohmand country; that Mitai was in the Mohmand country, which belongs to the

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 142 (Frontier), dated the 28th July 1896.

Amir; and that he would never withdraw his men; that his advance was necessary because of the Khan of Nawagai's encroachments; that the Kabul Convention map, which showed only undemarcated boundaries, was worthless and could not be accepted; and finally he asked that the Government of India should address the Amir, as he could not of himself do anything until he received His Highness's orders. The Amir also replied (18th May) to the Viceroy's letter. He expressed surprise that the Government of India should have called upon him to restrain the Sipah Salar, as he had been expecting to hear that a warning had been sent to the Khan of Nawagai instead. He maintained that it was the intention of the Durand Convention to leave the whole of the Mohmand country to Afghanistan; that no mention of any details was made in the Convention itself; and that in the Convention map the Mohmand line was only shown in a general manner and was not correct. His Highness observed that many discrepancies and mistakes had become evident in the Kabul map of 1893: and he affected to consider the various concessions made to him from time to time in the course of demarcation, as mere rectifications of errors in the original map, which is not the case. His Highness further said that in occupying Mitai, Ghulam Haidar Khan did not act contrary to the agreement; that Safdar Khan had attacked Afghan subjects; that the British Government did not reprimand him, and it therefore became necessary for the Sipah Salar to protect the Mitai people; that even when withdrawing from Mitai, the Khan had posted some of his men in hereditary villages of Mitai, and wrote to the Sipah Salar that Inzarai and Karkanoshah belonged to Nawagai. That subsequently the Khan admitted Inzarai belonged to the Afghan Government and withdrew his men, but held on to Karkanoshah. As to the latter place, he agreed to the Khan's claim being enquired into and decided by the Joint-Commissioners when demarcation was resumed. The Amir stated that he was ready to order demarcation to be resumed, whenever the Government of India wished. In His Highness's opinion, the line from the Nawah Kotal, where Mr. Udny stopped work, should be the mountain range, which runs along the following places:—"Nawah, Chamarkand, Tahat-rusar, Rambat, Silalasar, Parugat, Shishai, Koh-i-Mur, Buland Kandao, and Babar Azi, going as far as Michni." Few of these places were shown on our maps, and it was not possible to make out exactly the line which the Amir suggested. The Amir's letter was

friendly in tone; but he had not ordered the Sipah Salar to retire, and apparently had no intention of doing so. Nor did he make any allusion to the complaint that Ghulam Haidar Khan had been interfering with, and giving unfriendly advice to, the tribes on the British side of the boundary.

Meanwhile the Sipah Salar did not fail to act up to the reply sent by himself and his master. He reinforced his khassadars at Mitai, occupied the villages from which Safdar Khan retired, and wrote to certain Maliks of Mitai and elsewhere that the whole Mohmand tribe was under the control of the Amir, and that unless the Khan of Nawagai made reparation for the attack on Mitai, he would be brought to account. The arrival of the Afghan khassadars in Mitai was regarded with anxiety by the majority of the Mohmands. The Halimzais, who were ordered to be ready to aid Ghulam Haidar in attacking the Khan of Nawagai if he failed to make reparation, took oath among themselves not to do so. In pursuance of his claim to the whole Mohmand tribe, the Sipah Salar summoned even the Isa Khel and Burhan Khel sections to come to him under penalty of being treated as enemies: these sections receive no allowances from Kabul, and live in Pindiali, on the right bank of the Swat river, some fourteen or fifteen miles from the Peshawar border, and about forty miles to our side of the Durand map line. Many sections refused to obey the summons.

Throughout the month of June, the Afghan khassadars remained at Mitai: they behaved in their usual truculent manner and quarrels with the people have resulted. The Musa Khel were now as anxious to be relieved of the presence of the Amir's levies as they were two months ago of the Khan of Nawagai. The latter was called upon by the Sipah Salar to pay a lakh of rupees as compensation for the injury done by him in his attack on Mitai, and the Musa Khels were made to pay the Sipah Salar for the aid given them in expelling the Khan. Meanwhile, the Amir continued to send firmans to the whole Mohmand tribe, telling them that under the Kabul Convention they all belong to Afghanistan and more tribesmen sent to enquire of the Commissioner of Peshawar what their status really was. The Usman Khel and Khwaezai were asked to give in an agreement accepting Afghan rule, but decided to decline.

Eventually, on the 7th of July, after obtaining the telegraphic sanction of Her Majesty's Government, the Amir's letter of 18th May was replied to. His contentions that the Durand Convention left the whole Mohmand country to Afghanistan, and that many errors had been made in the agreement map were refuted. The line drawn on that map was explained to him; and the Government of India declined to give up to His Highness tribes with whom they had had direct relations for the last forty years, such as the Dawezai and Utmanzai Mohmands, and those sections of the Halimzai and Tarakzai, who live between Michni and Palosi. The Amir was again requested to withdraw his khassadars from Mitai, and it was insisted that the discussion in regard to the boundary must proceed on the basis of the Kabul Agreement map. The Amir was told that the line proposed by him was altogether contrary to the map, and could not under any circumstances be admitted. It was added that on His Highness accepting these propositions, the Viceroy would be willing to proceed with the discussion about this part of the boundary, and, as a preliminary measure, if the Amir approved, His Excellency was prepared to depute

an officer to Landi Khana, or some other convenient place, to meet an officer appointed by the Amir, and discuss the best way of defining and demarcating the British and Afghan spheres of influence from Nawah Kotal to the Kabul river and thence to Landi Khana and Safed Koh. At the same time, the Punjab Government was instructed to authorize the Political Officers on the frontier to enter at once into relations with the Dawezai, Utmanzai, Halimzai and Tarakzai sections of the Mohmands on the British side of the Durand line, and to assure them that they would in any case remain under British influence. It was decided not to give similar assurances to the Baezai and Khwaezai Mohmands, who live in Mitai and that neighbourhood.

Demarcation
of the Af-
ghanistan-
Baluchis-
tan fron-
tier.

The Viceroy's letter of the 1st December 1895 agreed to the line of boundary proposed by the Amir between the Sarlat range and Koh-i-Malik Siah, on the condition that His Highness withdrew all objections to the line already demarcated from Chaman to the Sarlat range, and admitted certain grazing rights of British subjects on the Afghan side of the boundary. His Highness accepted the concession, but re-asserted the right of Afghanistan to Iltaz Karez on the Sarlat range, which was clearly British territory. This was, however, considered a point of minor importance, and while maintaining that it was situated in the British district of Shorarud, the Government of India informed

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 19 (Frontier), dated the 29th January 1896.

the Amir that, if the settlement and ratification of the remaining portion of the Baluch-Afghan boundary were carried out without delay, Iltaz Karez would be conceded to Afghanistan. Captain A. H. McMahon, C.I.E., now re-organised his mission and left Gulistan for Spintizha on the 29th January, his Afghan Colleague, Sardar Muhammad Umar Khan, joining him a few days later.

Work commenced on the 5th February, and by the 7th the line had been carried along the watershed of the Wachdara nullah to the crest of the Khwaja Amran range. Towards the end of March, demarcation had been completed to Robat, and on the 26th of that month, Captain McMahon and the Afghan Commissioner started thence with a small party to complete demarcation to the Persian frontier, the main British camp party remaining at Robat.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 149 (Frontier), dated the 11th August 1896.

Delimitation was satisfactorily completed to the Koh-i-Malik Siah on the 19th April. The march through the 250 miles of desert between Robat and Koh-i-Malik Siah was a very trying one, owing to heavy sand and sandstorms, want of water and supplies, great heat, and the impossibility of procuring good guides.

The final joint agreements and maps were signed at Robat on the 13th May, and the Commission broke up the next day, the Afghan Commissioner returning to the Helmand and the British party to Quetta, where the latter arrived on the 29th of May. Before Captain McMahon and the Afghan Commissioner finally separated on the 14th May, they arranged that the Chageh post should be evacuated by the Afghan khassadars and taken over by the British on the arrival there of Captain McMahon's party. The fort was accordingly made over by Captain McMahon on the 19th May to the original owner, Ali Khan, Sinjerani. The Afghan customs-post, which for some years past had been stationed on the Nushki-Persian kafil route at Ghalicha, nearly 100 miles south of Robat, was withdrawn to Arbo, north of the demarcated line.

In August 1895, Sir James Browne submitted proposals for securing order on the adjoining frontiers of Baluchistan and Afghanistan. He pointed out that a system of regular criminal extradition would be a difficult matter, but considered that it might be worth while to make an effort in this direction. He thought, however, that there would be no difficulty in laying down in conjunction with the Afghan Government rules, whereby quarrels could be settled by reference to mixed "councils of elders" from both sides of the border, and thereby prevented from developing into serious forms of crime. The Government of India considered that an extradition treaty was out of the question, but they fully recognised the desirability of introducing some arrangement by which petty disputes between members of tribes on opposite sides of the border could be settled direct by British and Afghan frontier officers. Captain McMahon had reported that the Afghan Boundary Commissioners with whom he had been associated had shared these views, and on his return from Koh-i-Malik Siah in June 1896, he reported that his Afghan colleague was still anxious for a system of direct communications between frontier district officers to be introduced, and was strongly representing the matter to the Amir. The Viceroy decided not to address His Highness on the subject for the present, but to wait and see if he took the initiative. The Agent to the Governor-General was informed accordingly, and told that in the meantime his officers should encourage the settlement of border cases as far as possible by tribal custom, and that there was no objection to their occasionally corresponding with the local Afghan officials regarding petty border matters, whenever those officials showed any inclination to respond.

Arrangements for settling petty border disputes.

Reports were received from several quarters that the Russians were about to extend the railway line from Merv to the Kushk valley. The Russian Consul-General assured Mr. Ney Elias in January that, so far from any railway or road being undertaken in the direction of the Herat frontier, the troops near the border were being reduced. Notwithstanding this, numerous informants of the Meshed Agency persisted in their statements that the line was about to be built, and that the roadway was under preparation. Their reports received strong confirmation from St. Petersburg, whence a newspaper correspondent telegraphed in April that sanction had been accorded for the construction of the line. Reports were also received that branch lines from Dushakh to Sarakhs, and from Charjui to Karki, were about to be commenced. On the 26th June, Mr. Ney Elias telegraphed that earthworks for the railway were in course of construction between Pul-i-Khishti and Sheikh Junaid. According to local reporters, re-inforcements had arrived at the latter place, and about 20 more guns were sent there from Sarakhs at the end of April. The troops which ordinarily leave the Kushk valley during the unhealthy hot months and which had actually started, were sent back to Sheikh Junaid. The frontier posts at Kizlayak and Bosagha on the Oxus were occupied by 600 infantry, 350 Cossack cavalry and 200 Turkoman sowars, and here too some unusual activity was reported. News-writers at various places in Trans-Caspia continually referred to some movement being impending. The Amir's news-agents also reported that something unusual was in progress; and His Highness addressed the Government of India on the subject. He stated that the garrison of Sheikh Junaid had been increased, and that guards of mounted Cossacks

Russian activity on the Herat frontier.

had been placed on every post and road in Russian territory, to watch the frontier and prevent persons from Afghan territory from ascertaining the movements of troops. With regard to the railway extensions, His Highness said that contracts had been given for the completion of the work in three months,

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 143 (Frontier), dated the 4th August 1896.

and that it was being quickly hurried on.

He accordingly asked advice as to what counter-preparations should be made in Afghanistan, so that the frontier might be properly protected and no time lost. The Amir was informed that the Government of India had no reason whatever for supposing that the Russians were contemplating any hostile designs against Afghanistan; that they had recently introduced a new system of customs regulations, and their arrangements connected with it possibly afforded an explanation of the reported activity of the frontier guards of Cossacks. A further communication was promised to His Highness, after the Government of India had heard from Her Majesty's Government.

Request by the Russian Government for the extradition of a murderer who had taken refuge in Afghanistan

In November 1895, the Russian Government represented to Her Majesty's Government that, some six months previously, a Russian soldier accompanied

by a jigit had been sent to a post called Tubeek, where, with the aid of some Afghans, the jigit had murdered the soldier, and afterwards fled to Rustak taking with him the horse and arms of his victim. The Russian Government asked that the murderer might be made over to their nearest frontier officer with the stolen property. Under instructions from Her Majesty's Government, the Amir was requested to cause enquiry to be made, and, if the crime were established, to cause the murderer to be surrendered. The Amir made no denial of the facts put forward by Russia, and said that he had arrested the murderer; but he argued that it would be a disgrace to Afghanistan and Great Britain if he were compelled to surrender to Russia criminals who took refuge in his country, unless the Russian Government reciprocated. He asked if they were prepared to do this, and if so, he wanted an agreement with Russia to be secured through the medium of the British Government. The Government of India, in addressing the Secretary of State on the subject, stated that there was no common standard of justice between India and Afghanistan, that they themselves were not prepared to enter into arrangements with the Amir for reciprocity in the matter of extradition, because there would be no guarantee that criminals surrendered to the Amir would not be condemned without fair trial and subjected to barbarous treatment. The same reason would, no doubt, appeal to the Russian Government, and the Government of India hoped that it might be possible to explain to the Russian Ambassador that the Amir made stipulations which rendered compliance impossible, and that, in doing so, His Highness was within his rights. It was further pointed out that any arrangement for reciprocity in this respect as between Afghanistan and Russia must be made through the British Government, and that we should be responsible for the Amir's carrying it out, an addition to our responsibilities which it was most undesirable to make.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 18 (Frontier), dated the 29th January 1896.

While this question of extradition was still under consideration, the Russian Consul-General at Meshed asked the British Consul-General to obtain the release of one Arna Muhammad Sarik, a

Russian subject, who had been imprisoned in Afghanistan whither he had gone to purchase black lamb-skins. The Amir was asked to inform the Government of India of the facts of the case, and replied that black lamb-skins were a monopoly of the Afghan Government; that any unauthorised person found trading in them was heavily fined and imprisoned for a year in irons; that Arna Muhammad was well acquainted with the restrictions, and was carrying on the trade surreptitiously: and that he had accordingly been arrested and imprisoned, and the skins confiscated. A reply in these terms was sent to M. de Vlassow, and no further representation on the subject was received.

In March, the Viceroy addressed the Amir regarding a complaint by the

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 75 (Frontier), dated the 22nd April 1896.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 94 (Frontier), dated the 18th May 1896.

Russian Government that their patrols on the right bank of the Amu and Panja rivers were fired upon by Afghan soldiers from the opposite bank. His Highness

Russian complaint of hostile acts by Afghan soldiers.

replied that his people had not behaved in the way complained of, and mentioned two instances of unfriendly proceedings on the part of the Russian officers on this part of the frontier. According to a report from the Beg of Kataghan, some time between December and January last, when he was proceeding from Hazrat Imam Kunduz with fifty sowars, inspecting the river posts, the Russian pickets on the opposite bank turned out fully armed whenever they saw the Afghan party, and fired their rifles in the air, in the direction of the Afghan camp. The second incident was reported on the authority of the Hakim of Wakhan, who stated that about the same time, a Russian officer, accompanied by a few Shighnis from trans-Oxus, crossed the river and seized Kazi Ghulam Nabi of Wakhan and three other Afghan subjects, and took them away: the three Wakhis had since been released, but the Kazi was still under detention. The Amir asked that specific instances might be given instead of a general charge against his frontier officers. He added that both last year and this, the Russians fired upon the Afghan guards at the Kakal and Samtal ferries in Rustak and elsewhere; and he requested that the Russian Government might be addressed on the subject.

During the half-year, the Amir enjoyed rather better health than of recent Kabul years. Though still lame, he on more than one occasion accompanied his sons on shooting excursions near Kabul, travelling in a sedan chair. Though undoubtedly annoyed at the refusal of Her Majesty's Government to allow him to appoint an official agent in London, the relations between His Highness and the Government of India have continued to be fairly satisfactory. In replying to Lord Salisbury's autograph letter communicating the decision about the official agent, His Highness said that he had made the request because the Russians were close on his frontier, and he feared that occasions might arise necessitating speedy discussion when it would be simpler for him to write direct to Her Majesty's Minister in London, through an agent there, than to do so through the Indian Government. As Her Majesty's Government were not able to agree to his wish, he accepted their decision, but he added that, if there were at any time delay in questions of urgency, he would be free from all responsibility. In the same letter the Amir expressed great pleasure in permitting his sons, Habibulla Khan and Nasrulla Khan, to accept the distinction of Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George, conferred

on them by Her Majesty the Queen. His Highness was reported to have sent some very valuable presents to Her Majesty, through the Hon'ble George Curzon. His Highness made no communication to the Government of India on this subject.

After his return from England, Sardar Nasrulla Khan resumed charge of the civil and criminal work of Afghanistan, and is reported to have introduced reforms gratifying to the people. Sardar Habibulla Khan superintends the administration of the army. According to a report from Kabul, the Amir at the request of the leading Muhammadzais and Barakzais had decided to assume the title of Sultan, and "Light of the Nation and the Religion;" the title of "Amir" being conferred upon Sardar Habibulla Khan.

Two more of the eight 7"—guns which the Government of India are presenting to the Amir arrived at Kandahar on the 3rd of January, and were removed to Kabul. Four of these heavy guns have now reached the capital.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 12 (Frontier), dated the 15th January, 1896.

British
Agent at
Kabul.

In April, the Viceroy nominated Risaldar-Major Muhammad Amir Khan, Popalzai, 3rd Punjab Cavalry, for the appointment of British Agent at Kabul, in succession to Lieutenant-Colonel Muhammad Akram Khan, who had been murdered in the previous October. The Amir, however, objected to the nomination and asked that the Agent should be a Sunni Mussulman, born of Indian parents, and not of Afghan descent. Considerable difficulty is experienced in obtaining an official with the necessary qualifications.

The Amir's
trade
agents.

As a result of the prosecution of the Amir's trade agents at Peshawar for refusing to obey the orders of the Deputy Commissioner, the offenders were fined. Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 66 (Frontier), dated the 15th April 1896. The Viceroy explained the circumstances to the Amir (24th January 1896), pointed out that the collection by any State of taxes within the territory of a foreign Power is opposed to the exclusive rights in the internal administration which such Power must claim and retain, that the practice of His Highness's agents was an encroachment upon those rights, that they had exceeded the limits which the law allows, and finally suggested that, in order to avoid further unpleasant questions arising, the Amir should conform to the practice of all nations and station within his own boundaries all officers or agents who had authority from His Highness to demand the dues of Afghanistan. The Amir replied that, if his agent's proceedings caused any injury to the British Government, he would order the recovery of the dues at Dakka, and on the Government of India concurring that this was desirable, he enquired which of his various agents at Peshawar it was desired should be withdrawn. The Viceroy replied (24th June) that the object of the Government of India was merely to put a stop to practices, on the part of His Highness's agents and officials, which constituted an encroachment on the exclusive right of the Government of India in the matter of the collection of taxes in British territory; accordingly, while there was no objection to the presence at Peshawar or elsewhere of the Amir's agents employed in business concerns only, His Highness should withdraw all those persons who took tolls in British territory on goods coming from or proceeding to Afghanistan.

The exactions of the Afghan officials continued to have a prejudicial effect on trade with British India. Owing to the imposition of extra taxes upon

traders and the enhancement of the export duties, several Kuchi camel-owners did not return to Afghanistan this summer, but went on to Kashmir. Under orders from Kabul, the Afghan officials at Dakka demand a fee of three rupees a foot passenger, and five rupees a camel, on all kafilas proceeding to Peshawar. A guarantee is also demanded from the merchants that they will return within a fixed time. On the 23rd of April, the Khyber Rifle guard sent to Landi Khana to escort the kafila for India returned alone, as the traders, who were unable to meet the Afghan demands, were detained at Dakka.

The Amir wrote to the Commissioner of Peshawar, complaining that certain carriers were in the habit of leaving Peshawar secretly with goods for Afghanistan, in order to avoid paying the kafilabashi fee to His Highness's Agent in that city; and that on men being sent after them, the Political Officer in the Khyber refused to allow any enquiries to be made of the carriers. The Commissioner informed the Amir (7th May) that the kafilabashi had twice gone to Jamrud and, without previous reference to the Political Officer, seized camels *en route* to Kabul; and on the second occasion, he had beaten the carriers, enforced double payment of fees, and behaved in a very arrogant manner.

After giving full consideration to the views of Her Majesty's Government regarding the harsh treatment of soldiers of the Indian army when on leave in Afghanistan, the Government of India decided not to address the Amir on

Harsh treatment of soldiers of Indian army in Afghanistan.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 46 (Frontier), dated the 11th March 1896.

the subject at present. In a despatch, dated the 11th of March 1896, it was explained to the Secretary of State that the

British soldiers, whose ill-treatment had been reported, were all subjects of the Amir who had entered our service without the Amir's consent and had gone back to their homes on furlough without first obtaining His Highness's permission. The Government of India recognized in practice the Amir's objection to British subjects entering Afghan territory and our inability to help them there, and this being the position with regard to British subjects, a stronger line could not be taken in the case of the Amir's own subjects. It was added that, as regards the ill-treatment of Her Majesty's Indian subjects in Afghanistan, the Government of India had intervened in cases where the treatment was considered harsh or unjustifiable, and such intervention had never been altogether in vain.

The Amir having failed in his endeavours through Sir Mortimer Durand to obtain the consent of the Persian Government to the appointment of an Afghan

The Amir's Agent at Meshed.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 87 (Frontier), dated the 6th May 1896.

Agent at Meshed wrote to the Viceroy (11th March 1896) asking the intervention of the Government of India. He

stated that the Persian officials told Abdulla Khan, whom His Highness had deputed last year to Meshed, that they could not recognize his appointment without a firman from their own Government; that His Highness had asked the British Minister to obtain the requisite firman, but that Sir Mortimer Durand had replied that the Persian Government would never recognize the appointment in any way. The Amir accordingly informed the Government of India that, unless an Afghan Commercial Agent were permitted to reside in Meshed, he would prohibit Afghan traders from visiting,

Persia, and order them to trade in future with Merv, Askabad and Panjdeh instead. The Government of India were aware that the object of the Amir was not merely the establishment of a trade agent, and that the functions of the agent were intended to be rather of a political than a mercantile nature, and this was contrary to the arrangement with His Highness that he should not have direct relations with any foreign Power other than the British. A reply was accordingly sent to His Highness to the effect that, as he had already approached the Persian Government through Sir Mortimer Durand, and the Government of India could only do the same, it was feared that the answer communicated by Her Majesty's Minister must be accepted as final.

The Governor of Herat sent some Afghan officials early in the year to establish an Afghan Post Office at Meshed. The Postmaster-General of Khorassan sent Abdulla Khan a message that, if the men were not immediately withdrawn, he would move the Karguzar to turn them out of Meshed. The Afghan officials were thereupon recalled to Herat.

Military executions during the operations of the Chitral Relief Force.

Towards the end of the year 1895, Her Majesty's Government invited the attention of the Government of India to the various military executions which had taken place during the operations of the

Chitral Relief Force, and asked for a complete list of such executions, and for full information as to the authority under which the death penalty was inflicted and as to the manner in which it was carried out. Her Majesty's Government also asked if the Government of India were satisfied that in each case the offence was sufficient to justify the death sentence. In complying with Lord George Hamilton's request (19th May 1896), reference was made to the difficulties and responsibilities that devolve on General and other officers charged with the safety of a force under their command, and the Government of India stated that they were satisfied that the offence was in each case sufficient to justify capital punishment, that the officers responsible did no more than their duty required of them, and that they acted in accordance with the customs of war as recognised by the highest authorities.

Burning of the bodies of Ghazis.

About the same time, the general question of the burning of the bodies of Ghazis came under consideration. The law provides that the bodies of fanatics sentenced to death under the Murderous

Outrages Act shall be disposed of as the sentencing Magistrate shall direct; and enquiries showed that it had been the almost invariable custom, both on the Punjab frontier and in Baluchistan, to burn the bodies as a deterrent measure. The opinions of distinguished officers, both in the past and present, are greatly divided on this question: His Excellency Lord Elgin and Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick are among those who disapprove, the late Major-General Sir James Browne on the other hand was strongly in favour of the practice, as was the late Lord Lawrence. The Government of India considered it repugnant to employ a form of punishment which derives such efficacy as it possesses solely from the result it is supposed to produce in the next world; nevertheless, the reasons given for its continuance had sufficient force to render it undesirable to make any change at present in the Act. Consequently after full consideration, they contented themselves with expressing their concurrence in Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick's aversion to the practice,

and requested that their views might be made known to all officers serving on the Punjab frontier and in the Baluchistan Agency. Executive officers prosecuting under the Act will then be aware that, as a matter of policy, the burning of bodies should be strictly limited to cases of true fanatical outrage, and that even in such cases, this method of disposing of the body should only be pressed for when the Local Government has admitted that, owing to the prevalence of the crime in any particular tract, such action is necessary or expedient.

On the 1st of May, a Shinwari Ghazi, a *talib* of Mulla Najm-ud-din of Adda, stabbed Lieutenant Stevens of the 20th Punjab Infantry, on the Peshawar railway platform. Lieutenant Stevens died on the 6th of May from the effects of the wound. The murderer was tried and executed. He was a Ghazi of the most fanatical type : he heard his sentence unmoved, and the only request he made was that he might be paraded through the Peshawar city before execution.

**M u r d e r o f
Lieutenant
Stevens.**

HALF-YEAR

WHICH ENDED ON THE 31ST DECEMBER 1896.

On the 14th August, an important letter was addressed to the Punjab Government on the subject of the administration of the frontier districts and the management of the trans-frontier tribes. The results achieved during the last few years in carrying out the policy which Government wished to substitute for the "close border" system were reviewed, attention was again called to the objects desired, further explanation was given as to the means by which those objects can be best attained, and as to the extent of the interference with the tribes which the Government of India have in view, and the Lieutenant-Governor's suggestions were invited for further regulating and improving the administration of the border in order to give full effect to this policy. The letter is not one to which justice can be done by an imperfect abstract, and it will be found printed *in extenso* as an appendix to this volume.

Punjab frontier policy.

The working of the arrangements for keeping open the Dir-Chitral road has continued to run very smoothly during the half-year. Major Deane was able to purchase locally almost all the grain required by the Chitral garrison, in spite of the efforts of Mullas and others to prevent the sale of supplies to the British Government. A few cases of fanatical attacks on individuals occurred in the vicinity of the Malakand camp, and two or three of the Khan of Dir's levies were killed by rifle thieves; but the safety of the road has never been endangered, and traders have travelled in perfect security. The levies have settled down to their work and the service is popular. Trans-frontier trade by this route has naturally increased enormously under the new order of things. During the six months which ended on the 30th September 1894, the value of imports and exports, respectively, totalled Rs. 2,22,744 and Rs. 2,91,920. During the corresponding period in the current year, the figures rose to Rs. 10,43,424 and Rs. 16,15,892, exclusive of all Government supplies and stores for Chitral and Malakand.

Dir-Chitral Road.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 124 (Frontier), dated the 14th July 1896.

The Khan of Dir has, on the whole, behaved well. On the 22nd of November, he came in to the Malakand to see His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor who was visiting the post, and announced his intention of making a donation of Rs. 5,000 for the construction of a dispensary at Chakdarra. The dispensary, which at the Khan's request will be called after Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, has been commenced, and will be a great boon to the people of the country.

Umra Khan arrived at Lahore with his followers, on his return from Mecca, on the 17th July. He persistently refused the offer made to him of an allowance and honourable employment in Baluchistan, maintaining that he had always been loyal to Government, and was not responsible for the trouble last year in Chitral, and begging that he might be allowed to return to Jandol.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 172 (Frontier), dated the 23rd September 1896.

Mr. Crawford, the Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, saw him at Ziarat, and pointed out the advantage of accepting the Government offer, but the Khan refused to alter his decision and left Chaman for Kabul on the 24th of August. The Amir, who was informed of Umra Khan's return, has given an assurance that he will not be allowed to live near the frontier. Most of the men, who went to Kabul with Umra Khan, have returned to Bajaur, and still give out that he will shortly return there.

Early in the winter, information reached the Political Officer for Dir and Swat that the Khan of Nawagai had attacked the Khan of Pashat at Dageh, and that in the fighting which ensued, some men were killed on both sides. The Khans of Dir and Barwa were both anxious to aid the Khan of Pashat, but as this would inevitably have led to other Chiefs joining in the conflict and a general disturbance in Bajaur, Mr. Davis told them not to do so. Under orders from the Government of India, he warned Safdar Khan that he would suffer if he attacked a Khan who was friendly to Government, and requested him to desist from attacking Pashat, and to restore all property and places which he might have captured. Safdar Khan replied that the Khan of Pashat had long been subordinate to him, and that if he would come in and tender submission, the Nawagai force should be withdrawn. Mr. Davis again reminded him that he was risking the displeasure of Government. Safdar Khan thereupon disbanded his following, but left garrisons in the two Dageh forts which he had captured, and at the end of the year he continued to hold the whole Babukarra valley from Dageh to Jhar, and part of the Mamund valley to a line a little north of Inayat Kila. The Shamozaï Utman Khel, the Salarzai and Mamunds all collected to help the Pashat Khan, but the Khan sent them back, finding it difficult to provide supplies for them and relying on the intervention of the British Government. Mr. Davis reported that he had good information that the whole affair was worked by the Adda Mulla, backed up by the Sipah Salar, in order to throw difficulties in the way of the Boundary Commission going to those parts.

In June, Major Deane submitted certain proposals connected with future arrangements for the maintenance of the road. He expressed the opinion that, if

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 154 (Frontier), dated the 25th August 1896.

Government desired, to extend their influence and obtain a stronger hold over the country, so as to ensure the certainty of control over Dir and the neighbouring tribes, the troops forming the flying column should be moved nearer Dir to the open country in the Adinzai valley at the foot of the Laram, the Laram itself being occupied during the summer. If this forward move were rejected, Major Deane recommended the break up of the Malakand Brigade and the withdrawal of the movable column, leaving one regiment to hold the posts at Durgai, Malakand and Chakdarra. The Viceroy declined to sanction the proposed advance, which would constitute a departure from the declared policy of Government of maintaining and securing the road by arrangements with the tribes. Those arrangements had so far worked well, and His Excellency agreed with an opinion expressed by Major Deane that the more the Government can keep out of the country, compatible with the maintenance of communications with Chitral, the better. Nor was the Viceroy prepared to reduce the Malakand garrison to the extent recommended

by Major Deane: His Excellency considered it of much importance not to risk the success of the policy hitherto pursued by a premature withdrawal, or by too great a reduction in the number, of the troops. In consideration, however, of the support which could be rapidly moved up from Mardan in case of necessity, the Government of India thought it might shortly be possible to withdraw from the Malakand one battalion of Native Infantry and a company of Sappers and Miners, but a decision on the point was deferred until next year.

Captain Godfrey, the Officiating British Agent at Gilgit, has been on tour ^{Gilgit Agency.} to Gupis where he met the Governor of Yasin, the Hakim of Ghizr and other notables of the district. They willingly agreed to arrange by levies for police work in their country, provided that this did not entail military duty. Raja Akbar Khan of Punyal and his men are willing to undertake levy work of any description.

The Chilas district has been perfectly quiet throughout the year. The people thoroughly understand that they are subjects of His Highness the Maharaja and are responsible for their own particular portions of the district; there have been practically no crimes of violence, the few instances having always been amongst the Gujar population in the highest portions of the nullas, and far from the road between Bunji and Chilas, along which traders and all classes travel to and fro without fear. The Chilas and Thak communities paid in their tribute to Kashmir for the current year, as well as arrears for previous years. They are now cultivating a great deal more land than formerly.

Large convoys for Gilgit have used the Babusar route, and when the road which is now under construction is completed, and rest-houses erected along it similar to those on the Burzil route, the difficulty of the journey from Abbotabad to Gilgit in the winter will be considerably lessened. The detachment of the 37th Dogra Regiment sent up to relieve the detachment of the 32nd Pioneers at Gilgit travelled by this route, the relieved troops also using it on their way to India.

The tribesmen of Tangir and Darel, who had been led by interested persons to believe that the British Government intended attacking their country, have notwithstanding given no trouble. Certain of the tribal elders came in to Gilgit and were interviewed by Sir George Robertson, who assured them of the kindly intentions of Government towards them, and told them to remove from their minds any fear and alarm raised by selfish and foolish persons. The Darelis and Tangiris only wish to be left alone and the British Agent's action has had good results.

Raja Sikandar Khan of Nagar made a representation to the British Agent that frequent attempts on his life had been made by his enemies, instigated by Raja Khusru Khan, his nephew. At the pressing request of the Chief, and on the condition that he would personally bear the cost of their maintenance, the British Agent agreed to Khusru Khan and his brothers being sent to Gilgit.

The arrangement sanctioned by the Secretary of State, under which Chitral. Chitral is to be added to the charge of the Political Officer for Dir and Swat, had not been introduced at the end of December, when the Assistant Political Officer in Chitral was still under the orders of the British Agent at Gilgit.

The Chitral State has been perfectly quiet during the half-year. The Assistant British Agent accompanied the Mehtar on a prolonged tour in the Turikho valley and in the Shoghot, Lutkho and Arkari districts. He reported that he found the Turikho Adamzadas, who are devoted to the cause of Sher Afzal, discontented and that they would give trouble if they dared. On the Mehtar's arrival at Rain, the Adamzadas refused to obey orders, and the Assistant British Agent warned them that, unless they behaved properly, they would be severely dealt with. The individuals who had been disobedient were punished as an example to the others. Enormous numbers of cattle have died in almost every district of the State from rinderpest.

On the 2nd July, a summer camp on the hills south of Darosh, at an elevation of 7,300 feet, was occupied by a small detachment of the 28th Punjab Infantry. A road fit for laden mules has been cut almost to the summit by working parties of men of the regiment.

Owing to a report having been received that a number of rifles had been and were being sold from Chitral territory to Kohistanis and others, enquiries were made as to how many of the rifles presented to the State by Government now remained in the Mehtar's possession, and he was urged to call in and impound all military rifles in the hands of his people which they could not prove to be legitimate private property, keeping for himself and registering in Chitral those which are Chitral State property, and returning to Government any taken from our troops, all of which bore distinguishing marks. As a result of these enquiries, it has been ascertained that, out of the 750 Snider rifles and carbines presented by Government to Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk in 1886 and 1889, only about 100 are in the possession of the present Mehtar, the bulk of the remainder having been taken away by Sher Afzal in 1892 or by Umra Khan in 1892 and 1895. About 100 Enfield rifles are also in the possession of the Chitral State: and it is believed that, excluding these, there are not now more than 150 rifles of all kinds in the hands of the people of the country.

The question of the duration of the stay of the British garrison in Chitral came under consideration during the summer. On grounds of economy it was thought desirable that the force should be relieved every second year, but on political grounds it was eventually decided that the troops should be relieved next spring, and that thereafter, if the movement of troops through Bajaur were effected as quietly as on the last occasion, it might be possible to allow the Chitral reliefs to take place biennially.

In September Sher Afzal, Amir-ul-Mulk and the rest of the Chitralis under detention in India were removed from Dharmasala to Ootacamund, it being considered undesirable to keep them in convenient proximity to the frontier.

The Amir has issued a notice to the traders of Badakhshan that he wishes them in future to travel to Asmar, Bajaur and India through Kafirstan, instead of by Chitral as hitherto, and he promises to exempt them from all tolls for three years if they will do so. The merchants were doubtful about accepting the Amir's proposal, but the route is already beginning to be used. The tolls on through trade between Badakhshan and Bajaur form an important part of the revenue of the Chitral State; and it will be a serious loss to the Mehtar if the

Amir eventually induces traders to adopt the Kafirstan route. The question of paying compensation to the Mehtar on the understanding that he should withdraw the tolls levied on traffic in Chitral came under the consideration of Government, but it was ascertained that the duties levied on local trade were small, and it was feared that any reductions of the tolls on through trade to Badakhshan and Wakhan would be followed by a proportionate increase of the rates levied in Afghanistan, and the proposal was abandoned, subject to reconsideration hereafter.

The Amir's suzerainty over Kafirstan may now be said to be completely **Kafirstan.** established, and the Kafirs are settling down under the new order of things. According to a census taken under the orders of the Sipah Salar, it was found that the country contained about twenty-five thousand inhabitants. This is less than one-half of the estimate formed by Sir George Robertson. The Sipah Salar has been directing his energies to the construction of roads through the country. A good road has been constructed from Lughman to Munjan through Waigal, and a detachment of sappers is to be permanently employed in keeping it in repair. A road from Kunar to Munjan through Veron has also been completed, and it is to be extended to Badakhshan; strong forts have been built in the Veron valley and at Kamdesh and Lutdeh.

Generally speaking, the Kafirs have embraced the Muhammadan faith and are fairly well treated. The Kulam and Ramgul Kafirs are more severely treated than the other sections, as they have stood out against observing Muhammadan customs.

Early in November, a deputation of Wai Kafirs arrived in Chitral to ask the Assistant British Agent and the Mehtar if they might seek refuge in Chitral, or if anything could be done to save them from the tyranny of the Amir's officials. They stated that the Afghans exact supplies without payment, besides levying revenue to the extent of half their crops, and eight rupees a family. Lieutenant Gurdon interviewed the deputation, and they informed him that their real object in coming was to ascertain if he would write to the Sipah Salar and urge him to treat them more leniently. Lieutenant Gurdon informed them that he had no authority to correspond with the Sipah Salar on such matters, but that, if they or any of their fellow-countrymen desired to take refuge in Chitral territory, they were at liberty to do so.

The Tungani rebellion was completely suppressed before the end of the **Chinese** year. The Russian Consul at Kashgar did his utmost to make the rising appear **Turkistan.** of grave importance, and offered protection to the Munshi in charge of the British Agency, who, however, politely declined assistance. M. Petrovski assured the Russian subjects in Kashgar that on the first outbreak of a disturbance in the city Russian troops would be called in.

Mr. Macartney returned to Kashgar in September after being away over a year. He was very cordially received and found that his position had not been weakened during his absence. He re-opened the case of the assault by Chinese soldiers on the Agency Munshi, but was unable to get any further satisfaction from the Chinese authorities, who contended that the soldiers had been duly punished. The Chinese have behaved in a very friendly way in the

matter of emancipating slaves of British Indian origin in the New Dominion, and but few remain to be released.

Last year Mr. Macartney made a present of an atlas to Tao Tajén, the late Provincial Governor of the New Dominion. The Chinese officials on examining it noticed that the region situated east of Ladak known as Aksai Chin was shown as within Kashmir territory. This they maintain is incorrect; Aksai Chin, they contend, belongs to Chinese Tibet, and the Taotai, under orders from the Provincial Governor, mentioned the matter to Mr. Macartney, with a view to his bringing it to the notice of the Government of India. Mr. Macartney promised to report the matter, adding that Askai Chin was a general name for an ill-defined and very elevated table-land at the north-east of Ladak, and it was probably the case that part was in Chinese and part in British territory. This supposition appears to be correct: the Aksai Chin tract having been so shown on the maps of the Government of India for many years past. Mr. Macartney believes that M. Petrovski, the Russian Consul, to whom the atlas was shown by the Taotai, induced the Chinese to make this reference.

**Hazara
border.**

The Government of India have agreed to Saiyid Firoz Shah and his followers re-occupying Sitana on the border of the Hazara district, from which he was exiled 38 years ago. Previous to 1853, the Saiyids and Hindustani fanatics were jointly established at Sitana. Between that year and 1863 several expeditions were sent against them, and agreements were subsequently taken from the adjacent tribes that they would not permit the Saiyids or Hindustanis to again settle in Sitana. During the next few years Firoz Shah made several attempts to re-establish himself at his old home but unsuccessfully, and since 1888 he has lived quietly at Malka, maintaining until recently his friendship with the Hindustanis and persistently holding aloof from our authority and influence. Now, however, he has voluntarily made submission to Government, and begged to be allowed to settle in the home of his forefathers. The local authorities considered that sufficient punishment had been inflicted upon him for his past misdeeds, and that his request might be conditionally granted. It has accordingly been decided that, if Firoz Shah obtains the consent of the tribes concerned to his re-settlement in Sitana and Mandi, and if the tribes agree to be responsible for his good behaviour, he may be allowed to return there, provided that he does not levy any tolls by land or river, and does not admit any Hindustanis into the tract.

**Black Moun-
tain.**

Hashim Ali Khan, the leader of the troubles on the Black Mountain, which culminated in the expeditions of 1891 and 1892, has also been making overtures to the local British authorities, asking pardon for past offences and begging to be allowed to return to his home trans-Indus in Isazai limits. He has been told that the offer previously made to him still holds good, *viz.*, that if he desires to come in and make his submission, he may do so, and that he will be given an allowance of Rs. 150 a month, conditional on his living in the Peshawar or Rawalpindi district.

**Pamirs,
Shighnan,
Wakhan,
&c.**

In October the Amir duly took over the cis-Oxus Darwaz district, which fell to him under the terms of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1893. He sent a force of 500 khassadars to establish his suzerainty, and so far as is known, there have not been many cases of people leaving their homes for Russian or

Bokhara territory in consequence of the change. The number of families which have come under the Amir in Darwaz is said to be about 7,000.

The Russians have made trans-Oxus Shighnan and Wakhan over to the Amir of Bokhara, and withdrawn most of their troops. The inhabitants are, however, dissatisfied with Muhammad Akbar Khan, the Shighni prince installed as Governor by the Bokhara ruler, and have petitioned the Russians to remain. A small Russian post is being established on the Oxus near Langar Kisht, opposite the Afghan post of Kila-i-Panjah.

On the 4th of August, the Viceroy sent to the Amir a copy of the map signed by the British and Russian Commissioners, who last year demarcated the Russo-Afghan frontier on the Pamirs. A note describing the boundary line was also sent, and His Highness, having previously been informed that the British and Russian Governments had ratified the demarcation, was told that these documents would serve as a sanad for the Afghan Government. In his reply, dated the 27th of August, the Amir repeated a request, which he had made in a former letter, that he should be furnished with a sanad from the Russian Government. Adverting to the occupation of the tract which under the settlement had fallen to Afghanistan, he repeated the view which he had consistently maintained, that 400 sowars and 1,000 khassadars were necessary for its efficient protection. He referred to the barren and inhospitable nature of the country, and the great expense of keeping men in such a locality; and his letter amounted to a warning that, unless all cost connected with the payment, feeding and housing of this force with its transport were borne by the British Government, he would not regard the tract as part of Afghanistan. His Highness added—"If the tract be not looked after, the Russians, who are notorious for making encroachments, might advance, and if the Afghan 'karawals' be not equal to cope with them, a similar disgrace to that which some years ago fell on the Afghan Government, when they slaughtered some of my 'karawals' would be inflicted again on my Government, and even if there be 600 khassadars, the same thing would happen."

After a reference to the Secretary of State, a reply was sent to the Amir in January 1897 to the effect that the protection of the boundary was secured by the agreement made between Great Britain and Russia, and that in these circumstances the number of men desired by His Highness was more than sufficient for the purpose of showing that Eastern Wakhan is in Afghan possession, and the Russian Government might reasonably object that the employment of so large a force was contrary to the provision of the agreement that no military posts should be established in it. It was explained to the Amir that the new country which he now has to administer is a narrow strip from Kala Yust to the new Russian boundary, a distance of about 120 miles, only one-third of which is capable of being inhabited in the winter, and that a sum of Rs. 50,000 a year should be ample for its administration; this sum was offered to His Highness as an addition to his subsidy. With regard to the Amir's request for a sanad from the Russian Government, it was pointed out that the documents already furnished to him were sufficient record of the agreement, which had been accepted by the Russian Government, and that no further sanad was necessary.

Mohmands.

The Amir left the Viceroy's letter of the 7th July unanswered for two months, and meanwhile, in spite of the assurances given to the Dawezai, Utmanzai, Halimzai and Tarakzai sections by the Commissioner of Peshawar, considerable uncertainty pervaded the minds of the Maliks, who continued to make enquiry as to their future status. Orders were accordingly issued that Maliks of these sections might be told quite clearly that in the future they must look to the British Government alone, and that if they were interfered with they should report the fact to the British officers. Should any Maliks raise the question of allowances, they were to be told that, wherever the Amir had been in the habit of paying allowances, the tribes might rest assured that they would be no worse off in future under the British Government, but that the amounts to be given would be enquired into and considered in connection with the pending negotiations with the Amir.

The Sipah Salar continued to exert himself to the utmost to induce the whole Mohmand tribe to accept the Amir's suzerainty and to secure the punishment of those who had come to Peshawar to see British officers. He received letters from the Amir for delivery to the Tarakzais, telling them to cherish no hopes of deliverance from His Highness's control, as he would never allow English rule over Lalpura subjects, and that they should refrain from intercourse with the British authorities at Peshawar, as it could do them no good and they would repent it hereafter.

On the 9th of September, the Viceroy reminded the Amir that no reply had been received to His Excellency's letter of the 7th July. The Amir was told that there appeared to be much unrest among the Mohmand tribes on account of the uncertainty as to the exact position of the boundary, and that consequently the headmen of the Dawezai, Utmanzai, Halimzai and Tarakzai sections had been informed, in reply to their letters, that they would remain under British control. The desirability of early demarcation was again urged, and the offer made in the letter of the 7th July, to depute an officer to Landi Khana to discuss the matter with an Afghan official, was repeated. The Amir was also told that, if any of the Mohmands on the British side of the boundary had been in the habit of receiving allowances from Kabul, there would be no necessity for His Highness to continue these payments after the boundary had been demarcated, as the British Government would undertake the payment of such allowances for the tribes under their control, and the headmen had been so informed.

The Amir's answer to the letter of the 7th July was received a week after the foregoing was despatched. It was a long, argumentative letter, the main contention being that no reliance was to be placed on the Kabul agreement map, and that the whole of the Mohmand tribes belong to Kabul: consequently His Highness declined to admit that, in sending armed khassadars to Mitai, the Sipah Salar had acted contrary to the agreement, or trespassed in any way beyond Afghan limits. On the above understanding, the Amir expressed his readiness to proceed with demarcation.

In reply the Amir was told that the Government of India altogether declined to accept his arguments or to depart in any way from the position

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 142 (Frontier), dated the 28th July 1896.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 183 (Frontier), dated the 14th October 1896.

defined in the Viceroy's letter of 7th July; and that, unless within a month His Highness accepted the propositions therein laid down, it would be assumed that he was unwilling to undertake the demarcation of this part of the frontier. In this case, His Highness was warned that the Government of India would strictly adhere to the agreement map line, and would hold His Highness responsible if any of his officers trespassed beyond it; further that, if through his default the demarcation of the frontier could not be completed, the whole agreement which contained provisions highly beneficial to His Highness's Government, might be imperilled. The Amir was told that the British Government would, in future, pay such allowances as might be necessary to the Halimzais, Tarakzais and other Mohmands on the British side of the border; and that, if the Khan of Lalpura, who is under the protection of the British Government, were willing to come into British territory and to live in the Peshawar district, the Government of India were willing to continue to pay the tribal allowances through him, and that this suggestion was being communicated to the Khan. The Khan of Lalpura was addressed accordingly by the Commissioner of Peshawar.

The negotiations now seemed about to take a more favourable turn. On the 23rd of October a letter was received from the Amir which, while he said nothing about withdrawing his khassadars from Mitai, amounted to an acceptance of the propositions laid down in the Viceroy's letter of the 7th July last, and His Highness expressed his willingness to partition the Mohmand country in accordance with the agreement.

In view of the friendly and reasonable tone of His Highness's letter, the Viceroy replied, on the 12th November, offering to concede the Baezai villages other than Mitai and all the Khwaezais, while maintaining that the country of the Halimzai, Tarakzai, Dawezai and Utmanzai sections whose tribal limits are well known, including also the Kandahari and Safi villages and all the villages of the Musa Khel Baezais of Mitai, must necessarily remain under British control. It was explained to the Amir that this delimitation involved a very considerable concession to His Highness, that it was impossible to yield any more of the country on the British side of the line, and that the decision was final.

In spite, however, of the apparently satisfactory terms of the Amir's letter, all local reports showed that his agents had in no way relaxed their efforts to induce the whole Mohmand tribe to accept Afghan suzerainty. Winter quarters were being built for the khassadars at Mitai; allowances were being paid to Maliks, who were told that they would be made to refund all payments made in the past if they submitted to the British; and all were encouraged to visit the Sipah Salar, who was industriously giving out that we meant to open a road through Mohmand limits to Bajaur and place troops on it, and thus virtually conquer the Mohmands.

Early in November, in compliance with a summons, fully representative jirgas of the clans which the Government of India have taken over came in to Peshawar. Their attitude was good and they accepted the position as explained to them; it was agreed that they should continue to receive river tolls as here-

tofore, and allowances aggregating Rs. 16,800 a year were granted to them as follows :—

					<i>Rs.</i>
Halimzai	8,480
Kamali	2,800
Dawezai	1,200
Utmanzai	720
Tarakzai	3,600

The above represents payments to be made by Government in lieu of allowances heretofore paid by the Amir, and is exclusive of the allowances and presents made to the tribes by the Khan of Lalpura, amounting to about Rs. 7,000 a year, which at their request it has also been agreed to pay to them direct in future. On the 26th November, over a thousand men of all sections were received by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab in Darbar near Shabkadar. His Honour informed them that they had come under the sole control of the British Government, that in return for the allowances they would be expected to render such service as Government might require from them, and to be faithful and well-conducted in their dealings with us. They fully recognized the main fact that they were now under the British Government, and liable to do service when called on.

The Khan of Lalpura at first sent an evasive answer to the Commissioner of Peshawar's letter, in which he was told that, if he were willing to come and live in British territory, the Government of India would continue to pay through him the tribal allowances hitherto paid by the Amir. Subsequently he wrote that he was ready to come in, but dare not till his son and brother were safe out of Kabul. He maintained this doubtful attitude throughout, and it was decided to break off negotiations with him altogether, leaving him as before under the Amir.

The acceptance of the Government terms by the Mohmand sections unfortunately by no means cleared away the last of the difficulties by which the Mohmand boundary question is surrounded. In December a letter was received from the Amir, the intention of which was apparently to withdraw from or modify the position accepted in his letter of the 17th October, *viz.*, that His Highness would agree to partition the Mohmand country in accordance with the Durand agreement. He repeated his former arguments that the Mohmand country had always been, and was still, a part of Afghanistan, and that the British Government had declared that they would at no time interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

With the Secretary of State's concurrence, it was decided that the Government of India must maintain the position which they had from the first adopted. His Excellency the Viceroy addressed the Amir accordingly, reminding him of the previous correspondence in which His Highness withdrew his objection to our contention that we had a right to a part of the Mohmand country, and informing him that the offer made in the Viceroy's letter of the 12th November would remain open to His Highness until the 31st January 1897, and that if His Highness failed to reply within that date, the concessions offered in the said letter would be considered as withdrawn, without any further

intimation from the Government of India. The Amir was further informed that we should not proceed with the negotiations with the Khan of Lalpura, who had not seen fit to come into British territory when the suggestion was communicated to him ; that arrangements had now been completed with the Halimzais and Tarakzais and certain other sections of the Mohmands in a manner satisfactory both to the Government of India and to the jirgas of the tribesmen ; that the allowances which the tribes had received either directly from Kabul or through the Khan would now be paid to them by the Government of India, and that His Highness would be relieved of any concern with them.

A fresh local dispute arose during the summer, regarding the head of the Kurram. Kharlachi canal on the Kurram river, about which some correspondence passed between the Amir and the Government of India in 1894, when Afghan subjects destroyed the dam built on a site selected by the Officer on Special Duty in Kurram. On that occasion, the Amir agreed to the dam being reconstructed on the original site. It now appears that about the middle of May last the dam broke ; it was rebuilt under the personal superintendence of Mr. Hastings, who explained the matter to the Afghan Governor of Khost ; but in spite of this, the dam was destroyed on the 22nd May by an Afghan daffadar and some sowars. The dispute in connection with the site of the dam raised the question as to the actual boundary line between the Lora Khula and Sulemani Chauki villages, which are respectively a few hundred yards north and south of the Kurram river. The cultivation of the Afghan village of Pathan and that of the Turi village of Kharlachi overlap just about where the line crosses the river. When Mr. Donald and Sardar Sherindil Khan were demarcating, they saw the inconvenience of this, and to obviate future disputes, small pillars were erected, in the presence of the Afghan Governor, at the corner of each field where the line changed direction. On the demarcation map, the scale of which was too small to show the intricacies of local cultivation, the boundary between Lora Khula and Sulemani Chauki was shown by a perfectly straight line. The subsidiary pillars had now been destroyed, and Sardar Sherindil Khan denied all knowledge of their ever having existed. He claimed that the boundary lies in a straight line from Lora Khula to Sulemani Chauki : and he further proposed that, to avoid future disputes, the Pathan people should give up to the Kharlachi men their land on the British side of the line, receiving in exchange the land on the Afghan side of the straight line at present occupied by the men of Kharlachi. The Viceroy wrote to the Amir expressing his readiness to accept this proposal, provided that His Highness would issue explicit instructions to Sardar Sherindil Khan that the dam-head should not be interfered with again.

In reply the Amir maintained that the dam-head had been improperly built within Afghan limits and that his officials rightly destroyed it. He insisted that the boundary line is a straight line between the pillars erected at Lora Khula and Sulemani Chauki, denied that any subsidiary pillars were ever erected between those points, declined to agree to the exchange of lands between the Afghan villagers of Pathan and the Kurram villagers of Kharlachi, and further denied that any such proposal was ever made by the Governor of Khost. While, however, demanding that the boundary line between Lora Khula and Sulemani Chauki should be a straight line, His Highness gave an

amusing specimen of his inability to understand a map, by declaring that the perfectly straight line drawn on the Government map between the pillars is not a "straight" line; and he explained his meaning by sending a "corrected" map in which he drew a *perpendicular* line downwards from Lora Khula, which, however, did not join Sulemani Chauki at all.

Further argument being considered useless, the Government of India agreed with His Highness that the simplest line to adopt is a perfectly straight one, as on the demarcation map, but said that it must lie evenly between and connect the boundary pillars at Lora Khula and Sulemani Chauki, and that all the land on the British side of the line will belong to the people of Kharlachi and all the land on the other side to the subjects of Afghanistan; and in order that there might be no room for future complaint, it was suggested that the Officer on Special Duty in Kurram should, in communication with the local Afghan officers, erect a few subsidiary pillars directly on the straight line connecting the two boundary pillars at Lora Khula and Sulemani Chauki.

The Amir still appeared not to understand the position; he affected to consider the perpendicular line which he showed on the map the correct one, but he agreed to subsidiary pillars being put down along the straight line previously demarcated by the Joint-Commissioner, "on the lands of the Pathanis and Kharlachis, which have been partitioned." Orders were accordingly sent to the Officer on Special Duty in Kurram to erect subsidiary pillars, in communication with the Governor of Khost, either strictly in a straight line between the existing pillars at Lora Khula and Sulemani Chauki, or in accordance with the existing local rights of the cultivating villagers, whichever he finds the Afghan representative prepared to agree to.

The Cham-
kanni Tribe.

In July 1895, a peaceable settlement was arrived at by the Officer on Special Duty in Kurram with the Khani Khel Para Chamkannis, who for a long time previously had given trouble in Kurram. The jirga came in and promised to be friendly, and the settlement was consequently a very lenient one, being no more than the wiping out of all old scores as between the Chamkannis and Turis. It was, however, hoped that it would ensure future peace on the border. The Chamkannis, however, commenced misbehaving again during the past summer. Three separate raids were committed by them between May and July 1896, and they cut the telegraph wire on the 5th July. A post of the Kurram Militia was located at Shakardarra, and Mr. Hastings, the Officer on Special Duty, was authorized to inform the Chamkannis, in reply to a letter which they addressed to one of his officials, that the door of forgiveness was open to them if they chose to come in, bringing with them all the cattle stolen in the recent raids. At the end of October, a fully representative jirga came in to Sadda, and was received by Mr. Hastings. The demeanour of the tribesmen was satisfactory, and time was given them to bring in all the stolen property in their hands as a preliminary to the establishment of friendly relations. They failed, however, to restore the property and committed further offences, and at the end of the year the Punjab Government proposed to send a punitive expedition against them. A similar proposal had been vetoed in the previous year, and again on this occasion the Government of India expressed their strongest disapproval of it. As an alternative, they suggested that the

tribe should be blockaded, and that the Chamkannis should be told that continued bad behaviour would entail the thorough punishment of the tribe at our own time, while good behaviour, including return of the stolen property, would entitle them to friendly treatment and perhaps eventually the grant of service allowances for levies to be entertained within their limits.

The Amir has not replied to the Viceroy's letter of 15th April, regarding Waziristan. the boundary demarcated between Domandi and Khwaja Khidr, to portions of which His Highness raised objection. He, however, explained that the reason that he had not ratified the boundary was that he was dissatisfied with it, and intended making a further representation on the subject. Meanwhile the Wano Ahmadzais were reported to be hesitating about taking up their *Kirris* to graze in the tract round Baghar China and Zindawar which is on the British side of the line. They had been led to believe by reports from Birmal that the boundary delimited would be altered, and that grazing fees would be levied from them in this tract by Afghan officials. Instructions were accordingly issued that the Wano Ahmadzais might be assured that the Government of India intended to adhere to the boundary line laid down, and would not permit any interference by Afghan officials on the British side of it.

At the end of June a dispute arose between the Tapi Khel and Zalli Khel Waziris, regarding certain land in the centre of the Wano valley, about three miles from the cantonment. Both sides took up arms and a serious disturbance appeared imminent. The Government of India held that it was impossible to allow fighting in this locality, and orders were at once telegraphed to the Political Officer, Wano, directing him to interfere authoritatively and to insist upon the settlement of the disputes by a jirga of the headmen if possible, and failing this, by the appointment of arbitrators. The result fully justified expectations, and a satisfactory settlement was promptly arrived at in the presence of the Political Officer. Permission was similarly given to the Political Officer to interfere and insist on a peaceable settlement of a land dispute between the Giga Khel and Nekzan Khel Mahsuds on the one side, and two sub-sections of the Toji Khel Ahmadzais of Wano on the other. The Government of India ruled that, throughout the Wano plain, the Political Officer was responsible for the maintenance of peace and order, and that, while in all cases tribal machinery should be used for the settlement of disputes in accordance with tribal custom, he should authoritatively forbid bloodshed and any attempt to enforce supposed rights by an appeal to arms. It is not intended that the Political Officer should himself administer the tract or should himself decide any disputes, but it is his duty to see that the tribal machinery works and is worked properly. He should insist on all disputes being referred to and decided by arbitration or tribal jirga, and if possible by mutual consent, and should support the authority of the headmen by assisting them with the levies to enforce their decisions when necessary.

The proceedings of Mulla Powindah have been productive of some uneasiness. He gathered round himself a band of 200 men, whom he sent to the different sections demanding a contribution of two rupees from each man. His object was said to be to get the Maliks of all sections

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 182 (Frontier), dated the 14th October 1896.

to join him and supply him with funds, and, after thus demonstrating tribal consolidation, to obtain the formal recognition of the complete independence of Mahsud country beyond Shahur. He sent one party of 25 men to Wano to collect contributions, but on the Wano Maliks objecting, the Political Officer ordered the party to leave Wano, and they went away. The Mulla next demanded contributions from the Shahur Shaman Khels, threatening to loot them if they hesitated about paying. Mr. Grant informed the Shahur Shaman Khel Maliks that they were at liberty to contribute religious alms to the Mulla, but that, if they were unwilling to do so, Government would not permit the Mulla to injure them in Shahur. About the middle of July, a letter was received by Mr. Grant from all the principal Mahsud Maliks, asking for permission to make an urgent representation to Government, as Mulla Powindah had openly claimed the rulership (Badshahi) of the Mohmand country, and declared that no Maliks or other persons who receive pay from Government should have funeral ceremonies performed over them by Mahsud Mullas or even be buried in Mahsud country. The Maliks said they feared a serious outbreak might take place which would bring them into disrepute, and they prayed that Mulla Powindah should be compelled to leave Mahsud territory, and that Government would occupy the rest of their country.

At the end of July, the Mulla started for Kabul and arrived there early in August, with a following of 700 men and women. According to a report from the Kabul Agency, the party offered their allegiance to the Amir, and asked for help to fight the British. His Highness told them that he had a firm friendship with the British, and reminded them that, when he wished to enter into relations with the Waziris in years gone by, they refused to come to him, whereas now that they were in difficulties they asked for help. The Amir himself addressed the Government of India about the arrival of the Waziris, and forwarded a petition, which they presented to him. In this they described themselves as duly authorized representatives of all the Mahsud and Dawari tribesmen, stated that they had determined to migrate from their country into Afghanistan, and begged that land might be given them. They further asked that British officials should not interfere with them or their tribesmen, so that they might "come to the country of Islam," and that the British Government should be asked to pay them the price of their lands and property in Waziristan. The Amir asked for advice as to the answer he should give, and added—"As these people have published the fact that they are refugees who have sought the protection of the Afghans, I must ask Your Excellency to make some arrangement for them."

His Highness was told in reply that the British Government had no objection to Mulla Powindah and the Maliks with him migrating to Afghanistan, that British officers would not be allowed to interfere with those who wished to leave their country, and that the tribesmen could make any arrangements they pleased with their fellow-tribesmen for the disposal of their lands and houses in Waziristan.

The Amir's treatment of the Mulla was not such as to encourage others to follow his example. The barest subsistence allowance was granted to the party, and before the reply of the Government of India to the Amir's reference reached Kabul, many of them had returned secretly to their homes. It was

ascertained that the party, who went to Kabul and signed the petition to the Amir, were, with very few exceptions, men of no importance and were certainly in no sense representative of Mahsud tribal opinion. On the Mulla's arrival at his home on the 2nd October, he at once summoned the Waziri and Daur Maliks to meet him for a general consultation. Very few attended, and he is generally discredited, the Maliks refusing to have anything to do with him. He wrote, however, to the Political Officer at Wano that the people of Islam had been much inspired and encouraged by the boldness of the Amir, and that "if a move is made by Government to take up a fresh position, perhaps disturbances will occur between the Musalmans and the British." At the end of the year he was reported to be in great difficulties and anxious to be allowed to come in to British territory.

The state of affairs in Waziristan and the Tochi has not been altogether satisfactory. Intrigues against the Maliks are at work, and the control of the Maliks over the turbulent characters of their sections has been relaxed. Several murders and other offences on the roads, for which we are responsible, have been committed, and the murderers have escaped and raids and counter-raids between Waziris and their Afghan neighbours have become frequent on the frontier. Consequent on this unsatisfactory condition of affairs, the headquarters of the Tochi force was moved to the vicinity of Datta Khel in the Upper Tochi. The site for the new cantonment had not been definitely decided upon at the end of the year.

In April 1896 the Amir wrote to the Government of India, complaining that numerous raids had been committed by Waziris against Afghan subjects in Khost. A reply was sent to the Amir informing him that several cases had been brought forward by the Waziris of attacks on them by Afghan subjects, and that the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab proposed to arrange for a meeting between the British and Afghan officials concerned, with a view to the settlement of all outstanding cases on both sides. The Amir was asked to instruct his local officers accordingly, and the letter expressed the opinion that, if the local officers on both sides of the border were encouraged to correspond direct with each other and to meet occasionally to settle the more important disputes, much advantage would result to both Governments. The Amir replied that he had ordered his frontier officers to draw up a list of all the cases and then appoint an agent to go, with the complainants, to the British officer in Waziristan, for the settlement of their claims. But he declined to accept the Viceroy's suggestion that the British and Afghan frontier officers should correspond direct with each other regarding such frontier cases, and occasionally meet to discuss them. His Highness said that, until he himself was aware of the circumstances of a matter and had issued his personal orders about it, he could not delegate any authority to his officers.

In September, the Amir announced to the Government of India his **Kabul.**

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 178 (Frontier), dated the 7th October 1896.

adoption of the title of "Zia-ul-Millat wad-Din" (Light of the Nation and Religion), in addition to his title of Amir.

He wrote that it was the unanimous request of his people that he should be thus honoured in recognition of all that he had done for the country, and that

he had agreed to their proposal. His Highness added—"As the illustrious British Government are the friends of the God granted Government of Afghanistan, I thought fit to inform Your Excellency of the excellent unanimity of the people and the appropriate arrangements made. * * * On account of this unanimity of the people of Afghanistan, I convey my congratulations to the high officials of the illustrious British Government." The letter contained no reference to the selection of Sardar Habibulla Khan as His Highness's successor, though it had been reported from several sources that an announcement to this effect was made by the Amir in Afghanistan, and that the Sardar was now everywhere recognized as heir to the throne. The Viceroy cordially congratulated the Amir, and sent His Highness a diamond star as a personal memento on the auspicious occasion.

In the Amir's letter just referred to, His Highness also informed the Government of India that his people had decided to increase the strength of the force available for the protection of the frontier. His Highness writes—"In addition to the agreements of the agents of the tribesmen of Afghanistan and the Muhammadzais, the people of the country have written about one other matter also, stating that, in the laws of their religion, the strengthening of their frontiers is an essential matter; and, as the limits of their dominions have been duly defined and fixed, they required a sufficient number of troops, for which purpose they have selected one out of every eight able-bodied men in the country; that they have undertaken the support and maintenance of the men so selected, and have arranged for their training in military exercises and drills, and that these men will be ready on the occasion when their services are required."

From information received from various parts of Afghanistan, it appears that this proceeding is far from a spontaneous one on the part of the people. On the contrary, the Amir's order for this additional conscription is said to have caused much dissatisfaction and dismay, and many people have fled the country to evade it.

The Amir having accepted the nomination of Maulvi Ghafur Khan, Deputy Collector of Lucknow, as British Agent at Kabul, he left Peshawar on the 29th October, and arrived at Kabul on the 11th of November. He announced to the Amir that he had been entrusted with the insignia of the Order of St. Michael and St. George for delivery to the Shahzadas Habibulla Khan and Nasrulla Khan. The Amir said that he would himself deliver the insignia, &c., to his two sons, and the Agent accordingly made them over to His Highness.

Reports are in circulation that the Amir has severed his connection with Sir Acquin Martin, and appointed Mr. Pack, a Roumanian Jew, as His Highness's agent in India. The Afghan agent with the Government of India gives credence to the report, but no official communication on the subject has reached either the Government of India or Sir Acquin Martin.

The Amir has been unusually active in attempting to induce Afghan refugees and others in India to return to Afghanistan. Having patched up his long-standing quarrel with Sardar Ibrahim Khan (eldest son of Amir Sher Ali), he has pardoned and taken into favour, amongst many others, Saiyid Mahmud,

the ex-Badshah of Kunar, the notorious Sardar Nur Muhammad Khan, who for so long defied the Afghan troops on the confines of the Jalalabad district, and the son of the late Mustaufi Habibulla Khan. His Highness is also said to have thrown out hints that he would be quite prepared to receive Sardars Muhammad Ayub Khan, Muhammad Yakub Khan and Muhammad Ishak Khan, if they were willing to return. He also asked the Government of India to allow Sher Afzal, Chitrali, to return to Kabul. In the case of the ex-Badshah of Kunar, His Highness addressed the Viceroy, stating that he had pardoned his offences against the Afghan Government and agreed to his return to Afghanistan, and enquiring what was the nature of the charges on account of which the Government of India recently ordered his removal to Sialkot as a political prisoner. The Amir was told that it was hardly necessary to furnish His Highness with all the details of Saiyid Mahmud Khan's treacherous conduct, but that the Government of India were satisfied that he and his family had been engaged in intrigues endangering the peace of the frontier. On this account, and because the Saiyid's place of residence in Kunar was close to the Mohmand and Nawagai border, it was considered inexpedient, for the sake of the good understanding between the British and Afghan Governments, that he should go back to his own country, until the settlement of the boundary in the Mohmand country is completed. So soon as that was accomplished, the Viceroy would be pleased to meet the Amir's wishes and allow the ex-Badshah and his son to return to Afghanistan.

In connection with the Amir's representation asking for advice consequent on the renewal of Russian activity on the Herat frontier, the Government of India addressed an important despatch to the Secretary of State on the 4th August. After reviewing the assurances

Reference by the Amir regarding Russian activity on the Herat frontier.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 143 (Frontier), dated the 4th August 1896.

given from time to time to the Amir, and the statements of policy which have emanated from Her Majesty's Government in regard to the defence of Afghanistan from foreign aggression, they declared their adhesion to the traditional policy of the British Government, and expressed the opinion that it was essential to the security of our Indian Empire that the integrity of Afghanistan, and the distance which now separates the Indian and Russian frontiers should be jealously maintained, and that any serious attempt by Russia to occupy or attack any portion of Afghan territory, as now demarcated and defined, should be regarded as tantamount to a declaration of war. The Government of India accordingly proposed in replying to the Amir to renew the assurance given by Sir Mortimer Durand in November 1893, that the British Government would aid His Highness in repelling unprovoked aggression on His Highness's territories; to inform the Amir that the best and most obvious means of meeting any hostile intent on the part of Russia is to encourage the improvement of communication in Afghanistan itself, more especially between Kandahar and Kabul, and Kandahar and Herat, and between these places and British India; to remind His Highness of the advice given him by Lord Lansdowne regarding the great advantages to be expected from the construction of railways and telegraphs, and, while admitting that the decision must necessarily rest entirely with His Highness, to urge very strongly the expediency of uniting Herat with Kabul and India by telegraph; to inform him that we recognise the desirability of

pushing on our own railway systems up to the Afghan border, so as to be in a position to give effective assistance should necessity arise, and that we are prepared to extend the railway beyond Peshawar when necessary, and finally to offer to give the best advice in our power in regard to any matter which His Highness considered necessary for the protection of Afghanistan from foreign aggression. The Government of India pointed out to the Secretary of State the great advantage of extending the railway from Peshawar towards Dakka, and that it would afford the strongest evidence to the Afghans that we meant to act up to our engagements with them, while it would be an exact reply from our side to the Russian railway extension, without being in any way a violation of our engagement not to interfere with the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

Her Majesty's Government considered it undesirable to renew the assurances already given to the Amir; or to specially remind the Amir of the advice pressed upon him by Lords Lansdowne and Dufferin in respect to the construction of railways and telegraphs; they preferred that the reference to the desirability of constructing railways and telegraphs as protective measures should be touched upon in general terms; they did not object to the letter containing a reference to railway extension beyond Peshawar, if the Government of India considered this opportune; but they held that no encouragement should be given to the Amir to incur further expenditure on the defences of Herat, and that he should not be led to expect further assistance from Her Majesty's Government for adding to the defences of a fortress acknowledged to be incapable of staying the advance of an invader for any length of time; the offer to furnish His Highness with technical advice as to the defence of his northern frontier should be conveyed in general terms, and should not point directly to an increased supply of armaments from British arsenals.

A letter on the foregoing lines, and omitting any reference to the desirability of railway extension beyond Peshawar, was accordingly despatched to the Amir on the 2nd January 1897. Meanwhile, the reports of Russian railway extension from Merv towards the Herat frontier, which gave rise to the correspondence just reviewed, have been fully confirmed. Earthwork for the line from Merv to Tanurah has been taken in hand, and it is expected that the line will be opened in 1898.

Extradition
with Af-
ghanistan.

The question of the introduction of extradition arrangements as between Afghanistan and Russia and Afghanistan and England has again on the represent-

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of
State for India, No. 20 (Frontier), dated the 29th
January 1896.

ation of the Russian Government been under consideration during the half-year. Her Majesty's Government fully recognized the difficulties which the Government of India had shown must attend any such arrangement, but they were reluctant to acquiesce in an admission that the British Government had no means of inducing the Amir to surrender refugees in his territory who are accused on good evidence of exceptionally heinous crimes; the more so, as after making such an admission it would not be easy to protest against any measures that Russia might adopt for coming to an arrangement with the Amir direct. Some of the objections raised by the Government of India were privately explained to M. de Staal, coupled with an offer, should the Russian Government desire it, to

consult the Government of India as to the possibility of negotiating an extradition agreement with Afghanistan, "which should provide for the surrender by the Amir to the British Government of British or Russian subjects accused of heinous murders in British or Russian territories or protectorates, respectively, who had taken refuge in Afghanistan, and reciprocally for the surrender, through the British Government, to the Amir of Afghan subjects accused of a similar crime committed in Afghanistan, who had taken refuge in British or Russian territories." Certain limitations and provisos were suggested, and it was observed that such an arrangement seemed likely to encounter many difficulties in execution; but it was admitted that the question of arranging some form of extradition with Afghanistan could hardly be indefinitely postponed.

The Russian authorities objected to the arrangement being worked through the Government of India, and wished the agreement to be made direct between them and the Amir. Independently of the general question, they asked whether the Turkoman, for whose extradition they had originally asked, could not be surrendered. Her Majesty's Government accordingly suggested that the Amir should again be addressed on the subject, that His Highness should be assured that the British Government was prepared to enter into negotiations for an agreement for the extradition to Afghanistan both from Indian and Russian territories of any offender, being the subject of His Highness, who might be proved guilty of a crime similar to that for which the surrender of the Turkoman was requested, and that no objections were anticipated on the part of Russia, provided that political offenders were excepted from surrender, and that those criminals who were surrendered should not, if their guilt be proved, be subjected to any inhuman punishment that would be contrary to the usages of civilized nations. The Amir would, of course, be expected to reciprocate in the case of British or Afghan subjects, irrespective of the race or religion of the person to be surrendered.

The Government of India still maintain their opinion as to the grave difficulties with which this proposal abounds; but the Amir was addressed as directed by the Secretary of State; His Highness was again asked to surrender the Turkoman to the nearest Russian frontier official, and told that, if he wished to further discuss the conditions under which such surrenders might be hereafter provided for, the Viceroy would be prepared to enter into details.

Several fresh instances of refusal by Afghan officials to grant passports to soldiers of the British Indian army on leave at their homes in Afghanistan having been reported, the Amir's Agent with the Government of India was requested to bring the matter to the notice of the Amir, and to say that the Government of India would regard it as a friendly act if His Highness would issue orders that soldiers of the British Government going to their homes in Afghanistan on leave, should not be interfered with so long as they committed no offences. The new British Agent at Kabul was also instructed to address His Highness in similar terms should any instances of detention of our soldiers come to his notice. The Amir's Agent sent in a copy of a letter which he received from the Amir on the subject. His Highness said that those Afghans, who had taken service in the British Indian army, were mostly men who had

Harsh treatment of soldiers of the British Indian Army in Afghanistan.

committed offences in Afghanistan and fled the country ; and that consequently "the only remedy for the Afghan officials against such persons lies in their keeping themselves thoroughly informed about them." The Amir added that he had no objection to the enlistment of Afghans who have not committed crimes in their own country. Subsequently His Highness wrote to the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, requesting that no Hazaras in British employ should, under any circumstances, be permitted to re-enter Afghanistan, as they were all escaped rebels and enemies of His Highness's Government.

Baluchistan-
A f g h a n
Frontier.

A great many inhabitants of Pishin have left British territory for the Kandahar district, beguiled by promises of favourable treatment circulated by the Afghan officials. Similar attempts have been made to induce residents on the Shorawak border to leave British territory. The Agent to the Governor-General while visiting Pishin took an opportunity of enquiring into the causes which led the people to quit British territory, and has taken steps to remedy their grievances.

Allahyar Khan, Rustumzai, Imam Bakhsh Khah, Sarpara, and a few other Baluchis of importance, who considered that they had certain grievances against the British authorities, went to Kabul early in the year. They were well received by the Amir, who wrote to the Government of India, asking that no restrictions should be placed on the movements of their relatives, if they should wish to join the Khans in Afghanistan. The Amir was told that the families were free to leave British territory if they wished, but that most of the Khans had already returned to their homes. Since then Allahyar Khan, with the remainder of the party, has returned, and Mr. Barnes, after receiving them at Quetta, reported that he hoped to satisfactorily settle all their grievances, and that this would ensure the peace of the Shorawak border, where several robberies by men from across the frontier have recently occurred.

C h a g e h
district.

With the concurrence of the Secretary of State, the Government of India have sanctioned the introduction of arrangements for improving our political control and fostering the trade route in the territory between Nushki and the Persian border, which, owing to the demarcation of the Baluch-Afghan frontier, has come within the British sphere of influence. An Assistant Political Officer, Lieutenant Webb-Ware, will be placed in charge of the tract ; mounted levies will be stationed at suitable places along the road ; and Sardar Ali Khan, Sinjerani, who was turned out of Chageh by the Afghans in 1886, but has now been reinstated, has been granted an allowance of Rs. 350 a month, in return for which he will maintain a few levies for the protection of the frontier beyond Chageh and towards the Helmand. Early in January, the Government of India sanctioned the abolition of the Nushki tolls, and the payment of Rs. 7,000 a year to the Zagar Mingal Sardar as compensation for the loss of this source of income. The Sardar agreed to place one-half of this sum at the disposal of the Agent to the Governor-General for the establishment of a levy post at Nushki. It is expected that a large increase of trade on this route to Seistan will follow on the increased security and peace which will result on the adoption of these measures. Lieutenant Webb-Ware started on a tour to the

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 170 (Frontier), dated the 16th September 1896.

Persian border on the 1st of January 1897, accompanied by a trader's caravan of over 200 camels. He will pay a visit to the Deputy Governor of Seistan and explain the objects of Government.

In June 1892, the Governor of Farrah raided Chageh and carried off 110 men, women and children, mostly relatives or dependents of Muhammad Ali Khan, Sinjerani. They were sent to Kandahar and thence to Kabul, 18 escaping on the way and returning to Chageh, where they killed the Afghans who were then holding the fort. Of the ninety who actually reached the capital, twenty-five alone lived to return to Chageh after the completion of boundary demarcation this past summer, the remainder having died at Kabul. Muhammad Ali Khan stated that, besides the above, forty other Sinjeranis were taken as prisoners to Kabul in 1894, and that they had recently been deported to Ghorī in Kataghan. The Government of India asked the Amir, as Chageh is now on the British side of the frontier, to allow these forty men to return to their homes, and His Highness at once replied that he would have the Sinjeranis sent back.

A shocking outrage occurred early on the morning of the 14th October at **Marris**. the Sunari Railway Station, North-Western Railway. About daylight six or seven Tingiani and Shaheja Marris, armed with breech-loaders, attacked the station, and murdered the entire railway staff there employed, comprising the Muhammadan Station Master, Mr. Canning, plate-layer, a Sikh constable, a Hindu chowkidar, a trolley-man and a sweeper. A Hindu shop-keeper was also killed and his shop burnt over his body. The gang on the following day fired a hut occupied by railway workmen near Dalujal, and killed four of the occupants, afterwards firing at a train, and then making for the hills. Prompt steps were taken to check the panic which ensued and to restore confidence along the line; troops were brought up by special train; large rewards were offered for the capture of the murderers, whose names were known; the tribal headmen were summoned, and a party of Tingianis who happened to be at Harnai were seized as hostages. The attitude of the tribe generally was at first somewhat doubtful, and there were rumours of a general rising being imminent. After a day or two, affairs improved, and it was reported that the Marri headmen seemed anxious to catch the offenders. On the 24th October, three of the gang, including two of the leaders, were captured by General Gatacre, who had gone into the hills with a picked party of 20 men of the 24th Baluchistan Regiment. They were tried under the Murderous Outrages Act, sentenced to death and executed on the 2nd of November. Their bodies were afterwards burnt. The three remaining members of the gang were arrested and surrendered by the Marri tribesmen. They were similarly tried and convicted. Two were sentenced to death and executed, the third to transportation for life. All available evidence showed the outrages to have been the result of sudden and isolated fanaticism, and there is no reason to suppose that the Marri tribe, as a whole, was concerned.

19th January 1897.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

HALF-YEAR

WHICH ENDED ON THE 30TH JUNE 1897.

The arrangements for keeping open the Dir-Chitral road continued to work satisfactorily during the half-year. Dir-Chitral Road.

Frontier desp.
No. 192 (S.), dated
the 7th July 1897.

The Chitral reliefs were carried out without a hitch, in spite of some little inconvenience from rain, snow and floods. The troops marching up left Chakdarra on the 2nd May and reached Drosh on the 11th; the troops returning to India crossed the Lowarai on the 17th May and reached Chakdarra on the 25th. Heavy snow was lying on the Lowarai and on both sides of it: but much had been done to clear the road on the Chitral side by the 2/5th Gurkhas, and on the Dir side by gangs of local workmen.

On the 3rd May, Major Deane met the Khan of Dir and his son at Serai. He reported that he had never found the Khan more satisfactory to deal with. He has been spending money freely on his people and has got the character of being a man who thinks of the interests of his tribes, and is compared very favourably with others who force all they can out of the people. He has put all his levies into uniform, and they are working admirably.

Frontier desp.
No. 192 (S.), dated
the 7th July 1897.

Major Deane reported in June that persistent efforts, said to be instigated from Kabul, had been and were being made to arouse Muhammadan fanaticism in Bajaur, Swat and Dir against the British. The Adda Mulla, the Manki Mulla and the Palam Mulla were all working with this aim. The Khan of Dir had himself been sounded by Mullas, but had rejected all overtures, and had informed Major Deane that, when the reliefs were completed, he intended moving against the Palam Mulla, who had been trying to make the Dir levies desert and to prevent others from enlisting. The Khan also intended to assert himself against the fanatical party in Upper Swat. Major Deane feared that, unless the fanatical party were kept under control, there was risk of fanaticism spreading to the detriment of British interests, and told the Khan that he was responsible for maintaining the Chitral communications, and was at liberty to ensure success in the best manner he could.

The Khans of Allahdand have not been behaving altogether well. They have given a great deal of trouble with their feuds and factions, and are now combining to oppress weaker men.

Trade along the Malakand road continued to show a very satisfactory increase. During the six months which ended on the 31st March 1897, the exports from India totalled Rs. 17,70,684 and the imports into India Rs. 20,10,669. These figures speak well for the general security which has resulted from the opening up of the road under the levy system inaugurated less than two years ago.

A settlement has not yet been effected regarding the Pashat Khan's villages seized by the Khan of Nawagai (see page). The latter for a long time postponed a settlement, pending the result of the meeting of Mr. Udny and the Sipah Salar in respect to demarcation in the Mohmand country; in March, however, he deputed representatives to discuss matters with the Khan of Pashat and Major Deane. One of these representatives undertook, on behalf of Safdar Khan, that Major Deane's wishes should be carried out, and Major Deane sent the Pashat Khan to Nawagai to settle the question in personal communication with Safdar Khan. Major Deane took the opportunity to impress on the Khan of Nawagai the necessity for identifying himself with Government interests. The Khan shortly after wrote to Major Deane that he had settled his dispute with the Khan of Pashat, but the latter reported that Dageh had not been restored to him.

On the 16th January, a representative jirga of all the Bajaur tribes and the Shamozaï Utman Khel came in to see the Political Officer. The Mamunds, Salarzai, Charmungi, Shinwari, Shamozaï, Alizai and Mandal were all represented by their most influential men. Their object was to ascertain whether the Sipah Salar's statement that all the Mohmand tribes had been left to the Amir was true, or whether the Government intended to adhere to the Kabul agreement line; and whether the assurance given them that Government did not intend to annex their country still held good. Mr. Davis told them that those tribes, who fell on our side of the line as laid down by Mr. Udny, would certainly not be made over to the Amir, and that the Government proclamation was still in force. The Mamunds on the Bajaur side of the line then asked if they might cross over and help the sections of their tribe at Shortan, who were being oppressed by the Amir. They were advised not to mix themselves up in conflicts with the Amir. All the tribes represented appeared to be well disposed and expressed their good-will to Government.

Major Deane, in summing up the situation after the satisfactory termination of the Chitral reliefs this year, wrote:—

“The fact of the tribes being left in enjoyment of their lands revenue free, a privilege which, notwithstanding the proclamation before the expedition, they did not expect to be granted, owing to their not having fulfilled their share of the conditions of that proclamation, and the policy of not interfering with them except in so far as necessary to prevent disturbances, has created great confidence towards Government, which would enable us at the present time to raise an irregular force of 15,000 to 20,000 men, whom nothing would please better than to receive orders to perform service. * * * I do not now think it too sanguine to hope that these fanatical tribes may be converted into a powerful frontier defence. * * * Those who were most difficult and troublesome to deal with during the first year of working, *viz.*, the Sam Ranizais who were with difficulty prevented from forcing on direct annexation by misbehaviour and factional disputes are now most exemplary in their behaviour. A firm system of village and tribal community has been established—an excellent form of local self-Government and the backbone of frontier working—the factions have been suppressed, and there appears in their stead an honest desire to maintain peace and order. * * *

Frontier desp.
No. 102 (S.), dated
the 7th July 1897.

"The position with Nawagai, the Utman Khels and other clans off the direct line of communications (not taking into account individual fanatics) is growing into an alliance which coupled with that of the Panjkora clans may prove of great value to Government. It is useless to be sanguine in such matters, but the present position is far stronger than, with my knowledge of the Pathan tribes, I ever contemplated that it could become."

In pursuance of the policy of the Government of India to concentrate, as Gilgit Agency. far as possible at Gilgit and other important points, the detachments of Imperial Service Troops on the lines of communication in the Gilgit Agency, the Government of India in April sanctioned the introduction of a police levy scheme on the Gilgit-Chilas line. The scattered detachments of Imperial Service Troops on the line were withdrawn, and levy posts established at Gilgit, Leycher, Jalipur, Bunar, Ges, Thak, Babusar, Kinaghar, Chilas and Gichi. The service is popular, and the scheme promises to be successful. The levies built themselves lines at the various posts at their own expense, and have already commenced bringing in suspicious characters whom they found passing through their limits.

In May a similar scheme for the whole of the Gilgit district was sanctioned, at an annual cost of about 36,000 rupees. The scheme was gladly accepted by chiefs and people, and its adoption has allowed of a considerable measure of concentration of the Imperial Service Troops in the Agency.

The Government of India have sanctioned the levy of a light tribute to Kashmir from the Chilas district. The total amount of tribute is assessed at about 2,676 rupees a year, to which will be added about 300 rupees more, on the restoration to the Chilas of some land near the Chilas fort, which they deserted after the fighting in 1893, and which has since been cultivated by the Commissariat Department. The Chilas readily accepted the distribution of the tribute and paid up the first demand without any demur.

The headmen of Hodar and Thak asked that a detachment of troops might be posted in their valleys, to protect them from bad characters and Yaghistan refugees: but were told that this could not conveniently be arranged.

The Indus valley people below Chilas are divided at present into two parties of about equal strength and influence,—one friendly and the other hostile to the Government of India. The hostile party wish to have no dealings of any kind with the Agency; the other desire that more friendly relations should be established. The latter appear to be gaining ground, since Tangiris and Darelis are selling produce in Chitral and taking employment on Government work. No interference of any kind is being exercised from Chilas where all but known bad characters are free to come and go as they please. A Tangir jirga, which obtained permission to come in and see the Political Officer, was assured that no expedition against them or Darel was intended; this being a matter in regard to which they have been anxious of late, owing to rumours spread by interested persons.

The Mir of Hunza raised the question of his paying tribute to China and entered a mild protest against having to do so. He represented to the British

Agent that he was a servant of the British Government and asked why he should pay tribute to a foreign power. The Mir was somewhat disturbed by the attitude of the Chinese in the matter, and expressed dissatisfaction at the tone of the last two letters which he had received from the Taotai of Kashgar on the subject. The Mir was advised to continue his annual present of gold to the Chinese Government.

The management of the affairs of the Chitral State was separated from the Gilgit Agency, and added to the charge of the Political Officer for Dir and Swat, with effect from the 1st March 1897.

Frontier desp.
No. 102 (S.), dated
the 7th July 1897.

During Major Deane's short stay in Chitral in May, in connection with the Chitral reliefs, he had a discussion with the Mehtar and the Adamzadas on certain points connected with the administration of the country. It was no secret that the Mehtar himself, influenced by interested advisers, was at the root of much of our supposed unpopularity in the country. He had for some time past set himself against men who were known to render service to Government, and against those who assisted us during the late troubles. He had consorted with and consulted men who acted against Government, and endeavoured to discourage all from visiting the Assistant Political Agent; and he had ignored the advisers appointed by Government. Major Deane remonstrated with him both in public and private. He explained to the Mehtar that Government did not maintain troops in the country merely to keep him in his position (which he could scarcely hope to retain without Government support), while he worked against Government interests and countenanced injustice. In order to prevent his continuing to spend the Government allowance in an improper manner, Major Deane ordered it to be paid monthly in future instead of half-yearly or yearly, and he insisted on the removal of the young Mehtar's ill-advisers.

Frontier desp.
No. 102 (S.), dated
the 7th July 1897.

Writing on the 15th May, Major Deane says:—"Anything approaching the injustice and tyranny in regard to the land and houses of the poorer classes in Chitral which appears to have gone on for years past, I have never imagined possible. Every man, with a semblance of power as a headman, has seized the land of his poorer neighbours. Lieutenant Gurdon has done a good deal to improve matters, but he has not had the assistance of the Mehtar and his advisers that he should have had. Left to himself the Mehtar would not see his advisers, and the Assistant Political Agent has had a good deal to do in preventing those whom the Mehtar favoured from land grabbing in every direction. It is most important in the interests of the Mehtar and of Government that the existing state of affairs be changed, and I have to-day had a meeting with the Mehtar and his advisers, and pointed out to them that they must take the matter in hand, in the same way that we have led the Khans in Swat and Dir to do. I have directed them to meet regularly with Mr. Gurdon for three days a week and to take up the petitions of the cultivators, and to gradually settle them with some fixity of tenure, also to authoritatively stop any further oppression by headmen and Adamzadas in seizing land to which they have no right. This latter has been to a very great extent stopped already by Mr. Gurdon."

The effect of Major Deane's proceedings was excellent. The young Mehtar expressed his regret and promised to turn over a new leaf; and towards the end of June, Lieutenant Gurdon reported that matters were improving, and that he noticed a distinct change for the better in the tone of the Adamzadas. The regular work of settling land disputes was proceeding satisfactorily, the majority of cases now being expeditiously disposed of according to Muhammadan law or custom.

The Afghans have established posts on the north side of the Dorah Pass, with the object of preventing merchants travelling from Badakhshan to Chitral. All traders attempting to travel by that way are being turned back. What the Amir was unable to perform by persuasion and promises, he seems determined to carry out by force, and traders will now be compelled to use the Kafiristan route.

The Government of India have ruled that the crest of the Lowarai range is to be regarded as the boundary between Dir and Chitral, and the decision has been communicated to the Khan of Dir and the Mehtar of Chitral. The Khan was annoyed at the arrangement, which prevents him having control in Arnawai, but he was told that the question had been definitely settled and could not be re-opened.

In the autumn of 1896, the Amir sent to the Viceroy a letter from Sher Afzal, the Chitral detainé at Ootacamund, asking to be allowed to return to Kabul. About the same time a letter was received by the Government of India from Sher Afzal, asking that his family at Kabul might be allowed to join him at Ootacamund. The Amir was told that the Government of India could not agree to the release of Sher Afzal, and His Highness was asked whether he would agree to the family coming to India. The Amir in reply sent a letter from the different members of the family declining to leave Afghanistan.

Early in the year reports reached the Government of India that there was **Kafiristan**.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 94 (Frontier), dated the 29th June 1897.

a feeling of unrest among the Kafirs, and some of their headmen came to Lieutenant Gurdon, the Assistant Political Agent in Chitral, and informed him that forty families from Lutdeh intended leaving their homes in the spring and settling in the Mehtar's territory. Their principal grievance seemed to be that they were being called upon to furnish fresh hostages in place of those who had died at Kabul. In March a deputation of Lutdeh and Kamdesh Kafirs again visited Lieutenant Gurdon, and represented that they were much disturbed owing to an order from the Amir that they were to furnish men for military service. Lieutenant Gurdon advised them to obey the Amir's orders. They failed, however, to accept his advice, and towards the end of April or the beginning of May, the Lutdehchis refused to send hostages to Kabul, and followed this up by attacking and killing about twenty Afghan khassadars and some Mullas. Akram Jan, the Amir's officer at Birkot, thereupon advanced with a strong force, and guided by the Kamdesh Kafirs, easily defeated the Lutdehchis who offered little resistance and fled into Chitral in large numbers with their wives and children.

The Mehtar and Chitralis were unable to bear the burden of supporting them, and Major Deane reported that it had been proposed to the Kafir head-

men that they should move to the country between the Panjkora and Shishikuf known as Bashghar, in the territory of the Khan of Dir, who was willing to

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 94 (Frontier), dated the 29th June 1897.

give them land and allow them to settle without interference with their religion.

Major Deane was instructed to give the Mehtar such pecuniary assistance as might seem necessary in feeding the refugees and transporting those who would willingly go to Bashghar, and to disarm them and explain to them that they could not be allowed to remain more than temporarily in Chitral. The Government of India informed the Amir of the arrival of the refugees in Chitral, and asked His Highness whether assurances might be given to the refugees that their lives would be spared, and their property restored if they returned to Kafiristan and submitted to His Highness's authority.

He replied that, if the Kafirs "repent and come back, their lives will be

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 94 (Frontier), dated the 29th June 1897.

spared, and they will be allowed to lead a humble and rural life, but repent they must." He expressed strong objection to

their being allowed to remain in Chitral, "because their proximity would create a great many disturbances in the State," and endanger neighbourly relations.

This decision was made known to the refugees, and Major Deane was told that he should allow those to return who wished to do so under the condition stated, but that under no circumstances should any be forced to return against their will. The total number of refugees in Chitral at the beginning of June was 1,616; they were scattered over the country, working for their food and giving little trouble. Some of the headmen, with a hundred refugees, had

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 94 (Frontier), dated the 29th June 1897.

gone over to the Khan of Dir, and the remainder were gradually returning to Kafiristan of their own accord. The Af-

ghans treated with leniency those Kafirs who were made prisoners after the rising, and it is expected that all, except a few of the headmen, will go back to their homes.

On the 30th June, a letter was received from the Amir, stating that the refugees, in a body, wished to return to their homes, but that they were

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 151 (Frontier), dated the 4th November 1897.

prevented from doing so by the officials in Chitral. His Highness asked that orders might be sent to the officials not to inter-

fere with those who desired of their own free will to go back to Kafiristan. A similar letter was written to the Mehtar by the Afghan Hakim of Lutdeh, and the Assistant Political Agent in Chitral replied to him that, so far as he was aware, no Kafirs who wished to return had been prevented from doing so, but that he would make enquiries and send messages to the refugees that they were free to go back whenever they pleased.

Chinese-Turkistan.

During the half-year, Mr. Macartney continued to move in the matter of

* Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 56 (Frontier), dated the 5th May 1897.

the liberation of slaves of British Indian origin in the New Dominion. The Mayor of Kashgar, in co-operation with

Mr. Macartney, released all the remaining slaves that could be traced in his jurisdiction, without any charge for ransom, and issued a proclamation making

the possession of slaves henceforth unlawful. Similar measures were adopted by the Chinese district officer in Yangi Hissar, and, with the exception perhaps of a few at Maralbashi, all known slaves of Indian origin have been set free.

In December 1896, Mr. Macartney was again assaulted by a Chinese soldier. While riding through the Kashgar main bazaar on his way to dine with the Taotai, a soldier gave his horse a sharp cut with a stick, without the slightest provocation and apparently with a sheer desire to cause annoyance. Mr. Macartney had the soldier seized by two of his chaprassis, and taken to the Foreign Commerce Office; and he demanded that the man should be punished. The Taotai expressed regret, but said he had no control over the troops who

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 62 (Frontier), dated the 12th May 1898.

were under the Titai; and the head of the Foreign Commerce Office made a similar excuse, and added that the Officer in

Command of the Cavalry liangtsu to which the soldier belonged had definitely declined to take any action in the matter. Mr. Macartney accordingly addressed the Governor at Urumtsi asking for the soldier's punishment. The latter officer telegraphed that he had desired the Commander-in-Chief to see that the man was punished. A date was fixed for a flogging to be administered, and Mr. Macartney announced his intention of being present. He, however, allowed himself to be persuaded to send the Agency Munshi in his stead. The latter was engaged for some little time in conversation in an inner room at the house of the Infantry Commandant, and then an orderly announced that preparations were completed. On the party proceeding to the outer room, the culprit was found on his knees, a pretence was made that the flogging had just been concluded, and the Commandant expressed a hope that the matter might now be considered at an end. Mr. Macartney made a further reference to the Taotai on the subject, but was unable to obtain any redress, the Taotai maintaining that the culprit had been punished, and begging Mr. Macartney to allow the whole matter to drop.

As the whole affair was a mere farce, and the assault on the Kashgar Agency

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 62 (Frontier), dated the 12th May 1898.

Munshi in May 1896 had been dealt with in a similar fashion by the local Chinese officers, the matter was brought to the

notice of the British Minister at Peking.

The Russian Consul-General at Kashgar used his utmost exertions to close

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 53 (Frontier), dated the 28th April 1897.

the trade routes into Chinese Turkistan against traders from India, under the pretext of precautions against plague. He

was at first to some extent successful; but on Her Majesty's Minister at Peking representing to the Yamen that there had been no indigenous cases of plague in the Punjab, the North-Western Provinces or Kashmir, and that ample precautionary measures had been taken to prevent the spread of the disease, the Chinese Government instructed the Taotai not to close the trade routes in any case, and only to establish quarantine if necessity required.

The Russian Consul-General at Kashgar thereupon gave out that the bubonic plague had made its appearance in Sarikol, that scores of people were

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 53 (Frontier), dated the 28th April 1897.

dying from it, and that the runners carrying the post from Gilgit had been the means of importing the contagion from India.

He despatched a Russian Surgeon to Tashkurghan to report on the matter, and to adopt effective measures against the spread of infection to the New Dominion. As a matter of fact, no case of plague had occurred in Sarikol, and the reports were groundless.

**Pamirs,
Shighnan,
Wakhan,
&c.**

The Amir replied to the Viceroy's letter of the 15th January 1897, accepting the offer of 50,000 rupees a year for the cost of administration in Eastern Wakhan. He said that he would establish no posts or patrols in the district, but would merely send an officer with a small escort into the tract, during the summer months, to collect revenue and attend to administrative affairs.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 42 (Frontier), dated the 24th March 1897.

The Wakhis appear to be more contented than at first with the Afghan rule, and those who have visited Chitral say that the Amir has warned his officials to deal justly with them. The headmen of the villages on the Russian bank of the Ab-i-Panjah have been warned that they should allow no one coming from the direction of India to cross the frontier. This is supposed to be in pursuance of the Russian policy of protection against the spread of plague.

A scientific expedition left Russia at the end of March for the Pamirs, Shighnan and Roshan. Rumours were reported from many quarters that extensive movements of Russian troops on the Pamirs would take place during the summer.

Mohmands.

The Amir replied on the 13th January to the Viceroy's letter of the 2nd idem. He expressed surprise at the unfriendly words addressed to him, but added that he would not "renounce the friendship of the illustrious British Government, for up to the present time I have formed no sort (of connection) whatever with the Russian Government, which men call 'provision for the future,' and I have not even thought of such a thing." The letter continued:—

"I do not wish that, for the sake of a few Mohmand villages, there should arise disagreement between Afghanistan and the illustrious British Government. On this account, although the Mohmand country belongs to Afghanistan and forms its boundary, I agree to the (proposals made in the) letters of Your Excellency, dated the 7th July 1896 and the 12th November 1896, and I have written to Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan to commence the boundary demarcation in accordance with the terms of the above letters of Your Excellency, copies of which have been furnished to the Sipah Salar. Let Mr. Udny be the head of the Commission on Your Excellency's behalf, and let Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan be the head of the Commission on my behalf. But the members of the British Commission should move about within the limits of the Mohmand districts belonging to the British side, and the members of the Afghan Mission should do so within the Afghan limits of the Mohmand country. Let the boundary demarcation work commence between the two divisions of the Mohmand country, so that, please God, this remaining portion of the frontier may be early settled and finished."

A reply was sent to His Highness on the 30th January. The Viceroy expressed his gratification at His Highness having accepted the advice offered to him, and regret if it in any way

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 18 (Frontier), dated the 3rd February 1897.

appeared to His Highness as unfriendly. He would instruct Mr. Udny to put himself into communication with the Sipah Salar, and if there were difficulty owing to snow and cold in the Commissioners visiting the high hills for a few weeks, they might usefully employ the interval in holding a preliminary meeting at some convenient place and arranging the details of their work.

The Viceroy's letter continued :—"There is one point on which I desire to say a word of explanation. Your Highness perfectly correctly describes the ordinary procedure, *i.e.*, that each Commission should move along its side of the boundary line with its own escort and equipment. But there are many reasons why this would not be convenient in the Mohmand country, where the march of the large escorts of the Afghan and British Commissions would be likely to give rise to disturbances among the people, that would both prevent the work of the Commissioners being satisfactorily carried on and endanger a peaceful settlement. I accordingly proposed in my letter of November 12th, the conditions of which Your Highness has now accepted, that we should abstain from the ordinary procedure in this case, should demarcate the boundary so far as we could reach it from the north and south, and be content in the meantime with an affirmation of the tribal boundaries in the interior of the Mohmand country. In making this proposal I had in my mind a suggestion made by the Sipah Salar to Mr. Udny, *i.e.*, that they should ascend a high hill at convenient points, and from thence make a general survey of the country sufficient to fix the line upon the map. Your Highness will remember that this course was followed in the Bashgal valley and gave satisfaction to Your Highness. I shall be obliged therefore if Your Highness will instruct the Sipah Salar to discuss an arrangement on these lines with Mr. Udny."

In his reply (dated the 9th February 1897) the Amir agreed to a preliminary meeting between the Sipah Salar and Mr. Udny, but maintained his ground in regard to each party moving within their own limits, accompanied by their own escort. As to the procedure for demarcation, he declined to delegate full authority to the Sipah Salar, and said the decision must be come to by the Government of India and His Highness after consideration of the reports of their respective Commissioners.

Meanwhile reports continued to be received that the Sipah Salar and the Adda Mulla were working to ensure trouble if the Demarcation Commission entered Mohmand country. The Afghan khassadars were still at Mitai, and there appeared to be no preparations impending for their withdrawal.

Mr. Udny met the Sipah Salar at Landi Khana on the 11th March. He had suggested that the meeting should take place at Dakka, and that he should proceed there under an Afghan escort, but the Sipah Salar preferred to come to Landi Khana. Mr. Udny commenced business by reading over the important parts of the correspondence which had taken place between the Amir and the

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 49 (Frontier), dated the 14th April 1897.

Viceroy, and then asked whether the Sipah Salar would take him up the Kunar valley again and escort his survey officers to convenient points on the Kunar-Panjhora watershed between the Nawa Kotal and the point where the boundary of the Musa Khel country runs up to this watershed on the eastern side, so that a general survey of the Mohmand country

might be made as far as possible. The Sipah Salar suggested that it would be better to begin from the southern end first, but Mr. Udny could not agree, and eventually Ghulam Haidar expressed himself unable to take Mr. Udny's party to the crest of the range on the east of the Kunar valley, because that was the joint line between the jurisdiction of the two Governments, and he could not be responsible for the safety of the British party if tribesmen fired upon them from our side of the line. He further argued that the whole Mohmand boundary should be either tribal or demarcated, but not partly one and partly the other. Mr. Udny closed the interview by saying he would put his proposals in writing and wait for an answer at Landi Kotal.

Correspondence then passed between Mr. Udny and the Sipah Salar practically to the same effect as the conversation at their meeting. It became clear that all attempt to demarcate on the spot must for the present be abandoned. Mr. Udny's party was accordingly broken up; and on the 26th March, the Viceroy addressed the Amir stating that he was not unwilling to define the

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 49 (Frontier), dated the 14th April 1897.

boundary through the whole of the Mohmand country by tribal divisions, as His Excellency had formerly proposed for the interior of the country. If the Amir would consent to this method of determining the limits of the spheres of influence of Afghanistan and of the Government of India, all that would be necessary would be to record which sections of the tribes belong to the sphere of each Government, and to prescribe as the actual territorial limits those which the tribesmen themselves have been accustomed to observe. His Excellency was, however, obliged to make a preliminary stipulation as to the withdrawal of the Afghan khassadars from Mitai.

The Amir replied upholding the Sipah Salar's refusal to escort Mr. Udny's party up to the joint boundary line, or within such portion of Mohmand territory as falls within the British sphere of influence, adding—"The high officials of the illustrious Government should make their own arrangements for the preparation of maps, &c., and the protection of their own men." With reference to the Viceroy's proposal that the boundary in the interior of the Mohmand country should be described by tribal divisions, and generally indicated on a map, the Amir quoted his letter of the 9th February 1897, in which he wrote that he could not say anything as to the details of demarcation, but that the work should be done in such a manner that the people on both sides might not lose their local rights, and that this could only be settled after the Joint-Commissioners had visited the ground. To this view His Highness adhered, and he declined to accept a map, until the Commissioners of both sides should have demarcated the boundary and the local rights should have been settled after examination on the spot. While, however, His Highness refused to agree to the proposals for recording a settlement until the entire boundary line had been examined by the two Commissioners, he wrote that he had ordered the withdrawal of the Afghan khassadars from Mitai, and added a hope that he would get his local rights in this locality at the time of partition of the territory.

The Afghan khassadars were withdrawn from the Mitai valley to Kunar on the 22nd April. The immediate effect of the withdrawal was good. The Khan of Nawagai at once deputed an agent to remain at the Malakand with Major Deane. He had for some time before demurred about appointing a man, but

Major Deane thought it necessary that he should show openly that he had thrown in his lot with Government. The Khan now sends men of his own to see that grain purchased for Government is not interfered with, and very plainly warned tribes under his influence who were on the verge of giving trouble, that he would punish them at once if he heard any further complaints about them from the Political Agent.

As soon as the Afghan khassadars left Mitai, the Musa Khel wrote to the Khan of Nawagai, offering to acknowledge him as their ruler. Major Deane promptly warned the Khan, through his agent, that he must avoid disturbances in Mitai, that he was not to consider himself free to attack Mitai, and that he should arrange matters for the future amicably with the Maliks and not send any of his own men there for the present. The Khan's agent promised that no aggressive action should be undertaken.

It has been decided to call in the Musa Khel with a view to arrangements being made with them similar to those already concluded with the other sections of the Mohmands on the British side of the line. Mr. Udny and Major Deane were instructed to meet and discuss the various questions involved, and submit proposals to Government. These were awaited at the end of the half-year.

The Khan of Lalpura, who, in obedience to the Amir's summons, went to Kabul early in the year, was coldly received by His Highness, and in May, fearing that his arrest was imminent, fled and has so far evaded capture.

On the 21st December 1896, when the Jemadar of the Khyber Rifles **Khyber.** arrived at Landi Khana in charge of the Kabul kafila, he met there an Afghan official from Dakka, with a strong escort of khassadars, who warned him that, if he came one foot beyond the stream near the ruined serai at Landi Khana, which was the boundary between British and Afghan territory, he would run the risk of being attacked. The Political Officer in the Khyber wrote to the Sartip of Dakka on the subject, as the spot at which the Afghans demanded that the convoy guards should be changed is different from the spot which it has been customary for our guard to proceed to for the past eleven years. The Afghan khassadars continued on each kafila day to object to the Khyber Rifle escort proceeding to Torkham, and stated that they were acting under the authority of a firman received from the Amir. Colonel Warburton asked the Sartip to let him see the Amir's firman, and said that the question as to the boundary in the vicinity of Landi Khana was one which could only be settled by the Amir and the Government of India. The Amir's firman was not produced, but eventually it was arranged that the Kabul escort should accompany kafilas to the water-course near Landi Khana, and that the Khyber Rifle escort should, as heretofore, proceed to Torkham. No representation on the subject was received from the Amir. The Afghan action was clearly intended to notify their claim to draw the boundary line close up to Landi Khana when delimitation operations should be commenced.

Reports continued to be received during the half-year that the Amir was intriguing with the Afridis; but though emissaries from Kabul undoubtedly visited the Afridi country, and several headmen went to Kabul, there is no reason to attach much importance to their proceedings.

Kurram.

In view of the continued misconduct of the Para Chamkannis, and the failure of all efforts to bring the tribe to reason, the Government of India decided to send a wing of a Native Infantry Regiment to Kurram to increase the confidence of the Turis and to strengthen the position generally. The additional troops arrived in the valley in February, and simultaneously the tribe was placed under blockade. At the end of March a jirga of the Haji Khel and Ovi Darrah came in to the Officer on Special Duty, bringing in some looted cattle and promising to return the remainder which had been taken from Kirman. The jirga was dismissed, and informed that the blockade would not be withdrawn until the tribe had paid up the claims of the Turis in full. Early in June, a representative jirga of Haji Khel and Khwaja Khel Chamkannis came in to the Officer on Special Duty, and settled in full the claims of the Kirman Saiyids. They also gave a written agreement that, if, within fifteen days, the Khani Khels had not come in, they would give hostages at the rate of one man from each village, and agree to Government having a right of way by the Sikaram and Mir Karim Passes to visit the Khani Khel country.

The Governor of Khost has put up mud pillars at intervals along the straight line defining the boundary between Lora Khula and Sulemani Chauki, and the villagers of Pathan have quitted their lands on the Kurram side of the line, and are cultivating the lands which formerly belonged to the Kharlachi villagers on the Afghan side of it. The Political Officer in Kurram was instructed to inform the Governor of Khost that he accepts the line as defined by the subsidiary pillars, and agrees to the exchange of the Pathan and Kharlachi lands. The dam of the Kharlachi canal has now been reconstructed and the Kharlachi men have been allowed to cultivate the land on the Kurram side of the line.

A fair quantity of water has for some time past been allowed to flow into the Lewanai canal, and the villagers have sown their rabi crops over a considerable area with fair prospects of success.

Waziristan.

Throughout the half-year, raid and counter-raids between Waziris and the tribes on the Afghan side of the Durand line were of constant occurrence. The British Political Officers were able to settle many of the complaints put forward by Afghan subjects, but were not able to induce the Afghan officials to reciprocate. The Amir will not allow his officers to settle cases without reference to him, and all attempts to get the Governor of Urgan to meet our officers for a general settlement of inter-tribal disputes failed, the Governor in replying to letters on the subject expressing a wish to re-open the boundary question, a matter which the Government of India have decided is finally concluded.

Besides the raids across the frontier, above referred to, a great many offences were reported as between different sections of the Waziri tribes and also against Government. Amongst the latter may be noticed the murder of a cavalry sowar on the 21st March near the Datta Khel camp; on the 25th March the cavalry ration party was fired at near Jandola and a horse killed; on the 28th and 29th March, Commissariat camels and camelmen were carried off by Mahsuds from Karkan; on the 5th April the mail cart was stopped three miles above Idak by a band of robbers, who killed the driver and wounded one passenger and robbed the others and the mail bags; on the 11th April a con-

voy from Datta Khel cutting brush-wood was fired at, and a search party was fired at on the following day; on the 16th April the Munshi of the Nagandi Oba post and a levy guard sent by the Political Officer to Spin to enquire into a dispute between Zalli Khel cultivators and Powindahs, were roughly handled and robbed of their weapons and uniform; on the 21st May, some shots were fired at a grass-cutting party two miles from Datta Khel; and on the same date six Commissariat camels, while grazing on the lower slopes of the Vezhda Sir range, were stolen by Mahsuds; on the night of the 29th May, a sentry of the 1st Punjab Infantry was shot and three men wounded at Datta Khel by a fanatic; on the nights of the 1st and 2nd June, shots were fired into the convoy enclosure at Saidgai and some animals stolen.

A far more serious outrage than any of the foregoing remains to be recorded. On the 10th June, Mr. Gee, the Political Officer in the Tochi, proceeded with an escort of 300 rifles, two guns and twelve sabres under Lieutenant-Colonel Bunny, from Datta Khel to Sheranna and Maizar, for the purpose of fixing a site for a post and realizing a fine which had been imposed for

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 110 (Frontier), dated the 21st July 1897.

the murder of the Mohurrir of the Sheranna post last year. It had been Mr.

Gee's intention to go to Maizar the previous day, but the visit was postponed owing to rain, and his intended visit was known to all the Sheranna and Maizar Maliks. On arrival at Maizar, Mr. Gee visited Dotoi with some of the Maliks and the cavalry, leaving Sadda Khan and Alambe, two of the most influential of the Sheranna Maliks, with Lieutenant-Colonel Bunny, the infantry and guns at Maizar. On Mr. Gee's return, Sadda Khan produced food for the Muhammadans of the party and the British officers, who numbered seven all told. About 2 P.M. when lunch had just been finished, and without the slightest warning, fire was opened on the British officers from the buildings close by. With the exception of Mr. Gee, all were almost immediately hit, and the British force was compelled to retire over the hills to Sheranna, followed by a gathering of tribesmen which rapidly increased to over 1,000. The retirement was made deliberately and in excellent order, the tribesmen being kept at a distance. Reinforcements from Datta Khel then joined the retreating party and the tribesmen dispersed. On the British side the casualties were Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Bunny, 1st Sikhs, Captain J. F. Browne, R.A., and Lieutenant H. A. Cruickshank, R.A., killed; Lieutenant A. J. M. Higginson and Surgeon-Captain C. C. Cassidy of the 1st Sikh Infantry, and Lieutenant C. L. S. Seton-Browne of the 1st Punjab Infantry wounded. Dr. Cassidy subsequently died of his wound. One native officer and 21 rank and file were killed, and 24 rank and file wounded. Several horses and mules were also killed and wounded. The enemy's losses were estimated at about one hundred killed, including some Maliks of importance, and many wounded.

The attack was undoubtedly planned beforehand. A regular trap seems to have been set for the British party.

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There is no reason to suppose that Mulla Powindah was concerned in the attack, or that he was even aware it was impending. The Madda Khel, who were the principal offenders, sent a messenger to the Mulla for help after the occurrence,

and it is rumoured that they also informed the Amir's Governor at Urgan. There was no evidence implicating Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan, but Mr. Gee mentioned a suspicion that the attack was instigated by him, and added that the suspicion very probably had some foundation. The Mulla summoned a meeting of his followers, and promised to do what he could after the harvest, but up to the end of June, no hostile gathering was reported. On the 20th June, a letter was received from him by the Native Assistant Political Officer at Wano, in which the Mulla offered to arrange peace with the Madda Khels, and asked what terms were to be demanded. No answer was sent to him, it having been long ago decided that any negotiations with the Waziri tribes must be through the agency of the tribal Maliks, and not through individual Mullas.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 110 (Frontier), dated the 21st July 1897.

Miran Shah ...

... { 2 Maxim guns.
40 Sabres.
368 Rifles.

Datta Khel ...

... { 4 Mountain guns.
2 Maxim guns.
20 Sabres.
924 Rifles.

Boya ...

... { 20 Sabres.
92 Rifles.

Idak ...

... { 20 Sabres.
40 Rifles.

Saidgai ...

... { 20 Sabres.
52 Rifles.

At the time of the outbreak, the force in the Tochi Valley was distributed as follows :—

Steps were immediately taken to strengthen the garrisons in the Tochi, and also on the Shahur and Gumal lines, though there seemed little risk of the Mahsuds generally joining in.

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The Madda Khels fled to the hills leaving Sheranna and Maizar deserted.

** 1st Brigade.*

2nd Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
1st Regiment, Sikh Infantry.
1st Regiment, Punjab Infantry.
88rd Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
1 Squadron, 1st Regiment, Punjab Cavalry.
No. 3 Peshawar Mountain Battery.
No. 2 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

2nd Brigade.

3rd Battalion, The Rifle Brigade.
14th Sikh Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
6th Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
25th Punjab Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
1 Squadron, 1st Regiment of Punjab Cavalry.
4 Guns, No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 110 (Frontier), dated the 21st July 1897.

Gee, Lorimer and Kettlewell were attached to the force as Political Officers.

Major-General Bird assumed command on the 21st June at Bannu. The terms to be demanded in punishment of the treacherous outrage were under consideration at the close of the half-year.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 110 (Frontier), dated the 21st July 1897.

In January several Kabul Khel families, including some influential Maliks, came from Birmal to the British side of the border, and represented

that they had fled to escape from the oppression of the Afghan officials. The Political Officer in the Tochi discouraged the idea that Government would do anything for them, and advised them, if they were determined to leave Birmal for good, to go to Kurram, where they are entitled to a share in the Kabul Khel lands. In March, they submitted a petition begging that, as Birmal had been made over to the Amir, the Government of India would make provision for their maintenance, and the Political Officer heard that they hoped to induce the Waziris in Shawal to aid them in attacking Birmal during the summer. The majority of the refugee families, however, returned to Birmal soon afterwards, and the Political Officer was authorized to take security, if necessary, from the most important Malik remaining, and was instructed to remind the Waziris that one of the conditions upon which they were given allowances is that they must prevent the commission of raids and other offences across the boundary in the Amir's territory. Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan, the Amir's Governor at Urgan, wrote to the Maliks who remained on the British side of the border that with certain exceptions they were at liberty to return to their homes if they wished.

A fine of 6,000 rupees has been imposed on the Marri tribe, in connection **Marris.** with the fanatical outrage at the Sunari railway station on the 14th October 1896. In view to preventing the recurrence of similar outrages, the Marri Sardar's eldest son will be stationed at the levy post at Quat Mandai near Baba Kach to supervise the levies on the railway line: the post at the Spintangi railway station will be strengthened; two sowars will be posted at Sunari to support the four Pathan levies there; and men will be detailed from the other levy posts on the line to guard the gang huts on the railway. Security has been taken for the good behaviour of the relatives of the murderers: no armed Marris will be permitted to approach, or travel by, the railway line, or to proceed up the valley towards Harnai; all arms carried by Marris approaching the line are to be deposited in the posts, and the levies will be held responsible that these orders are carried out.

In April Mr. J. B. Guthrie, a merchant of London, paid a visit to Kabul **Kabul.**

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 95 (Frontier), dated the 29th June 1897.

at the invitation of the Amir. He returned to India in June, and informed the Government of India that the Amir had appointed him sole agent to His Highness and to the Government of Afghanistan for Great Britain and the whole of Europe. The Amir has not yet withdrawn any of the agents employed at Peshawar in collecting taxes on behalf of the Afghan Government, to whose proceedings the Viceroy took exception last year. A reminder was sent to him on the 26th May 1897, in which the Viceroy expressed a hope that the Amir would meet the wishes of the Government of India without further delay.

The Amir sent a very friendly letter to His Excellency the Viceroy, asking that His Highness's congratulations might be conveyed by telegraph to Her Majesty the Queen on the occasion of the completion of the sixtieth year of her reign. The following telegraphic reply from Her Majesty was communicated to His Highness:—

“I am deeply touched by the friendly interest shown by Your Highness in an event which the Almighty has, in His infinite goodness, spared me to

celebrate, and which has been made an occasion for public rejoicings throughout my Empire. That Your Highness should desire to participate in the joy which this happy event has caused to my people and my friends, is a proof of your desire to maintain and strengthen the relations of friendship and good understanding which subsist between your kingdom and myself. On my part, I desire to reciprocate your friendly sentiments, and to express my earnest wish for the prosperity of your country and the continuance of Your Highness's health and happiness."

From the Khyber a circumstantial report was received of the reception at Kabul of a Russian Envoy. The Amir is stated to have held a Darbar in his honour, at which all the military officers attended in full dress. The Envoy is represented as having taken a photograph of the officers and to have announced his intention of sending it to the Czar. The British Agent at Kabul made no mention of the incident, and, though several reports on the subject were received, it is believed that the story is untrue.

**Extradition
with Afghan-
istan.**

On the 1st March, the Amir replied to the Viceroy's letter of the 6th January 1897, regarding the question of extradition between Afghanistan and India and Russia. He entirely ignored the renewed request that the Russian Turkoman subject should be surrendered: and while he professed to generally accept the idea of reciprocal extradition, he raised many difficulties in regard

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 66 (Frontier), dated the 18th May 1897.

to details. Thus, whereas the Government of India had specially excepted political offenders and carefully restricted the class of criminals to be surrendered, the Amir submitted a long list of crimes, most of which are quite beyond the scope of the arrangement the possibility of which was under examination, while some at least came under the category of political offences. Another condition suggested by the Amir was as follows:—

"Each Government should, on a demand being made for the surrender of criminals mentioned in the agreement, who have taken refuge in its territory, hand them over, without any excuse or delay, to the frontier officials of the Government making the demand, and should take a receipt for their delivery: if delay be made in their surrender, the agreement would come to an end from that date, and all the terms become null and void."

The Amir thus set aside any idea of an investigation into the guilt of the accused by the country surrendering him; a demand for surrender is to be at once complied with and the penalty of failure to surrender is the abrogation of the treaty. The Government of India considered it impossible to surrender criminals to the Amir in this fashion, and moreover recognised that, even if it were possible to decide upon a basis for an extradition agreement with His Highness, they must be prepared for anything but loyal co-operation on his part. Consequently in a despatch, dated the 18th May 1897, they again expressed to the Secretary of State their strong conviction that it was desirable to defer the consideration of extradition proposals, and to limit intervention to good offices on either side in exceedingly heinous and special offences. In case Her Majesty's Government should determine that negotiations must be continued, the Government of India expressed a decided opinion that any agreement of the nature suggested should not only be negotiated between

the Indian Government and the Amir, but should take effect solely through the medium of the Indian Government.

Consequent on the attitude adopted by the Amir in regard to the harsh treatment of Afghans who, having entered the service of the British Government as soldiers, proceed to their homes on leave, the Government of India have ruled that native soldiers, who are subjects of the Amir, should not be granted permission to enter Afghanistan on leave, unless they have themselves obtained permits or passes from the Afghan authorities. In view of the prevalence of plague in India during the present year (1897), all leave to Afghanistan has been temporarily prohibited.

A letter from the Amir, dated the 9th February 1897, in which His Highness accepted the Viceroy's proposals in connection with the Mohmand boundary question, contained the following passage:—

“The purport of the agreement is to the effect that the British Government, as long as they exist, will not fail to render help to the Afghan people, particularly Amir Abdur Rahman and his sons, by means of money and men; that in the event of a foreign enemy attempting to make war upon Afghanistan, the British Government will, in consideration of this friendship, render help to Afghanistan by means of money and troops, as long as there is a single rupee in the British treasury, and a single soldier in the British army. Under such an agreement there is no room for a double tongue and a double heart. As long as the British Government do not renounce the friendship of the Afghan Government, the people of the Afghanistan, myself and my children will not renounce the friendship of the British Government.”

The Government of India pointed out to Her Majesty's Government that this letter appeared to raise definitely the question of the assurances given to His Highness, and that, although no immediate reply was necessary, the statement could scarcely be altogether passed over in silence.

About this time the Amir was informed of the anxiety professed by the Russians lest the plague should extend to Afghanistan and thence across the frontier to Russian territory, and of the precautions taken by the Russian Government. His Highness denied that there had been the slightest sign of the plague in his dominions, and remarked that the movements of the Russian troops along the Afghan frontier were not undertaken on account of the plague, but that the Russians had always been waiting for opportunities to strengthen their posts with troops and warlike stores. Her Majesty's Government on being asked whether the Amir might be assured that his fears were groundless, replied that the Russians were genuinely alarmed at a possible spread of the plague, and that the Amir should be advised to adopt sanitary arrangements on his frontier, to avoid any steps which might lead to a collision, and reminded that the support of the British Government is conditional on his following the advice of the Government of India in matters of this kind involving international relations.

Harsh treatment of soldiers of the British Indian army when on leave in Afghanistan.

Question of renewing the assurances given to the Amir.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 108 (Frontier), dated the 21st July 1897.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 44 (Frontier), dated the 7th April 1897.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 44 (Frontier), dated the 7th April 1897.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 44 (Frontier), dated the 7th April 1897.

In writing to the Amir it was proposed, with reference to his letter, dated the 9th February 1897, to also answer him on the question of the assurances given to him by repeating the words of Sir Alfred Lyall's letter to His Highness, dated the 20th July 1880, but Her Majesty's Government considered that it would be sufficient in writing to the Amir to add the following words:—

“Her Majesty's Government desire me to offer you this advice not merely as a friend, but in accordance with one of the conditions formally annexed to the assurances given to you in 1880, namely, that Your Highness follows unreservedly the advice of the British Government in regard to your external relations.”

The Amir was addressed accordingly on the 25th March 1897, and in forwarding the correspondence to the Secretary of State, it was pointed out that, in referring to “the agreement which Her Majesty the Queen sent me,” His Highness must have had in his mind the letter from Sir Alfred Lyall, dated the 20th July 1880, which was given to His Highness by Sir Lepel Griffin, though the Amir had omitted to recite the two important conditions upon which the assurance depends:—(1) That it is for the British Government to determine the extent and manner of the aid to be given in repelling unprovoked aggression; and (2) that His Highness “can have no political relations with any foreign power except with the British Government,” and must unreservedly follow the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations. It was further explained that to accept the Amir's version as a correct statement of our obligations might be held to give him the right to call upon us to assist him in a way which might be considered unadvisable, and that it seemed to the Government of India that the time had come for reconsidering the question of renewing the assurances to the Amir, in order to place before His Highness the full extent as well as the limits of the obligations towards him. The reply of Her Majesty's Secretary of State was awaited at the end of the half-year.

The Amir in acknowledging the Viceroy's letter, dated the 25th March, took no exception to being reminded of the condition annexed to our assurances. His Highness said:—“If Your Excellency remembers in my letter, dated the 6th Ramzan 1314 H., corresponding to the 9th February 1897, on the subject of the division of the frontier tract of the Mohmand country, I wrote to Your Excellency some words detailing the conditions of the self-same agreement, and reminded Your Excellency that, in accordance with the purport of the said agreement, the friendship and union between these two Governments were secured and rendered firm through the bonds of unity. Thus now Her Majesty's Government communicate to Your Excellency some of the conditions contained therein to remind me about them.”

Herat.

In May, a notice addressed to the people of Herat by the Amir was published in Herat city. Its purport is as follows:—

“Now-a-days it is said that the Russian guards have been increased on the banks of the river Oxus and in their posts and districts, in order to take care that Afghans should not enter into Russian territory on account of the sickness

prevailing in India; and the soldiery and people of these places think that the Russians entertain some idea of making war; therefore it is stated that neither I nor the Russian Government have any intention of going to war. This anxiety should be removed from your minds, because the friendship and neighbourly feelings existing between the God-granted kingdom of Afghanistan and the people of Russia are complete and fixed."

The people of Herat have been greatly troubled at the closing of the Meshed road; they maintain it has been closed by the Russians to divert traffic to the Panjdeh route. It is significant that, while on the Herat-Meshed road, all traffic to or from Afghanistan is absolutely prohibited, passengers and traders are only detained, on the Herat-Panjdeh route, at Takhta Bazar for three days' quarantine, and are then allowed to pass. No restrictions have been placed by Russia on traffic between Khorassan and Trans-Caspian territory: on the Ashkabad road there is nothing more than a medical examination, which is neither strict nor troublesome.

In the beginning of year, the Russian Government commenced to display great anxiety lest the plague prevalent in Bombay should extend to Afghanistan, and thence across the frontier to Russian territory. Medical posts of observation were first established at Takhta Bazar, Kushk, Kerki, Aiwanj and

Russian precautions against plague.

other places on the southern frontier of Turkistan and the Khanates. The Amir was informed of the precautionary measures adopted by Russia, and of the precautions taken in British territory to prevent the spread of the disease. He was also told of the ports of Bombay and Karachi having been closed to pilgrim traffic and of the lawlessness prevailing in the Hedjaz, and promptly issued orders that pilgrimages should be postponed till next year.

Early in February the Russian Consul-General at Meshed informed Colonel Yate that, if necessary, Russian troops would be sent to guard the Russo-Afghan frontier against the plague; and he duly warned the Persian Governor-General that troops had been despatched for this purpose; 1,200 Cossacks were at first mentioned, but subsequently Colonel Yate learnt that M. Vlassow had demanded passage and supplies for 2,000 Cossacks from Pul-i-Khatun to the Herat frontier, and for 2,000 more from Ashkabad to Seistan through Meshed. The Governor-General refused to comply without orders from his Government, whereupon the Russian Consul-General threatened him with the Emperor's displeasure.

Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran protested against the presence of Russian troops on the Perso-Afghan frontier as likely to cause excitement in Afghanistan, and explained that such a measure was quite unnecessary, seeing that there was no plague in Afghanistan or Baluchistan. He also warned the Persian Government that any military measures on the part of the Russians on this frontier might entail counter-measures on the part of the Indian Government.

It appears certain that the Persian Government did in the first instance give permission for the entrance of a Russian force to form a cordon along the Afghan frontier: but a compromise was subsequently effected by restricting the permission to an escort of 50 Cossacks to accompany the Russian doctors. Her

Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, however, pointed out to the Persian Government that the presence of even fifty Cossacks was calculated to cause alarm, and requested that urgent orders might be sent to stop the arrival of the Cossacks on the frontier. In reply to this representation, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs gave a formal assurance that no Russian troops would be permitted to enter Persian territory, and that an escort of Persian troops would be provided for the Russian doctors and their assistants who were being sent, one to Kerman and the others to watch the Herat and Sabzwar roads.

In spite of this assurance, which was given on the 17th and repeated on the 18th February, M. Vlassow on the 20th February announced to the Governor-General of Khorassan that 120 Cossacks were starting from Pul-i-Khatun, and would arrive at Turbat-i-Sheikh Jam on the 26th February. Meanwhile the Governor-General sent a special messenger to the Governors of Kain and Seistan, notifying the closing of the Afghan frontier, and directing them to post guards on their respective borders and stop traffic altogether. Notwithstanding that not a single case of plague had appeared in Baluchistan or Afghanistan; all communication between Afghanistan and Persia was strictly prohibited; even Colonel Yate's post from India by Herat being interdicted. Caravans from Herat, which had proceeded as far as Turbat, were turned back, and Persian quarantine guards were posted all along the frontier.

Information of the movement of Russian troops into Khorassan was received by the priests and people with apathy, and there was no thought of opposition or sign of agitation. The Governor-General of Khorassan, and the leading men in Meshed, all expressed the opinion that the prevention of the spread of plague was merely an excuse, and not the true motive of Russia in sending troops to Khorassan and Seistan. The general idea in Meshed was that an attack on Afghanistan was imminent. Count Mouravieff positively assured Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg that there were no political objects in the action which Russia was taking, and that he had enjoined great caution on the officers sent to the Perso-Afghan frontier to prevent their proceedings causing excitement in Afghanistan.

On the 2nd of March, Colonel Yate was informed by the Russian Consul-General that, if plague appeared in Seistan, Russia would hold the line from Sabzwar eastward in force, taking the whole of Khorassan north of that line under their charge. Colonel Yate also reported that General Kuropatkin had written to the Governor of Herat, offering the services of a Russian doctor for that city. The Government of India, in informing the Amir of the arrival of the Russian doctors and Cossacks on the Perso-Afghan frontier, offered to supply medical assistance if required; but the Amir replied that no cases of plague had yet appeared in Afghanistan, and medical aid was not needed.

On the 3rd March a Russian Colonel with 4 officers and 130 Cossacks crossed the frontier from Pul-i-Khatun and went towards Zurabad; and on the 8th March a Russian officer, two doctors and 14 Cossacks arrived at Meshed. At the end of the month, Russian pickets were posted along the frontier as far south as Karez, and a Russian doctor was starting for Birjand and Seistan.

In a letter, dated the 23rd February, the Amir expressed the opinion that the preparations and movements of the Russians on the frontier were not undertaken on account of plague precautions, but that "they had been waiting for

an opportunity to fill their frontier posts with large numbers of troops and warlike appliances," and had taken the present opportunity to do so. Besides the additions to posts on the Herat and Turkistan frontiers, His Highness stated that a large body of Bokharan or Russian troops had been sent from Hissar to Baharak, Chobak and Mahal Serai, facing the Afghan posts of Samtai, Darogh and Hazrat-i-Imam on the Oxus. The Hakim of Rustak had sent reinforcements to Yangi Kila, and the Amir said that this was no time for negligence, and that a post should be established "opposite each Russian post furnished with the necessary men and armaments, so that we may not remain passive while they are active."

In reply the Viceroy warned His Highness against taking any step which might involve risk of misunderstanding and trouble on the border, and on the 8th April the Amir wrote that he had communicated information of the Russian proceedings, not by way of complaint or as an expression of alarm, but by way of news; that if the Russians encroached on Afghan territory, the Afghans were ready to protect themselves, and the Amir would communicate the circumstances to the British Government.

The news-agent at Samarkand reported the despatch of 1,500 infantry, 400 Cossacks and 4 guns to Khozar, between the 15th and 23rd February. The news-writer at Kerki reported the arrival there of 1,500 Russian and 1,700 Bokharan troops, and that 2,000 Russian troops had been despatched to the Afghan frontier; and Colonel Yate, in informing the Government of India of these movements, said that the concentration of troops on the Afghan frontier appeared to be in far greater strength than would seem necessary if quarantine were the sole object.

Early in March, M. Vlassow informed Colonel Yate that he had heard the Afghans were collecting troops on the frontier, and that, in order to minimize the risk of a collision between them and the Russian Cossacks, he intended posting the Cossacks in parties of ten along the frontier as a second line behind the Persian frontier guards; and he added that it was General Kuropatkin's intention to withdraw the Cossacks at the beginning of the summer, if no plague cases occurred before then. M. Vlassow maintained that the disease had appeared at Kandahar and Nushki, in spite of Colonel Yate's assurances to the contrary.

The Governor of Herat furnished the British news-writer with a copy of a letter, which he had received from General Kuropatkin about the plague. General Kuropatkin wrote that the Government of India, through fear of loss to their traders, had not taken effective steps to prevent the plague spreading from Bombay to other parts, and that it had consequently spread to Sind and Quetta, whence it might easily get to Kandahar and other places in Afghan territory. He suggested that the Afghan Government should guard their frontier with troops, that travellers and goods should not be allowed to cross it, or traffic should only be permitted at fixed places where travellers should be examined and those suspected of carrying infection turned back: "otherwise all traffic should be stopped from places like Quetta to which plague has spread, and no one should be allowed to enter Afghanistan from that side." The General offered to furnish assistance for the protection of Herat against the disease if required. The letter was taken to Herat by Taj Nazar Ishan,

who had before carried communications to the Governor from trans-Caspian officials. The Governor sent it to the Amir for orders. His Highness did not address the Government of India on the subject: and it is not known whether His Highness ordered any reply. Taj Nazar Ishan was received at Herat with every distinction. In his conversation with the Governor, he dilated on the independence of Afghanistan, and did his best to set the Afghans against the English and to win them to the Russian side, telling them that the English were about to enter into hostilities with Turkey, but that Russia intended to befriend the Turks. He left Herat to return to Tanurah on the 15th March, accompanied by the Governor of Kushk and a guard.

On the 11th April, a collision occurred between four Russian Cossacks and five Afghan footmen, near Istoi, on the left bank of the Heri Rud, not far from Zulfikar. Two Afghans were shot. The Russian officer responsible sent word to the Afghan authorities that the Afghans had entered Persian territory in defiance of the orders of the plague picket, but that he was prepared to give compensation to the families of the men who had been shot. The Afghans refused to accept the offer.

About the same time, the Amir informed the Government of India of

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 96 (Frontier), dated the 7th July 1897.

another collision between Russian troops and Afghan subjects near Shaikh Junaid.

It appears that the Russian officer at Tanurah complained to the Afghan Sarhang at Chahil Dukhteran that fifteen Afghan sowars and soldiers had entered the limits of Shor Sufaid and fired on the Russian frontier guard. The Sarhang contradicted this version and stated that three nomad flock-owners with three shepherds, had taken their sheep to a spring within Afghan limits; that ten Russian soldiers came from Shor Sufaid into Afghan territory, and demanded that the sheep should be given up: the flock-owners refused, whereupon the Russians withdrew some distance towards their territory, then returned and fired a volley wounding three of the Afghan party, who retired carrying away the wounded "without saying anything to the Russians."

On the 1st May a telegram was received from Colonel Yate, reporting that

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 72 (Frontier), dated the 25th May 1897.

a collision had occurred between some Afghans and Russian Cossacks at Musabad

south of Hashtadan, and that two Russians and one Afghan had been killed. Subsequently Colonel Yate telegraphed that the report was unfounded; that two Russian officers had stayed for a few days at Musabad and proposed to establish a Cossack post there, but that, on the advice of the Persian frontier officer, they had returned and established a post of ten Cossacks at Khushaba instead. The Amir, who was informed by the Government of India of the reported collision, replied (30th May 1897) that no such incident had occurred, and he added—"Again Musabad is not a disputed tract. It is manifestly a tract

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 96 (Frontier), dated the 7th July 1897.

within the limits of the God-granted kingdom, so much so that, in the boundary

settlement of the outskirts of Hashtadan, this valley has been included in the jurisdiction of Afghanistan, and the boundary line and the marks of the (boundary) pillars are visible there. For many years past a border guard of this Government has been located at that place and been keeping a watch there.

In the map acknowledged by the Russian Government, which is now lying before me, this place has been shown as a part of Afghanistan, and the Persian Government too has never considered and do not consider it to be a disputed tract between the two Governments."

The Amir's position is incorrect. General MacLean, who acted as arbitrator in the Hashtadan dispute, purposely avoided dealing with Musabad, which is claimed by both Persians and Afghans. The Viceroy accordingly replied that he was not aware to what map His Highness referred as "the map acknowledged by the Russian Government," that General MacLean's labours were confined within certain specified limits, and that the

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 96 (Frontier), dated the 7th July 1897.

Persian Government equally with His Highness maintain their claim to the Musabad lands, though since the conclusion of the Hashtadan demarcation, they had not actively pushed their claim and had in this acted in conformity with an arrangement made at the time with General MacLean that they would preserve the *status quo* in the disputed tract. The Viceroy expressed a hope that the Afghan officials would abstain from taking any steps which might lead the Persians to press their claims, and perhaps disturb the peace of the frontier which has happily remained for so long unbroken.

At the end of May all the Russian Cossacks who had been employed on the Perso-Afghan frontier had returned to Pul-i-Khatun, with the exception of ten who remained with an officer and doctor at Karez, and ten at Birjand. They were replaced by 150 Persian Cossacks sent from Tehran, but as under orders from the Persian Government, all Persian quarantine guards were placed under the orders of Captain Raffalovitch, the Officer Commanding the Persian Cossacks, and as he takes his orders from the Russian Legation at Tehran, the state of affairs on the frontier will not be much altered by the departure of the Russian Cossacks.

Prior to the withdrawal of the Russian Cossacks from the Perso-Afghan frontier, the Russian officers feasted the people among whom they had been staying. A repeating rifle was given to the Deputy Governor of Bakherz, and two Russian decorations were promised to him and to the Deputy Governor of Jam. The Russian Colonel told the former Deputy Governor that the troops were not being withdrawn for good, but would shortly return.

Arrangements have been come to with the Suleman Khel for the levy from them of a moderate grazing tax both on the Baluchistan and Punjab side of the border. The Suleman Khel agreed to the tax, on condition that the Dotannis who graze along with them should be made to pay the same dues. This was considered appropriate, and, in consideration of their agreeing to the tax, and in order to enlist the influence and co-operation of the headmen, allowances aggregating 4,500 rupees a year have been granted to the Suleman Khels, and 1,000 rupees a year to the Dotannis.

Afghan-Baluchistan Frontier.

The Afghan officials all along the Baluchistan frontier are said to have received orders from the Amir to try and induce people inhabiting British territory to emigrate to Afghanistan. It is reported that His Highness frequently abuses the emigrants from Baluchistan, because they leave their country, not for the sake of their religion, but simply to increase their importance

in the eyes of the British officials. His Highness has consequently sent an order to the Governor of Kandahar that, in future whenever any Baluchi enters Afghanistan with his family, he should be immediately sent to Kabul. His Highness will show favour to such immigrants, but certain members of their families will be sent to settle in Turkistan, and, if they object, they will be turned out of His Highness's dominions.

Chageh district and
Seistan.

Lieutenant Webb Ware, who started on a tour to the Persian border on the 1st January 1897, found that the newly demarcated frontier from Chaman to the Koh-i-Malik Siah had been scrupulously respected by the Afghan authorities, with the exception of the portion in the vicinity of Nushki. Here raids and counter-raids on both sides of the border were of frequent occurrence, the fault as a rule being with the Afghan Barechis. Mr. Webb Ware warned our subjects that the border must on no account be again violated, and that no interference with caravans would be tolerated: and the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan addressed the Governor of Kandahar and invited his co-operation to prevent the recurrence of offences in future.

Between Nushki and Galichah there are natural facilities for a caravan route: the stages are easy, well-water is abundant and excellent, and there is plenty of grass for horses and grazing for camels. Sardar Sir Nauroz Khan had been giving trouble in the Galichah direction. When he was at Quetta just before Lieutenant Webb Ware started for Nushki, the Agent to the Governor-General explained to him the arrangements for opening the trade route to Seistan, and told him plainly that Government could not recognise his claims to any of the country, which by the demarcation of the Afghan boundary had been recovered from the Afghans. The Sardar acquiesced in the justice of the decision, and said he did not desire to assert any claims to Dalbandin and the Chageh district; but he wished that his boundary might be clearly defined and said he had a claim to one piece of land in Dalbandin called Wuchki Nali, for which he declared he held a sanad from the Amir. He further said that Gakok and Galichah belonged to him, as his only road to Mashkel ran through Galichah. Mr. Barnes replied that his claims to Wuchki Nali, Gakok and Galichah would be enquired into, if he sent a representative to meet Lieutenant Webb Ware, which Sir Nauroz Khan promised to do. After his departure from Quetta, however, the Sardar began to forcibly assert his claims as against Sardar Ali Khan, Sinjerani. His sowars have, during the last year, by their exactions and oppression, driven most of the camel-owners and Baluchi residents out of the district. The wells have nearly all been wilfully destroyed, and the Sardar's name inspires such dread throughout the place that Lieutenant Webb Ware found it difficult to restore confidence, and raise the required number of levies for the posts at Dalbandin and Galichah. Mr. Barnes called upon Sir Nauroz Khan for an explanation and the matter has been settled.

After arranging for levy posts on the Nushki-Seistan route, Lieutenant Webb Ware left Koh-i-Malik Siah on his way to Seistan on the 11th March. He found the nomad Baluch near the frontier very friendly and ready to sell supplies. His movements were closely watched by the Afghans, who are paying great attention to the Nushki-Seistan trade route.

In spite of full instructions for his respectful treatment having been issued by the Persian Government, Lieutenant Webb Ware found a hostile influence

In spite of full instructions for his respectful treatment having been issued by the Persian Government, Lieutenant Webb Ware found a hostile influence working against him in Seistan from the first: while outwardly he was treated with courtesy and consideration, his movements were kept under surveillance, and he was subjected to various petty annoyances and delays; the townspeople were afraid to visit him for fear of incurring official displeasure.

On arrival at Nasirabad on the 18th March, he was received by the Naib-ul-Hukmat and the Sartip, the latter, a youth of about 16, of a weakly constitution and enfeebled intellect. Lieutenant Webb Ware found it difficult to discuss business with them, both evincing a marked disinclination to go beyond an interchange of courtesies, under the pretext that they were being watched by the Russian news-writer. Eventually, however, he was able to refer to the opening of the road, the removal of tolls, and the desirability of preserving inviolate the frontier demarcated last year. The Sartip and Naib promised to use every means in their power to prevent raids into British territory, and guaranteed protection to our traders while within their jurisdiction.

After taking leave of the Sartip on the 21st March, and having been promised every assistance in the way of transport and supplies, Lieutenant Webb Ware was delayed twelve days at Hussainabad, and did not reach Koh-i-Malik Siah on his return journey until the 10th April. A Russian medical officer reached Nasirabad about the date of Lieutenant Webb Ware's departure from Hussainabad.

During Lieutenant Webb Ware's absence in Seistan, his infantry escort built a post at Robat (Koh-i-Malik Siah). All along the road from Nushki to the frontier, posts are now held by levies enlisted from the local tribesmen, who have taken kindly to the work and are giving no trouble. Refugees are returning in considerable numbers to the long deserted tracts, and the people are anxious to take advantage of the security which now prevails.

In March, Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh, with the concurrence of the Persian Government, was deputed to Seistan, by the Nushki route, to watch the working of the arrangements initiated by the Persian Government for preventing the spread of plague into Seistan from Baluchistan.

On reaching the Persian frontier, Dr. Brazier-Creagh found that all caravans proceeding to Seistan from Nushki or elsewhere in Baluchistan, were being turned back by the Persians. This was in accordance with the orders of the Persian Government that all roads leading from Baluchistan into Persia, except the one to Bampur and Bam, should be closed. Her Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran was asked whether he could obtain permission for traders to enter Seistan after suitable precautions, as the prohibition was causing discontent and killing trade. On his representation, orders were sent to the Governor-General of Khorassan that the Seistan roads might be used, subject to the conditions as to quarantine measures which are imposed in respect to the other open roads.

Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh arrived at Nasirabad in Seistan on the 14th May. He reported that the Russians show interest in the smallest details regarding the newly-opened up desert route from Nushki. They have established news-writers not only in Seistan, but all along the road thence to Meshed, at Neh, Birjand and Tabas. Few of the Persian officials know or believe anything about the plague; they suspect that the Russians have stopped the trade routes for their own purposes.

Miscellaneous.

On the occasion of the celebration of the sixtieth year of Her Majesty's reign, the Government of India sanctioned the release of Ali Gauhar Khan, the Khan of Agror, who had been under police surveillance on account of his complicity in the border outrages which brought about the punitive expedition undertaken in 1888 against the Black Mountain tribes. His estate and lands were confiscated at the time, but at the forthcoming settlement of the valley, a portion of the lands will be granted to the Khan, subject to the conditions that he and certain of his relatives will not come within a prescribed distance of the valley, and that the lands shall be held and managed on his behalf by the Punjab Government.

Sardar Sher Ali Khan, ex-Wali of Kandahar, one of the most important Afghan refugees in India, died at Karachi on the 21st of January. He was in receipt of an allowance from Government of Rs. 5,000 a month, about one-half of which is being continued to his family.

21st July 1897.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

HALF-YEAR

WHICH ENDED ON THE 31ST DECEMBER 1897.

THE half-year ending the 31st December 1897 has been remarkable for a fanatical outbreak on the north-western frontier, more serious and extended than any that has occurred since the annexation of the Punjab.

In May 1897, Major Deane reported that persistent efforts had been and were being made to arouse Muhammadan fanaticism against us in Bajaur, Swat and Dir, and he feared that, unless the fanatical party were brought under control, there was considerable risk of fanaticism spreading to the detriment of British interests. The Khan of Dir had informed Major Deane that, as soon as the Chitral reliefs were completed, he intended to assert himself against the fanatical party in Upper Swat, and to move against the Palam Mulla, who had been trying to make the Dir levies desert and to prevent others from enlisting. Major Deane told the Khan that, as he was responsible for maintaining the Chitral communications, he was at liberty to ensure success in the best manner he could. The Government of India approved Major Deane's attitude.

Early in June, the Khan commenced to execute his plans. He apparently experienced little difficulty in entering Upper Swat and in temporarily establishing his authority there. His action caused considerable local excitement. The Upper Swati clans sent in messages to Major Deane asking to be protected against the Khan. Major Deane replied that there was nothing to prevent their coming to him and establishing direct friendly relations with us, but that, unless they did so, he saw no reason for moving in the matter.

Early in July, Major Deane received at Chakdarra the Khan of Dir and a large gathering of the Maliks of Upper Swat. He reported that the jirgas accepted the fact of their being under Government influence in a good spirit, and looked to their country being placed on the same footing as that already under political control. They said that they wanted peace; were ready to perform service if required, and undertook to furnish fighting men for Government, if called on to do so. Major Deane explained to them that Government had no desire to interfere with their internal administration, but would assist them in settling their disputes if they brought them before the Political Officer; that Government did not intend to impose revenue on them, and that all Government wanted was to secure peace and order in Upper Swat, as in Lower Swat and the Ranizai country. "The main point about the present position," Major Deane wrote on the 3rd July, "is that the power of the Mian Guls, trading on the old Akhund's name, is broken. The

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 126 (Frontier), dated the 1st September 1897.

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Mian Guls have been determined that the Upper Swat Maliks should not come into direct contact with us, but they are glad now to send in letters, such as I have received during the past week, declaring themselves servants of Government and ready to do service." * * * "The Swatis themselves say that, had they not made up their minds to 'lay hold of the skirt' of Government for good and all, they would not have come in." The jirgas left on the understanding that the good intentions and friendly feelings, which they expressed, would be judged by their future actions, and that they would come in again later to settle disputes, &c., and to arrange any points that might be necessary.

On the 26th July, barely three weeks after the return of the jirgas, an outburst of fanaticism, as serious as it was sudden, broke the peace of the Swat valley. On the evening of that date, Major Deane telegraphed that a mad Fakir had during the previous week been preaching against Government and announcing that our troops were to be turned out of the country in eight days; he had secured a great hold on the religious feeling of the people throughout

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the valley and on the Dir side, and Major Deane feared it might become necessary to move a column towards Thana. An hour or two later, Major Deane telegraphed that the Fakir had been joined by the whole of Thana except one Khan, and was between Thana and Malakand with a small gathering, and that a column would move out against him the first thing in the morning. The Fakir, however, advanced rapidly; the villagers and levies offered no opposition, and before 10-30 P.M. on the 26th, he attacked the position at Malakand with about 1,000 fanatics. The attack lasted till nearly daylight, and was repulsed after severe fighting. Chakdarra was simultaneously attacked by about 1,000 men of the Dush Khel, Adinzai and neighbouring Upper Swatis. At daylight on the 27th, the 31st Punjab Infantry, with a cavalry detachment and 4 guns, were sent out from Malakand to pursue the enemy and to open communication with Chakdarra. The cavalry cut their way through to Chakdarra, but the infantry and guns were recalled to Malakand.

Fighting continued till midday on the 27th, when Major Deane telegraphed that the tribes generally were rising. The enemy attacked both the Malakand

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camp and Chakdarra in increasing numbers on each successive night up to the 30th July, notwithstanding that severe losses were inflicted on them. The Malakand was promptly reinforced. During the night attack on Malakand on the 29th, the Fakir was wounded and withdrew, and his companion and chief supporter was killed; but this did not prevent still larger gatherings collecting on the 30th.

The troops at Malakand and those moving up were formed into a Field Force of two Brigades under the command of Major-General Sir Bindon Blood,

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who arrived at Malakand on the 1st August. Reinforcements under Colonel Reid reached Malakand on the 31st, and on the 2nd August, a column, under Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, relieved Chakdarra after some smart fighting.

The gatherings at Chakdarra and Malakand were estimated at 20,000, and included Utman Khels, Bunerwals, Bajauris, Ranizais, Lower and Upper

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Swatis, Adinzais and Dush Khels. Major Deane believes the influence of the Mian Guls was at first against the outbreak, and that they did not join until the 29th, when they were unable to withstand the pressure brought to bear on them. The Ranizai Maliks on the south side of Malakand do not appear to have themselves taken part in the attack, but they could not restrain their tribesmen, and no Malik of Lower Swat remained faithful, it is believed, except Inayat Khan of Thana, who sought refuge in Chakdarra. Some of the Dir levies joined in the attacks, but the levy jemadar of Chakdarra was killed fighting on our side. The tribesmen themselves put their loss during the fighting from the 26th July to the 2nd August at over 3,000 killed.

During the fighting, the Khan of Dir had a difficult part to play; he openly declared he would not go back on the promises he had made to Govern-

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ment, and, after the relief of Chakdarra, at once commenced to punish those of his subjects who had joined against us. Postal communication with Chitral was only interrupted for a few days.

The Ranizais from Khar downwards were among the first to send in jirgas

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to Major Deane suing for peace, and were permitted to return to their villages on the condition of surrendering all arms and Government property in their possession, and of submitting to such fine or further punishment as might be imposed upon them. The Alladand jirga also came in and set about endeavouring to collect all Government property in the possession of their tribesmen. The jirgas of the Shamozaï, Shamizai, Nikpi Khel and other clans on the right bank of the Swat river came in to Chakdarra on the 12th August, and Major Deane was authorized to settle with them amicably on the basis of their making submission, giving passage to our troops, if required, and paying a fine.

After the relief of Chakdarra, Sir Bindon Blood was authorized to advance on the left bank of the Swat river to Saidu or Minglaor. This movement was not undertaken in order to inflict damage on the tribes if they made submission and reparation, but to mark the fact that they had wantonly attacked a British force, and that the troops had the power to advance when they chose into their country. The column started from Amandarra for Upper Swat on the 16th August. On the 17th, after leaving Thana, they encountered 2,000 to

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3,000 men in position on a spur between Jalala and Landikeh. The tribesmen were easily dispersed, some retreating to Upper Swat and some towards the Morah Pass and Buner. The column marched to Ghaligai on the 18th August, seeing no sign of the enemy, and on the 19th to Mingaora, where the Aba Khels and the jirgas of Mingaora and the valleys beyond commenced bringing in the arms demanded from them by way of punishment; a few days later the force returned to Thana, the political objects of the march through Upper Swat having been satisfactorily attained.

During the first week after the attack on the Malakand, it was more than once reported that the Adda Mulla was preparing to join the enemy in the

Swat valley; but on the 7th August, he descended the Gandab valley with a following of about 5,000 men, comprised of Mohmands and men from Afghan territory, and, after burning the Hindu village of Shankargarh, within the British frontier, attacked the Shabkadar post. The Commissioner of the Peshawar Division had received intelligence of the Mulla's advance, and troops were on their way to Shabkadar when news of the attack arrived. The Shab-

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kadar post was occupied by a few men of the border police, who held their own and inflicted considerable loss on the tribesmen. A force under Colonel Woon arrived at Shabkadar on the 8th. The enemy under the Adda Mulla himself were then in the low hills near the fort. They were attacked the next morning and driven back into the high hills beyond the frontier of the Peshawar district. A few days afterwards the Adda Mulla left the neighbourhood. There is little room for doubt that the Adda Mulla's gathering included many men including sepoys from Afghan territory, and the villages along the Kabul river between Jalalabad and Dakka are said to have sent contingents. The Viceroy accordingly addressed the Amir, through the Commissioner of Peshawar, on the 13th August, informing His Highness of the nature of the reports which had reached the Government of India, and requiring him to take immediate steps to recall his subjects, and to prevent the repetition of so exceedingly grave an offence. The letter concluded as follows:—"It is impossible that Afghan sepoys can have joined in this attack without the knowledge of the

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Sipah Salar, and the Viceroy is constrained to warn Your Highness that, if you do not control the Sipah Salar, or withdraw him from his command on the frontier, Your Highness must be held responsible for his actions." The Amir emphatically denied the truth of the report that men of his regular army had joined the Adda Mulla and personally engaged that no such act of hostility would ever be committed by them. He attributed the proceedings of the tribesmen to the influence of the Mullas, whom he denounced as turbulent agitators. His Highness read out the Viceroy's message and the draft of his reply in a full Darbar at Kabul, and publicly protested his unalterable good faith towards the British Government.

On the 16th August, a report was received that an Afridi lashkar, 10,000

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strong, accompanied by 1,500 Mullas from Ningrahar, had started to attack the Khyber road and posts from Landi Kotal downwards, and that the Orakzais would simultaneously commence hostilities in the Samana direction. The troops in Peshawar had been previously strengthened, and precautions were taken, including a demonstration in force to Jamrud.

On the 17th August, a large body of Massuzais was reported to be on the

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move in the direction of Para Chinar, and about the same time, news was received that shots had been fired into Fort Lockhart on the Samana on the night of the 14th. Kohat had been considerably strengthened to admit of arrangements being made for reinforcing the troops in Kurram and on the Samana. Reports of large gatherings of Orakzais were now received, an attack was made on the

police post at Marai, and a raiding party was seen at the Ublan kotal near Kohat, and it was clear that the Orakzais had determined to join in the general rising.

At the end of August, a column under General Jeffreys was detailed to visit the Utman Khel country on the left bank of the Swat river. Reports were, however, received that the Adda Mulla had collected a large gathering, and that it was his intention to advance on Dir. Accordingly, early in September, the column was recalled, and it was decided that a force under Major-General Sir Bindon Blood should advance by Sado and Nawagai into the Mohmand country, while another force under Major-General Elles advanced from Peshawar. The objects were to destroy the Adda Mulla's power and disperse his gathering, to clear the Mohmand country of hostile forces, and to protect the Nawab of Dir and the Khan of Nawagai against attack.

General Blood, with the 2nd and 3rd Brigades of the Malakand Field Force under Brigadier-Generals Jeffreys and Wodehouse, at once prepared to advance on Nawagai. The troops halted three days at Gohsam, in the hope of being able to effect a settlement with the Shamozaï Utman Khels, who had agreed to surrender 100 rifles. On the 10th, the Malik brought in 15 breech-loaders and 57 old guns, which latter Major Deane declined to accept. He was unable, in the limited time, to settle with the tribe. On the 14th September, part of the 2nd Brigade under General Jeffreys marched from Khar to the foot of the Ramat Pass, with a view to entering the Mohmand country by that route. The rest of the force under Sir Bindon Blood on that date reached Nawagai. There had been no sign of any gathering to oppose the advance, and, although an uneasy feeling prevailed in the country, the Khans of Nawagai, Khar, and Jhar showed a good example and afforded every assistance to the force in collecting supplies. On the night of the 14th, General Jeffreys' camp at Markanai, at the foot of the Ramat Pass, was fired into, and two British officers were killed and one dangerously wounded. Two men were killed and a few sepoy wounded, and there were many casualties among horses and mules. This hostility on the part of the people of the Mamund valley, in General Jeffreys' rear, caused a change of plans. He discontinued his movement towards the Mohmand country, and his force spent the next few days in punishing the Mamunds and Salarzais concerned in the attack on the camp. On the 16th, there was severe fighting with the Mamunds in the Wadelai valley, in which our losses were considerable. The punitive operations were continued till, on the 27th September, the Bajauri Mamund jirga came in; their attitude, however, was by no means submissive; they refused to accept the terms demanded, and punitive measures were resumed. General Jeffreys visited 12 villages on either bank of the river unopposed; he blew up 15 towers and destroyed much property. On the 30th he attacked the villages of Agrah and Gat, and met with strong opposition from a force estimated at 2,000 men. The enemy suffered severely, but the action was not sufficiently decisive to crush further opposition. Our casualties were heavy. Badalai was destroyed

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on the 3rd October. The total losses of the enemy in the Mamund valley up to this date are estimated at over 350 killed and many wounded.

At the end of September instructions were sent to Major-General Sir Bindon Blood that he and his Divisional Staff, Brigadier-General Jeffreys with his brigade, and Brigadier-General Meiklejohn with his brigade, were to remain on the Malakand side to complete terms with the local tribes and to maintain order there. General Blood returned to Inayat Kila on the 2nd October, and joined the 2nd Brigade, with one and a half battalions of infantry and 8 guns, to enforce a settlement with the Mamunds, who still had a large gathering at the top of their valley, and who were receiving daily reinforcements from Afghan territory.

It was now decided to give the Khans of Nawagai, Khar and Jhar an opportunity of endeavouring to bring about the submission of the Mamunds; and word was sent to the tribe that, if they desired peace, they should put pressure on the gathering from Afghan territory to return to their homes. The Mamunds acted on this advice, and on the 11th October the Mamund jirga brought in 20 of the Martini rifles lost by the troops on the 16th September, and gave security for the remaining two, which have since been surrendered. They swore to maintain peace and promised to turn Umra Khan's following out of their valley. Sir Bindon Blood accepted their submission, and, in view of the heavy losses inflicted on them in lives and property, agreed to consider the account with them as closed.

The force next moved to Matta Shah in the Babukara valley on the 13th October, and effected a settlement with the Salarzais, who surrendered 131 guns and ten breech-loaders, and gave security for ten more of the latter. General Blood thereupon marched (20th October) to Jhar, and on the day following his arrival there, a settlement was effected with the Shamozaï. The force recrossed the Panjkora on the 23rd October.

The 3rd Brigade under General Wodehouse, with General Blood himself, halted at Nawagai until the 21st September. The Adda Mulla's gathering attacked the camp of the brigade on the nights of the 19th and 20th; on the first occasion, the attack was not pushed home; but on the night of the 20th it lasted 4 hours, and was repulsed with heavy loss inflicted on the assailants.

General Elles's force, consisting of two brigades, concentrated in the meantime at Shabkadar. On the 15th September, he advanced to the Karappa Pass meeting with no opposition. At Galanai on the 18th September, the Halimzai of Gandab submitted to the following terms:—Free forage for all troops in Gandab, surrender without payment of 2,400 maunds of grain, of all breech-loaders and Enfields in Gandab, and 300 guns of local make and 300 swords, also payment of a fine of Rs. 5,000 in cash, all to be given in within seven days; in addition, the forts of the principal supporters of the Adda Mulla in Gandab were to be destroyed. The Nahaki Pass was crossed on the 19th, and

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 143 (Frontier), dated the 14th October 1897.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 143 (Frontier), dated the 14th October 1897.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 154 (Frontier), dated the 4th November 1897.

on the 21st General Elles, bringing up one brigade, met Sir Bindon Blood at Lakarai, when the latter decided to place the 3rd Malakand Brigade at the disposal of General Elles to enable him to deal effectually with the Adda Mulla while he himself joined General Jeffreys.

General Elles attacked the Adda Mulla's gathering on the Bedmani Pass on the morning of the 23rd September. The Safi Mulla and the Ningrahar contingent had already left for their homes. The enemy, chiefly Baezai Mohmands, were taken by surprise, as they had expected the troops first to reduce the Mitai valley and attack Bedmani afterwards; consequently only some 500 men held the pass, the advance up which was, however, stubbornly contested. The Adda Mulla fled westwards by Salala towards the Sangu Khel Shinwari country, as soon as the guns opened fire, and his gathering was completely dispersed. All towers in Bedmani were destroyed. The Musa Khel of Mitai

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were punished on the 24th, and those of Suran on the 25th. General Elles proceeded on the latter date to Jarobi; his advance was opposed, but his casualties were slight. The Mulla's residence was found to be a mosque, and was left untouched, but all forts in the glen were destroyed. As the Atamar Khel, Lashkar Khel and Khoda Khel Baezais and the Khwaezai refused to surrender rifles and to pay fines, offering only a paltry number of country-made guns, their towers were also destroyed.

On the 26th, General Elles moved into the Bohai Dag, within 2 miles of the watershed, by which, according to the map attached to the Durand Convention, the boundary of the Amir's territories was to be defined, returning thence to Karwarina. General Westmacott moved straight down the valley

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towards Kung punishing as he went by the destruction of towers and forts. The Khwaezai, Dawezai, Utmanzai, Kamali, and Pindiali jirgas having come in, terms were dictated to them, including provision of free grain, forage, and fuel for troops, the surrender of all breech-loaders and Enfields in their possession, as well as a fixed number of other weapons, and the payment of fines. These terms were duly complied with, and General Elles's First Brigade remained at Nahaki, while his Second Brigade proceeded to march round the Utmanzai, Dawezai, and Isa Khel country. This brought operations in the Mohmand country to a successful conclusion, and the force retired from the Mohmand country without being molested during withdrawal.

The total sum collected in fines by Major Deane up to the end of September from the Khan Khels, Ranizais, and Adinzais, and by the Khan of Dir from the tribes on the right bank of the Swat river, amounted to 85,000 rupees: 3,800 guns and 1,500 swords were also surrendered. One hundred and sixty-two breech-loaders had also been obtained, of which 30 were obtained from Jandol, and 15 from the Shamozaï Utman Khels. The Utman Khel of Kuz Totai had surrendered 100 guns, and were collecting 50 more, as their share of the 600 imposed on the Cis-Swat sections. On the 24th September Major Deane received at Chakdarra the Upper Swat jirga and the younger Mian Gul, a lad of 14 years, who came in with them, thus ratifying the submission made at Mingaora.

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The Khyber Pass remained open and quiet until the 19th August, and it was believed that the timely arrival of troops at Jamrud had greatly discouraged the Afridi lashkar. On the 23rd, however,

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Ali Masjid and Fort Maude were captured and burnt by the tribesmen, the Khyber Rifle garrison retiring to Jamrud with their rifles. The Landi Kotal post was attacked on the 24th August. The garrison which consisted of 370 Khyber Rifles held out on the 24th, inflicting severe loss on the enemy; but, on the 25th, the Shinwari jemadar was wounded and his tribesmen then deserted; Subadar Mursil, commanding, was shot dead in repelling an assault; and the defence collapsed, not, however, until the assailants had suffered a loss of 250 killed. One hundred and thirty-four men of the Landi Kotal garrison came in to Jamrud with their rifles, but the majority joined their fellow tribesmen, taking with them 274 Snider rifles, the property of Government.

At the end of August, the Orakzai rising assumed serious proportions.

On the 25th a large lashkar, composed of Ali Khels, Alisherzai, Mamuzai and Malla Khels, concentrated near Karappa in Akhel limits, and their advance was only deferred because the Mishtis and other sections still refrained from joining. On this date, a force of 250 or 300 Daulatzais collected in the Ublan Pass, with the intention of attacking the Muhammadzai post. On the 26th, they were reinforced by 600 Firoz Khels and Bazotis, and sent word to the

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Deputy Commissioner that they would disperse if the Kohat salt duty were reduced and Swat evacuated. During the night they attacked the old police post of Muhammadzai, temporarily held by 25 border police and a few armed villagers; the garrison retired to the new police post, into which a company of infantry had been thrown that same night. The enemy did not attack the new posts, but retired to the Ublan. Early on the 27th, a force marched up from Kohat and drove them out of the pass. The Lakka post was attacked on the morning of the 27th August and Shinawari and Saifaldarra during the previous night: the posts were eventually evacuated and burnt by the enemy.

On the 28th, a night raid was made on Kahi, and the police lock-up

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partly burnt; on the 29th, the bazaar at Nariab was looted and the school-house burnt. On the 30th, news was received from Fort Lockhart that the posts on the Samana were surrounded by a force of Ali Khels, Mamuzais, Alisherzais, Mishtis, Shekhans, and Malla Khels.

Orders were now issued for the concentration of a force, under General Sir

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William Lockhart, for an advance into Tirah to exact reparation from the Afridis and Orakzais for their unprovoked aggression.

During the last few days of August, the enemy remained in large numbers before Gulistan, sending out raiding parties daily to harass the valley below and firing into the posts at night. Early in September, contingents of Afridis, who gave out exaggerated accounts of their proceedings in the Khyber, began

to join the Orakzais. A half-hearted attack was made on Gulistan on the evening of the 3rd September. During the next few days the lashkar continued to invest the Samana posts, cut the telegraph line, and commit other acts of aggression. On the 11th, an Afridi lashkar, headed by Mulla Saiyid Akbar

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and Mir Bashar, was seen moving down the Khanki valley below the Samana ridge.

General Yeatman-Biggs, by moving eastward along the range, checked a meditated attack on Hangu, but during the night his own rear guard was smartly attacked while on the crest between Tsallai and Saifaldarra. On the 12th, scarcity of water compelled the force to return to Hangu; and in their absence, the lashkar attacked the Crag Picket and Saragarhi in force. Saragarhi fell after a very gallant resistance, and 23 men of the 36th Sikhs, who comprised the garrison, were killed. The Hangu force again moved up to the Samana on the night of the 13th, and relieved Gulistan and Fort Lockhart. The Samil lashkar in great force opposed General Yeatman-Biggs' advance at Gogra, but the fire of his guns drove them from their position with loss.

Towards the end of September, it was reported that the Orakzai pickets

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left in observation near the Samana had disappeared, and that the Samil Orakzais, very disheartened, were anxious to make

terms. The Afridis and Gar clans had sent a deputation to Kabul, but the members were stopped at Jalalabad under orders from the Amir, who refused to help them and ordered them to return.

Sadda in Kurram was attacked on the night of the 31st August; and

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Balish Khel on the following day. The enemy were beaten off by the villagers aided by the Kurram Militia. The camp

of the flying column was attacked at Sadda on the night of the 16th September by a lashkar of Mussuzais; there were only a few casualties among the troops; the enemy's loss is believed to have been heavy, and the attack was not repeated.

The British Agent at Kabul having heard reports that Afghan subjects and soldiers were joining the Adda Mulla's lashkar in large numbers, addressed the Amir on the subject, of his own motion, on the 21st August. This elicited from the Amir an autograph letter to the effect that Afghan subjects, from fear of

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His Highness, could not have openly joined the Mulla; they might have joined secretly, but instructions had been given to the

officials in Ningrahar, they were keeping secret watch and had recently dispersed a gathering of 500 men who were intending to join the Mulla. The Amir added that he was powerless to prevent men going secretly; but, as far as possible, he would watch their movements. The Amir adopted a similar strain in writing to the Viceroy.

In acknowledging His Highness's letter, the Viceroy took the opportunity

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 143 (Frontier), dated the 14th October 1897.

of informing the Amir of the intention to despatch a force into the Mohmand country "to search out the Mulla of Adda

and his lashkar, and to disperse and destroy them," and, if necessary, to follow him up to Jarobi, or to any place similarly situated; at the same time, His Highness was assured that the British troops would not remain in the country and would not go further into it than was necessary to carry out the object with which they had been despatched; and that, if the Mulla should take flight across the mountains into the Kunar valley, the troops would not follow him beyond the watershed, but the Government of India would look to His Highness to deal with him as he deserved and restrain him from exciting the tribesmen to further acts of hostility.

In his reply, dated the 12th September, the Amir said that the Adda

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 143 (Frontier), dated the 14th October 1897.

Mulla was unlikely to enter Afghanistan, as he had acted badly (towards the Amir), but should he do so, the Amir would

expel him, "so that he may go towards Arabia, because he is a very wicked person."

Early in October, Sir William Lockhart issued a notification to the Tirah

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 158 (Frontier), dated the 11th November 1897.

Afridis and Orakzais, announcing the determination of the British Government to despatch a force to march through their

country and to proclaim from the heart of it the terms which we intend to demand in satisfaction of their recent misconduct. It was not considered advisable to announce the terms in the notification, and it was left to Sir William Lockhart to proclaim them in such manner and at such time as might seem best to him.

The Tirah Expeditionary Force comprised two Divisions—the First*

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 158 (Frontier), dated the 11th November 1897.

* First Brigade under Brigadier-General Hart, V.C. (vice Brigadier-General Ian Hamilton, injured by an accident); Second Brigade under Brigadier-General A. Gaselee.

† Third Brigade under Brigadier-General F. J. Kempster; Fourth Brigade under Brigadier-General B. Westmacott.

under Major-General W. P. Symons, the Second† under Major-General Yeatman-Biggs: Lieutenant-General Sir A. P. Palmer commanded the line of communications: Colonel W. Hill commanded the Kurram Movable Column: Brigadier-

General A. G. Hammond commanded the Peshawar Column, operating from Bara. Sir Richard Udny was appointed Chief Political Officer under Sir William Lockhart.

Sir William Lockhart left Kohat for the Samana on the 9th October. The

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 158 (Frontier), dated the 11th November 1897.

troops from Peshawar marched through the Kohat Pass in three columns unmol-

ested, on the 10th, 11th, and 12th October, respectively.

An Afridi and Orakzai jirga came to Jamrud on the 16th October to make

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 158 (Frontier), dated the 11th November 1897.

a representation, but the men were told to present themselves before Sir William

Lockhart in Tirah. At a jirga held by the Orakzais on the 9th October, it was decided to hold the Sanpagha Pass against the British force. For some days previously the enemy had taken no offensive action, beyond sending out raiding parties, and had been disputing as to their line of action.

Meanwhile, the Expeditionary Force was concentrating for the advance with as great expedition as possible. The working parties improving the road

over the Chagru Kotal were daily annoyed by a number of the enemy

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 158 (Frontier), dated the 11th November 1897.

who entrenched themselves in sangars at Dargai, and fired on the covering parties on their retirement in the evening to camp. On the 18th October, a force was sent from Shinawari under General Sir Power Palmer to operate against Dargai. Dargai was captured and the defences demolished by noon, with but small loss on our side. About 3 P.M., however, a large Orakzai and Afridi lashkar, which had assembled in the morning at Khangarbur, hearing the sound of firing, marched with great rapidity up the lateral valleys leading from the Khanki river in the direction of Dargai and the heights to the west, to attack the troops engaged in punishing the Ali Khels west of the Chagru defile. Severe fighting ensued, and the enemy were driven off. The defences of several other villages were destroyed, and the troops returned in the evening absolutely unmolested.

On the morning of the 20th, General Yeatman-Biggs was ordered to march

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 158 (Frontier), dated the 11th November 1897.

with the 2nd Division by the Chagru Kotal to Karappa. The enemy were posted in great strength along the crest of the western heights, and it was not till the afternoon that the position was taken. Three British officers were killed and five wounded, and the force lost 163, killed and wounded. The enemy comprised a large Afridi lashkar, and the whole of the Gar Orakzai lashkar of Mamuzais, Ali Khels and Alisherzais, with a small Mishti contingent from the Samil Orakzais.

The force halted at Karappa nearly a week, the advance being delayed owing to difficulties of the road and transport. The camp was fired into at intervals both by day and night, foraging parties were sent out daily up and down the Khanki valley, and large quantities of supplies were obtained. On the 28th, both divisions moved to Gundaki, and a reconnaissance was made to the foot of the Sanpagha Pass, the Pass was taken next day, with small loss.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 158 (Frontier), dated the 11th November 1897.

The gathering who opposed the advance were, mostly, Samil Orakzais, aided by a few Afridis. Sir William Lockhart reconnoitred towards the Arhanga Pass on the 30th October, and found it held in force by the enemy: it was taken on the following day, with but slight opposition, the troops camping in Maidan, 3 miles below the Pass.

In a letter, dated the 7th October, the Viceroy informed the Amir of the intention to despatch a punitive force against the Orakzais and Afridis, and asked him to disarm any tribesmen who, on the advance of the troops, might take refuge in Afghan territory, and to prevent them from making Afghan

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 158 (Frontier), dated the 11th November 1897.

territory a base for attacks on the British force. The Amir in his reply said that, if fighting should ensue between the British troops and the Afridis and Orakzais, he could not prevent the latter taking refuge in Afghanistan; but he would not allow such refugees to interfere in the British territory or permit his subjects to join them.

On the 14th October, some 200 Afridis and other Tirah tribesmen arrived at Kabul. The British Agent asked the Amir to reject their petitions as he had done before. The Amir replied that he had seen the deputations on the 17th

October, that they were full of alarm and repentance, and wished him to submit their apology to the British Government, and to learn the conditions of pardon. The letter continued—"You should enquire whether any negotiations should be undertaken, so that I might speak to them.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 158 (Frontier), dated the 11th November 1897.

But, if orders have already been issued for the punishment of these foolish tribesmen, then there is no room to say anything whatever. They deserve every punishment which may be given to them." The Viceroy thanked the Amir for the undertaking in regard to the Afridis and Orakzais who might take refuge in Afghan territory, and sent him a copy of the notification issued by Sir William Lockhart, showing that terms and conditions would be announced to the jirgas on the General's arrival in Tirah.

On General Lockhart entering the Maidan valley on the 31st October, he found that most of the inhabitants had fled; but the camps were continually

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 5 (Frontier), dated the 13th January 1898.

fired into and convoys and foraging parties harassed. On the 4th November, Sir William Lockhart issued a proclamation to the Afridis and Orakzais, summoning them to attend at his camp to hear the terms of Government. The Orakzai jirgas, including those of the Massuzais who live in the hills bordering the Kurram valley, obeyed, and General Lockhart announced the Government terms to them on the 12th, allowing them a fortnight for compliance. The terms comprised the restoration of all Government property, the surrender of 500 breech-loading rifles, a fine of thirty thousand rupees, and the forfeiture of all allowances. The jirgas were also told that, whether they complied or not, every part of their country would be visited, and it depended upon themselves whether the visit should be a friendly or punitive one. The Massuzais were included in these terms. A separate demand for 1,000 rupees, 30 breech-loading rifles, and the restoration of all Government property was communicated to the Chamkannis. The Orakzais promptly commenced to comply.

The Afridis, on the contrary, carried on hostilities with determination, and few of them gave any sign of responding to Sir William Lockhart's demand.

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On two occasions when Saran Sar, on the direct road from the Maidan to the Bara valley, was visited in force, they attacked the rear guard as the troops returned to camp, and they closely followed General Kempster's brigade on his return, on the 16th November, from the Waran valley, which he had visited in order to punish the Zia-ud-din section of the Zakka Khel Afridis.

About the middle of November it was calculated that forage in Maidan and upper Mastura would not last beyond the end of the month, and that the force could not stay in those valleys after that time. Authority was, therefore, given to move to the lower Bara valley. As a means of bringing additional pressure to bear on the Afridis, they (as also the Orakzais) were placed under a strict blockade, and Sir William Lockhart was authorized to occupy the posts in the Khyber, and as a temporary expedient to keep that road open during the winter by troops. The strongest clans, the Kamrai, Kuki and Zakka Khels, had made no move indicating a desire to treat, and on the 21st November, Sir William Lockhart announced the Government terms verbally to the

Malikdin, Kambar, Aka and Adam Khel jirgas in his camp, and by letter to the others, giving them one week in which to comply. The terms comprise formal submission, the surrender of hostages, a fine of 50,000 rupees, 800 breech-loading rifles, restoration of all Government property in their possession and of private property taken at Landi Kotal, or its value in default. The clans were told that the British Government intended to re-open the Khyber Pass in such manner as they might deem most desirable, and that the Afridis must accept any arrangement which the Government might subsequently make. They were further told that all tribal allowances had been forfeited by misconduct, and that any question of their renewal could only be entertained as part of the general settlement of future relations; it was clearly brought home to them that the destruction of the Khyber posts in violation of their agreement entitled the Government to demand their restoration, though the question of compensation on this account would be reserved for decision when the reconstitution of tribal relations for the future should come under consideration.

In response to the announcement of terms, the Malikdin and Kambar Khel and the Adam Khel of Maidan sent a submissive letter, begging for a reduction in the number of rifles demanded, and offering to provide hostages for their share. They were informed that no abatement could be made under any circumstances, and that the question of taking hostages could only arise if they first proved their sincerity by paying up a large instalment of the rifles and money fine, after which it might be possible to consider whether hostages should be accepted for the balance. On the 27th of November, Sir William Lockhart issued a proclamation to the Afridis warning them that, though he was about to leave Maidan on account of the cold, he did not intend to leave the Afridi country; on the contrary, he would remain in it until they complied with the terms of Government, and would attack them in their other settlements during the winter.

Camp had meanwhile been moved to Bagh, the principal meeting place of the Afridi jirgas, and a flying visit along a most difficult road had been made to Dwatoi, the junction of two streams which, uniting, drain the Bara valley. Sir William Lockhart had now determined to leave the Maidan valley by a western pass into the country of the Massuzais and Chamkannis, who were actively hostile, although the Massuzai jirga had come to him in Maidan, and had not rejected the terms there announced.

On the 4th November, a combined Massuzai and Chamkanni gathering, about 3,000 strong, had collected in the Kharmana Darra, the stream which joins the Kurram river at Sadda. On the 7th, a reconnaissance in force was made through the defile by the Kurram Movable Column; the enemy were surprised, and showed no opposition beyond firing on the rear guard on the column retiring. They would have done little damage, but for an unfortunate occurrence which happened to a picquet

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 5 (Frontier), dated the 13th January 1898.

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of the Kapurthala Imperial Service Infantry, consisting of one Native officer and 35 men. They had been holding the heights above the right bank of the Kharmana, and, when called in, they took the wrong road, got entangled in rough ground, cut off by burning grass and surrounded by the enemy. They made a gallant fight, but were in a hopeless situation, and were killed to a man.

Sir William Lockhart's advance into this country, with a brigade under General Gaselee, was not unopposed. The defences of the villages *en route* were therefore destroyed, and he entered by the Lozaka Pass on the 28th November. The Kurram Movable Column under Colonel Hill marched from Sadda on the 29th November to co-operate. The Samil faction of the Massuzais brought in some rifles on the 30th November, when convinced that punitive operations were about to be undertaken in the event of non-compliance with

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terms. On the 1st December, the Kurram Movable Column under Colonel Hill, strengthened by some of the troops from

Maidan, visited Thabi in the Chamkanni country. The Khani Khel Chamkannis opposed Colonel Hill, firing on the troops while they were destroying villages and during their retirement. They showed no sign of submission, and punitive operations were continued by the Movable Column on the 2nd December. Many more villages were destroyed in face of strong opposition, and the enemy on both days suffered severely. General Gaselee also destroyed the defences of several Gar Massuzai villages along the Lozaka stream, in which operation he was unopposed. The punishment inflicted on the Massuzais was held by Sir William Lockhart to settle the account against this clan; the balance, indeed, was small, as they had paid up the greater part of the fine demanded.

The Kurram Movable Column returned to Sadda on the 3rd December

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without meeting with further opposition, and the troops under General Gaselee

withdrew on the same date, arriving at Khanki Bazaar on the 4th December. As the Mamuzais had completed their share of the fine and rifles, and not a shot was fired in their country, their forts were spared; and on the 5th December, General Gaselee's force re-entered Maidan by the Chingakh Pass, unopposed. The camp was now in the limits of the Adam Khel Afridis who had also submitted, but, as the Malikdin and Kambar Khel had brought in no rifles, and only a small portion of their cash fine, the destruction of their forts in the Maidan valley was commenced.

By the 20th December, the settlement with the Orakzais was practically completed.

The whole of the fine of Rs. 30,000 had been paid, with the exception of

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Rs. 794 remitted from the share of the Massuzais on account of the unintentional

burning of some of their houses: 490 of the 500 breech-loading rifles demanded had also been surrendered: the remaining 10 have since been recovered. The Orakzais now asked that the blockade against them might be raised. It would have been impossible to prevent supplies reaching the Afridis if the Orakzais

were permitted to trade freely in British districts; their request was therefore refused, and it was explained to them that, as they joined the Afridis in the outbreak in August and September, they must, in respect to supplies from British districts, continue to suffer until their partners had also submitted.

The next movements of the force were directed towards effecting a concentration at Mamani in the lower Bara valley. The Peshawar Column moved up from Fort Bara improving the road as they went. The first division

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moved down the Mastura valley, whence, on the 11th December, a force was sent to punish the Aka Khel Afridis in the

Waran valley. About 150 towers and fortified houses were burnt or blown up. On the 12th, the force continued the march down the Mastura, unopposed, to And Khel, 2 miles from the crest of the Sapri Pass, and on the 13th reached Mamani.

On the 7th December, the march of the 2nd Division from Bagh to Bara was commenced. On the 9th, the 4th Brigade went 4 miles up the Rajgul valley to complete the survey, collect forage and destroy the defences of the Kuki Khel villages. Heavy loss was inflicted on the enemy. On the 10th

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both brigades marched from Dwatoi down the Bara valley. They reached Mamani

on the 14th, after meeting with a good deal of opposition and encountering much difficulty from the rugged nature of the ground and the inclemency of the weather. While the rear guard was being pressed on the 13th, a wounded British soldier, Sergeant Walker, of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, was taken prisoner by the enemy. He was still in their hands at the end of the year.

It had been Sir William Lockhart's intention to leave one Division of the

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main column, and the Peshawar Column, in the Bara valley, while the other Division could occupy the Khyber and Landi Kotal, the Bazaar valley being visited by forces operating simultaneously from the Bara valley and Khyber bases; but in the middle of December, finding the Mian Gul Bagh Pass leading from the Bara valley into the Bazaar valley was blocked with snow, he gave up all idea of operating in the Bazaar valley from the Bara side, and determined on moving into the Bazaar valley from Ali Masjid with the 1st Division, leaving the 2nd Division on the Bara side. The command of the 2nd Division was assumed by General Sir Power Palmer on the 21st December, on the late General Yeatman-Biggs being invalided.

On the 23rd December, General Hammond's Column occupied Ali Masjid without opposition. All wood-work had

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 5 (Frontier), dated the 13th January 1898.

been burnt, but no other great damage had been done. On the following day,

the 1st Division marched from Ali Masjid for the Bazaar valley, the 1st Brigade by the Alachi Pass, the 2nd by Chora. The force went as far as China, the only village of any considerable size in the open plain of the Bazaar valley. Some opposition was experienced. Village towers and defences were destroyed along the route, and the troops returned on the 29th to Ali Masjid. General

Hammond's Column reached Landi Kotal on the 26th December without opposition. They found the walls and gate of the fort intact, but all buildings inside had been wrecked, and everything movable carried off. The telegraph line was cut in the pass in the afternoon, and 5 miles of wire carried away.

A most unfortunate incident occurred on the 20th December. Sir Henry Havelock-Allan, M.P., who had been permitted to visit Landi Kotal, was returning in the afternoon of that date. He started from Ali Masjid for Jamrud at 1 P.M., but appears to have left his escort and ridden on alone. What

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happened is not precisely known, but on his non-arrival being reported, search parties were sent out, and his horse was found

stripped and shot. Further search on the morning of the 31st resulted in the discovery of Sir Henry Havelock-Allan's dead body.

Up to the end of December, the Afridis showed little sign of submission. On the contrary, they displayed activity in the Khyber, attacking picquets and convoys on every opportunity, and resisting the destruction of their towers. At the close of the year the position in regard to the fine of rifles any money demanded from the Afridis stood thus:—The total number of breech-loading rifles due from the Afridis, when the troops entered the Maidan valley on the 31st October, was 800 on account of the fine, 244 missing from the Khyber

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Rifles, 53 carried off by deserters from regiments and 14 stolen from troops at or near Peshawar since the outbreak in

August. To this had to be added about 40 rifles lost by our troops in Tirah, making a total, in round numbers, of 1,150. Of breech-loading rifles, only 89 had been surrendered; a balance, therefore, of about 1,060 rifles still remained due. Of the cash fine only Rs. 3,830 had been paid.

On the 25th November the Amir wrote to the Viceroy, repeating his assurance that, if the Hadda Mulla fell into His Highness's hands, he would be expelled from Afghanistan. The Amir added that he had written to the Mulla,

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 5 (Frontier), dated the 13th January 1898.

ordering him either to leave Afghanistan at once and go to India, or to proceed to Kabul and go thence to Mecca or

Medina through Persia; and that, failing compliance with this order, troops would march from Asmar against him and any tribesmen who should give him aid. The Amir further repeated his promise that no Tirah tribesmen, who might take refuge in Afghan limits, should be permitted to give annoyance in British territory. His Highness enclosed two petitions from the Afridi and Orakzai jirgas at Kabul, and offered to communicate to them any reply which the Viceroy thought desirable.

The Amir was advised to inform the Afridi and Orakzai deputations that,

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 5 (Frontier), dated the 13th January 1898.

if they wished for peace and to save their country from further punishment, they should return to their homes and assist the

jirgas in securing compliance with the term which Sir William Lockhart had announced, and that, if they had any genuine grievances, they should state them to Sir William Lockhart. His Highness wrote on the 3rd January that he had

communicated this message to the Afridi and Orakzai jirgas and had dismissed them from his presence, permitting them to return to their country. A few days later, the jirgas returned from Kabul and were said to be thoroughly disheartened, all hopes of receiving any assistance or of Amir interceding on their behalf having been refused.

On the 2nd October, Major Deane interviewed at Malakand Gul Badshah

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 154 (Frontier), dated the 4th November 1897.

and Amir Badshah, two of the Mian Guls, with a considerable following of Maliks, Mullas and Sheikhs. The result of the

interview was satisfactory, the fanatical element in Swat was fully represented, and Major Deane considered that the danger of further trouble from that side was removed. At the end of October, the elder Mian Gul, with his brother and 600 Maliks, came in to Chakdarra to see Major Deane. Their conversation turned mainly on future administration, the jirga for the most part desiring our direct interference and declaring that, without it, they had no hope of justice. Major Deane advised them to settle their difficulties according to Muhammadan law. The jirga represented that their difficulty did not lie in applying Muhammadan

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 4 (Frontier), dated the 13th January 1898.

law, but in finding a power capable of enforcing its decisions. The Mian Guls showed their desire to establish friendly

relations with Government by asking that they might be given an opportunity of effecting a settlement between Government and Buner, adding that they had already sent men to the Buner jirga to advise submission. They were told that they were at liberty to do what they could in the matter, and, on leaving Chakdarra, the Mian Guls with Maliks from each clan in Upper Swat went to Buner, to try and persuade the Bunerwals to submit. Their efforts have, however, proved fruitless.

At the end of the year, Major Deane recorded his conviction that the risings were due, not to any settled feeling of hostility against the British Government, or to any particular grievances, but to a sudden and unexpected outburst of fanaticism which had now spent itself, and that the country was settling down almost as rapidly as it became disturbed. Major Deane personally maintained the view which he had held from the first, that the Amir and

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 4 (Frontier), dated the 13th January 1898.

his officials directly incited this disturbance. There were, no doubt, suspicious circumstances in the dealings of the Sipah

Salar with the Mamunds and others, but no direct evidence has been adduced in support of any charge of complicity against the Amir himself, and he has denied, in explicit terms, the truth of these allegations when they were brought under his notice. Lord Elgin recorded that he was bound also to acknowledge that the Amir had fully responded to our call upon him to observe the obligations of an ally; and had, by word and deed, impressed upon his subjects his firm intention of maintaining friendly relations with the Government of India. It is obvious that the Mullas had everything to gain in attempting to make the tribes believe that the Amir was supporting them, but Major Deane's view as to their attitude bears out the contention of the Amir that he himself has suffered from their antagonism.

On the 22nd November, a column under Colonel Reid was despatched into the country of the Utman Khel on the left bank of the Swat river, to the north of the Peshawar district, in order to enforce the disarmament of those sections who had not complied with the requisition to surrender fire-arms in punishment for their complicity in the attacks on the Malakand and Chakdarra. A settlement had already been effected with the Kuz Totai villages of Kot Myana and Barh; but Bar Totai and Agrah had not sent in their guns, and the Utman Khel villages just beyond the Peshawar border had also to be dealt with. In less than a fortnight the column recrossed the border, having met with no opposition, and having secured compliance in full with the Government demands. The net results of the expedition were the surrender by the Agrah, Upper Totai and Khanauri sections of the Utman Khels, of 300 guns and the payment by the Laman Utman Khel jirgas of a fine of 2,000 rupees, 300 guns and 300 swords. The country was completely surveyed, and free forage was provided during the stay of the troops beyond the administrative frontier.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 4 (Frontier), dated the 18th January 1898.

At the end of December 1897, the time having arrived when, in the event of failure to comply with our demands, we could conveniently advance into their country, the Punjab Government was instructed to communicate to the Bunerwals the punitive terms for their unprovoked hostility during the disturbances in the Swat valley. One week's grace was allowed for compliance, failing which it was made quite clear that troops would enter Buner.

The terms demanded were :—

- (i) The deputation of a fully representative jirga of all implicated sections to make submission in British territory ;
- (ii) The surrender of all Government property in the possession of the tribes or payment of compensation in lieu thereof ;
- (iii) The surrender of 600 guns, which must include any breech-loaders in the hands of the tribe, and the Enfield rifles, some 50 in number, which were stolen from the Peshawar border ; and
- (iv) A fine of 11,500 rupees.

The Punjab Government was instructed, at the same time, to announce terms to the Chamlawals whose complicity in the recent disturbances had also been proved. In the case of Chamla, the demand is a fine of 1,500 rupees, 100 guns and 100 swords and some standards as a token of submission.. A representative jirga of the Khudu Khels (a sub-division of the Utmanzai), who were also implicated in the rising, came in and promptly paid a fine of 2,000 rupees, 150 guns, 200 swords and some standards. The Gadun jirga also came in on the 22nd December, and were informed that they must pay 2,500 rupees, 200 guns, and 200 swords; they complied with these terms a few days afterwards. The Bunerwals refused to submit to the Government terms, and shortly after the end of the year a force under Major-General Sir Bindon Blood entered their country.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 177 (Frontier), dated the 30th December 1897.

On the 13th July, General Bird issued a proclamation announcing his **Waziristan.**

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 110 (Frontier), dated the 21st July 1897.

intention to advance to Maizar and destroy the fortified buildings in Maizar and Sheranni, and to remain there, or in the neighbourhood, as long as might seem desirable, and to compel obedience to the orders of Government. The proclamation promised that the punitive terms would be announced in due course, and warned all who wished to live in peace with Government to refrain from obstructing the force, as any unfriendly acts would be severely dealt with.

On the 20th July, all preparations having been completed, the force

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 121 (Frontier), dated the 18th August 1897.

marched unopposed to Sheranni, which was found deserted. The cavalry reconnoitred to Maizar, which, save for a few watchmen, who fled to the hills on the approach of the troops, was also deserted. The demolition of the fortified buildings in Sheranni was completed by the 23rd July; those at Maizar a few days later.

The following are the terms of punishment which it was decided to impose on the Madda Khels :—

- (1) The Madda Khel tribe must come in and make submission, agreeing to surrender all

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 110 (Frontier), dated the 21st July 1897.

Maliks and other ring-leaders in the attack on the Political Officer's escort at Maizar on the 10th June 1897, whom, after such enquiry as General Bird thinks fit, he may declare must be surrendered, and all persons surrendered will be dealt with in such way, and be subject to such punishment, as the Government of India may determine.

- (2) All stolen property must be restored in good condition, or, in default, the value, as determined by Government, must be paid.
- (3) Payment of the fine of 1,200 Kabuli rupees outstanding on account of the murder of Honda Ram, mohurir of the Sheranni levy post, must be made good.
- (4) Payment will be required of a fine of ten thousand rupees, in cash or arms, on account of the recent misconduct of the tribe. This fine may, with the sanction of the British Government, instead of being levied as above, be discharged, in whole or in part, by the tribe furnishing labour for the construction of the Sheranni post, or of any other work approved by Government without payment, or on such terms as the Government may prescribe.

The Madda Khels have forfeited, by their misconduct, the allowances

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 110 (Frontier), dated the 21st July 1897.

which they received from Government, and this fact was also to be announced to them when General Bird announced the punitive terms.

On the 31st July, 257 camels were looted from the grazing ground, 5

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 121 (Frontier), dated the 18th August 1897.

miles from Miran Shah, by a band of 400 Khostwals, Tanis and Gurbaz : two camel-drivers and three of the raiders were killed, and two of the latter taken prisoner. Troops from Miran Shah turned out in pursuit, but were unable to recover the camels which were taken in a northerly direction across the border. Some of the stolen animals are said to have been presented to Sardar Sherindil Khan, who ordered that the rest should not be sold until the Amir's orders about them were received. In reply to a request made to the Amir by the Viceroy for the restoration of the camels, His Highness wrote that the camels were stolen by Waziri thieves and sold by them to the inhabitants of Khost, that Sardar Sherindil Khan had ordered the purchasers of the camels to keep them safe, and that, if His Excellency considered they should be restored, then the price current in the country should be given to the Khostwals, "so that they may not suffer loss."

On the 5th August, General Bird sent out messengers with a notice to

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 121 (Frontier), dated the 18th August 1897.

summon the representative Maliks of the whole Madda Khel clan, on safe conduct, to appear before him on the 12th August, and hear the terms. He reduced the number of persons whose surrender it was proposed to demand to seventeen. The tribesmen, however, temporized, evading the summons on one excuse or another, and General Bird therefore sent for certain leading men, and, to avoid risk of misunderstanding, at a public Darbar on the 17th August in their presence, announced the terms, and sent them all to the Madda Khel country to explain the Government demands to all concerned, giving them ten days within which to come and make submission.

For some days longer, the tribesmen continued to make excuses, and on

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 136 (Frontier), dated the 30th September 1897.

the 3rd September, the Ger Madda Khel Maliks sent in letters to General Bird definitely refusing to come in. The pretext was that the Maliks could not trust the safe conduct offered to them. General Bird concluded that the true reason was that the tribesmen had been deluded by promises and hopes held out to them by the Afghan officials. The towers of the Kazha Madda Khels were destroyed and their crops cut on the 26th September, and the troops were kept moving about freely in the Kazha valley, Dotoi, and the neighbourhood of Charmina, and improving communications.

Practically no progress was made towards a settlement with the Madda

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 155 (Frontier), dated the 4th November 1897.

Khel during October. Sadda Khan and the other Maliks did not come in ; they sent in letters, giving a statement of what happened both before and at the Maizar fight, which differs from the statements previously made ; but they neither offered to submit to the punishment awarded nor asked for an interview, though they appeared anxious to make their peace with Government before the approach of winter.

It was now generally considered that the attack at Maizar was the outcome of tribal quarrels in connection with the fine imposed for the murder

of the mohurrir of the Sheranni post, and that there was no deliberate treachery on the part of Sadda Khan and his party, or any preconceived plan on the part of the Maizarwals to entrap the escort.

General Bird was accordingly authorised, if the Madda Khel still held out against the unconditional surrender of the men demanded, to announce that they or any selected individuals of them would not be punished with death or transportation.

General Egerton started on the 3rd October from Sheranni with a column to visit Dotoi and the slopes of Charmina and Bizha, and to work his way round to the Khina Algad. The column was frequently fired on, but few casualties resulted.

On the 31st October, Sadda Khan and his brother surrendered themselves unconditionally, on a promise that Sadda Khan's life would be spared and that he should not be transported. Other Maliks also came in and promised to accept any terms imposed so far as might be in their power to comply with.

On the 4th November, General Bird had a prolonged interview with Sadda Khan, and allowed him to represent his account of the events which led up to the outbreak at Maizar. The Malik offered to bring in his tribesmen, and to induce them to accept the Government terms, and he sent his brother to collect them, himself remaining in General Bird's camp under surveillance. As a token of his good faith, he brought in some of the property lost at Maizar.

On the 14th November the Madda Khel jirga came in, bringing four more of the 17 men demanded. These surrendered unconditionally. General Bird thereupon received the jirga in Darbar and accepted the submission of the Madda Khel, on their agreeing to comply with the Government terms.

The trial of Sadda Khan and the four other Madda Khels who surrendered was commenced on the 1st December by a special tribunal, consisting of Major-General Corrie Bird as President, and General Egerton, Colonel Pollock, and Mr. Younghusband, C.S., as members. The record of the trial had not reached the Government of India at the end of the year.

One more of the 17 men whose surrender was demanded gave himself up unconditionally on the 9th December, leaving 11 still to be surrendered. The latter were reported to be in Khost and Birmal, waiting to see the result of the trial of those who had already come in, before deciding as to following their example.

The Madda Khels have paid the first half of their fine of Rs. 10,000, partly in cash and partly in arms, and security has been taken for the payment of the

second half in two instalments after the spring and autumn harvests. The Maliks have agreed to provide material and labour for posts, if required, in lieu of paying the balance of the fine in cash. They have paid in full the balance of the fine outstanding in the case of the murder of Honda Ram, the mohurrir of the Sheranni post. The property looted at Maizar consisted of 8 Martini-Henry rifles, 4 boxes of Martini ammunition valued at Rs. 600 and other things valued at Rs. 17,000. The demand made against them for the property other than the rifles and ammunition was fixed at Rs. 10,000, as it was felt that this was as much as the Madda Khels could pay. They have given up 4 rifles; if the

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 127 (Frontier), dated the 28th July 1898.

remainder are not forthcoming, a fine of Rs. 500 will be demanded for each. They have also returned property assessed at Rs. 1,750, leaving Rs. 8,850 to be made good. This balance they agreed to pay in the spring of 1898. As for the rest of the men whose surrender have been demanded, the Madda Khels state that they are in Afghan or Mahsud territory beyond their reach, that they will consider them as enemies, will give up their lands to Government and will arrest and surrender them if they return to Madda Khel limits. The Government of India accepted this settlement as satisfactory under the circumstances, and with reference to a petition from the Maliks for the restoration and redistribution of their allowances, they were told that this would be duly considered when they had completed payment of the balance of the fine and compensation for the unrestored property looted at Maizar, and when the section had completely settled down.

A fine of Rs. 3,100 in three equal shares has been imposed on the Dawaris (within whose limits the offence occurred), Turi Khels and Momit Khels for an attack on the mail ekka in August last, and a further general fine has been imposed on the Turi Khels for their misconduct in July and August.

A fine of Rs. 2,500 imposed on the Khidder Khels, Manzar Khels and Ismail Khels for the murder of Niaz Muhammad, a camel sowar of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, on the 21st March last, was realized at the end of October, and in some other outstanding cases the fines have been recovered.

It is noteworthy that the fanatical outbreak in the Swat valley and the subsequent risings along the frontier did not spread to Waziristan. Several offences by individuals and small gangs of raiders were committed, but throughout the half-year there were no large gatherings or attacks in strength on British posts either in the Tochi or Mahsud territory.

Captain A. H. McMahon assumed charge of the Gilgit Agency on the 14th August.

Gilgit
Agency.

A fairly representative jirga from Darel came into Gilgit in August to ask that Raja Akbar Khan of Punyal might be made their ruler. The Resident in Kashmir was told that any avoidable activity in connection with the communities of Shinaka and the Indus Kohistan was, under present circumstances, to be deprecated, and that no opportunity should be lost of assuring and repeating to the Tangiris, Darelis and others that, provided they do not commit themselves beyond their own limits, the Government of India are quite content to leave them absolutely to themselves. If the tribesmen choose to ask our officers for advice in their difficulties, friendly advice will be given,

but the initiation rests entirely with the tribesmen themselves. The election of a ruler is a matter with which, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, it is particularly undesirable for the local officers to interfere.

Captain McMahon visited Yasin at the end of November. He reported that the general state of affairs seemed satisfactory and prosperous, and that many exiles from the country were returning there from Badakhshan and Wakhan.

A representative jirga from the Thur valley came to the Political Agent at Gilgit on the 18th December, and begged that Lieutenant Dew, the Assistant Political Agent in Chilas, should be allowed to proceed with them to Thur taking the Chilas headmen with him and an escort of 40 men, to settle some blood-feuds which have destroyed the peace of the valley. Captain McMahon recommended that this should be sanctioned, and that he might be authorized to establish a levy post of 15 men in the Thur valley. The Government of India decided that Lieutenant Dew should not visit Thur, and declined to entertain the proposal to establish a levy post there. The Resident in Kashmir was told that, if the Thur and Chilas headmen came to Lieutenant Dew for assistance in settling their difficulties, he might do what he could by friendly advice, but should make it clear that he gave them advice only and at their own request.

The total number of Kafir refugees in Chitral at the beginning of July **Kafiristan**. amounted to 630 men, women and children, inclusive of the Kam and Lutdeh Kafirs, who came to Chitral in the winter of 1895. Those who returned to Lutdeh were kindly treated by the Afghans, and others continue to return in small parties; eventually, only those who have special reasons for fearing punishment at the hands of the Amir's officials will remain in Chitral.

In reply to the Amir's letter, stating that the Kafir refugees wished to return to their homes, but were being prevented by the Chitral officials, His Highness was informed (9th July) that the refugees had been told that they could return to Kafiristan whenever they pleased, and that he might rest assured that neither the Chitralis nor the British officers in Chitral would do anything to prevent the return of any Kafirs who wished to go back of their own free-will.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 151 (Frontier), dated the 4th November 1897.

The issue of a proclamation by the Taotai of Kashgar, strictly prohibiting the keeping or selling of slaves throughout **Chinese Turkistan**, has brought to a conclusion Mr. Macartney's labours for securing the emancipation of slaves in the New Dominions. During the last four and a half years upwards of two thousand slaves have been released, of whom more than five hundred are described as of Indian origin. The Taotai and his subordinate officials have one and all warmly co-operated in the arrangements for the general suppression of slavery in the province.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 168 (Frontier), dated the 23rd December 1897.

The cases of assault on Mr. Macartney and the Kashgar Agency Munshi have been satisfactorily settled. On the 2nd October Mr. Macartney informed the Taotai that, if apologies were offered and punishment inflicted on the soldier who assaulted Mr. Macartney in December 1896, Her Majesty's Minister at

Peking was willing to drop the other cases. The Taotai immediately replied that arrangements had been made for the punishment of the soldier on the 5th October, and invited Mr. Macartney to be present; the punishment, by bastinado, was duly inflicted, until stopped at Mr. Macartney's intercession, and the Taotai also offered to "ko-tow" to Mr. Macartney—a condescension against which the latter politely protested. The satisfactory conclusion of these incidents is due to the intervention of Her Majesty's Minister at Peking with the Chinese Government.

The Chinese have taken active steps to prevent the Hunza people from encroaching on the northern side of the Hindu Kush. Hunza has certain claims on parts of the Taghdumbash, and during the summer some Hunza men commenced cultivating in the Raskam valley. Chinese officials from Yarkand seized the cultivators and carried them off as prisoners, and orders were passed for the establishment of an outpost in Raskam to effectively stop further Hunza encroachments. China has recently shown on more than one occasion a determination to maintain her rights to the crest of the Hindu Kush and Mustagh.

Chitral.

The news of the disturbances along the frontier of the Peshawar Division caused little excitement in Chitral. Absurd rumours circulated in the bazar, but the Chitralis took matters very quietly. The Ashreth men behaved particularly well, carefully watching the passes leading across the hills. There has been a great improvement in the attitude of the people of Chitral, since Major Deane took the young Mehtar to task in May 1897.

Consequent on the almost entire cessation of through trade between India and Badakhshan by the Chitral route, the Mehtar's income from tolls has very largely fallen off. During the fortnight ending the 22nd August 1896, the collections from tolls amounted to nearly Rs. 1,000 ; for the period from 21st July to 31st August 1897 the total income from the same source was only Rs. 61.

Darwaz, Pamirs, &c.

During the summer, a disturbance arose in cis-Oxus Darwaz. The Badakhshi levies enlisted for duty in that part of the frontier refused to obey their Afghan officials, and asked that their officers might be selected from among the Badakhshis of good family. The Afghans refused to agree, and decided to deport the leading Badakhshis who were responsible for the agitation. The decision coming to the knowledge of the Badakhshis, they treacherously killed the Afghan officers and attacked their small escort of Afghan regular troops, who were compelled to take refuge in a fort. The Darwazis joined in the disturbance, they refused to pay revenue, and killed the Revenue Collectors. General Taj Muhammad Khan, the Afghan Commandant at Faizabad, promptly occupied the Darwaz districts on the left bank of the Oxus, and quelled the insurrection. At a Darbar which he held at Faizabad, he informed the Darwazis that the Amir had pardoned their past offences, but that severe measure would be dealt to them if they offended again. The late Hakim of Darwaz, who was the prime mover in the insurrection, fled to Russian territory. The people are reported to be very discontented at the high rate of taxes being levied from them.

The Amir celebrated the Diamond Jubilee of Her Majesty the Queen, by **Kabul.** holding a public Darbar and illuminating the citadel and Bostan Serai. A few days after the receipt of Her Majesty's reply to the Amir's telegraphic congratulations, His Highness personally delivered to Sardars Habibulla Khan and Nasrulla Khan the insignia of Honorary Knights Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George, which had been handed to His Highness by the British Agent at Kabul eight months before. His Highness is reported to be in excellent health, and to have been remarkably free from attacks of his old enemy, the gout, for some time past.

Sir Salter Pyne did not leave Kabul during the year.

The Amir wrote to the British Agent complaining of the tone of an article in the "Akhbar-i-Am" of Lahore, which casts doubts on His Highness's good faith to the British Government and referred to the possibility of an attack on Afghanistan by the British Government. The Amir took the opportunity of protesting his loyalty to Government, and his regret that inferior persons should be allowed to "let loose their tongues on the subject of our friendship." The Government of India instructed the British Agent to inform the Amir that the article in question had not been noticed by Government until attention was drawn to it by his letter; that as recently as the 30th August the Viceroy had told the Amir that, as long as His Highness observed his obligations to the Government of India, they would honourably adhere to their promise to support His Highness's Government; and that for the rest there was nothing to add to the letters which were sent to the Amir in June 1891 and August 1893, regarding the liberty allowed to the press in India and in England.

Russian officers and a few Cossacks have remained in Khorassan during the half-year, under the pretext of precautions against plague. Quarantine arrangements were left entirely in the hands of two Russian officers, who declined to receive any orders issued by the Persian Government, unless endorsed by the Russian Consul-General in Meshed. Herat and Meshed both suffered greatly from the rigid prohibition of inter-communication and all Herat trade was for a time driven to the Panjdeh market. Even after all quarantine had been abolished in the autumn, the Russians tried to enforce special restrictions on people and goods from India, and to establish a new quarantine station at Turbat-i-Haidari to stop caravans from Baluchistan or the Persian Gulf ports, or, in other words, caravans which had already been travelling from one to two months in Persian territory. The majority of the Cossacks returned to Russian territory at the end of the summer, but their place was taken by Persian sowars who were placed absolutely under the orders of the Russian officers; the latter had not withdrawn from Karez and Turbat at the end of the year, and there was some talk of an intention to re-establish quarantine, in view of the recrudescence of plague at Bombay.

Russian precautions against plague.

On the withdrawal of quarantine restrictions by the Persian Government, **Seistan.** Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh returned to Quetta in November 1897. During his stay in Seistan he had done his best to make known the steps taken by Government for opening the Nushki-Seistan trade route, and a considerable amount of trade is already beginning to pass along it. Surgeon-Major Brazier-Creagh says

that the Russians are very jealous of the opening of this route and the establishment of levy posts along it, and are determined to take counter-measures.

Baluchistan
Frontier.

On the 13th June, the Amir sent letters to the Viceroy and the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, stating that certain Tarins, residents of the Harnai tahsil, in the Thal-Chotiali district, had come to Kabul and expressed a wish to be permitted to emigrate to Afghanistan with their families, dependents and belongings; and they had applied to His Highness for a letter to the Agent to the Governor-General to ensure their not being prevented from accomplishing their wishes, and the Amir accordingly asked the Viceroy to issue orders that they should not be interfered with. The Amir was told that no restrictions would be placed on their movements: but, as a matter of fact, the persons referred to have returned disappointed from Kabul, as the Amir did not give them what they had expected, and they will in all probability not go back to Afghanistan.

The emigration of these Tarins is not an isolated case. During the last two or three years, there has been a considerable emigration from Peshin to the Amir's territory, and the movement has extended into the Hindu Bagh tahsil of the Zhob district. The Amir and his officials do everything in their power to induce the frontier tribesmen to move into Afghanistan, offering far more favourable terms in regard to grants of land and takkavi advances than can be obtained under British rules. Two years ago a small section of the Barakzai tribe, known as Gurjazais, living in the Khwaja Amran above Gulistan, went away *en masse*, and were given lands in Uruzgan. The men who first emigrated from Peshin were well received by the Amir and were granted lands revenue free for a term of years. Their success attracted others, and the movement in Peshin has been helped by the fact that cultivation there cannot be largely increased without expenditure of capital in irrigation works, and this the people do not possess. Our revenue policy may also have tended to account for some of the emigration; at any rate, the increase in the revenue is one of the reasons commonly given by the people themselves for their wish to leave British territory. In the Chagai direction, the opposite state of things prevails, and large numbers of families are crossing into British territory with the intention of permanently residing there.

On the 6th August, a man named Jafir Khan, of the Sarpara clan of Brahu, with a band of ten or twelve companions (five or six of whom were armed with rifles), attacked three tongas on the Kalat road between Ferozabad and Mastung, robbed the passengers, killed two of the drivers, and severely wounded the third. The Agent to the Governor-General met the Sarawan Sardars, whose business it was to arrest the murderer, and sent them out to Mastung with orders to bring in Jafir Khan and his gang, but they allowed them to escape to the hills between Shorawak and Shorarud. This was not an ordinary case of dakaiti or *ghaza*; Jafir Khan was an instrument in the hands of more powerful men, who used him to show their dissatisfaction at the proceedings recently taken in an old dispute which had long existed between certain of the leading Sarawan families. Instead of endeavouring to capture the gang, which they could certainly have done had they wished, the Sardars remained at Mastung and disobeyed two distinct orders of the Political Agent directing

them to return to Quetta. Mr. Barnes thereupon arrested and imprisoned the principal offenders. This had an excellent effect in causing other leading men to come in and give assurances of their loyalty. The telegraph line in the Bolan was, however, cut on the 26th and 28th August, and on the night of the 29th August Jafir Khan's gang attacked a small levy post at Ghazaband to the north-west of Quetta. They robbed the three levies in charge of the post and some Muhammadan travellers sleeping there, and killed two Hindu lascars. The Bangalzai and Lehri Sardars, with a brother of Mehrulla Khan and some fifty sowars, left their homes and fled across the Afghan border, but, finding their tribe disinclined to support them, came in to Quetta and made their submission at the end of September.

The Political Agent at Kalat, with 40 sabres and some levies, and 100 rifles of the 24th Baluchistan Regiment under Major Alban, was sent to try and effect Jafir Khan's arrest. On the 21st September, the cavalry made a forced night march of nearly 40 miles from Nushki, hoping to surprise Jafir Khan at Isar Chah, but he had left a few hours before, and the cavalry were confronted by 200 armed Mingals who refused to allow them to water their horses. The cavalry returned to Nushki at once, and on the night of the 22nd, Major Alban started for Isar Chah with the infantry mounted on camels. On arrival at daylight on the 23rd, the Mingals fired on the party, and Major Alban thereupon attacked and carried the village, killing 3, wounding 20, and taking some prisoners. Jafir Khan crossed the frontier into Afghan territory and went to Kabul. He has since gone to Kandahar, where the Amir has made him a grant of land.

Mr. Barnes gave his opinion that exaggerated reports of Muhammadan victories of Europe had caused a general exaltation of mind among the frontier population, and there had been many wild and disquieting rumours in Baluchistan in regard to the disturbances elsewhere on the border and the share taken in them by the Amir, but he was nevertheless of opinion that the recent attitude of the Baluch Sardars who were mixed up in this disturbance was of local origin.

After discussion with the leading Sardars and with their full acquiescence, Mr. Barnes released Mir Mehrulla Khan and Sardar Yar Muhammad Khan, the principal offenders, on certain conditions which they accepted, and for the fulfilment of which they pledged their landed property as security.

At the end of October Azad Khan, the brother of Mehrulla, and the brother and son of Sardar Yar Muhammad made their submission. Mir Rasul Bakhsh, Raisani, who went to Kandahar, and is probably not permitted to return, is now the only Sarawan Brahui of any standing who has not come back, but his son and brothers are with the Agent to the Governor-General.

Several cases of desertions by sepoys of the army and men of the Zhob Levy Corps, carrying off their arms into Afghanistan, have been under disposal during the half-year. On the 4th May, eleven sepoys and two non-commissioned officers of the Zhob Levy Corps deserted from the Chichobai post on the frontier of Tirwa, and fled across the Kundar into Afghan territory, taking with them 18 Snider rifles and carbines, 4 horses, a pony and other Government property. The British Agent at Kabul reported the arrival of the deserters

at the capital, and that the arms and ammunition had been deposited in the Kotwali. He subsequently reported that the Amir had paid the deserters a sum of Rs. 60 for each rifle and restored the horses to them, and told them to go to their homes. The Viceroy asked the Amir to cause the Government property to be handed over to the British Agent. In his reply His Highness admitted that 14 rifles and 11 bayonets had been purchased by his officials for State purpose, but affected not to have been aware that the vendors were deserters. He says Rs. 350 had been paid for the arms, and that, if the Government of India required them, they should be handed over to any person the Viceroy might direct. As for the rest of the property—horses, carbine and ammunition—stolen by the deserters, the Amir said he knew nothing. The Amir was thereupon asked to make the arms over to the British Agent at Kabul, and he did so.

On the 8th July, a non-commissioned officer of the 29th Regiment of Bombay Infantry deserted from Chaman taking with him three rifles, the property of Government. He fled to his home at Shorawak, and was brought before the Afghan Hakim of that district, who took the rifles from him. The Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan wrote on the subject to the Hakim, who replied asking Mr. Barnes not to write to him again, as, without the Amir's permission, he had not "even a hair's breadth of power," and the receipt of letters from the Agent to the Governor-General caused the people to give him a bad name. The Viceroy asked the Amir to order the return of the rifles to Chaman, but no reply had been received at the end of the year.

Eight Brahui sowars deserted on the 5th November from the Zhob Levy Corps, taking away their horses and arms, and arrived at Kabul towards the end of the month. The British Agent asked the Amir to make over to him the stolen Government property in their possession. The Amir replied that the men said they had deposited money with the British authorities as security for the arms and horses, and, this being the case, they would, if His Highness asked them to give up the arms, &c., refuse to do so: under the circumstances, the Amir declined to have anything to do with them. It is not the fact that they had paid for the arms and horses, and the Viceroy has explained the case to the Amir and asked him to recover the stolen property and make it over to the British Agent.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

HALF-YEAR

WHICH ENDED ON THE 30TH JUNE 1898.

A despatch, No. 3 (Frontier), was addressed to Her Majesty's Secretary of State on the 13th January 1898, giving a short account of the different occasions in late years on which the Government of India has been compelled to advance into tribal country, beyond the British border. The concluding paragraphs may conveniently be here cited:—

“52. Whatever may once have been the advantage of leaving the Pathan absolutely alone, we conceive that the day has long passed when that plan can be tried with any hope of success. Interests reaching far beyond our immediate border led us, sixty years ago, to Kalat. The second Afghan war brought us into intimate relations with several tribes, and imposed upon us obligations which could not and cannot be ignored. Since Her Majesty's Government authorised Lord Ripon to guarantee the Amir of Afghanistan against unprovoked external aggression, our policy towards the frontier tribes has been definitely shaped by higher and more imperial objects than the temporary prevention of plunder on the British border. The dealings of the Amir with the Waziris, Mohmands and others, and his advance into Bajaur forced upon the British Government the delimitation of his frontier, and the practice of remaining unconcerned with the actions of the tribes, provided only they did not molest us within the confines of British India, became impossible when Her Majesty's Government authorised Sir Mortimer Durand to negotiate with the Amir a treaty, defining the different tribes or clans who were thenceforth to be outside the pale of the Amir's interference, and for whose actions the Government of India were therefore made, in a measure, responsible. If there is material difference between the present methods and those of the ‘close border,’ it is to be found in the fact that a policy of cultivating friendly relations with the Pathan is not to be carried out by a practice of conciliation alone. For the Pathan will neither acknowledge power nor respect authority unless he fears the one and must obey the other. No intimate and friendly relations can be established with the border tribes, until they are first taught that their own interest lies in cultivating the friendship and in giving no cause for the enmity of the power which is willing to live at peace with them, but able to crush them in war.

“53. We recently laid down, in correspondence with the Punjab Government,* the main lines of our policy in dealing with the tribes on the Punjab frontier. We desired that, as far as possible, interference with the autonomy of the tribes should be avoided. We desired that by

* Letter No. 2197 F., dated the 14th August 1896.

means of tribal allowances in payment for services rendered, and by cordially supporting the legitimate influence of the headmen, a friendly and responsible authority should be established in each tribe. We desired that the Political Officers should lose no opportunity of extending their personal influence, and that, while carefully abstaining from making themselves or the Government of India responsible for the actual administration of tribal country, they should endeavour to establish cordial and friendly relations with the headmen, and should give them support to ensure the proper recognition of their authority. We do not wish to go beyond this in tribal country generally. There are some tracts in which circumstances have rendered it necessary that the Political Officer should be responsible for the maintenance of peace and order, and in which, although tribal machinery should be used, as elsewhere, for the settlement of disputes in accordance with tribal custom, he must authoritatively forbid bloodshed and any attempt to enforce supposed rights by an appeal to arms. In such tracts as these it is the Political Officer's duty to see that the tribal machinery works properly: he must insist on all disputes being referred to and decided by arbitration or tribal jirga, and if possible by mutual consent, and should support the authority of the headmen by assisting them to enforce their decisions, when necessary.

"54. It has been said that the recent risings and the military expeditions which have thus been forced upon us prove that the frontier policy of the Government of India has broken down. We maintain that this is to entirely misapprehend the situation. It is impossible to refuse to recognise the claim of frontier districts to protection from the wild fanatical marauders who haunt their borders, and we submit that the narrative of this despatch proves beyond dispute that by no exercise of patience or forbearance can the occasions for armed interference be altogether avoided.

* * * * *

"55. We have endeavoured in this despatch to make it plain that the particular measures to be adopted at any one moment cannot be prescribed beforehand, but must largely depend on the circumstances of the time. We have pointed out that engagements, deliberately entered into, have made it necessary to occupy strategic positions, and secure the command of means of communication, in order that obligations to which we are honourably bound may be punctually fulfilled. We do not pursue this subject on the present occasion, because it will be our duty, when military operations are over, to fully consider the whole position on the frontier and to endeavour to formulate proposals by which the resources at our disposal may be efficiently and economically utilised. Our recommendations will in due course be submitted to Your Lordship. We have every confidence that they will be found to be conceived in no spirit of aggression, with no desire for undue interference with the tribes or annexation of their territory, but in full accord with the policy of 'vigilant, constant and never ceasing defence,' which we and our predecessors have professed and to which we unhesitatingly adhere."

Before this despatch reached England, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India addressed the Indian Government at length on the subject of the frontier policy in a Secret despatch, No. 1, dated the 28th January 1898. His Lordship reviewed the narratives of events connected with the recent disturbances on the frontier, which had from time to time been sent home by the Government of India, and indicated the policy which Her Majesty's Government desired to be pursued in future. The main principles were that posts and cantonments should be limited to those positions only which are indispensable to the fulfilment of the general policy that "we are as determined to respect the rights of others, as we are able to enforce our own;" that no new responsibility should be taken unless absolutely required by actual strategical necessities and the protection of the British Indian border; that the best possible concentration of our military forces should be made, so as to fulfil our existing responsibilities; that interference with the tribes should be limited, so as to avoid the extension of administrative control over independent tribal territory; that regular troops should nowhere be established except in such posts or localities, and under such conditions, as will enable them to promptly repel any attacks upon them; and that local or tribal levies should assume the aspect, as far as is possible, of a police rather than a military force. His Lordship was averse to the permanent disarmament of tribal territory, holding that such a procedure involved serious consequences and implied our readiness to protect the disarmed tribesmen against their armed neighbours. Finally, His Lordship ruled that the safety of the Khyber Pass must be the paramount consideration in any reconstruction of the arrangements with the Afridi tribes.

At the beginning of the year 1898, the wave of fanaticism on the frontier had nearly spent itself. The Zakka Khels, however, remained obstinately in opposition. Khwas and Wali Muhammad, Maliks of the clan, who were in Afghan territory, persuaded their fellow-tribesmen to continue resistance, promising to help them with ammunition and other necessities; the property in Peshawar of these two men was now confiscated and sold. Cutting the telegraph wire and firing on foraging parties and convoys continued; the freshly laid water-pipes at Landi Kotal were taken up and broken; and the Aka Khel committed raids near Bara. On the other hand, Colour-Sergeant Walker, Royal Scots Fusiliers, who had been a prisoner in the hands of the Afridis since the 13th December, was brought in safe and well to the camp of the 4th Brigade at Mamani on the 14th January.

Secret desp.
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 25 (Fr.),
dated the 10th
Feb. 1898.

A large jirga, including representatives of all clans of the Khyber Afridis except the Zakka Khel, came into Jamrud on the 17th January. Their general tone was submissive. At the end of the month, the jirga was still at Jamrud, but had done little in respect to payment of fines and surrender of arms. On the 25th submissive letters were sent in by Maliks Khwas and Wali Muhammad, and by the Zakka Khel jirga, expressing readiness to obey orders. Colonel Warburton replied that a full jirga should come in and comply with the terms of Government.

Ditto.

In consequence of frequent raids between Bara and Matanni, combined action was taken on the 23rd January from Matanni, Bara and Mamani

Ditto.

against the Aka Khel settlements south of Bara. No resistance was met with and the settlements were found deserted. Information having been received of the presence of large numbers of Malikdin, Kamrai and Sipah families with cattle in the Kajurai plains, a combined movement of troops from the 1st and 2nd Divisions was undertaken on the 29th January. The 1st and 2nd Brigades saw only a few of the enemy; but the contingent from the 4th Brigade encountered the enemy near Shin Kamar, and suffered somewhat severely in the course of the operations and during the withdrawal of the troops towards camp, Lieutenant-Colonel Haughton and four other British officers being killed and two wounded.

Secret desp.
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 25 (Fr.),
dated the 10th
Feb. 1898.

The Khyber route remained closed to through traffic with Afghanistan. All exports from British territory to the Mohmand country were stopped, in order to prevent supplies reaching the Afridis from that direction, and steps were taken to prevent supplies reaching them from other sources.

Ditto.

A fine of 4,000 rupees was imposed on the Loargai Shinwaris for their share in the attack on the Landi Kotal post, and they were called upon to restore the Sniders belonging to the Khyber Rifles and any Government property in their possession. They readily complied with these orders, and brought in quantities of timber and iron-sheeting belonging to the Government buildings at Landi Kotal. They were thereupon employed on picquet duty at Landi Kotal, and more than once repulsed parties of Zakka Khel raiders, who in return commenced reprisals on the Shinwaris. The Mullagoris behaved well and their allowances were paid.

Ditto.

On the 24th January, a remonstrance was sent to the Amir regarding Afridi refugees making Afghan territory a base for attacks on territory within our limits. His Highness was reminded that he had given an assurance that such refugees would not be allowed to attack or interfere with our territory, and he was asked to prevent such proceedings. In another letter written about the same time, His Highness was told that reports had been received that the Afridis were receiving assistance from the Afghan officials. The Viceroy's letter concluded as follows:—"I believe that, if Your Highness's officials cease to give countenance and encouragement to the said Afridis, peace will soon be restored to the Khyber, and the losses to which Your Highness and Your Highness's people have been subjected will speedily be brought to an end."

Secret desp.
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 47 (Fr.),
dated the 10th
March 1898.

On the 1st February representatives of the Kambar and Malikdin clans and of all the Zakka Khel, except the Pakhai sub-section, met in the Bazar valley. The Pakhai sided with Maliks Khwas and Wali Muhammad, who remained in Afghan territory and continued their endeavours to prevent their fellow-tribesmen from submitting. After this tribal meeting in Bazar, a few rifles were brought in almost daily to Colonel Warburton at Jamrud, and it was decided to suspend offensive operations until after the festival at the end of Ramzan, which terminated on the 23rd February. The jirgas at Jamrud were warned that, if the clans failed to submit by that date, their punishment would recommence. Meanwhile, roads from Mamani to Gali Khel, and from the Khyber into the Bazar valley by the Bori Kandao and the Chura Pass, were improved, and preparations were made for an advance.

In the middle of the month, the Malikdin, Kambar, Kamrai and Sipah jirgas made two requests to Sir William Lockhart at Jamrud : *first*, that peace should be made with each clan separately as each paid its own share of the money and arms demanded, and that the blockade should then be immediately raised in regard to every clan thus submitting, though maintained against all others ; and *second*, that the punitive operations should be deferred to give the jirgas more time. Sir William promised to consider the first request ; but said that the second could not be entertained until the sincerity of the jirgas had been established by at least one clan paying up in full. On the 20th February, the Malikdin Khel completed payment of their quota, the blockade against them was raised, and they were allowed to export a limited quantity of supplies.

Secret desp.
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 47 (Fr.),
dated the 10th
March 1898.

Before the end of February, the Tirah Adam Khels, the Sipah, and the Kamrai complied with the demands against them, and the blockade against them was in due course raised. The Aka Khel, as an earnest of their intentions, gave in four rifles and 3,000 Kabuli rupees. On the 28th February, whilst Sir William Lockhart was at Jamrud, a Zakka Khel jirga of 125 persons came in and was seen by him. All matters touching their fine in cash and rifles were explained to them, and they divided amongst themselves the share that fell on each section. They begged for more time to pay, and that each Zakka Khel sub-section should be dealt with separately. Sir William Lockhart rejected the latter request. The month ended with a fairly good prospect of the Afridis submitting without further military operations being required.

Ditto.

The blockade against the Orakzais was modified early in the month, and certain clans were allowed access to British territory ; the strict prohibition of exports was also relaxed later on. The blockade against the Mohmands, which had up to this time been enforced to prevent supplies reaching the Afridis through Mohmand territory, was simultaneously removed.

Ditto.

The Amir continued to represent the hardship to which he and his people were subjected by reason of the obstruction caused to trade. He wrote that he has nothing to do with the affairs of the Afridis, and asked that the Tartarra or Abkhana route should be opened for kafilas until the Afridis surrender. On the 2nd February, in reply to the letter from the Viceroy regarding certain Afridis who were using Afghan territory as a base for attacks on the Khyber, the Amir asked for a nominal list of the refugees, stating that, although the leading men are "evidently recognized and do not commit any unlawful act," the tribesmen are not distinguishable from the people of Ningrahar, and conceal themselves among the Ningraharis who show them sympathy. On receipt of such a list, His Highness said he would issue strict orders to the headmen of every Afghan village to watch the Afridi refugees and prevent them from misbehaving.

Ditto.

The Viceroy replied—

"I cannot accept Your Highness's letter as carrying out the promise which Your Highness made in your letter of the 13th October that you would not allow any of the tribesmen who might come to your country to behave

Ditto.

improperly or make any interference with British territory. Two Maliks of the Afridis, Khwas Khan and Wali Muhammad Khan, are reported to be residing at Girdi Sarkani, and to assert that they are under Your Highness's protection and are acting by your advice in encouraging the Zakka Khel to continue their resistance. I call on Your Highness to cause these men to abstain from using Your Highness's name falsely and from making mischief, or to cause them to leave Afghan territory. For the rest, it is the duty of Your Highness's officials to distinguish between strangers and the people of the country, and thus to fulfil the obligations of Your Highness as an ally of the British Government. It is in this way that Your Highness can assist in the restoration of peace and the renewal of the trade facilities which Your Highness desires."

Secret desp.
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 47 (Fr.),
dated the 10th
March 1898.

In reply, the Amir said that he had not heretofore required Maliks Khwas and Wali Muhammad to leave his country, because they were in daily communication with the British officers about terms of peace, and His Highness thought they might come to terms, and that the British Government might have objected if he had expelled them while negotiations were in progress; moreover, they professed to be living quietly. Now that it had become clear to the British officers that what the Maliks said was untrue, and there was no hope of peace with them, they should, in accordance with the Viceroy's wish, be removed from the frontier.

Ditto.

Sir William Lockhart now recommended that the Khyber should be opened to the passage of kafilas as before the disturbances began; this was sanctioned and the pass was declared open for traffic on the 11th March. The Amir was informed of this, and that the resumption of traffic had been authorised on the faith of His Highness's undertaking to prevent the recalcitrant Maliks from causing further mischief.

Secret desp.
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 69 (Fr.),
dated the 5th
May 1898.

Sir William Lockhart interviewed the Afridi jirgas at Jamrud on the 13th March. The differences between the Rajgal and Udredunkai Kuki Khels were first adjusted. Their fine was divided, and Sir William Lockhart announced that, in consideration of the loyal behaviour of the Udredunkai, their share of the general fine would be remitted, provided that the Rajgal share was paid in full by the 17th March. The Kambar Khel and Zakka Khel were also told the fines must be paid by that date.

Ditto.

Rifles were brought in very slowly, and, the period of grace having expired, Sir William Lockhart again interviewed the jirgas on the 17th. The Rajgal Kuki Khels had then paid 60 out of 118 rifles; the Kambar Khel 64 out of 154; and the Zakka Khel 20 out of 154. The two former sections begged for a further postponement of military operations to enable them to get in their own share of the fine and to bring pressure to bear on the Zakka Khels. Sir William Lockhart required them to furnish a sufficient number of trustworthy hostages. The jirgas promptly gave 72 hostages and the advance was again postponed.

Ditto.

On the 26th March, the Kambar Khel completed payment of their tale of rifles, and their hostages were at once released. The Rajgal Kuki Khel settled

up the following day, and their hostages were also set free. At a meeting of the jirgas at Jamrud on the 26th, the Malikdin, Kambar, Kuki, Sipah and Kamrai agreed to pay up the Zakka Khel balance, trusting by joint action to be able to recover hereafter the rifles or their value from the defaulting section. By the 3rd April, the whole fine of 800 rifles and fifty thousand rupees had been paid in full, with the exception of the amount remitted to the Udredunkai Kuki Khels, and a small balance due by the Aka Khels, for which hostages were given, and which was made good a few days later. It may be here noted that of the rifles surrendered by all the tribes concerned in the recent disturbances, very few indeed can be in any way traced to Kabul, and no evidence has been forthcoming of the supply of arms or ammunition to the tribesmen by the Amir. The majority of the rifles surrendered were Martinis or Sniders made up by native manufacturers from components of Government arms.

The question of the source of supply of the tribesmen's arms and ammunition has received close attention, and Colonel L. H. E. Tucker, C.I.E., and Colonel W. Hill, I.S.C., have been placed on special duty to hold an enquiry to ascertain what steps can be taken to prevent rifled arms and ammunition from reaching the border tribes. The question of the arrangements under which the Amir is permitted to import arms and ammunition free of duty, and in practically unrestricted quantities, also came under the consideration of Government (Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State, No. 82 (Frontier), dated the 2nd June 1898).

The Tirah Expeditionary Force was broken up on the 6th April. Three brigades, designated the Khyber Field Force, remained temporarily in and about the Khyber Pass, under the command of Major-General Symons, C.B., who was vested with supreme political control. Mr. F. Cunningham, C.I.E., was appointed Chief Political Officer.

Secret desp.
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 69 (Fr.),
dated the 5th
May 1898.

The allowances formerly enjoyed by the Loargai Shinwaris and Shilmanis, which had been discontinued since the outbreak in the Khyber last summer, were now restored, it being made clear that Government reserve the right to modify them, if necessary, when final arrangements are concluded.

Ditto.

On the 18th April, Major-General Symons discussed with the jirgas of Khyber Afridis and the clansmen present at Jamrud the matters which still remained over for settlement. The demeanour of the jirgas was quiet and friendly. They agreed to surrender the Sniders belonging to the Khyber Rifles, and to restore rifles carried off by military deserters; they also admitted their liability for rifles taken at Saragarhi, but said they were quite unable to pay compensation for Government and private property looted or destroyed; and could not surrender arms taken during the fighting.

Secret desp.
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 79 (Fr.),
dated the 26th
May 1898.

The clansmen at Jamrud represented that they were a jirga, and not, as had been supposed, hostages surrendered as security for compliance with conditions and liable to detention in default. Sir Richard Udny and Mr. Cunningham agreed that these clansmen were not present in circumstances which gave security for the fulfilment of outstanding demands to which the clans object. The jirgas and half of the 'hostages' were allowed to go to their homes to assist in collecting the rifles which the clans agreed to surrender.

Ditto.

Secret desp.
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 79 (Fr.),
dated the 26th
May 1898.

As to realizing compensation for Government and private property looted or destroyed by the Afridis, General Symons was instructed that Government did not wish pressure exercised on this account at present. Opportunity was to be taken to make it clearly understood that all rights as to property looted, damaged or destroyed were reserved, but that our demands on this account would be formulated in connection with the settlement of future relations and the renewal of the pass allowances.

Secret desp.
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 91 (Fr.),
dated the 16th
June 1898.

During the month of May considerable numbers of Afridis and other tribesmen visited Kabul; and, as usual, many conflicting rumours were current in regard to the attitude and intentions of the Amir towards them. General Symons was advised to take opportunities of counteracting mischievous rumours by reminding the Maliks that the Amir had plainly told the Afridis that he had nothing to do with them, and by pointing out that misbehaviour at the present juncture might prejudice the future relations of the tribe with Government. Language of this nature was accordingly held to a jirga assembled at Jamrud on the 25th May. About this time, the Afridis returned to their homes thoroughly dissatisfied with their reception at the Amir's hands, and convinced that they had been duped into going there by their Mullas.

Ditto.

Secret desp.
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 122 (Fr.),
dated the 21st
July 1898.

The brigade at Bara was withdrawn early in May, and during June, the Khyber Force was reduced to a single brigade. Mr. Cunningham made over charge of his political duties to Mr. D. Donald on the 9th June. General Egerton assumed command of the Khyber Brigade and supreme political charge in the Khyber on the 24th June. At the end of June, the account against the Afridis in regard to the restoration of Government property still in their hands stood as follows: Of the 234 Snider rifles belonging to the Khyber Rifles, 45 still remained to be brought in. Of 52 rifles carried away by deserters from Native Regiments, 23 had been surrendered. Of arms taken before the commencement of the campaign, including those taken at Saragarhi, ten were still in the hands of the Afridis. Seventy Lee-Metford rifles and 20 Martinis were captured during the war, and none of these had been recovered, the tribesmen declaring their inability to restore them. The following is an estimate of the sums claimable against the Afridis for public and private property looted or damaged, and buildings destroyed:—

	Rs.
On account of Government property looted	13,976
On account of private property looted or destroyed at Landi Kotal and at Ali Masjid	14,613
On account of Government buildings	2,50,000

No payment on either of these accounts had been received.

It was not until near the end of June that the Government of India were in a position to formulate their views in regard to the future policy to be adopted in the Khyber. In a Secret despatch No. 95 (Frontier), dated the 23rd June 1898, they placed their recommendations before Her Majesty's Government. These were, briefly, that the reservoirs and water-works at Landi Kotal should be improved and extended, and a fort capable of protecting them should be built; that the fort should not be occupied by regular troops, but

that a local tribal corps should be raised for service in the Pass and commanded by British officers, and that this force should be strong enough not only for patrol and convoy work in the Pass itself, but to hold the position at Landi Kotal. An essential part of the plan is that a movable column of sufficient force shall be equipped with transport, and ready to support the irregular force in the Khyber on the occurrence of any emergency calling for action of the kind. The Viceroy and majority of His Excellency's Council desired to leave in the hands of the Local Government the control of the Khyber Militia, and the political relations with the Khyber Afridis, Sir Charles Nairne and Sir Edwin Collen dissenting. It was proposed that in the new arrangement to be come to with the Afridis, we should secure the right to construct and work a railway line to Landi Kotal, though for the present it was only desired to lay the railway bed, ready for putting down the permanent way when the time should come for doing so. In most other essentials, it was proposed that the agreement should be drawn on the same lines as the agreement of 1881, and that the allowances should be restored. It was further proposed to forego the claim for rifles captured by the tribesmen during the war, and for the value of buildings and Government and private property destroyed or looted in the Khyber. By way of marking the fact that we had made peace without exacting the full terms originally imposed, it was suggested that the date from which the allowances should be restored should not be from the day when peace was made with the Afridis, but the date upon which they accept the new terms of settlement.

In a letter, dated the 14th May, the Amir raised the question as to the British Afghan boundary in the Khyber. This question had been previously raised by the Sartip of Dakka, who contended that the frontier was at Landi Khana, and that the men of the Khyber Rifles had no right to escort kafilas beyond that spot. The Amir made a similar claim, but was told that the British boundary extended to Tor Kham and that the Government of India could not admit his contention that British limits terminated at Landi Khana. His Highness replied setting forth the grounds on which he based his claim, and saying that the Viceroy had been misinformed as to facts, and requesting that orders might be issued that the Khyber Rifles should not, in future, escort kafilas beyond Landi Khana.

Secret desp.
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 92 (Fr.),
dated the 16th
June 1898.

A representative Khani Khel Chamkanni jirga came in to Para Chinar Kurram on the 8th May. They stated that they were unable to pay the fine of 1,000 rupees imposed on them, or restore the 30 rifles taken from the Kapurthala Infantry, or any other Government property, as they had been ruined by the burning of their villages and fodder at Thabi; but that, if Government would forgive them, they would behave well and obey any orders that might be given to them. The attitude of the jirga was respectful and friendly, but the Officer on Special Duty considered it would be quite impossible to induce them to pay any fine or restore any property, without at least a show of force. It may possibly be decided hereafter to forego the outstanding fine, but no announcement of the decision of Government will be made to the Khani Khels, until the future arrangements with the Afridis have been settled, and

meanwhile the Officer on Special Duty in Kurram will do everything in his power to induce the Khani Khel to restore the rifles which are still in their possession.

Secret desp.
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 44 (Fr.),
dated the 10th
March 1898.

The expedition into the Buner country, under Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, completed its work and recrossed the frontier within twelve days of its starting. On the 7th January the main column advanced by the Tanga Pass, which was held, but not obstinately, by the tribesmen. A few shots were fired at a small detached force under Colonel Adams, which advanced by the Pirsai Pass, and a slight show of resistance was offered to a column under Brigadier-General Jeffreys, while marching towards the Ambela Pass. Except on these occasions, no opposition was offered. The Bunerwals were found to be poorly armed, and it is believed that they never had any intention of making a determined resistance, but refused compliance with the Government terms, and made a show of opposition, to save their good name among their neighbours. On the 9th January, the jirgas of the Salarzai and Ashazai clans came in; their attitude was very submissive, and a few days later, they paid their share of the fine in money and arms. On the 13th, the jirga of the Gadaizai clan came and accepted terms. On the 15th, the Nasozai clan and the Khan of Dagar followed their example, and the Daulatzai submitted on the following day. Meanwhile the 2nd Brigade had visited the Ambela Pass, and the Chamlawals made their submission on the 16th. On the 19th, the force withdrew from Buner; the expedition had been entirely successful; all sections had made complete submission and the country had been surveyed.

Ditto.

The Gaduns, who were also implicated in the Malakand disturbances, came in to Mardan on the 6th January, one day before the expedition started, and complied in full with the terms demanded from them.

Dir, Bajaur
and Swat.

Secret desp.
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 20 (Fr.),
dated the 3rd
Feb. 1898.

The Nawab of Dir has been again making representations in regard to Jandol, and pressing Major Deane to let him take over the valley. Major Deane declined to agree to this, and tried to bring about a meeting between the Nawab and the Khan of Nawagai or the Khan of Khar, to effect some definite understanding between them. His efforts, however, failed. The Nawab continued to give trouble on the subject, and at the end of January, Major Deane was authorised to inform him that the Government of India had heard with regret that the Nawab appeared disposed to interfere in Jandol and Bajaur, and that, if he disregarded Major Deane's advice and meddled with tracts beyond his own jurisdiction, the Government of India would view his action with grave displeasure.

Secret desp.
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 60 (Fr.),
dated the 14th
April 1898.

Rumours were still prevalent in Bajaur in the beginning of March that there would be a fresh outbreak of jehad before long, and Major Deane reported that there was a very strong undercurrent of feeling throughout the whole country that he could not understand: it was fanatical and nothing tribal, and the Malikis were openly showing that they felt that they could not control the people. He added—"I am warned again that, if any disturbance starts afresh as before as a matter of religion, the lower Swatis and all round who have every desire for peace will feel themselves *compelled* to join and, what is more, to be first in the field."

An emissary of the elder Mian Gul asked Major Deane to let the elder Mian Gul combine with the Nawab of Dir and take over the whole of Swat, sharing the revenue, the Mian Gul managing the country as far as Muhammadan law is concerned, and the Nawab of Dir practically governing it. Major Deane told him that the arrangement was one to which he could have nothing to say. The elder Mian Gul has since applied to Major Deane more than once for assistance in settling the disputes between himself and his brother.

Secret despatch
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 60 (Fr.),
dated the 14th
April 1898.

The different factions in Bajaur also continued to come in to Major Deane and ask him to settle their quarrels, openly saying that it was not so much a decision that they wanted, but that the decision should be enforced.

Ditto.

The Chitral reliefs were satisfactorily concluded, without a hitch and without a shot being fired, on the 25th May, on which date the relieved troops arrived at Chakdarra. The Nawab of Dir's men all worked well, and carried out the instructions given to them for the prevention of trouble. The mad Fakir, who started the Malakand rising, moved into Makhozai territory to the north-west of Buner, and tried to create a disturbance, but the Upper Swatis refused to have anything to do with him.

Secret despatch
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 86 (Fr.),
dated the 9th
June 1898.

The levy posts on the Malakand-Chitral road, which were destroyed during the recent disturbances, have been rebuilt, and the levies have been working satisfactorily. The allowances granted to the Khans of Swat in commutation of tolls formerly levied by them, which had been withheld during the rising, were restored with effect from the 1st January 1898. The service allowances of the Swati Khans have, however, with a few exceptions, been temporarily confiscated.

Secret despatch
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 73 (Fr.),
dated the 5th
May 1898.

Immediately following the conclusion of the reliefs, the following reduction and redistribution of the Malakand Force were made:—One squadron of Cavalry, one company of Bengal Sappers and one battalion of Native Infantry were withdrawn. At Chakdarra, four companies of Native Infantry and a quarter squadron of Cavalry were posted; on the Malakand a quarter squadron of Cavalry and one and a quarter battalion of Native Infantry, and the East Kent Regiment until the weather admits of European troops moving; at Dargai, half a squadron of Cavalry and two companies of Infantry. In addition to the above, a movable column, consisting of one Mountain Battery, a squadron of Cavalry, a company of Sappers, and two battalions of Native Infantry were kept in the Swat valley temporarily, in advance of the Malakand position, until the completion of the defences of the pass and Chakdarra.

Secret despatch
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 86 (Fr.),
dated the 9th
June 1898.

Early in June some fighting occurred in the Jandol valley between the two factions headed by Saiyid Ahmad Khan of Barwa and Umra Khan's brothers and cousins. Major Deane experienced no little difficulty in inducing the Nawab of Dir and Khan of Nawagai to desist from joining in the conflict. The former sides with Saiyid Ahmad Khan of Barwa, and the latter with Abdul Majid Khan of Munda. The Nawab of Dir behaved unsatisfactorily, apparently desiring to force on trouble, in order to find an excuse for entering Jandol with his lashkar; but eventually both the Nawab and the Khan of Nawagai agreed to accept Major Deane's advice.

Secret despatch
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 104 (Fr.),
dated the 7th
July 1898.

Secret desp.
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 104 (Fr.),
dated the 7th
July 1898.

A large deputation of Mamunds went to Kabul in the spring, but returned angry and disappointed; they stated that they received no allowances and had to sell their clothing to buy food. General Mir Atta Khan called on the Mamunds who are Afghan subjects to submit to his orders, but they refused to do so.

All has been quiet in the Mohmand country throughout the half-year. The allowances of the Tarakzais, who behaved well during the recent disturbances, were restored without a break; the allowances of the other sections were regranted with effect from the 1st April 1898.

Secret desp.
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 61 (Fr.),
dated the 14th
April 1898.
Waziristan.

The actual amount of fines, including forfeiture of revenue remission and free grants, levied on Peshawar villages for participating in the Mohmand rising, is Rs. 41,541.

The settlement with the Madda Khels having been concluded, the Tochi Field Force was broken up on the 15th January 1898, and the control of political affairs restored to the Commissioner of the Derajat Division, acting under the orders of the Punjab Government. The garrison in the valley was reduced to 4 mountain guns, two squadrons of Native Cavalry, 4 battalions of Native Infantry, and 4 Maxim guns.

In March, orders were passed on the proceedings of the tribunal appointed to enquire into the case of the six Madda Khel prisoners surrendered in connection with the attack on the Political Officer's escort at Maizar on the 10th June 1897. It was held to be proved that Sadda Khan had failed in discharging his responsibilities as head of the Madda Khel, in that he kept back from the Political Officer important information regarding the temper of some of the leading men of the section; Alambe was equally guilty; there was no evidence against Dande, and he was acquitted; Sheikh Nur, Ware Khan and Khanijan, headmen of the section, were present at the fight and must be treated as if they had taken part in it. The five men found guilty will be detained at Dera Ismail Khan, as hostages during the pleasure of Government.

Secret desp.
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 127 (Fr.),
dated the 28th
July 1898.

No more of the 17 men demanded have been brought in; but the Madda Khel jirga submitted a petition representing that the remainder are beyond their reach, either in Afghan or Mahsud territory, that the Madda Khels will consider them as enemies, give up their land to Government, and arrest and surrender them if they return to Madda Khel limits.

Secret desp.
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 20 (Fr.),
dated the 3rd
Feb. 1898.

Before the break up of the Field Force, petitions were received through General Bird from certain Darwesh Khel and Madda Khels, the former praying for a re-distribution of their allowance, and the latter for the restoration and re-distribution of their share. General Bird was told that the petition of the Darwesh Khels could not at present be considered, and that it might more appropriately be brought forward by a complete Darwesh Khel jirga, after a decision has been come to in regard to future arrangements in the Tochi. The Madda Khels were told that the question of restoring their allowances could not be entertained, until they had completed payment of the balance of the fine and compensation for the unrestored property looted at Maizar; but that when the Government were satisfied with the execution of the terms imposed,

and the section had completely settled down, the matter would be duly considered.

At the end of 1897, one-half the general fine of 10,000 rupees was still due, also a further sum of about 9,000 rupees on account of property looted and not restored. Four Martini-Henri rifles also remained to be surrendered. During the half-year under notice, the Kazha Madda Khels paid in 2,470 rupees, and the Ger Madda Khels 5,500 rupees, Kabuli; and they brought in a small amount of looted property. A considerable balance is, however, still due on account of the latter.

Secret desp.
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 86 (Fr.),
dated the 9th
June 1898.

Several offences by gangs of raiders and individuals were again committed during the half year both in the Gumal and Tochi, and Waziri raids into Zhob became somewhat frequent. With the exception of offences of this class, the condition of the Waziri tract has been quiet.

The Amir has written to the Viceroy (22nd May 1898), complaining that a large body of Waziri tribesmen recently crossed the boundary, killed two men and wounded two others, and carried off some sheep belonging to the Zadrans. His Highness says that for many years past the Waziris have been behaving in this lawless manner, that the British officers do not punish them, "while the people under Afghan jurisdiction, being liable to be called to account by the Afghan authorities, cannot retaliate by attacking the Waziris."

Secret desp.
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 104 (Fr.),
dated the 7th
July 1898.

Several cases of raids and counter-raids across the Durand line are awaiting a settlement. This could most easily be arrived at by a meeting between the local British and Afghan officials, but this it has not yet been able to bring about, since the Afghan officials declare their inability to take up the raid cases, unless the question of the Waziristan boundary is re-opened at the same time.

In connection with the scheme, approved in Sir H. Fowler's Secret despatch No. 37, dated the 24th August 1894, for establishing an effective control over Waziristan, it was decided to revise the Bhattanni tribal service. Accordingly in June the following expenditure was sanctioned:—An initial outlay of Rs. 15,000 for the construction of levy posts, &c., in the Bhattanni country, and an additional annual expenditure of Rs. 6,945 on account of service allowances to the tribe, &c.

Secret desp.
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 113 (Fr.),
dated the 14th
July 1898.

The rival factions in Thur having mutually agreed to refer the settlement of their blood feuds to a third party, came in to Chilas and entreated Lieutenant Dew to return with them to Thur and adjudicate for them in the various cases. The Government of India in supersession of their previous orders agreed to Lieutenant Dew visiting Thur, if Captain McMahon were satisfied that both sections of the Thuris would welcome Lieutenant Dew and accept his arbitration, and that the visit could be made without risk of collision either at the time or afterwards.

The people of Darel have, like the people of Thur, shown a desire to get their internal disputes settled by the British officers of the Gilgit Agency.

During the half-year ending the 31st December 1897, the Government of India had under consideration a proposal by Colonel Sir John Ardagh that the

present recognized frontier of India, contiguous to the Chinese dominions, should be extended beyond the crest of the Hindu Kush and Mustagh ranges, and that we should aim at keeping our enemy from any possibility of establishing himself on the glacis occupying the longitudinal valleys, and there preparing to surprise the passes. The Government of India were unanimously opposed to Sir John Ardagh's proposal. They considered [Secret despatch to Secretary of State, No. 170 (Frontier), dated the 23rd December 1897] that any attempt to incorporate within the British frontier the zone which Sir John Ardagh suggested would involve real risk of strained relations with China, and might tend to precipitate the active interposition of Russia in Kashgaria, which it should be our aim to postpone as long as possible; moreover, they considered that an advance beyond the existing frontier line, the mountain ranges defining which are perhaps the most difficult and inaccessible in the world, would weaken our military position without any corresponding advantages.

Chinese Turk-
kistan.

After considerable local negotiations, the Chinese agreed to the Kanjutis cultivating in Raskam, on the understanding that the tract is Chinese territory, and that the Kanjutis are liable to be made to pay a small revenue, which demand it is unlikely will be enforced. The Mir of Hunza has fairly strong claims to the Raskam tract and the question is one of considerable interest to the Government of India, connected as it is with the question of the extension of British political control beyond the crests of the present natural mountain boundary. Mr. Macartney reports that the Russian Consul at Kashgar, who loses no opportunity of opposing British interests in Chinese Turkistan, did his utmost to make the Chinese reject the Kanjuti claim to Raskam.

Information has been received that negotiations have commenced at St. Petersburg for the settlement of the frontier between Russian and Chinese possessions in Eastern Turkistan.

Secret desp.
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 152 (Fr.),
dated the 1st
Sept. 1898.

During the early part of the year, the attitude of the District Magistrate at Yarkand became so unfriendly towards Mr. Macartney and the Indian traders that a representation had to be made on the subject to Her Britannic Majesty's Minister at Peking.

The Kashgaris are making a practice of taking to the Russian Consul their complaints against the Chinese officials. The Consul openly expressed to Mr. Macartney the opinion that the Chinese administration in Kashgaria was rotten to the core, detested by the natives and that nothing remained but for Russia to take the country.

During the progress of the Chitral relief, Major Deane saw the young Mehtar of Chitral. The following extract from a letter from Major Deane, dated Darosh, the 14th May 1898, shows what a great improvement has taken place in the Mehtar and in the feeling of his people:—

“The difference on this side of the Lowarai to the other is very striking. It is a pleasure to see the cheery looks and people enjoying life, as they do, on this side, after the sulky scowling faces on the other. The Mehtar is quite changed, bright and cheery, plenty to say for himself, seems to thoroughly understand that all that has been done for him is for his good, and is doing his

best to learn to administer his country himself. He said that last year he was young and did not understand, but that he hoped I would now trust him to stick to the new line he has taken, and so long as Government stands by him, he can ensure his country giving no trouble. The Adamzadas seem to be working well. Between this and Drosh, I noticed a considerable extension of cultivation brought about by Captain Gurdon, and he deserves great credit not only for this, but for the evident change in the Mehtar and in the feeling throughout the country."

At the end of May, it was reported to the Assistant Political Agent in Wakhan. Chitral that, in consequence of rumours that a Russian force had moved in the direction of the Pamirs, orders had been sent from Kabul that the Wakhan border should be carefully watched, and that the Afghan officials at Kila-i-Panja had forbidden all intercourse between Afghan subjects and Wakhis on the opposite bank of the river. In June, the Amir wrote to the Viceroy saying that a hearsay report had reached him that the Russians, under the pretext of plague precautions, were encroaching in the Wakhan direction, "and that some of their men had been moving about in the wilds and forests of the Pamirs." On this account, His Highness said he had deferred the despatch of Afghan sowars (to Eastern Wakhan) this season, lest a conflict should take place between them and the Russian sowars, and he asked whether he should still send a small body of sowars as usual, or refrain from doing so this year. The Amir was advised to send an Afghan official, as before, by way of asserting Afghan possession and right of occupancy.

Secret desp.
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 103 (Fr.),
dated the 7th
July 1898.

In March, the Amir announced the dismissal of Colonel Ghulam Rasul Khan, Kabul, who had held for several years the post of Afghan Agent with the Government of India. His Highness said that he had appointed Sardar Muhammad Ismail in his place, but the Sardar had not arrived in India at the end of June, and there was some reason to believe that his nomination had been cancelled.

Sir Salter Pyne returned to India in February. Mr. Frank Martin, and Mr. and Mrs. Clemence were then the only Europeans at Kabul, but at the end of June, two Germans, or Austrians, named Kurdian and Fleischer, went to Kabul, *via* Peshawar, under an engagement to establish a glass factory. It transpired that one of these men was an expert in the manufacture of small arms.

Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan, Charkhi, died at Jalalabad about the 20th March. General Mir Atta Khan succeeded him in command of the forces at Jalalabad and Asmar.

In answer to a letter (dated the 10th January 1898) in which the Viceroy asked the Amir to restore certain Government arms taken into Afghanistan by deserters of the Zhob Levy Corps, His Highness invited attention to the correspondence which took place in 1896 and 1897 on the subject of extradition between Afghanistan and England and Russia, and said that, if it were considered necessary that arms and accoutrements of deserters from both sides should be taken from them and restored to the Government concerned, then the extradition arrangements should proceed. In reply, it was pointed out

Secret desp.
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 51 (Fr.),
dated the 17th
March 1898.

that the request made to the Amir was merely for the restoration of certain Government property, and that the surrender of the deserters had not been asked for.

Secret despatch
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 70 (Fr.),
dated the 5th
May 1898.

The Amir replied on the same lines as those of his previous letter, re-introducing the question of an extradition arrangement, and expressing a hope that the reply of Her Majesty's Government on this subject would soon be received. As regards the men of the Zhob Levy Corps, whose desertion gave rise to the correspondence, he said that they had sold their arms and horses to various persons and had gone away, and His Highness knew no more about them. The British Agent at Kabul reported that the deserters had sold the Government horses which they took away when they deserted, that the arms which had been seized by the Kabul Kotwal had been given back to them, and that they had been promised land in the Kandahar district.

Secret despatch
to H. M.'s S.
of S. for India,
No. 100 (Fr.),
dated the 7th
July 1898.

The Amir wrote on the 21st May 1898 to the Viceroy, sending correspondence which had passed between His Highness and M. Ignatiev, the Russian Consul in Bokhara, regarding the prohibition of the export of horses and carts from Bokhara to Afghan territory. The prohibition had been recently introduced, and His Highness wrote to the Consul enquiring the reason. M. Ignatiev replied that the orders were issued with his approval, that the export of horses and carts from Bokhara did great injury to the prosperity and trade of that State, and he concluded by expressing a hope that the decision would "in no way affect or interfere with the friendly relations existing between the two exalted Governments." In forwarding the correspondence, the Amir added that, besides the inconvenience caused by the Russians adopting this attitude, the closure of the Khyber route for seven months, and the consequent delay of His Highness's imports and traders' goods have caused his country to sustain a loss of many lakhs of rupees.

The Viceroy replied that, though he did not think it was a case in which it would be possible to interfere, he would forward the correspondence to Her Majesty's Government. He assured the Amir of the ready co-operation of the Government of India if His Highness were disposed to entertain proposals for the improvement of the means of communication, and said that he would rejoice to see greater opportunities given for the importation of goods from India to Afghanistan, for he believed nothing would more directly tend to the advantage of both countries. As regards the interruption of traffic through the Khyber, the Amir was reminded that this was the act of turbulent tribes, and the opportunity was taken to express the Viceroy's satisfaction at the manner in which His Highness had treated the deputations of Afridis who had recently visited Kabul.

**Baluchistan
Frontier.**

Mir Rasul Bakhsh, Raisani, the only one of the Sarawan Brahuis concerned in the disturbances in Baluchistan in the autumn of 1897, who had not made his submission, came in to Quetta early in March, surrendered to Colonel Wylie, and gave security for his future good conduct. He had visited Kabul and been well treated by the Amir; but preferred returning to his home to a life in exile in Afghanistan.

A lamentable case of *ghaza* occurred at Smallan, in the Loralai district, on the 14th March. Lieutenant-Colonel G. Gaisford, Deputy Commissioner, Thal-Chotiali, who was on tour in the Loralai district, was about to retire to rest at midnight, when he was attacked from behind by a *ghazi* who had managed to effect an entry into the building, which Colonel Gaisford was occupying. Colonel Gaisford was wounded by knife and sword cuts, and died from the effects a few hours later. The *ghazi* was arrested, tried and executed.

There has been some unrest among the Marris and Bugtis, and during April and May, a number of Marris went off to Afghanistan. The Marri Chief, Nawab Mehr-ulla Khan, to whose maladministration the discontent is believed to have been due, asked the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan to help him stop the runaways. The Chief had for some time past unofficially delegated his duties to his son, Mir Khair Bakhsh, and it was the latter who headed the first party of Marris which left for Kabul, after a dispute with his father.

Some Bozdars also went to Kabul, and a considerable number of Bugtis were reported to be preparing to take flight to Afghanistan. A settlement was, however, come to between the Marris and Bugtis, by which each tribe agreed to surrender the fugitives from the other, and this, if properly carried out, should have a good effect in keeping the tribes internally quiet. In June Colonel Wylie, accompanied by the Marri and Bugti Chiefs and their following, marched to Thal-Chotiali, where a Bugti Chief had taken refuge, after robbing cattle and other things from his clan; the Chief had with him about 300 men, and they and the cattle were injuring the crops of our ryots, who were very indignant, and there seemed every chance of a breach of the peace. The presence of the Agent to the Governor-General gave support to those who are loyal, and at the end of the month Colonel Wylie reported that affairs were settling down.

18th July 1898.

E. H. S. CLARKE.

HALF-YEAR

WHICH ENDED ON THE 31ST DECEMBER 1898.

HER MAJESTY'S Government replied on the 5th August 1898 (Secret **Khyber.** despatch No. 18) to the Government of India despatch of the 23rd June, in regard to the future policy to be adopted in the Khyber. Most of the proposals of the Government of India were accepted, including the construction of works at Landi Kotal, the organization of a movable column at the British end of the Pass, and preparations for extending the railway to Landi Kotal. The question whether the fort at Landi Kotal should be held by regular troops, or by a local tribal corps commanded by British officers was left open for the present. In dealing with the question whether the control of the Afridi Militia and Khyber Pass arrangements should remain in the hands of the Punjab Government, the Secretary of State expressed the opinion that the present arrangements were not satisfactory, and that it was desirable that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Punjab frontier should be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India. Lord George Hamilton inclined to hold that the Commissioner of Peshawar, and through him, his subordinates employed in conducting external relations with the various tribes on the frontier of the Peshawar Division, should, in respect of such matters, act directly under the Government of India, but the matter was too important for him to arrive at a final decision without giving it the fullest consideration, and he desired to receive any further observations which the Viceroy might desire to make. Lord Elgin's personal views on the subject were conveyed in a minute, dated the 6th November 1898, which was forwarded to the Secretary of State, with Secret despatch No. 207 (Frontier), dated the 10th November 1898.

A few cases of theft, wire cutting and of shooting into camp occurred in the Khyber during July; on the other hand, outstanding rifles continued to be brought in, and the general attitude of the tribe was one of expectancy and submissiveness.

The Afridi jirgas in Peshawar were allowed to return to their homes at the beginning of July. On the 15th July, the Afridis held a jirga at Bagh, at which they decided to collect all the rifles which had not yet been restored, to then report the fact and only surrender them when a distinct promise had been made that the subsidy would be restored to them.

On the 30th July, Mr. Donald took over charge of the appointment of Political Officer in the Khyber from Colonel Muhammad Aslam Khan, who retired on pension.

On the 7th September, the Secretary of State gave his general approval to an announcement being made to the Afridis to the following effect:—

First.—The Afridis by their own acts ruptured all agreements, forfeited all allowances, and forced the British Government to take and hold the Pass, which, as already announced by Sir William Lockhart, will be managed and controlled as the British Government think most desirable.

Second.—The Pass will be kept open for trade. The British Government will build a fort at Landi Kotal and posts between that and Jamrud, will keep up a good road or roads, and, if they want it, a railway, and will take such measures as they think fit to punish offences and preserve order on road and railway, in the fort and posts, and in the neighbourhood where necessary for their purposes.

Third.—The Afridis will have no dealings with any power but the British. They will be left to manage their own affairs in their own country; but, in the Khyber Pass, they are responsible to the British Government that they will co-operate to preserve order and security of life and property on roads or railway and within the limits of the Pass.

Fourth.—The British Government will give allowances as formerly to the Afridis for discharging this duty, and will maintain a militia recruited from the Afridi and other tribes and commanded by British officers. The British Government do not undertake to always keep troops at Landi Kotal, but will make arrangements for supporting the militia if circumstances require.

Fifth.—Arrangements for trade in the Khyber will be made by the British Government, and the militia will be used for guarding traders.

Sixth.—The allowances granted by the British Government will commence to reckon from the date of the adhesion by the tribe to the terms settled by the Government of India, but they are subject to withdrawal for misbehaviour in the Pass, in British India, or against the friends or allies of Government.

The duty of explaining this decision to the Afridis was entrusted to Brigadier-General C. C. Egerton, A.D.C., C.B., D.S.O., Commanding the Khyber Brigade, in association with Mr. A. F. D. Cunningham, C.I.E.

In compliance with General Egerton's summons, the Afridi jirgas came in to Peshawar on the 22nd October, and on the 24th, the orders of Government were announced and fully explained to them. Representative jirgas of the Malikdin Khel, Kamrai, Sipah and Kuki Khel were present. Of the Zakka Khel clan, sections resident in the Khyber were fully represented, also some Khusrogis and others of Bazar and Bara. Only a few Kambar Khel were present. It was arranged that the terms of Government should be lithographed and distributed in Pashtu, and that the jirgas should be received again three days later.

On the 27th, a jirga of over eleven hundred men representing all the Khyber clans except the Kambar Khel were interviewed. Of the Kambar Khel only twenty men attended. They handed in a written paper stating unconditionally their acceptance of the orders of Government as announced on the 24th. The clans present declared their willingness to be responsible for the Kambar Khel, and said they guaranteed Government could accept those Kambar Khel present as binding their clan; a feud between two sections of the Kambar Khel had delayed their jirga; but they were patching up a truce, and would come as soon as that was arranged.

The jirga then presented their written paper of petitions, ten in number, as follows:—

First.—For the reduction of the salt tax. In reply they were informed that General Egerton and Mr. Cunningham were not authorised to grant this,

and, as they had already been frequently told, Government would exercise their discretion in this matter upon consideration of the salt trade of India as a whole.

Second.—For the surrender of runaway women. They were told in reply that past practice in this respect could not be changed.

Third.—For the release of Sarwar Khan of Hangu. They were told in reply that a reference would be made to Government.

Fourth.—That certain former Khyber Maliks now in Afghanistan might be permitted to return and be re-appointed headmen. In reply they were told such men might come to the Khyber or to their country or to Peshawar and would not be arrested or touched, but that the question of the appointment or acceptance of such men as Maliks could not be considered in their absence. Their supporters stated that they were detained in Kabul against their will.

Fifth.—For the restoration of their allowances from the date of the last payments made. They were informed that Government was ready to grant the tribal allowances with effect from three months previous to the date of the adhesion of the tribe to the terms already announced.

Sixth.—That the Afridis should be fully represented in the Khyber Militia. This was answered by reference to term number four with an assurance that, whatever the strength of the militia might be, the Afridis would of course have their fair share of appointments with other clans or classes.

Seventh.—For compensation for mills destroyed at Ali Masjid during the war. They were told in reply that this could not be granted; it was a loss incidental to war. Similarly they had done damage to forts and buildings for which Government had not exacted satisfaction in full.

Eighth.—Compensation for any land that might be taken up for a railway. They were told that compensation would no doubt be granted according to the value of land taken.

Ninth.—That their women and Muhammadan women in general be not sent or allowed to go to the Mission Hospital, Peshawar. The reply to this was that Government sent no one there: they could please themselves.

Tenth.—For the increase of the Kambar Khel subsidy. No reply was given to this request on the ground that the Kambar Khel were not properly represented.

The attitude of the jirga was on the whole satisfactory. The assent of the jirgas present was practically sufficient, but to make more sure the meeting was adjourned for a few days to allow the Kambar Khel to come in.

The Kambar Khel jirga arrived on the 3rd November, and on the 4th the united Afridi jirgas ratified their complete acceptance of the Government terms. The restoration of their allowances was announced, with effect from the 27th October, to those sections who accepted the terms on that date, and to the Kambar Khel from the 4th November. Three months' arrears of allowances were then paid, this concession having been strongly recommended by General Egerton and Mr. Cunningham, and the jirgas dispersed. The allowances now restored are the same as those sanctioned before the outbreak of the disturbances last year, with the exception of those of the Kambar Khel, whose tribal

subsidy has been increased by Rs. 200 a month, their share having hitherto borne no proportion to the strength of the clan. General Egerton proceeded on leave at the end of the month, and the control of political relations with the tribesmen devolved upon Mr. F. D. Cunningham. During November, all remained perfectly quiet in the Khyber.

Amin Khan, the principal Kuki Khel Malik, was shot dead at his village near Jamrud, on the night of the 6th December, either by Kambar Khan, his rival, or the latter's friends. The question of the distribution of the Kuki Khel maliki allowances had therefore to remain in abeyance until it should be seen what action the clan would take. Most other questions in regard to the distribution of the Khyber maliki allowances have been decided. No changes had to be made in regard to the Sipah, Kambar Khel, or Kamrai; but a final decision in regard to the distribution of the Malikdin and Zakka Khel shares has been deferred for the present owing to the absence at Kabul of the leading Maliks, Firoz Khan, Khwas and Wali Muhammad who, it is said, are anxious to return to their homes.

A few rifles still remain to be brought in: it is not anticipated that there will be much difficulty in recovering the balance still outstanding.

The Amir wrote on the 28th May in answer to the Viceroy's letter of the 18th May, regarding the boundary in the vicinity of Tor Kham. His Highness still maintained that Tor Kham was within Afghan territory, and denied that it had ever been the practice to hand over caravans to the escorts of either side at Tor Kham.

The Viceroy replied on the 3rd September that he adhered to what he had already stated in his previous letter, and that, as the Amir was unable to accept his view, His Excellency was willing to let the precise boundary remain undecided until it could be conveniently settled on the ground as His Highness had suggested by officers representing the British and Afghan Governments.

Orakzais.

The restoration of the allowances of the Orakzai tribe has been sanctioned with effect from the 1st April 1898.

Bajaur, Dir and Swat.

Rumours were prevalent during July that the Sartor Fakir intended making a fresh attack on the British troops at Chakdarra. The Upper Swat people resisted his preaching, and refused him a passage: nevertheless, Major Deane reported that the tribes were generally upset, and that, in spite of the assurances of their leaders, no confidence could be placed in any of them where fanaticism is concerned.

On the 21st July, the Nawab of Dir, in spite of the plainest warning from Major Deane and without giving any notice of his intentions, started with a lashkar for Jandol. Major Deane at once wrote to him advising him to withdraw. Fighting took place in the Jandol valley on the 24th, when the Bajauris lost 136 killed and wounded, and the Nawab lost 31 killed and 50 wounded. On the same day Major Deane received a letter from the Khan of Nawagai, intimating that he would be obliged to oppose the Nawab. The latter's *Motamid* came in to Malakand on the 26th, bringing a letter from his master putting forward various excuses, and asking not only that he should not be forbidden to continue fighting, but that Government

should also assist him and send him a supply of cartridges. Major Deane assured the *Motamid* that the Nawab need expect no assistance from Government, and he wrote both to the Nawab and the Khan of Nawagai, suggesting that they should arrange a boundary in Jandol by mutual agreement among the parties concerned, and that meanwhile each side should withdraw its lashkar. Fighting was thereupon temporarily suspended though reinforcements had arrived on both sides.

With the exception of a skirmish between the Pashat Khan and some of the Nawab of Dir's men at Dageh, in which the former was worsted, August passed without further fighting in Jandol. At the end of July, the opposing forces are said to have numbered twelve thousand on either side; but, on the advice of Major Deane, they were mutually withdrawn on the 11th August. Neither the Hadda Mulla nor the mad Fakir made any movement, though the latter wrote to the Khan of Nawagai urging him to fight. Communication with Chitral remained uninterrupted. The Dir levies remained at their posts, and did not join the Nawab's forces in Jandol. The Khan of Nawagai behaved well throughout, and the blame for the disturbance rests entirely on the Nawab of Dir, whose aggressive proceedings brought it about.

Agents of the Dir and Bajaur Chiefs came in to Malakand on the 15th August to discuss questions connected with the settlement of Jandol affairs, and on the 20th Major Deane, who had been requested by the Chiefs to act as arbitrator, was authorized to announce the decision at which he had arrived, on the understanding that the responsibility and burden of giving effect to his award were to be put on the Khan of Nawagai and Nawab of Dir.

The main features of the award are that Saiyid Ahmad Khan retains Damtal, and in exchange must relinquish all claim to Chingai and Shah Khel villages, and in future have nothing to do with Mayar or its connected lands (except in so far as is in accordance with the award), and the Akhundzada owners of Mayar should settle their own disputes by Muhammadan law. All additions made to the fortifications of Chingai and Palosi since the 1st January 1898 are to be demolished, and the men under Saiyid Usman, Ustad Muhammad and Mir Agha Jan (*i.e.*, the men known as Umra Khan's gang) are to be excluded from the limits of Jandol. Anapia and Gandheri remain with Saiyid Ahmad Khan, and Khan Dheri and other places connected with Gambir remain with the Gambir Khan. In announcing his award, Major Deane warned the Khan of Nawagai and Nawab of Dir that he expected them to show their good faith in seeing that the above conditions were carried out, and in exacting compliance by the different Khans in Jandol, whose respective causes they had espoused; but that the Government of India would not approve any further interference than was necessary for carrying out the above terms.

Affairs remained quiet in Jandol during September, though the Khan of Pashat and some of the Salarzais tried to induce the Nawab of Dir to again advance into Jandol. The Khan of Nawagai wrote to Major Deane complaining that many of the Nawab's men were still in Pashat, Barwa and Palosi, that Government assisted the Nawab of Dir, and that the latter's levies joined in the fighting in Jandol. He was told in reply that the Government of India assist the Nawab in keeping open the road to Chitral, that the levies were

entertained solely for work on this road, and that during the recent fighting, the levies did not leave their posts. It was the desire of the Government of India that both the Khan of Nawagai and the Nawab of Dir should maintain peace in their own countries and between each other; if either Chief interfered in the affairs of Jandol, he would receive no assistance whatever from Government, nor would Government approve of his action.

In October the Nawab of Dir and the Khan of Nawagai executed an agreement, under the terms of which the Nawab is allowed a free hand in Jandol, while the Khan is not to be interfered with in any measures he may take against the Salarzai. The effect of this arrangement is that the Nawab of Dir throws over the Khan of Pashat and the Upper Salarzai, whom he has been helping hitherto, and the Khan of Nawagai deserts the Khans of Mundah, Tor, &c. The Khan is said to have been promised Rs. 20,000 by the Nawab in consideration of his refraining from supporting the Jandol Khans. The Nawab came in to see Major Deane at Malakand on the 22nd October, and produced the agreement for Major Deane's inspection. In compliance with Major Deane's demand, he gave up 16 rifles which he had taken in Jandol.

The Khan of Nawagai was prevented by sickness from coming in. He has taken Pashat, and set up the Pashat Khan's son as his representative.

On the 8th November Major Deane started on a flying visit to Drosh, *viâ* Dir and the Lowarai. He was well received everywhere, and, after seeing the Mehtar of Chitral at Ziarat on the 11th, reached Dir on his way back on the 14th. Here the Nawab brought him letters from the Shamozaï country, saying the Sartor Fakir had come down to Miandani in Azi Khel country, with 600 men and several standards, and intended crossing the river and raising a jihad against the Nawab, after which he would attack the Malakand. The news being confirmed from other sources, Major Deane returned on the 15th November to Robat, and to Chakdarra the next day, after giving the Nawab instructions about protecting his border and not to move beyond it. At Robat he found much discontent against the Nawab, whose leading men had little confidence in him or his arrangements.

On the 18th, Major Deane telegraphed that the Fakir had moved down to Paitai, that his gathering was slightly increasing, and that he considered the position serious. The Fakir, however, retired to Miandani a few days later, taking some of his followers with him, and leaving others in villages in the valley between Miandani and Paitai. (Miandani is a small place on the hills above the Azi Khel valley, about 11 miles from Paitai.) Major Deane sent a message to the Mian Guls that he expected them to expel the Fakir from Swat. Under authority from the Government of India, he allowed the tribes generally to understand that, though the Fakir's movements were ostensibly against the Nawab, they were also directed against the British Government, and that the Fakir would not be allowed to interfere with arrangements which have our sanction, and that opposition offered by the tribes to the Fakir's advance would be approved.

On the 21st November, Major Deane telegraphed that the Nawab of Dir was asking to be allowed to buy cartridges. Major Deane considered that the position justified a free supply of cartridges being given by Government, on the

Nawab giving an undertaking not to commit aggression against any tribes beyond his own border without the approval of Government. Sanction was accorded to Major Deane's proposal, and the Nawab has since handed in two papers formally acknowledging his boundaries, and promising not to interfere with any territories beyond those boundaries, and to be guided by the advice of the Political Agent in any disputes with adjoining tribes.

On the 25th November, the Fakir came down from Miandani with a gathering, 700 strong, composed of men of Paitai, Miandani, Kana and Ghorband, and fighting ensued between his party and a body of Shamozaï and Sebuji Swatis, in the Sebuji valley. Another fight occurred the same day in the Shamozaï valley, in which the Swatis lost 30 men and the Fakir 10 or 12. On the 26th or 27th, the Fakir moved into the Nekpi Khel valley, and killed four of the Nawab's representatives, the rest taking to flight.

The Movable Column marched to Chakdarra on the 29th November, and the Guides Infantry and a squadron, 10th Bengal Lancers, were sent up to the Malakand in support.

On the 30th November, a portion of the Fakir's gathering was reported to be on the crest of the watershed of the Robat and Kharmang and Tormang valleys. He was driven back from this by Abdulla Khan of Robat into the Nekpi Khel valley, and a reconnaissance by a small detachment of the Movable Column up the Shamozaï valley gave heart to the surrounding tribesmen, while it alarmed the Fakir. The Nekpi Khels declined to fight for him, and the Shamozaï, Sebuji, Jinki Khel and Azi Khel jirgas sent in messages to Major Deane that they would expel the Fakir, if Government would direct the Nawab of Dir to suspend operations against them and afterwards free them from his oppression. The Azi Khel jirga came in to Major Deane at Chakdarra on the 5th December, and executed an agreement that they would exclude the Fakir and agitators of his class from their territory, on the understanding that their relations with Government should in future be on the same footing as those of clans below them on the left bank. They returned the next day, accompanied by representatives of all other tribes, to put pressure on the Jinki Khels to expel the Fakir. Fighting took place on the 4th and 5th, in which there were some small losses both on the side of the Nawab and of the Fakir. The Nawab throughout showed want of energy and a failure to appreciate the gravity of the situation, but fortunately Major Deane succeeded in inducing the local tribesmen to desert the Fakir, and his following from the Indus Kohistan was not strong enough to enable him to advance without them. On the 7th December, the Movable Column marched to Haibatgram near Thana, and on the same day it was reported that the Fakir had retired to the left bank of the Swat river, and his following had fallen from 8,000 to about 300 men. For a day or two longer, the Fakir himself was harboured in Paitai, but pressure was brought to bear on the Jinki Khels, and they eventually escorted him beyond their borders, whence he retired to Ghorband.

All the left bank jirgas came in to Major Deane at Haibatgram on the 15th December, accompanied by the Shamozaï leaders who had supported the Fakir. They expressed their unanimous desire to come under Government. The Jinki Khels executed an agreement similar to that given by the Azi Khels, for the exclusion of the Fakir from their country.

The right bank jirgas executed an agreement with the Nawab and with Government, pledging themselves to exclude the Fakir and enemies of Government from their limits, the Nawab on his side agreeing to accept an annual sum in cash, to be collected and paid by the tribal headmen themselves, instead of continuing the present system of collection of revenue in kind by the Nawab's agents, who are thus prevented from oppressing the people. The Nawab has since effected a settlement with the left bank jirgas who had already come to terms with Major Deane. The disturbance having completely died out, the Movable Column retired to Khar, and the troops sent up to the Malakand in support were withdrawn.

Kurram.

In connection with a claim for compensation on account of a raid committed by Mastu Khel Massuzais on Paiwari Mangal cattle in February 1897, the Government of India ruled that the punishment inflicted on the Massuzai by Sir William Lockhart must be held to have wiped out all old scores against them, and that, as compensation had been promised to the Mangals, the cost of keeping this promise must be borne by Government. The question of the restoration or forfeiture of the Massuzai allowance has been reserved for the pleasure of the Government of India.

The Chamkannis have not yet paid up the fine of Rs. 1,000 and 30 rifles outstanding against them. A majority of the tribe is in favour of restoring the rifles taken from the Kapurthalla Infantry, but they are not strong enough to coerce the minority, who remain recalcitrant. Pending a final decision as to the treatment of the tribe, a warning against raiding has been sent to them, and they have been reminded that the restoration of the Kapurthalla rifles and Government property must precede any further negotiations.

On the 25th November, while Lieutenant Ketchen, Adjutant, Kurram Militia, was out shooting in the Kamadin hills close to Chapri, he came across three Waziris armed with rifles driving a flock of goats. On his hailing them, the Waziris took up a position behind a rock, and a fight ensued between them and Lieutenant Ketchen's guard. Two Waziris were killed and one Government Henry-Martini rifle captured. Some villagers who were sent to bring in the bodies, caught two men, also armed, one a Thalwal and one a Waziri, near the spot.

Several offences have been committed in Kurram by Afghan subjects during the half-year, but though the Officer on Special Duty in Kurram has addressed the Governor of Khost on the subject, no replies have been received.

Waziristan.

On the break up of the Tochi Field Force, six of the seventeen ringleaders of the Maizar outrage whose surrender was demanded had come in; four rifles (or in default Rs. 2,000) and Rs. 8,890 on account of looted property and ammunition remained to be recovered, as well as Rs. 4,940, the unpaid balance of the fine of Rs. 10,000. The Kazhawals, the Ger Madda Khel and the Machas of Tangis have since paid all but Rs. 4,670, and the Ger Madda Khel gave an agreement to pay their share, Rs. 2,250, in the autumn, and to arrange for the realization of the balance from the Machas. Two of the four rifles have been given in; the other two could not be procured, one being in Afghan territory and the other untraceable; but the Ger Madda Khel brought in a Martini and Snider which they asked might be accepted in exchange, or

that these two weapons should be retained as security until either the two actually stolen should be forthcoming, or their value, Rs. 1,000, should be paid. This request was agreed to.

In regard to the 11 unsurrendered ringleaders, Mr. Anderson has been authorized to tell them that they can no longer be given an opportunity of clearing themselves and of obtaining an acquittal, and that they must now be considered as guilty and be surrendered to be kept as hostages during the pleasure of Government. A definite time will be announced within which they must comply with the demand, and failing compliance, they will be considered as criminals and outlaws, and, if arrested, will be punished as such. The restoration of the forfeited Madda Khel allowances will be sanctioned when the outstanding claims against the section have been satisfied, and the eleven ringleaders have surrendered, or the term of grace allowed them has expired. The Punjab Government has been authorized to set at liberty Sadda Khan and Alambe, the two principal Malikis surrendered, whenever convenient and whenever it appears that their release would have a good effect on the attitude of the tribe.

The tribesmen asked that levy posts should be located in their country, and the Punjab Government recommended that posts should be built at Sheranni in Ger Madda Khel country, and at Bibi Algad and Ismail Khel in the Kazha. The Government of India, however, before agreeing to the establishment of new levy posts beyond Datta Khel, desired to be satisfied that the posts could be established on conditions that would not entail any obligation to support them with regular troops.

During the half-year, raids and crime both in the Gomal and Tochi have largely increased. Unfortunately, the Waziris not content with raiding in these tracts, extended their operations into Afghan territory. Raids by Afghan subjects into Waziri limits have also occurred.

On the night of the 3rd August, a large gang of raiders attacked an enclosure adjacent to the fort of Kanirogha in the Tochi. In the enclosure were some 800 coolies employed in making the Tochi road. The raiders killed seven and wounded several, of whom two have since died: they then made good their flight to Khost, carrying off 3 horses, 60 donkeys, and a large quantity of Government and miscellaneous property. The Waziris, who were in the fort, profess to have been afraid of the large numbers of the attacking party and their superior armament, and made no attempt to defend the occupants of the enclosure. The Political Officer in the Tochi has asked the Governor of Khost to arrest the criminals (Tanis and Gurbaz with some Tochi outlaws settled in Khost) and to secure the stolen property. The Governor of Khost is said to have made the Tani Malikis arrest the raiders and seized the stolen property. The Government of India have agreed to the imposition of fines (if they can be readily paid) aggregating three thousand rupees, on the Manzar Khels, Saidgais and Kharsins, through whose limits the raiders passed. Two talibs, one a Manzar Khel and the other a Tori Khel, who furnished information to the raiders, have been arrested, and for the present have been sent to the Bannu jail.

A reply (dated the 6th September 1898) has been sent to the Amir's letter of the 22nd May 1898 (see previous half-year's report), in which His Highness complained of a raid by Waziris on Zadrans. The Amir has been informed that the flocks raided were promptly restored by the Political Officer in the Tochi, who had further requested the Governor of Khost to send to him the heirs of the men alleged to have been killed, that they might prosecute their claims to compensation according to Muhammadan law and Afghan custom. The Amir was then reminded of three raids, in which Afghan subjects participated during July 1897, when a large number of camels were carried away into Khost, none of which has been restored, and the Viceroy added—"I cannot help thinking that much of the difficulty now experienced in settling cases of border thefts would be avoided, if Your Highness would agree to one of your officers occasionally meeting one of my frontier officers as proposed in my letter to Your Highness of the 29th October 1896." The letter concluded by bringing to the Amir's notice the attack on the Kanirogha post on the 3rd August (see above). The Amir was asked to see that the perpetrators of the outrage, if found, should be suitably punished, and that such of the stolen property as might be recovered should be duly restored.

On the 3rd September, a more than usually audacious raid was committed by Guri Khel, Garerai and Langar Khel Mahsuds opposite the Jani Khel military post. Four British subjects were wounded, and the raiders carried off 55 cows, 1,172 sheep and goats, and 7 donkeys: five shepherds, British subjects, were also carried off. The following terms have been imposed on the Guri Khels, who were the principal offenders:—Payment of the customary blood-money and compensation for men killed and wounded, the raiders being allowed to set off any sum on account of blood-money owing to them; the restitution of all animals carried off and of any ransom paid for them, and the value of any animals killed or permanently injured; payment of a fine of Rs. 800, half to be remitted if the other terms are completed within one month of the date of their announcement.

Early in October, a gang of 40 Miamai Kabul Khels, armed with breech-loading rifles, and guided by Zadran outlaws, attacked the village of Bazi Kon in Afghanistan in broad daylight, killed 4 men and carried off 60 cattle and 200 goats.

On the 5th October, a very large band of Kabul Khel Waziris from the Kurram side raided into Khost, at Tor Obo, and carried off nearly 2,000 sheep and goats. A few days later, they attempted a second raid, but the Khostwals were forewarned, and the attempt was frustrated. The Governor of Khost is said to be much excited about the occurrence, and has written in strong terms to the Amir on the subject.

On or about the 20th October, a gang of one hundred Mahsuds, Aimal Khels and others, raided some Kharotis beyond Birmal in Afghan territory. They carried off some camels, sheep and other property, and are said to have killed two Afghan levies and one sepoy who joined the pursuit party.

On the 9th November, the Amir again addressed the Viceroy about Waziri offences in Afghan territory. He made no reference to the Viceroy's letter of 6th September 1898, but repeated his former complaint and instanced five

fresh raids committed since the despatch of his previous *kharita*. Two of the five are mentioned above: and two are of minor importance. The fifth was a serious raid on or about the 30th October in which a large band of raiders from Kurram, including Khojal Waziris, Miamai Kabul Khels and some Zaimushts, raided into Khost and captured three flocks belonging to Ghilzais. Afghan cavalry pursued the raiders, a fight ensued, and an Afghan officer and two sowars were killed.

The Mahsud jirga has been formally warned to respect Afghan territory, and called to account for raids already committed. Steps were taken to put pressure on the Kabul Khels, a *baramta* on the Khojal Khels when they enter the Kohat district was authorised, also on the Kabul Khels, on the people of Biland Khel, and the Zaimushts of Admela. The Political Officer in the Tochi wrote to the Governor of Khost, asking for information regarding the raids so that they might be enquired into, and on receipt of a reply, the Governor will be invited to send in the complainants with a view to their charges being taken up.

The diaries received in December from the Political Officers in Waziristan continued to contain accounts of numerous raids and offences by Mahsuds and others. During October, a settlement was effected of all the cross-cases, which had arisen since the demarcation of the British-Afghan boundary, between the Gyan Khel section of the Zadrans and the Madda Khels of the Kazha. The settlement, which has been reduced to writing, was attested by the leading Gyan Khels and Kazha Maliks in the presence of the Political Officer in the Tochi and Mulla Saiyid, a representative deputed by the Governor of Khost. The Mulla at first professed himself ready to deal with all cases between Waziris and Afghan subjects, and this was borne out by his credentials, but, when the Gyan Khel-Kazhawal cases were finished, he said he had no authority to proceed further.

On the 2nd December, a successful *baramta* was effected by the Commandant of the Kohat Border Police on the Khojal Khel Waziris, who were the principal offenders in the raid of the 30th October into Afghan territory. Twenty Khojal Khels, over 12,000 sheep and goats, and many camels and cattle were captured; and of these, 15 men, 2,730 sheep and goats, 69 camels and 160 cattle have been retained pending a settlement. On the 6th December, a *baramta* was effected on the Kabul Khels about five miles from Thal, nine men, 200 head of cattle and 350 sheep and goats having been seized. The Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, has written to the Governor of Khost, requesting him to send down the complainants in the raids of the 10th and 30th October to appear before him early in January, when the jirgas of the offending tribes have also been summoned to be present.

The Viceroy replied on the 13th December to the Amir's letter of the 9th November 1898 (see above). The Amir was told that the British officers were taking steps to punish and control the Waziris, and was reminded that tribesmen from the Afghan side of the border had also committed raids and robberies on the British side of the line, as His Highness was informed on the 6th September. The Viceroy renewed the suggestion that an Afghan official should occasionally meet a British frontier officer to investigate such cases, and pointed out that it was the want of such co-operation that gave the robbers of both sides their opportunity.

Meanwhile, another letter was received from the Amir, dated the 29th November, in which he renewed his previous complaints. He still ignored the Viceroy's letter of the 6th September; and wrote that his arrangements for keeping his own tribesmen in hand were good, but that the British officers did not keep in control the tribesmen under their jurisdiction and were unable to punish them. He instanced two raids by Achakzais into the Kandahar and Kadanai districts, and added that, if the British officials did not restore raided property and the raids still continued, he would be compelled to tell his subjects that he had written on several occasions to the Viceroy informing him of the matter, "but, as the frontier officials of the illustrious British Government make no arrangements about these matters, you may, if you are able to do so, retaliate on account of the plunder and murder in view to preserve your honour. Because such terms of neighbourship, in which you do not commit aggression, while the other side commits acts of aggression against you, and no justice is done, cannot be endured. Such being the case, you are free to do what you can."

In reply the Amir was told that any such announcement could only be regarded as an unfriendly act, the more so, as a method had frequently been suggested, whereby these frontier disputes could be satisfactorily settled. His Highness was further informed of the happy result which had attended the deputation of an Afghan agent to the Tochi to take up the cross-cases between the Gyan Khel Zadrans and the Madda Khels of the Kazha; and that, in connection with the raids by Kabul Khels and Khojal Khels, reprisals had been made on the tribesmen's cattle, and that the Governor of Khost had been invited to send in the complainants with a view to the settlement of their claims.

Zarmelan.

In 1897, arrangements were come to with the Suleiman Khel for the levy from them of a moderate grazing tax both on the Baluchistan and Punjab side of the border, the Suleiman Khel agreeing on condition that the Dotannis who graze along with them should pay the same dues. In order to enlist the co-operation of the Maliks, allowances were sanctioned for both the Suleiman Khel and Dotannis. In December 1897, the Political Officer, Wano, reported that he was unable to collect the grazing tax in Zarmelan without strong coercive measures, the Sultan Khel Maliks having represented that, although they were prepared to abide by the agreement, they had not sufficient control over their tribe to compel them to pay, nor would the tribe come fully under their control until Government constructed a post in Zarmelan and put levies into it. The Commissioner of the Derajat recommended the establishment of the post, independently of the question of the levy of tirni from the Suleiman Khels and Dotannis, holding that Government were bound to establish control in Zarmelan. The Government of India considered that the establishment of a levy post in Zarmelan would be a marked extension of the assistance which they contemplated giving in the political supervision of that part of the Gumal route, and declined to sanction the post. The arrangements for the improvement of political relations with the Suleiman Khels, and the collection of a grazing tax have been deferred until a more convenient season, and meanwhile the allowances sanctioned for the Suleiman Khels and Dotannis will not be disbursed.

A section of the Punyalis, headed by a brother of Raja Muhammad Akbar Khan, has been raising some agitation in Punyal. After a prolonged enquiry into the alleged grievances of the Punyalis against Raja Akbar Khan, their Chief, it was ascertained that the complaints were not founded upon facts, and that the agitation was due partly to intrigues on the part of the numerous Rajas in Punyal, headed by Rajas Sifat Bahadur and Burish Khan, and still more to the assistance given to the intriguers by Pir Shah-i-Kalan, a Maulai Pir residing in Yasin, whose religious followers include most of the Punyal people. The Pir was brought before the Political Agent and warned; but his attitude did not improve, and he was removed to Astor on the 25th August. A reconciliation was then effected between Raja Akbar Khan and Burish Khan and his three younger brothers, but the quarrel between Akbar Khan and Sifat Bahadur could not be patched up, and the latter was removed to Kashmir on the 4th September. The Maulai Pir was shortly afterwards allowed to go to his home, and it is hoped that it will be possible to shortly allow Sifat Bahadur to return.

The question of the cultivation of Raskam by the Kanjutis still remains unsettled. The District Magistrate of Kashgar has rejected a proposal made by the Hunza Agent to pay an increased gold tribute in consideration of Hunza people being allowed to cultivate in Raskam, his reason being that the gold tribute was paid by the Mir in his capacity of Ruler of Kanjut—that is of a country over which the Chinese claim no direct jurisdiction—; consequently, if a similar tribute were paid on account of Raskam, he feared that it might be construed into an admission on the part of the Chinese that their jurisdiction over Raskam was of the same nature as that over Kanjut. Mr. Macartney has ascertained that the difficulties of the situation are aggravated by the Russian Consul. In the meantime, the Mir has commenced cultivation in one part of the valley and settled a few of his men there.

Captain Manners Smith, V.C., C.I.E., relieved Captain McMahon of the charge of the Gilgit Agency at the end of September. During October he went on tour in Punyal and Yasin. He visited the Ashkuman valley, this being the first occasion on which the valley has been visited by the Political Agent, Gilgit. Mir Ali Mardan Shah, the Governor of Ashkuman, is beginning to show more interest in his charge than formerly, and the opportunity was taken to impress on him and his people that they are responsible to Government for the proper carrying on of their duties.

Mr. Macartney's servants' quarters were entered on the 24th June by a band of about fifteen Chinese soldiers; a fight followed, in which two of Mr. Macartney's men received severe wounds, and four others, including the Hospital Assistant, were slightly hurt. Four Chinese soldiers were seized and made over to the police. A Chinese official visited Mr. Macartney shortly afterwards, admitted that the soldiers were entirely to blame, made apologies and promised every reparation. The Taotai also called next day to apologise and promised that the culprits should be punished in Mr. Macartney's presence. The promise was fulfilled a few days later.

On the 19th September, the Agency Munshi was assaulted by a Chinaman as he was riding out of one of the gates of the city. He brought the matter to

the notice of the Taotai, who called upon him and offered profuse apologies, which the Munshi accepted. The Taotai excused himself for not punishing the Munshi's assailant, on the ground that he was a servant of the late Mayor of Kashgar, with whom the Taotai did not wish to have a rupture just as he was leaving the district.

M. Petrovsky, the Russian Consul at Kashgar, continues to act in a high-handed way and to carry everything before him where Russian interests are concerned. The Kashgari traders have come to the conclusion that the Taotai is too weak to take any action that would be distasteful to M. Petrovski, and the impression is certainly growing, even amongst the ordinary people, that Kashgaria will eventually pass under Russian control.

For some time past, the Chinese District Magistrate at Yarkand has been showing himself hostile to the Hindu traders in his jurisdiction; Mr. Macartney was unable to effect any improvement; a representation was accordingly made at Peking, and orders were sent through the Governor of the New Dominion that the local authorities were to work harmoniously with Mr. Macartney in the settlement of cases in which British Indian subjects were concerned. Matters have been going more smoothly since. Mr. Macartney went to Yarkand at the end of July, was well received by the District Magistrate, and a joint Court was held for the hearing of cases, but it was only found possible to decide a few of the many which were pending. Mr. Macartney says that, though the attitude of the District Magistrate has changed for the better, all the Begs and Interpreters of the Yamên are at enmity with the Hindus, and intrigues fostered by them and the Andijani traders are being carried on to deprive the Hindus of their rights.

Pamirs, Darwaz,
Wakhan, &c.

On the 10th June, Mr. R. P. Cobbold, an Englishman travelling for sport, was arrested at Kila-i-Wamar, at the junction of the Murghabi and Panja rivers, by a Bokharan official, acting under the instructions of Captain Kivekas, the Officer Commanding the Pamir district, whose head-quarters are at Charog in Shighnan. Mr. Cobbold had obtained permission from General Vrewsky, Governor-General of Turkistan, to shoot on the Pamirs, and he immediately wrote to Captain Kivekas, protesting against his arrest, and forwarding the permit he had received from General Vrewsky, and other documents authorizing him to travel in parts of Asiatic Russia. Captain Kivekas arrived at Kila-i-Wamar on the 17th June, and explained that three months previously he had received orders to allow Mr. Cobbold to shoot anywhere he liked within the district under his (Captain Kivekas's) command; but a month later he received another order that Mr. Cobbold was to be turned back wherever he might cross the Chinese frontier, or, if he had proceeded beyond it, that he was to be detained pending further orders. Mr. Cobbold was refused permission to communicate with Gilgit, but he managed to send a letter through. Captain Kivekas agreed to permit Mr. Cobbold to accompany him to Charog on parole, and promised to send a favourable report about him to the Governor of Ferghana. Mr. Cobbold was shortly afterwards taken to Tashkurghan under a Cossack guard and there released. He arrived at Gilgit on the 4th August.

On the 1st August, a letter, dated the 23rd July 1898, was received from the Amir in which he complained that Bokharan officials were inciting the

people of cis-Oxus Darwaz to rebel against the Afghan Government. The Amir said that the Bokharans were instigated by the Russians, and requested that steps might be taken to stop such proceedings. The Amir was informed that his letter had been forwarded to Her Majesty's Government.

The Russians are constructing a good road from Charog in Shighnan to Murghabi. Starting from Charog, it follows the Ghund river to its junction with the Taguz Bulak stream; it will then run along the bank of the latter to the Koh-i-Titak pass, which it will cross, and at Tagar Kakti join the already completed Zung-Murghabi road. When this work is completed, it is intended to make a road from Zung to Kharigh, along the Panja river; the survey of this road has just been carried out.

Captain Kennion, who recently visited the Yarkhun valley, ascertained that the Afghan district of Wakhan is administered by a Kabuli, named Abdul Ghani Khan, in conjunction with Ismail Khan, the hereditary Naib.

There are about 200 families in Afghan Wakhan, from whom revenue is annually realized as follows:—

- Rs. 10 (Kabuli) per family.
- „ 12 on every hundred sheep or goats.
- Re. 1 on each milch cow or pony.
- „ 1 on occasion of a marriage.

Revenue grain is also realized at the rate of 600lb per family. This is handed over to the garrison at Panja on payment. Sheep for the troops are indented for through the Naib and paid for at the nominal rate of 4 annas each. There are 100 Afghan soldiers at Panja and 7 at Sarhad. The exactions of the Afghans are felt very severely.

The Amir has appointed Sarmsak, a Turk, as Beg of the Kirghiz of the Little Pamir. There appears to have been some dispute among the Kirghiz about the boundary near Kizl Robat, and the Naib of Wakhan has been sent to settle it.

Under instructions from the Government of India, the British Agent Kabul. addressed the Amir on the 17th July about the British cemeteries in Afghanistan, which had fallen into disrepair. The Amir readily issued orders that every facility should be provided both at Kandahar and Kabul for the graveyards to be put into proper order. At an interview with the British Agent a few days later, His Highness asked whether it would not be possible to remove to England the remains of officers of rank who had died in Afghanistan. The Amir was told in reply that, owing to the condition into which the cemeteries had fallen, it was no longer possible to discriminate between the graves of officers of rank and those of other persons buried in British graveyards in Afghanistan.

At the same interview the Amir referred to reports which have been prevalent of the presence of Russian officers at Kabul. His Highness denounced the statements as false; and spoke in very warm terms of his friendly feelings towards the British Government.

Sardar Muhammad Ismail Khan, the Amir's new Agent with the Government of India, arrived at Simla on the 7th August, and brought a letter from

the Amir accrediting him. The Amir clearly laid down that the Sardar is not empowered to discuss any official matters with Government officials on his own account, and that his sole duty is to receive and forward letters which pass between His Highness and the Government of India.

On the 27th July, the British Agent at Kabul wrote to the Amir, bringing to His Highness's notice the annoyance to which he and his men are subjected by the Kotwali, or secret police officials. He stated that these functionaries abuse his men, follow them to the bazaar, and forbid the shop-keepers to deal with them, are ever ready to pick quarrels with the Agency servants and annoy them in every possible way. The Amir declined to believe the charges against the Kotwali men without proofs, and added that the Kotwali men were appointed as a protection to the Agency officials, lest there should be a repetition of the incidents of 1879; and that the Agent must in future prevent his servants going out unescorted from the Agency precincts.

On the 18th August, a party consisting of two havildars and twenty sepoy of the Afghan army, armed with rifles, arrived at Landi Kotal on their way to Peshawar, giving out that they had been sent down as a guard over the Amir's Post Office in Peshawar. The party was detained at Landi Kotal pending the orders of Government; and at the end of September a letter was received from the Amir referring to the detention of the men at Landi Kotal and asking that they might be allowed to proceed to Peshawar, where His Highness said their presence was necessary to protect his official in charge of the Post Office from the bad characters living in the city. In replying to His Highness that the Government of India could not admit any necessity for the Postmaster to be attended by an armed Afghan guard, and that the men could not be granted admission into British India, the Viceroy took the opportunity to remind His Highness of the letters of the 24th June 1896 and 26th May 1897 about the collection of Afghan taxes in Peshawar, and to say that he should expect to hear promptly from His Highness that he had issued orders that all dues and tolls levied for the Afghan Government should, in future, be collected in Afghan territory only. The Amir replied (20th October) that, as the Government of India objected to the presence of armed khassadars at Peshawar, he had ordered them to be sent without arms for service under the Afghan Postmaster. His Highness denied that any Afghan State dues are collected in British territory, and said that his agents in Peshawar are solely engaged in facilitating the mercantile affairs of Afghan traders.

During the week ending the 3rd September a son was born to the Amir; the young Sardar has been named Amir Muhammad Khan.

Chitral.

A large amount of trade, which was formerly carried by the Chitral route to Badakhshan, is being diverted to the Pech valley route, thereby considerably reducing the Mehtar's revenue from tolls. The Sipah Salar has caused a proclamation to be made to the effect that the new road to Badakhshan, by the Pech valley, is now the shortest and best, and that the safety of traders using it is guaranteed.

The Afghan Hakim of Lutdeh has sent a message to the Bashgalis in Chitral, urging them to return to their homes and promising the restoration of their lands and houses. The messenger brought an unsigned letter from the

Hakim, asking that the Bashgalis should be expelled from Chitral, and saying that as, by the Amir's orders, five hundred Bajauris had been refused admittance to Afghan territory, reciprocity of treatment was expected on the part of the British Government as regards the Bashgalis. The messenger was told that, if he could induce the Kafirs to return, no obstacles would be raised to his doing so.

A number of sheep were raided by Bashgal Kafirs from the Bidir valley on the 29th July, but nearly all were recovered. It is difficult to prevent these raids at this season of the year, when the range that forms the Chitral-Kafiristan boundary can be easily crossed. The Bashgalis, who have settled in Chitral territory, will in future be held responsible for safeguarding the frontier.

During October Captain Kennion, Assistant Political Agent, accompanied a reconnaissance party to the source of the Yarkhun river, and to the Ak Kul, or Kul Sar lake. He reported that the country through which the Yarkhun river flows for the first 35 to 40 miles of its course, *i.e.*, from the source to Khan Khon Kuch, though geographically within Chitral limits, is really more like a part of Wakhan. Very few Chitralis ever visit that part of the country, whereas in summer the valley is crowded with Wakhis with their yaks and sheep; in fact, the people of Wakhan from Panja east-wards are entirely dependent on the Yarkhun valley for their livelihood. The question of taxing these Wakhi immigrants will have to be considered.

The military authorities in Chitral have been assisting the local inhabitants in the construction of water-channels which required skilled labour beyond the powers of the Chitrali villagers. This has been much appreciated by the people.

The Sartor Fakir's proceedings in the Swat valley excited no interest in Chitral. The Mehtar, in conversation with the Assistant Political Agent, expressed his regret that the Fakir's movement had so easily collapsed, as his people had hoped to be given a chance of showing their loyalty to Government.

During the half-year the Government of India had under consideration the question of the desirability of removing the head-quarters of the Chitral Force from Drosh to some more suitable position. Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. W. O'Sullivan, who had been deputed to Chitral to examine the available sites, reported in favour of concentrating the whole force at Chitral, the construction of a cart-road from Drosh to Chitral along the left bank of the river, and the establishment of levy posts at Drosh, Shishi Kuh and Ghairat. After careful consideration of the arguments for and against these proposals, the Government of India made the following recommendation to the Secretary of State:—

“That the whole force should be concentrated at Chitral, in and about the present fort.

“That the works should be of such an extent and nature as to be capable of defence by a small body, the bulk of the force being thus rendered available to act as a Movable Column if necessary.

Military despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 186, dated the 17th November 1898.

“That a cart-road be made from Chitral to Mirkanni, 9 miles below Drosh.

“That, if feasible, levies be raised to hold posts at Drosh, Shishi Kuh and Ghairat, with rest-houses at Drosh and Ghairat.

“It is anticipated that the cost of these proposals will not exceed five lakhs of rupees.”

The Government of India re-affirmed their reliance on the Dir road as the main line of communication between Chitral and India, and as the only practicable line of supply ; they expressed their belief that even were the tribes on the road hostile, communications could be maintained by timely precautions and a show of force : and they further announced their intention to gradually improve the road from Chitral by Mastuj to Gilgit, as funds become available and opportunity offers.

Baluchistan
Frontier.

The exodus of tribesmen from Baluchistan to Afghanistan continues, the liberal offers made to emigrants by the Amir having an unsettling effect. The whole of the Marris who went to Kabul have, however, returned to their homes, including the Chief's eldest son, Mir Khair Bakhsh, and other headmen. It appears that they were well received by the Amir, who gave them money and other presents, and ordered land to be provided for them. Disputes arose between the Marris who had gone to Kandahar and the Afghan officials about the land they were to occupy and about the treatment of the Marri women, and, meanwhile, the Marri Chief and his Wazir having become reconciled, the Chief sent word to Mir Khair Bakhsh to return. The latter, who, with his followers, was on his way to Kandahar, under the charge of some Afghan sowars, managed to elude the sowars, and proceeded by forced marches to the Marri hills. The Agent to the Governor-General was lately visited by Mir Khair Bakhsh, eldest son of the Marri Chief, and by a few other leading Marris, who craved forgiveness for having run away to Kabul. They stated that they had received over Rs. 16,000 from the Amir in cash, that when they fled from Afghanistan there were no Marris left in Kabul, and only twenty-five families in the Kandahar district. These latter are closely watched by the Afghans, but two families have escaped back to the Marri hills.

It is reported that the Afghan authorities have placed guards over the camps of both Sardar Imam Bakhsh, Sarpara, and Mir Afzal Khan, Kurd, two of the principal Chiefs who left Baluchistan, and informed them that any attempt to hold communication with British territory will meet with punishment.

A Russian Consul having been appointed to Seistan, Her Majesty's Government have decided on taking a similar step. Captain Sykes, British Consul at Kerman, has gone to Seistan as a temporary measure. A small native cavalry escort has been sent from India to join him.

The Nushki-Seistan trade route is fulfilling its promise of being a success. Lieutenant Webb Ware, Assistant Political Agent, Chageh, started from Quetta towards the Persian frontier on the 21st November, and expected to reach Koh-i-Malik Siah about the 25th December. Lieutenant Webb Ware is accompanied by a Survey Officer, an officer of the Intelligence Branch, and a small escort. It has been arranged that he should meet Captain Sykes, Consul in Seistan, at or near Ladis, at the end of December.

The Afghan khassadars at Taraki Tirwa have erected a building on the British side of the boundary, and refuse to allow the Lowanas to cross Afghan territory to get to their cultivation (which is contrary to the terms of the boundary agreement), or to cultivate their land within the British frontier. The khassadar, whom the Political Agent in Zhob saw on the spot, admitted that the Lowanas had been prohibited from cultivating, and stated that the ground on the British side of the line was only British for a space of seven yards and that beyond that it was Afghan. The Political Agent removed the effects of the khassadars from the building within British limits, and wrote to Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan regarding the khassadars' proceedings. Several similar acts by Afghan officials on this part of the frontier are reported to have occurred during the past eighteen months, of which no notice has been taken by the Afghan authorities, although they have been informed of the irregular action of their subordinates.

The extension of the Trans-Caspian Railway from Samarkand (by Tashkand) to Vernoe, and thence along the old trade route to Semipalatinsk (by Kopal), has been decided upon, and the survey is about to be undertaken. After the completion of this line, it is proposed to extend it, along the Irtysh river to Omsk, and thus to connect the Trans-Caspian and Trans-Siberian Railway systems. Central Asia.

The branch line from Merv to Sheikh Junaid on the Afghan frontier is being steadily pushed on. The line is complete and in working order as far as Sariyazi, and the remaining section is expected to be completed during the early part of 1899.

The Russians have, during the half-year under notice, established a strong Russian force at Pata Kesar on the Oxus. Some reports say that there are at present 5,000 troops posted at this important position.

CHAPTER III.

External.

PART I.

ADEN.

Early in 1894, the principal Wahidi Sultan of Balahaf, who had in 1888 Wahidi Sultan of Balahaf. accepted the protection of Her Majesty's Government, was reported to have plundered the cargo of a buggalow belonging to a British Indian subject, and to have imprisoned the Nakhoda. The Government of Bombay were authorised to demand the return of the plundered property and payment of compensation. Meanwhile the Sultan was driven out of his country by a coalition of the other Wahidi Sultans of Balahaf, who disavowed his acts. A co-signatory of the treaty of 1888 was recognised as Chief of Balahaf, and a new Protectorate Treaty was concluded with the Wahidi Sultans, which contained a clause binding the Chiefs not to dispose of their territory to any Power other than the British Government. The stipends of the Chiefs were raised.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 200 (External), dated the 24th October 1894.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 146 (External), dated the 23rd July 1895.

A request made by the Sultan of Lahej for permission to purchase 10,000 Sultan of Lahej. cartridges through private agency was refused on the ground that compliance with the request would be especially objectionable owing to the fresh outbreak of a rebellion in Yemen against Turkish rule.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 52 (External), dated the 28th March 1894.

In 1894, while a Protectorate Treaty with the Haushabi Sultan was on the eve of execution, information was received that hostilities had broken out between the Abdali and Haushabi tribes, resulting in the deposition of the Haushabi Chief and the conquest of his country by the Abdali Sultan. The Abdali Sultan then applied for the stipend formerly enjoyed by the Haushabi Chief, promising at the same time to hold and rule the Haushabi lands on the same terms and conditions as subsist between himself and the British Government in respect of the Abdali country. As the Haushabi tribes had voluntarily submitted to the Abdali Sultan, and had no desire to receive back their former Chief, the Government of India sanctioned the payment of the Haushabi Chief's stipend to the Abdali Sultan on his entering into the promised agreement. The Abdali Sultan subsequently abandoned his position of ruler of the Haushabi and restored the ex-Sultan. Hostilities between the Abdali and Haushabi tribes.

ADEN—SOMALI COAST.**Treaty with the Haushabi Chief.**

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 212 (External), dated the 23rd October 1895.

The Haushabi Sultan came to Aden and a treaty was concluded whereby the Haushabi Sultanate and all subordinate tribes were placed under British protection and agreed not to cede or sell any territory to other Powers. The Haushabi Sultan's stipend was increased. To the treaty was appended a declaration by the Abdali Sultan that it was concluded with his full knowledge and consent. At the same time a separate agreement was entered into by the two Sultans, under which certain suzerain powers were yielded to the Abdali to enable him to ensure the Haushabi Chief carrying out his treaty obligations. For his services on this and other occasions, the Abdali Sultan was granted, as a personal distinction, an increase of his salute to 11 guns.

Treaties with the Alawi and Lower Yaffi tribes.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 141 (External), dated the 16th July 1895.

Overtures were at about this time made by the Turkish authorities to the Chiefs of the Alawi and Lower Yaffi tribes, whose independence of the Porte had been claimed by Her Majesty's Government so far back as 1873. Protectorate Treaties were therefore concluded with the Alawi and Lower Yaffi tribes, and the stipends of the signatory chiefs enhanced.

Treaty with the Wahidi Chief of Bir Ali.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 144 (External), dated the 4th August 1896.

The Wahidi Chief of Bir Ali applied for a similar increase, and consented to the insertion in his treaty of a clause binding the tribe not to dispose of any territory except to the British Government. A revised treaty was accordingly concluded, and the Chief's stipend was raised.

Small arm ammunition for Chiefs in Southern Arabia.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 71 (External), dated the 25th May 1897.

In 1884 it was laid down that the Political Resident at Aden should not ordinarily comply with applications from Chiefs in Southern Arabia for arms or ammunition without previous sanction. As these orders had been productive of delay and were considered an inducement to smuggling, the Political Resident was vested in 1897 with discretionary power to supply small arm ammunition to those Chiefs in Southern Arabia with whom we have Protectorate Treaties, subject to certain limitations.

SOMALI COAST.**British and Italian spheres of influence.**

In 1894 a Protocol was signed delimiting the spheres of influence of Great Britain and Italy on the Somali Coast.

Zaila trade.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 47 (External), dated the 21st March 1894.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 50 (External), dated the 17th March 1898.

About the same time the French were actively improving the road from Jibuti to Harrar with a view to divert the trade from Zaila. Notwithstanding the competition of Jibuti, trade with Abyssinia and Harrar has increased at Zaila.

Police posts. Proposed improvement of the Zaila-Gildessa road.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 190 (External), dated the 24th October 1894.

For the protection of the Somali tribes within our sphere of influence from Abyssinian attacks, the Bombay Government proposed to establish police posts in the interior of the Somali country and to increase the coast camel corps. The Government of India were unable to

sanction either the construction of police posts or the measures proposed for the improvement of the Zaila-Gildessa road, which involved increased expenditure, as there was no probability of any relief being afforded from the British Exchequer to the charges paid from Indian Revenues for administering the Somali Coast.

Early in 1895 the Italian Government renewed a request which had been made in 1891 for the appointment of a Consular Agent at Zaila. The Government of India pointed out that the objections entertained in 1891 derived additional force from the hostile attitude of King Menelek of Abyssinia to the Italians and might lead to complications with the French.

In July 1895 the Italian Government deputed Dr. Nerazzini to Zaila for the purpose of watching and reporting Ras Makunan's proceedings and the situation at Harrar. Dr. Nerazzini was not officially recognised and was subsequently recalled.

In April 1896 the Government of India recommended reconsideration of the suggestion made in 1890 that Her Majesty's Government should take over direct control of the British Protectorate on the Somali Coast. The only interest India had in the Somali Coast was the security of the food supply of Aden, which would not be endangered by the proposed transfer. The Secretary of State was unable at that time to concur in this recommendation; but considered that if Aden could be made independent of the Somali Coast for supplies, the transfer might be facilitated.

The Secretary of State was subsequently informed, after local enquiry, that Aden was not absolutely dependent on the Coast for supplies; but that there was no prospect of any scheme of cultivation or pasturage, on that part of the Arabian Coast which is inhabited by the tribes near Aden, making any appreciable difference in the extent to which Aden has to be supplied by sea.

In August 1896 the Abyssinian flag was hoisted at Alalo in the Gadabursi country. The Secretary of State directed that the flag should not be removed in the presence of a superior force; but that, if the removal could be accomplished without collision, this should be done as a protest and claim of title. The Political Agent for the Somali Coast subsequently caused a few huts erected at Alalo by the Abyssinians to be burnt down, and informed Ras Makunan, the Abyssinian Governor of Harrar, of the fact.

The incident was considered of little importance except in so far as it indicated that the Abyssinians did not recognise the limits of the British Protectorate on the Somali Coast as agreed upon with Italy. Under these circumstances the Secretary of State was addressed with a view to the reconsideration of the question of sending a Mission to Harrar, in order to arrive at an understanding with the Abyssinians in regard to territorial limits, the control of the tribes, and the maintenance of trade routes. At the end of 1896 the Secretary of State telegraphed that the Foreign Office had decided that a Mission to King Menelek was necessary.

SOMALI COAST—
ZANZIBAR—PERSIA.

Treaty with King Menelek.
Transfer of the control of the Somali Coast to Her Majesty's Government.

The Mission arrived at Addis Abbaba, the capital of Abyssinia, in April 1897. A treaty with King Menelek was signed on the 14th May and came into operation in December 1897. It was subsequently decided to transfer the Somali Coast Protectorate to Her Majesty's Government. The transfer took effect from the 1st October 1898.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 19 (External), dated the 3rd February 1898.

ZANZIBAR.

Saiyid Abdul Aziz.

Saiyid Abdul Aziz-bin-Said of Maskat has continued to reside in Bombay, receiving an allowance of Rs. 800 a month from the Sultan of Zanzibar. Whilst complaining of the inadequacy of the allowance he refused to accept the provision of Rs. 600 a month which the Sultan of Maskat offered to make for him. In July 1893 Saiyid Abdul Aziz submitted a memorial in which he pressed his claims to the Sultanate of Zanzibar, and requested that the prohibition against his proceeding to Zanzibar or elsewhere might be cancelled, and that, pending final orders, his debts might be paid and a suitable allowance fixed for him. The memorial was forwarded to Her Majesty's Government, who decided that the allowance granted to Abdul Aziz by the Sultan of Zanzibar is, under the circumstances, liberal.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 17 (External), dated the 31st January 1894.

PERSIA.

Kerman Consulate and British interests in Southern Persia.

In 1893 Lieutenant (now Captain) P. M. Sykes, of the 2nd Dragoon Guards, was permitted to proceed "on leave" to Kerman upon an invitation which he had received from the Persian Governor, the Farman Farma. Lieutenant Sykes subsequently went to Tehran and thence to England, but about the end of 1894 returned to Kerman as British Consul. While holding this post he received no pay; but Her Majesty's Foreign Office gave him an office allowance, the Government of India having declined to contribute towards the expenses of the Consulate. The appointment was to last two years. In 1897 Captain Sykes again proceeded to England, but was shortly afterwards deputed to the Persian Gulf to collect information as to the ultimate destination of the arms imported by sea to the Gulf.

While Captain Sykes was so employed, the murder of Mr. Graves (see below) and the revolt of the tribes in Persian Baluchistan led to a decision to re-appoint Captain Sykes as Consul at Kerman. The Government of India, on this occasion, agreed to meet for a fixed period of five years half the expenses of the Consulate, provided such moiety did not exceed Rs. 6,000 a year.

At the end of 1897, the Secretary of State for India invited the observations of the Government of India on the policy which, in British Indian interests, Her Majesty's Government should follow, if matters in Persian Baluchistan came to a crisis. After briefly reviewing the position in Persia, the Government of India suggested that Her Majesty's Government should consider the

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 135 (External), dated the 10th August 1898.

appointment of British Consular Agents at important points in Southern Persia, and added that India might be prepared to contribute towards the cost of such a measure if and when Her Majesty's Government thought it could be safely attempted; but observed that, in the event of any sudden crisis, they could do no more than rely on Her Majesty's Government to see that Indian interests were not prejudiced.

In December 1896, Mr. Graves, an officer of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, was murdered between Jask and Charbar. The British Legation at Tehran demanded the arrest of the murderers and the punishment of the local headmen. The Political Resident, Persian Gulf, proceeded to the spot and held an enquiry into the circumstances of the murder. Persian troops were sent, and a detachment of the 21st Bombay Native Infantry was despatched to Charbar and Jask for the protection of the local telegraph staff. In April one of Mr. Graves' murderers was killed. A second was seized and executed at Jask. A third surrendered and is under trial.

PERSIA—PERSIAN GULF.

Disturbance in Persian Baluchistan and murder of Mr. Graves.

PERSIAN GULF.

Secret despatches to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, Nos. 29 and 75 (External), dated the 21st February, and the 9th May, 1894.

Turkish rule at El-Bida, but should refrain from visiting the harbour except when special occasion arises.

In 1894 instructions were issued that El-Bida.

Her Majesty's ships are not to recognise Turkish rule at El-Bida, but should refrain from visiting the harbour except when special occasion arises.

Secret despatches to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, Nos. 112 and 217 (External), dated the 26th June, and the 26th December, 1894.

In November 1894 a French Vice-Consulate was established at Maskat.

French Vice-Consulate at Maskat.

A serious rebellion, led by Saleh-bin-Ali, the Shaikh of the Harth, broke out at Maskat early in February 1895.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 129 (External), dated the 2nd July 1895.

The rebels attacked the palace of the Sultan, and desultory fighting continued for about a month. The Sultan eventually opened negotiations with Shaikh Saleh, and on March 9th it was announced that peace had been concluded. Shaikh Saleh evacuated the town of Maskat the same evening, and the rebellion ended.

Rebellion at Maskat.

The losses sustained by British subjects during the outbreak were estimated

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 133 (External), dated the 9th July 1895.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 211 (External), dated the 23rd October 1895.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 34 (External), dated the 19th February 1896.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 130 (External), dated the 7th July 1896.

at seventy-seven thousand dollars, and, in order to exact reparation from the offending tribes, the Sultan levied a tax on their export trade. He was also authorised to issue a notification warning the leading Shaikhs of Oman that the British Government would not in future permit attacks on Maskat or Mattrah.

As the proceeds of the tax were not likely to suffice for the payment of the indemnity within the prescribed time (three years), the Sultan was cautioned that outstandings might perhaps be recovered by stoppages from the Zanzibar subsidy. In view of French activity at Maskat the Secretary of State subsequently laid stress on the importance of maintaining British influence over, and amicable relations with, the Sultan, and His Lordship trusted that some way might be found of avoiding the extreme measure of deducting any part of the indemnity from the Zanzibar subsidy. The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf was instructed accordingly.

Payment of compensation to British subjects for losses sustained during the Maskat rebellion.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 16 (External), dated the 27th January 1897.

The Sultan has since farmed the collection of the punitive tax, and payments have recently been made with regularity.

In order to secure British control over the customs without infringing the Declaration (of 1862) of the Sultan's independence, it has been suggested that His Highness should entrust the management of the department to a British

Maskat Customs.

PERSIAN GULF.

official. With this view the Government of India are willing to advance to the Sultan a sum not exceeding one year's customs income on the security of the customs revenue.

Disturbances in Bahrein and Zobara.

In March 1895 a quarrel arose between the Chief of Bahrein and the subordinate tribe of the Al-bin-Ali. The tribe removed in a body to the Katr coast, where their leader, Shaikh Sultan-bin-Salamah, entered into relations with Shaikh Jasim, of El Bida on that coast. With the support of Jasim the Al-bin-Ali resolved on a settlement at Zobara, a place claimed as a hereditary possession by the Chief of Bahrein. They were encouraged by the local Turkish officials.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 44 (External), dated the 11th March 1896.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 136 (External), dated the 21st July 1896.

H. M. S. *Sphinx*, under the instructions of Government, then seized some of the boats of the rebellious tribe. This did not bring the Al-bin-Ali to reason. A few Turkish troops with a minor official had some time before been established at Zobara and the Ottoman flag had been hoisted. A Turkish war vessel also appeared on the scene and remained some time off Zobara. The situation became strained and in August the Mutaserrif of El Hasa addressed a letter to the Political Resident re-asserting Turkish pretensions.

Before this H. M. S. *Pigeon* had also proceeded to Bahrein, and on being despatched to Zobara, the Commander received an order from the Turkish official to depart under threat of attack, and also learnt that the large fleet of Arab craft lying there was prepared for an attack on Bahrein. Accordingly, after due warning, both H. M.'s ships opened fire on this fleet, of which about 40 were disabled. Shaikh Jasim offered full submission next morning, and in compliance with Captain Pelley's demands, some 120 more of the boats at Zobara were surrendered and removed to Bahrein. After this lesson, the Al-bin-Ali tribe, with the exception of Shaikh Sultan and a few of his adherents, returned to Bahrein and resumed their allegiance.

Shaikh Jasim was informed that, as the main instigator of the disturbances, he was fined Rs. 30,000, failing payment of which the captured boats would be destroyed. He repudiated responsibility, sheltering himself behind alleged orders from the Turkish authorities. The option of redeeming their boats, by paying a proportionate share of the indemnity, was offered to the tribes, and was availed of to the extent of one-third of the amount; the remaining boats were destroyed in April 1896.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 124 (External), dated the 30th June 1896.

Dhofar affairs.

In November 1895 a revolt occurred in the Maskat dependency of Dhofar, on the southern coast of Arabia. The Sultan of Maskat sent troops to quell the rebellion, but they failed to recover the fort. In January 1897 the Sultan asked for a British man-of-war to assist him in restoring his authority at Dhofar. The Government of India agreed conditionally to this request, and Colonel Wilson, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, sailed for Dhofar in March on the R. I. M. S. *Lawrence*, accompanied by H. M. S. *Cossack*, which carried the Political Agent at Maskat and the Sultan's brother. On arrival off Dhofar, Colonel Wilson found the Turkish flag flying. The local Shaikhs offered no resistance; the Turkish flags were struck, and the authority of the Sultan of Maskat was re-established.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 123 (External), dated the 30th June 1896.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 65 (External), dated the 18th May 1897.

In 1895 a serious case of piracy on a British Indian craft occurred at the mouth of the Shatt-ul-Arab. The Shaikh of Koweit was warned that his responsibility would be enforced if his subjects were not restrained.

PERSIAN GULF—
TURKISH ARABIA.
Piracy on the
"Haripasa."

During 1895 and 1896 there was an increase in the slave trade in the Persian Gulf, largely due to the liberal grant of the French flag to Oman dhows trading with the west coast of Africa. The French Government would not admit that the grant of the French flag was abused. The Secretary of State has, therefore, been furnished with precise instances.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 15 (External), dated the 27th January 1897.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 60 (External), dated the 12th May 1897.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 116 (External), dated the 4th August 1897.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 117 (External), dated the 4th August 1897.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 28 (External), dated the 10th February 1898.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 105 (External), dated the 7th July 1898.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 108 (External), dated the 7th July 1898.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 153 (External), dated the 1st September 1898.

During the year 1897 attention was directed to the trade in arms in the Persian Gulf and on the Oman coast. This and the slave trade question, being of Imperial interest, were referred to Her Majesty's Government, and action has been taken upon instructions received from time to time from the Secretary of State.

Trade in arms and
slaves.

In October, 1898, a French gun-boat brought a field-piece and other presents for the Sultan. They were presented at a Darbar at which His Highness cordially responded to a speech of the French Vice-Consul advocating closer relations between the two countries. This was followed by the dismissal of the Sultan's Wazir, who had British proclivities.

French influence at
Maskat.

A report has appeared in the French newspapers that France has obtained from the Sultan the lease of Bunder "Gesseh," by which is probably meant Bunder Jisseh, an excellent harbour close to Maskat. Enquiries have failed to substantiate the report, but the approval of Her Majesty's Government has been asked to enquire of the Sultan whether there is any truth in the rumour, and to warn His Highness that such action would contravene the engagement of the 20th March, 1891, under which the territories of Maskat and Oman can be alienated to no power but the British.

In October, 1898, the Jenebeh tribe, irritated by local grievances which the Sultan neglected to redress, seized the Sultan's forts at Sur. In November, the Sultan appointed a Governor acceptable to the tribe, who then returned to their allegiance and allowed him to re-occupy the forts.

TURKISH ARABIA.

In 1893 the Turkish Government revived the question of their claims to Mohammerah by levying customs on the Shatt-ul-Arab on goods in transit to and from Mohammerah. Representations were made by Her Majesty's Government that the exaction was detrimental to British trade and was unjustifiable in face of the treaty of Erzeroom, which gave

Turkish pretensions
to Mohammerah.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 172 (External), dated the 19th September 1894.

TURKISH ARABIA— the left bank of the Shatt-ul-Arab to Persia. These representations resulted in the Porte establishing a Board of Inquiry. Their report has not been received, but the Turkish officials have been instructed to desist from levying customs on goods in transit to and from Mohammerah.

NEPAL.

PART II.

NEPAL.

**Purchase of arms,
etc., by the Darbar.**

Permission had been accorded to the Nepal Darbar during Lord Lansdowne's Viceroyalty to purchase arms and ammunition, within "reasonable limits," in the open market. In December 1893 the Minister, Sir Bir Shamsheer, handed the Resident a long list of arms, ammunition and machinery, and asked to be informed of their cost. This led to the consideration of the "reasonable limits" of armament by Nepal. Colonel Wylie, the Resident, was consulted, and the whole question was again subjected to thorough consideration. Care was taken to avoid raising any doubts in the minds of the Nepalese as to our intention loyally to adhere to the policy of removing suspicion and distrust by liberal concessions; and the views of Government were eventually explained to the Darbar in a letter from the Viceroy, dated the 15th May 1894. The reply and the result of Colonel Wylie's consultations on the subject with Sir Bir Shamsheer were regarded as satisfactory, and Government decided to permit the Darbar to purchase a mountain battery of six 7-pounder rifled guns with 1,000 rounds of shell, and 8,000 Martini-Henri rifles with 200 rounds a rifle. The Secretary of State approved of these proceedings and considered the cordial understanding established with Nepal very satisfactory.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 189 (External), dated the 17th October 1894.

**Nepalese Mission to
China.**

In 1895, in connection with the despatch of the usual quinquennial Mission from Nepal to China, Her Majesty's Minister at Peking drew attention to a letter from the Maharaja Dhiraj of Nepal to the Emperor of China, which was published in the Chinese Official Gazette, and in which the former was represented as the devoted and submissive vassal of the Emperor. After a reference to the Resident in Nepal, the letter was found to be an exact copy of that regularly sent with the Mission to Peking, and in accordance with the terms settled at the close of the last century. It was suggested that Her Majesty's Minister at Peking might take occasion to inform the Tsungli Yamén that the submissive expressions were not regarded by Her Majesty's Government as an acknowledgment of vassalage, or indeed as anything more than a purely formal and complimentary style of address.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 179 (External), dated the 10th September 1895.

**Nepal-Tibet
dispute.**

The most prominent occurrences in Nepal during the year ending the 30th June 1896 were a boundary and trade dispute between Nepal and Tibet, and the proposed visit to Europe of the Minister, Sir Bir Shamsheer, in the spring of 1896.

Secret despatches to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, Nos. 101 and 118 (External), dated, respectively, the 19th May and 16th June, 1896.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 127 (External), dated the 30th June 1896.

The visit did not take place.

In July 1895 Commissioners from Nepal and Tibet met on the frontier to arrange the boundary and trade disagreements, but failed. They met again in

November, when the Chinese Amban at Lhassa deputed a representative to the meeting. This official made matters worse by writing an insulting letter to the Nepalese Minister, who threatened war unless an apology were made. Warlike preparations were made in Katmandhu, and the Minister sought and obtained the permission of the Government of India to purchase machinery for making tin cans and for cooking and preserving rations. The disagreement was, however, amicably settled.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 184 (External), dated the 21st October 1896.

NEPAL—BHUTAN
—SIKKIM AND
TIBET.

Towards the end of 1896 Sir Bir Shamsher asked the Resident how many troops the British Government would expect him to supply in case of war. This led to a conversation which was reported, with the Resident's views, to the Government of India. Colonel Wylie was authorised, if the Minister recurred to the subject, to say that the conversation had been reported to the Government of India, and that the Viceroy was much gratified by his friendly sentiments, but that our relations with all foreign powers were of a very amicable character.

Offer of military
aid to the British
Government.

Through the courtesy of the Nepal Minister, Dr. Führer, Archæological Surveyor, North-Western Provinces and Oudh, was permitted during the cold seasons of 1896-97 and 1897-98 to accompany the Darbar authorities in their search for Buddhist remains in the Nepal Terai.

BHUTAN.

In 1894 an application was received from the Deb Raja for the refund of the money deducted from the Bhutan subsidy during the previous year on account of disturbances on the Assam border. The request was refused. Certain minor frontier disputes which occurred were all settled satisfactorily, and our relations with Bhutan continue friendly.

Frontier disturb-
ances and disputes.

SIKKIM AND TIBET.

Shortly before Lord Elgin arrived in India, an Agreement regarding Trade, Communication and Pasturage on the Sikkim-Tibet frontier was signed by the British and Chinese Joint Commissioners.

Agreement regard-
ing trade, etc., on
Sikkim-Tibet
Frontier.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 32 (External), dated the 21st February 1894.

It was arranged that a trade-mart should be established at Yatung in Tibet and opened from the 1st May 1894. Mr. White, Political Officer for Sikkim, attended the opening of the mart. His report was on the whole not satisfactory, and it was decided not to post an officer permanently at Yatung. Mr. White pointed out that certain places within the boundary of Sikkim were occupied by Tibetans, and that trade between Sikkim and Tibet was hampered by the Tibetan officials. The attention of the Chinese Resident in Tibet was drawn to these matters; and he named officials to demarcate the boundary in conjunction with Mr. White. No real progress had been made, when the Chinese Resident asked that demarcation might be postponed. The Government of Bengal recommended that Mr. White should be authorised to proceed

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 125 (External), dated the 25th June 1895.

alone to lay down the boundary. The Government of India, however, directed that, if the Chinese delegates failed to meet Mr. White as arranged, he should explain matters by letter to the Chinese Resident and return to his head-quarters. Subsequently the Chinese Resident in Tibet suggested postponement until after five years from the date on which the

**SIKKIM AND
TIBET—SIAM.**

Trade Regulations attached to the Convention of 1890 came into force. The Viceroy declared his inability to seriously discuss such a suggestion. The Tibetans claimed land within the boundary of Sikkim, as laid down in the Convention, and the Government of India agreed to a full preliminary enquiry. As the Chinese Resident was recalled, the matter was postponed until the arrival of his successor. The development of friendly relations with the Tibetans and the improvement of trade were considered

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 66 (External), dated the 18th March 1896.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 113 (External), dated the 9th June 1896.

of far more importance than the actual demarcation of the border. The new Chinese Resident did not reach Lhasa till February 1898. A Chinese Prefect, accompanied by Tibetan officials, has recently been examining the border.

**Missionaries in
Sikkim and Tibet.**

In 1894 Miss Annie Taylor, of the Tibetan Pioneer Mission, protested against the orders of the Government of Bengal prohibiting members of the Mission from crossing the frontier into Sikkim or Tibet. The orders were to the effect that, if the Tibetans objected to Missionaries entering their country, the Government of India could not countenance any action which would bear the complexion of taking unfair advantage of the Trade Regulations in order to introduce Missionaries into Tibet. While Miss Taylor's reference was under consideration, two Missionaries entered Bhutan from Kalimpong, and thence went into Tibet. They were arrested there and sent back to British territory. The Bengal Government pointed out that, so long as Missionaries were allowed to enter Sikkim, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to control their future movements, and the Lieutenant-Governor accordingly prescribed rules regulating the visit of Europeans to Sikkim.

**Restoration of the
Sikkim Chief to
power.**

The Maharaja of Sikkim was restored to power and returned to Guntok in November 1895. The State has since been satisfactorily administered by the Raja and the Council jointly, under the advice and general supervision of the Political Officer. Trade has considerably increased and the revenue has improved.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 203 (External), dated the 16th October 1895.

**Mr. Landor's ill-
treatment in Tibet.**

In October 1897 the Government of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh forwarded an account of ill-treatment experienced by Mr. A. H. Savage Landor in Tibet. The Secretary of State for India was informed that Mr. Landor had no permission to enter Tibet; that there was no apparent intention of deliberately attempting his life; and that it would be undesirable as well as futile to endeavour to obtain any redress.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 163 (External), dated the 16th December 1897.

SIAM.

**British-French
Joint Commission.**

Intelligence was received in August 1894 from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India that the French Government had agreed to the despatch of a Joint Commission for the examination of the country on the Mekong, from which it was proposed to constitute an intermediary zone between the British and French possessions in that region. Mr. J. G. Scott, C.I.E., Superintendent of the Northern Shan States, who had been temporarily deputed to Bangkok as Chargé d'Affaires, was appointed British Commissioner. At the beginning

of January 1895, the French party joined the British, and field-work and SIAM; discussions were carried on until April. Mr. Scott received his instructions direct from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

As it appeared by no means certain that negotiations with the French Government would result in the creation of a buffer State, Her Majesty's Government considered it advisable to establish British posts in Keng Cheng and Keng Tung. A Political Officer, with an escort, was accordingly stationed at

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 95 (External), dated the 15th May 1895.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 132 (External), dated the 9th July 1895.

Möng Hsing, the capital of Keng Cheng, while additional troops were sent to the capital of Keng Tung. The road to Keng Tung was improved and telegraphic communication was established.

The negotiations between the British and French Governments resulted in British-French Agreement.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 88 (External), dated the 6th May 1896.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 146 (External), dated the 11th August 1896.

the Agreement of the 15th January 1896, whereby the Thalweg of the Mekong, between the Anglo-Siamese and the Anglo-Chinese frontiers on that river, forms the limit between the possessions or spheres of influence of Great Britain and France.

In consideration of the fact that the State of Keng Cheng was lost by Siam,

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 150 (External), dated the 23rd July 1895.

it was decided not to press a claim against the Siamese Government for compensation on account of her occupation of Eastern Karenni in 1891-92.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 99 (External), dated the 7th July 1897.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 98 (External), dated the 30th June 1898.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 184 (External), dated the 18th October 1898.

At the request of the Siamese Government, the Government of India have Loan of British Officers to Siam. recently lent the services of certain officers for employment in the Siamese Finance, Police, Survey and Forest Departments.

CHAPTER IV.

Internal.

PART I.

BALUCHISTAN.

Death of Sir James
Browne.

Major-General Sir James Browne, K.C.S.I., C.B., R.E., Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, died at Quetta on the 13th June 1896. His long and distinguished career and intimate knowledge of the frontier made his loss severely felt. He was the third Agent to the Governor-General and Chief Commissioner in Baluchistan who died in office.

Kalat.

In July 1893, when proposing the removal of Mir Khudadad Khan from the Chiefship of Kalat and reporting generally on Kalat affairs, the Agent to the Governor-General had explained in some detail his recommendations for the future administration of the State. The Government of India were of opinion that administrative improvements must be brought about by personal influence. Sir J. Browne was told that it would rest with him to take such steps as might be legitimately open to him to encourage the new Chief to devote his best attention to these objects.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 59 (External), dated the 30th March 1894, Enclosure 1.

In February 1894 Sir J. Browne visited Calcutta, and an opportunity was given him of stating his views verbally at a meeting of the Governor-General's Council. The services of a native officer were lent to the Khan as Political Adviser, and a Military officer was also lent to assist the Khan in raising a body of disciplined troops: 200 Punjabi Muhammadans were enlisted to form the nucleus of the Khan's army; the retention of the Military Adviser and the organisation of a camel corps for service in Makran were sanctioned.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 228 (External), dated the 25th December 1895.

It is now in contemplation to abolish the appointment of Military Adviser and to substitute tribal levies for the infantry portion of the Khan's troops.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 168 (External), dated the 15th September 1898.

The Viceroy's visit
to Quetta.

The Viceroy visited Quetta in November 1894 and held a darbar, which was attended by the local Political and Military officers, the Khan of Kalat, the Jam of Las Bela, and many leading Sardars and native officials and gentry. The opportunity was taken to invest the Khan of Kalat with the Insignia of a Knight Grand Commander of the Order of the Indian Empire.

Las Bela.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 108 (External), dated the 2nd June 1896.

Sir Ali Khan, K.C.I.E., Jam of Las Bela, died at Bela on the 14th January 1896. Owing to a family quarrel the late Jam had disinherited his eldest son, Mir Kamal Khan, and requested that one of his younger sons should succeed him. The eldest son, Mir Kamal Khan, was, however, recognised as Jam. It was laid down that the adminis-

tration should be carried on for five years by a Wazir acting under the guidance and control of the Political Agent. The Jam's conduct was at first very unsatisfactory. A new Wazir was appointed in April 1897, and the Jam's attitude has since improved. The financial condition of the State is satisfactory.

Despatches to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, Nos. 51 and 127 (External), dated the 28th April, and the 1st September, 1897.

In 1897 a satisfactory settlement of a long-standing dispute was arrived at with Tagia Khan, the Leghari Chief, in respect to his claims to the valley called Leghari Barkhan.

In February 1894 Sir J. Browne stated before the Governor-General in Council that both the Khan of Kalat and his Sardars were anxious that the British Government should assume the administration of Makran, and he himself advocated this course. The Government of India did not consider that they were called on to intervene with military force for the maintenance of order, and were averse to doing so from motives of policy.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 65 (External), dated the 25th April 1894.

In the cold weather of 1893-94 Major Ramsay, the Political Agent, Southern Baluchistan, visited Mand in Makran to investigate certain local questions, and to consider the best method of maintaining British political influence. The Political Agent met a Persian official in the open season of 1894-95 on the Perso-Baluch border near Mand, to decide outstanding disputes between the Rinds and Persian subjects; and subsequently proceeded to Mashkkel.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 142 (External), dated the 31st July 1894.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 134 (External), dated the 9th July 1895.

The notorious outlaw Gauhar Khan, ex-Sardar of the Jhalawans, continued to give trouble during 1895 by attacks upon subjects of the Khan of Kalat. He and his eldest son were killed in August 1895, in an encounter with a party of the Khan's troops and levies. By the death of Gauhar Khan the situation in Kalat was altered, and the Khan advanced proposals with a view to inaugurating a better administration in Makran. His Highness himself proceeded on tour to Makran, accompanied by the Political Agent, and escorted by detachments of his own troops. The Khan's arrangements in Makran were considered satisfactory. About 100 of the State troops were left there under the orders of his Nazim, Lala Udho Das, who had been transferred from the British service.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 228 (External), dated the 25th December 1895.

Early in 1897 Lieutenant R. A. E. Benn, Military Adviser to the Khan, was sent to Makran in accordance with His Highness's wishes, and certain local disputes were for the time settled.

At the end of 1897, a serious rising broke out in Makran, headed by Mir Mehrab Khan, brother of the Kej Sardar, and Mir Baluch Khan. The Khan's representative, Diwan Udho Das, was imprisoned, a British survey camp was looted and some of the followers killed; the telegraph line between Pasni and Gwadur was cut, and a number of minor acts of violence were committed.

In January 1898 a small force under Colonel Mayne defeated the rebels near Kej; and their leaders were either killed or dispersed. The country was traversed and pacified. Many of the Makran forts were demolished and the remainder occupied chiefly by detachments from the Kalat State troops. Colonel Mayne's force was then withdrawn.

The principal causes of the disturbances are believed to have been the unpopularity of Udho Das, the Nazim, and the general feeling of unrest prevailing on the border.

BALUCHISTAN.

With a view to securing an efficient administration of Makran, without direct British interference, the Government of India have approved the tentative introduction of a local Brahui administration.

Despatches to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, Nos. 163 and 214 (External), dated the 15th September, and the 17th November, 1898.

Marri-Luni disturbances.

A serious affray occurred in 1895 between the Marris and Lunis over a question of grazing rights, several lives being lost on each side. The ringleaders were ultimately sentenced by the Sessions Judge, Thal Chotiali, to various terms of imprisonment.

Marri outrages.

In October 1896 a fanatical outrage was committed at the railway stations of Sunari and Dalujal by a small gang of Marris, who murdered ten natives and one European. Six of the offenders were secured and five executed.

The Marri tribe were fined and made to adopt precautionary measures against similar outrages.

Unrest amongst the Marri and Bugti tribes.

In the spring of 1898 some unrest prevailed amongst the Marri and Bugti tribes; emigration to Afghanistan took place on a large scale; and the Chiefs concerned asked the Agent to the Governor-General to take steps to stop it. Colonel Wylie, accompanied by the Marri and Bugti Chiefs, proceeded to Duki, where about 1,000 emigrants had assembled under Ali Muhammad, their ringleader. Colonel Wylie induced most of the men to return to their allegiance to their Chiefs. Subsequently the Agent to the Governor-General reported that the

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 176 (External), dated the 6th October 1898.

whole of the Marris who had gone to Kabul had returned to their homes, including the Chief's eldest son, Mir Khair Bakhsh, and other headmen.

Delimitation of the Perso-Baluch Frontier.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 10 (External), dated the 24th January 1894.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 184 (External), dated the 18th September 1895.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 168 (External), dated the 8th September 1896.

In accordance with arrangements made in 1895, an Anglo-Persian Commission was appointed to demarcate the Perso-Baluch Boundary from Kohak to Koh-i-Malik Siah.

Colonel T. H. Holdich, C.B., C.I.E., R.E., (now Sir Thomas Holdich, K.C.I.E.) was the British Commissioner, with Captain C. A. Kemball, I.S.C., as Assistant Commissioner, and Lieutenant-Colonel Wahab, R.E., as Survey Officer. Captain P. M. Sykes, Her Britannic Majesty's Consul for Kerman, joined the mission at Kohak, where the Persian Commissioner, accompanied by the Governor of Bampur and staff, arrived on the 25th February 1896. Work soon commenced, and the demarcation was brought to a successful termination by the end of March 1896. The boundary was ratified at Tehran in December 1896.

Quasi-provincial Settlement.

The quasi-provincial settlement made with the Baluchistan Agency in 1892 expired on the 31st March 1897, when a fresh contract was concluded, which will remain in force for five years.

Affairs of the Sarawan Chiefs.

In November 1896, the affairs of the Sarawan Brahui Chiefs were in an unsatisfactory condition. Mir Allahyar Khan, Rustamzai, a man who had done much good service for Government, had fled the country with Sardar Imam Bakhsh, Sarpara, and Ghulam Jan, Muhammadshahi; and there was a very bitter feeling among the other Sardars, owing to the large power which during the last few years had fallen into the hands of Mehrulla Khan, the uncle of the Sarawan Sardar, and to his misuse of his authority. In December, Mir Allahyar Khan and his companions returned to the Agency, and at the Sibi

Fair, where the half-yearly Jirgas or Councils of Chiefs are held, harmony was in BALUCHISTAN. a measure restored.

In August 1897, a few Brahuīs perpetrated an outrage on the Kalat road, killing two tonga drivers and wounding a third. The Sarawan Sardars, who happened to be in Quetta at the time, were, at their own request, sent out to arrest the offenders. They did nothing, and when ordered to return to Quetta, declined to obey. The ringleaders, Mir Mehrulla Khan, uncle of the Sarawan Chief, Sardar Yar Muhammad Khan, and Sardar Ghaus Bakhsh were placed under surveillance. This had an excellent effect, and the Sardars soon tendered their submission. Mr. Barnes ultimately succeeded in effecting a settlement with the Sarawan Sardars.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 141 (External) dated the 14th October 1897.

Defiant attitude of certain Sardars in Baluchistan.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 159 (External), dated the 18th November 1897.

Settlement with the Sarawan Sardars.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 174 (External), dated the 30th December 1897.

In 1894 the Khan of Kalat determined to grant service allowances to the Jhalawan Sardars. This arrangement was calculated to secure peace on the Sind-Baluch border.

A serious dispute between the Largha and Bargha Shiranis arose from the abduction of a woman in June 1894. The case was referred in October 1894 to a joint jirga from the Punjab and Baluchistan, but the jirga were unable to agree. In March 1895, the case was again referred to a jirga the majority of whom considered that the woman should be given back. The Political Agent in Zhob and the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan recommended that the award of the majority of the jirga should be carried out; but before a settlement was arrived at, a gang of young Barghas committed a series of outrages and murdered a number of persons, including Lieutenant Home, R.E., who was superintending the construction of the Chuhar Khel-Dhana road. The gang subsequently effected their escape to Kandahar. Several Barghas were convicted of complicity in the outrages and sentenced to terms of imprisonment; fines were also imposed on the Bargha Shiranis, and on certain other sections for permitting the murderers to escape through their limits.

Shirani dispute. Murder of Lieutenant Home and others. Political control of the tribe.

Since 1890 the Bargha division of the Shirani country has been under the control of the Baluchistan Agency, and is assessed to the ordinary land revenue. The Largha tract, on the other hand, is managed by the Punjab Government; but the Larghawals pay no revenue. The policy followed towards them has been one of non-interference, and it has been the practice to decide cases with the assistance of jirgas. This plan has worked fairly well in petty cases; but there has been great difficulty in settling important cases and in enforcing decisions when given; and the Largha country has come to be regarded as a place of refuge for Bargha criminals and malcontents. All authorities are agreed that closer control should be exercised over the Larghas; and that they should be compelled to act up to the engagement entered into by them in 1890-91 whereby, in consideration of service allowances, they agreed to be responsible for the safety of trade routes through their country, to surrender offenders, to allow Government officials to travel in any part of their country, and to give Government the right to occupy it, if orders were disobeyed, disregarded or ignored.

The Secretary of State has sanctioned the adoption of measures for carrying out this policy; but has not accepted a proposal to collect a light revenue.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 147 (External), dated the 25th August 1898.

BARODA.

BARODA—CENTRAL
INDIA.—
Survey and Settlement
Department.

In his Annual Report for 1892-93, the Governor-General's Agent at Baroda adversely criticised the proceedings of the Alienation and Survey and Settlement Departments of the Baroda State under Mr. F. A. H. Elliot; the Secretary of State thereupon desired to be furnished with the conclusions of the Government of India.

The Government of India, after consulting expert opinion in Bombay, came to the conclusion that Mr. Elliot deserved high commendation for the manner in which he had inaugurated and developed the scheme of the Baroda Settlement, and that the Baroda Darbar were to be congratulated on their policy. The discontent at the manner in which the work was carried out was chiefly due to the misconduct of Wasudeo Sadashiv Bapat, an immediate subordinate of Mr. Elliot. Bapat was subsequently found guilty by a Special Commission of corruption and extortion, and sentenced to six months' simple imprisonment and a fine of 10,000 rupees. The Gaekwar reversed the conviction, but dismissed Bapat from his service. The Government of India held that Bapat had been properly convicted, and that Mr. Elliot had been injudicious in reposing complete confidence in him. They decided that Mr. Elliot should leave Baroda.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 185 (Internal), dated the 18th September 1895.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 61 (Internal), dated the 27th March 1896.

CENTRAL INDIA.

Baoni.

In June 1894 Government sanctioned the recognition of Riaz-ul-Hasan Khan as Chief of Baoni in succession to his cousin, the late Nawab Muhammad Hasan Khan, who, as well as his infant son, died during a pilgrimage to Mecca. Mehdi Hasan Khan, the father of Muhammad Hasan, who was still alive, claimed to succeed to the Chiefship, but as he had abdicated in 1883 on the ground of weakness and infirmities incident to old age, his claim was not admitted. Abdulla Hasan, half-brother of the ex-Nawab, also put forward a claim on behalf of his son. It was decided that the State should go to Ali Hasan Khan, the eldest full-brother of the ex-Nawab, but Ali Hasan Khan himself withdrew his claim in favour of his son, Riaz-ul-Hasan.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 135 (Internal), dated the 24th July 1894.

Rewa.

In September 1894 the Maharaja of Rewa was entrusted with a share in the administration of the State with a view to preparing him for the responsibilities of the Chiefship. A year later the Maharaja was invested with full powers.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 8 (Internal), dated the 15th January 1896.

Gwalior.

In December 1894 His Highness the Maharaja Sindhia of Gwalior was invested with full governing powers. The Council of Regency was dissolved, but most of the members continued as Heads of Departments, subject to the orders of the Maharaja. His Highness has since administered the State with care and prudence, personally controlling all departments and introducing many reforms. He is keenly alive to the advantages of developing the resources of his State by the extension of railways. The Guna-Bina Railway was opened in September 1895; the Ujjain-Bhopal Railway in April 1896, and its extension to Nagda in

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 12 (Internal), dated the 16th January 1896.

July 1896. The Guna-Bara Railway, and light railways from Gwalior to Sipri CENTRAL INDIA. and Gwalior to Bhind are also under construction.

For some time the Maharaja, who takes much interest in his army, has been anxious to improve the armament of the Military forces of the State. His Highness came to Simla in May 1898 and personally explained his wishes to the Viceroy. Sindhia was prepared to reduce his forces; to prescribe regulations similar to the Arms Act; and to adopt any precautions which Government might consider desirable. It was decided, after full consideration, to maintain the policy of not permitting the permanent supply of arms of precision and rapid fire to the local military forces or police of Native States. The Maharaja was, however, offered smooth-bore breech-loading arms, specially manufactured in accordance with His Highness's wishes.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 143, (Internal), dated the 25th August 1898.

It is understood that the Maharaja has accepted this offer.

The Maharaja also contemplates the establishment of the British rupee as the current coin of Gwalior, in lieu of the various coinages which at present obtain currency in his own territories.

In August 1895 the Agent to the Governor-General in Central India Malwa. forcibly represented the desirability of reconsidering the arrangement under which the Commandant of the Central India Horse, whose head-quarters

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 151 (Internal), dated the 18th August 1895.

were at Agar, was *ex-officio* Political Agent of Western Malwa. A whole-time Political

Agent was appointed to the Malwa Agency, with head-quarters at Neemuch, and the Central India Horse was re-organised.

In September 1895 information received from the Agent to the Governor-General in Central India, and reports in public prints left no doubt that the

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 198 (Internal), dated the 9th October 1895.

Maharaja Holkar of Indore had been acting in an arbitrary and cruel manner towards his subjects. Lord Elgin accord-

ingly sent a letter of remonstrance to His Highness, reminding him of the advice given to the late Maharaja by Lord Ripon when Indore affairs once before forced themselves on public notice, and warning His Highness of the grave responsibility he was incurring. The Maharaja's reply was at first unsatisfactory, and it was necessary again to impress upon him the gravity of the situation. Lord Elgin also abandoned the visit which he had proposed to make to Indore. At about this time the Maharaja endeavoured to press on a son of Colonel Barr a present of Rs. 20,000; and, shortly after, His Highness sent Colonel Barr personally and secretly over a lakh of rupees. The Maharaja subsequently tendered an unreserved apology. His Highness was informed that this apology would be accepted if he offered effective and practical proof of sincere regret for the past and of firm determination to amend. The Maharaja was required to give:—

- (i) a written apology to the Viceroy;
- (ii) an engagement to redress grievances, and to refrain from acts of oppression and misgovernment; and
- (iii) an assurance that he would appoint a qualified Minister with a suitable staff of subordinate officials, and would grant them adequate powers and support in their management of Indore affairs.

CENTRAL INDIA.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 224 (Internal), dated the 25th December 1895.

These conditions were accepted by the Maharaja.

It was expected that the leniency shown on this occasion would induce the Maharaja to reform, and for about two years, though His Highness occasionally exhibited signs of bad temper, no instances of serious misconduct came to the knowledge of the Agent to the Governor-General. But in November 1898 Colonel Barr reported that during the preceding six months His Highness had broken all the promises and pledges made in 1895, and been guilty of acts of oppression and misgovernment even more serious than his previous excesses. Colonel Barr could no longer hold out any hopes of the Maharaja's reform, and recommended that a Commission should be appointed to enquire into the affairs of the Indore State. The question is under consideration.

Bhopal.

Early in 1896 Her Highness the Begam of Bhopal undertook to make British Indian currency the sole medium of circulation in her territories.

* Act XI of 1897 (Bhopal Coinage).

A Bill to facilitate the arrangement was passed* in March 1897. Smaller

States in the Bhopal Agency joined in reforming their currency. The operations were successfully concluded. Nearly 69½ lakhs of Bhopali rupees were exchanged for Government rupees at the prescribed ratio of Bhopali Rs. 124 = Government Rs. 100.

Famine.

A large part of Central India suffered from severe famine in 1896-97. The

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 68 (Internal), dated the 12th May 1897.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 81 (Internal), dated the 8th June 1897.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 93 (Internal), dated the 29th June 1897.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 114 (Internal), dated the 28th July 1897.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 130 (Internal), dated the 8th September 1897.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 144 (Internal), dated the 14th October 1897.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 195 (Internal), dated the 27th October 1898.

affected districts comprised the whole of the Bundelkhand and Baghelkhand Agencies, with two Divisions of the Gwalior State, and covered an area of 36,625 square miles, with a population of 5,141,000. This area, immediately previous to 1896, suffered more or less from a partial failure of crops, and thus, with diminished food stocks, the inhabitants were in the worst possible condition to

meet the calamity with which they were confronted when the monsoon suddenly closed at the end of August 1896. It was necessary to open relief works and to institute gratuitous relief in poor-houses on a large scale in October 1896, and relief measures had to be maintained until September 1897. During this period about 33 millions of people, or more than 7 per cent. of the population, were maintained on relief works by the Native States, of whom 7, 10, and 11 millions belonged to Bundelkhand, Gwalior and Baghelkhand, respectively. The total cost of the famine to the Native States of Central India has been estimated at not less than 85 lakhs of rupees. The smaller States in Bundelkhand and Baghelkhand were unable to meet the expenditure necessary on famine relief; but, with the sanction and under the guarantee of the Government of India, the Maharaja Sindhia advanced to the States needing assistance sums exceeding twelve lakhs in all. Without these loans it would have been impossible in several States to carry on any sustained efforts in the direction of famine relief.

Rajkumar College.

It has been decided to amalgamate the Rajkumar College at Nowgong with the Daly College at Indore. The Rajkumar College was established in 1874 for the education of the young Chiefs and Thakurs of the surrounding

States, in memory of the late Earl of Mayo. The Chiefs of Bundelkhand subscribed Rs. 20,000 in donations and the Government of India added Rs. 20,000 for the building fund. The Chiefs have continued to subscribe generously to the institution, but they have not taken any personal interest in the College, and have not sent their sons to it. They have readily agreed to the abolition of the College, and it is believed that better results will be obtained if the two institutions are amalgamated. The Daly College was established to commemorate the connection of Sir Henry Daly with the Central India Agency. Most of the Central India Chiefs, including some of the Bundelkhand Chiefs, subscribed to this institution.

CENTRAL INDIA—
HYDERABAD AND
BERAR.

HYDERABAD AND BERAR.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 97 (Internal), dated the 5th June 1894.

During the latter part of Lord Lansdowne's Viceroyalty the Nizam introduced a new scheme of administration.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 169 (Internal), dated the 19th September 1894.

In August 1894 His Highness confirmed the Nawab Vikar-ul-Umra in the office of Minister.

In 1895 the Nizam's Government altered the constitution of the Hyderabad High Court, and appointed a permanent Chief Justice and a Hindu Judge.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 54 (Internal), dated the 27th March 1895.

In the same year the State budget for the year 1304 (Fasli)—October 1894 to October 1895—showed the net revenue of the State to be H. S. Rs. 2,79,55,000, and the net expenditure H. S. Rs. 2,74,11,000. The budget was prepared under the supervision of Mr. C. E. Crawley, who was lent to the State in 1893 as Comptroller General, and was an improvement on any previous document of the kind. It was ascertained, however, that the budget heads of expenditure were not adhered to, and in some instances were largely exceeded, especially in the case of "Payments to His Highness," while there were no corresponding savings in other directions, and no immediate prospect of increased revenue. The Resident was instructed to endeavour to satisfy himself that the financial reforms which the Nizam had undertaken to introduce were making fair progress, and to represent to His Highness the extreme importance of confining disbursements within budget limits, and the financial disorder which must inevitably ensue should the contrary course be countenanced.

In November 1895 Lord Elgin visited Hyderabad and personally cautioned the Nizam to restrict his personal expenditure, and impressed upon him the necessity of having a fixed allotment for his personal expenses by which he should abide.

In February 1897 the Resident submitted a report regarding the administrative changes introduced by His Highness the Nizam in 1893. This showed no real improvement in the administration except the reduction in the numbers of the regular army, and it indicated that the finances of the State were in a most

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 43 (Internal), dated the 24th March 1897.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 41 (Internal), dated the 27th February 1895.

unsatisfactory condition.

HYDERABAD
AND BEHAR.Loans contracted in
England.

In 1896 the Nizam's Government desired to borrow £250,000 in London, and information was received that the Hyderabad Government had actually contracted loans in England to meet the interest and dividends for the Nizam's Guaranteed State Railway Company. It was also brought to notice that the Nizam had decided that the amount to be allotted to him personally was to be limited to 70 lakhs of rupees a year. This information was received with much concern, and the Resident was instructed to convey a most serious warning to the Nizam. In September 1897 the Resident forwarded a report on the finances of the Hyderabad State prepared by Mr. Crawley. The general conclusion drawn from this report was that, under good financial management and with a limitation of His Highness's personal demands to 40 lakhs, the financial condition of the State would be sufficiently sound. The personal expenditure of the Nizam undermined the whole position. There was ample evidence to show that His Highness's present demands were not limited even to 70 lakhs. The Nizam blamed the Minister for the unsatisfactory financial position, and charged him with having debited to His Highness's personal (Sarf-i-Khas) estate, expenditure which properly belonged to the public revenue. The Nizam wished to dismiss the Nawab Vikar-ul-Umra, and—against the Resident's advice—His Highness appointed a "Committee of Nobles" to hold an enquiry into the State finances. The Government of India declined to countenance the dismissal of the Minister without a full statement of the facts on which His Highness based so serious a step, and the Nizam was strongly advised to allow Mr. Crawley to examine the "Sarf-i-Khas" accounts, instead of entrusting the duty to a Committee who were not qualified for the task. On reconsideration, the Nizam consented to give the Minister a further trial, but refused at first to allow Mr. Crawley to examine the Sarf-i-Khas accounts.

At this stage the position was reported to Her Majesty's Secretary of State. If the Nizam absolutely declined to be guided in financial matters by the advice given to him, it was proposed to instruct the Resident to make it perfectly clear to His Highness that, as the last resort, the Government of India would be compelled to intervene authoritatively to secure obligatory reforms. Her Majesty's Government agreed that the financial condition gave cause for anxiety, and that the existing embarrassment was directly attributable to the personal expenditure of His Highness.

The Nizam has since dissolved the Committee of Nobles, has agreed to produce a statement of the income and expenditure of the Sarf-i-Khas estates, and has instructed Mr. Crawley to classify the payments made from the public treasury on His Highness's behalf. The Nizam has also, in consultation with the Resident, drawn up revised rules for the guidance of the administration.

Two loans aggregating 27 lakhs of rupees were repaid to the Bank of Bengal in October 1898, partly from the balance remaining to the credit of the Nizam's Government from the sale of railway debentures and shares in 1897-98, and partly by a further small sale of railway stock. Mr. Crawley's transfer to Hyderabad has been extended till 1901. A further report was made to Her Majesty's Secretary of State on the 10th November 1898.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 211 (Internal), dated the 10th November 1898.

In 1895 the Government of India sanctioned an agreement made between the Nizam's Government and the Hyderabad (Deccan) Mining Company, Limited, for the lease of the Raichur-Doab Gold Field.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 9 (Internal), dated the 16th January 1895.

HYDERABAD AND
BERAR.
Raichur-Doab
Gold Field.

Shortly after the execution of the lease, the Company wished to assign a section of the Raichur Gold Field to a subsidiary Company. The Nizam's Government were willing to consent to the assignment, but the Government of India did not consider the proposed working capital sufficient, and required that the value of the concession should be reported by His Highness's Government with a view to obtaining some assurance that it represented in some measure at least the large sum demanded for it. The Secretary of State subsequently assented to the proposed assignment on condition that a working capital of not less than £25,000 should be provided, and that a declaration was made in the Company's prospectus that, in giving this assent, neither the Secretary of State nor the Nizam's Government accepted any responsibility in regard to the amount of the capital of the proposed Company, or to the estimate of the value of the concession.

In 1896 the Government of India advised the Nizam's Government to oppose an application by the Hyderabad Deccan Company to reduce their capital by the extinction of Deferred Shares to the extent of £30,000, and in consideration of this extinction to convert the remaining Deferred Shares to the value of £120,000 into ordinary shares. The High Court of Justice in London, however, allowed the Company's application.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 102 (Internal), dated the 26th May 1896.

Hyderabad (Deccan)
Company.

Scarcity and distress in Hyderabad became acute in November 1896 and again in July 1897. The affected districts extended along the southern, south-western and south-eastern borders. Over five millions of people were relieved at a direct cost to the State of nearly thirteen lakhs Hali Sicca, and an indirect cost of over thirty lakhs on account of abnormal remissions of land revenue and falling off in receipts. The work of relief was adequately carried out by His Highness's Government through the agency of Mr. A. J. Dunlop of the Revenue Board. The policy of non-interference with trade was loyally and firmly adhered to.

Most of the business connected with the Hyderabad Assigned Districts is disposed of in other Departments. The Foreign Department exercises a general control from a political standpoint, and deals with Legislation. The administration is conducted, as far as possible, on the lines of a Non-Regulation Province in British India. Any surplus revenue, after meeting the cost of administration and of the Hyderabad Contingent, is made over to the Nizam's Government. Owing to increase in expenditure during recent years, with no corresponding expansion of revenue, the surplus which in 1885-86 amounted to over 18 lakhs of rupees, was only about 6 lakhs in 1893-94. The Government of India do not administer the province with a view only to a surplus, and are bound to govern for the best advantage of the Assigned Districts. Nevertheless the maintenance of adequate surpluses is desirable, and the Resident has been told that every effort consistent with efficiency must be made to curtail expenditure.

Berar.

KASHMIR.

KASHMIR.
State Council.

Kashmir continued to be administered under the arrangement sanctioned by Lord Lansdowne in 1891. The Council consisted of the Maharaja as President, Raja Sir Amar Singh, K.C.S.I., as Vice-President, Pandit Suraj Kaul, C.I.E., Rai Bahadur Pandit Bhag Ram, and Sardar Muhammad Hayat Khan, C.S.I., as Members. Throughout 1894 discordant elements were at work in the Council. The Maharaja grew discontented with his position, and expressed a wish to abolish the Council and to be restored to full powers as the Ruler of the State, reserving the right to nominate a Minister. It was decided to remove Sardar Muhammad Hayat Khan from the Council, and opportunity was taken, during the Lahore Darbar in November 1894, to make a special communication to the Maharaja.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 6 (External), dated the 9th January 1895.

Finances.

At the beginning of 1895 the finances of Kashmir were seriously embarrassed, owing partly to excessive expenditure in the past on public works, and partly to the loyal efforts of the Darbar to assist in carrying out the policy of the Government of India in respect to the Gilgit Agency and the North-West Frontier. At the end of a year the position had considerably improved. Financial equilibrium was restored independently of any re-organisation in Gilgit.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 41 (External), dated the 4th March 1896.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 81 (External), dated the 29th April 1896.

The honorary rank of Major-General was conferred upon the Maharaja in connection with the siege of Chitral and the consequent operations.

In 1897 the financial condition of the State had still further improved.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 112 (External), dated the 28th July 1897.

The balance of the debt due by the Darbar on account of the telegraph lines had been remitted, and it was decided that the total cost of the Kashmir railway survey should be charged in equal shares between the Darbar and the Government of India, instead of in the proportions of one-third to the Government and two-thirds to the Darbar, as previously ordered. Sanction was accorded to the Customs Department being taken under State management, and to 10 per cent. of the excess collections under the new scheme being added to the Maharaja's allowance.

The general budget of the State for 1898-99 showed an anticipated surplus of about 7½ lakhs of rupees, the highest estimated for since the financial affairs of the State were re-organised. The Resident was informed that the results were in every way satisfactory.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 164 (External), dated the 15th September 1898.

The Kashmir Darbar have introduced the British Indian Currency as the sole legal tender in that State, with effect from the 1st May 1898.

Forests.

The attention of the Maharaja was drawn to the indiscriminate cutting of timber in the Marmat Gallian Forests, which His Highness claims as his own private property. With this exception, the administration of the State forests proceeded favourably.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 36 (External), dated the 24th February 1898.

Under the Treaty of 1870 the British Government agreed to levy no ^{KASHMIR—}
 duty on goods transmitted in bond through ^{MYSORE—}
 British India to Eastern Turkistan, or to ^{RAJPUTANA,}
 the territories of His Highness; and the ^{Transit Duties.}
 Maharaja agreed to abolish all transit duties on goods transmitted through His Highness's territories from and to Eastern Turkistan on which bulk is not broken within the territories of His Highness. In December 1896, and again in April 1897, it was brought to notice that considerable loss was being caused to Imperial revenues through the re-import into British India, without payment of duty, of silver which had been imported duty free through British India into Jammu. It was then arranged that the Government of India should levy, on behalf of the Darbar, upon goods transmitted to Jammu and Kashmir in bulk and without being opened, the duties from time to time leviable in British India under the Indian Tariff Act; the sums so collected to be accounted for and paid over to the Darbar, and not to the importer.

In January 1897 Colonel N. Chamberlain was permitted to relinquish the ^{Appointment of}
 appointment, which he had held for seven years, of Military Secretary to the ^{Military Secretary.}
 Kashmir State; and, as a temporary arrangement, Captain J. Manners-Smith, V.C., C.I.E., was appointed to succeed him. Eventually the offices of Military Adviser to the Darbar and Inspecting Officer of the Imperial Service Infantry at Jammu were combined, the cost being divided between the Government of India and the Darbar.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 37 (External), dated the 24th February 1898.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 57 (External), dated the 5th May 1897.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 175 (External), dated the 30th December 1897.

MYSORE.

Colonel His Highness Maharaja Sir Cham Rajendra Wadiar Bahadur, ^{Succession.}
 G.C.S.I., of Mysore, died on the 28th December 1894. He was succeeded by his
 eldest son Krishnaraj Wadiar Bahadur, then 10½ years old. During the minority
 the administration of the State is conducted
 by the Maharaja's mother, Her Highness the Maharani Vanivilas Sannidhana, C.I.,
 as Regent, and by the Diwan assisted by a Council of which he is President.
 The Council consists of three members nominated by Her Highness with the
 approval of the Government of India.

Despatches to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, Nos. 49 and 215 (Internal), dated the 20th March and the 6th November, 1896.

Her Highness the Maharani has been granted, in her capacity of Regent, ^{Salute for the}
 a personal salute of 19 guns during the ^{Maharani.}
 minority of her son.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 123 (Internal), dated the 2nd July 1896.

The tribute payable by the State is fixed at 35 lakhs by the Instrument ^{Mysore Tribute.}
 of Transfer. Owing to financial difficulties only 24½ lakhs a year were levied
 until the 1st April 1896. From that date
 the full tribute has been recovered.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 62 (Internal), dated the 27th March 1896.

RAJPUTANA.

His Highness Maharaja Sir Jaswant Singh, G.C.S.I., of Bhartpur, died in Bhartpur.
 December 1893, and was succeeded by his
 elder son, Kunwar Ram Singh, aged 20.
 In order that Ram Singh should acquire experience before exercising ruling

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 54 (Internal), dated the 28th March 1894.

RAJPUTANA.

powers, it was decided that he should carry on the administration with the assistance of his late father's Council, strengthened by the addition of two Members. The Political Agent was to be consulted on all questions of importance. In January 1895, the administration was in utter disorder owing to the inebriety of the Chief and the incompetence of the Council. There was no alternative but to deprive the Maharaja of power, and to place the State in the hands of a carefully selected Diwan, who would be responsible to the Political Agent. His Highness was removed from Bhartpur and placed under the care of an English doctor, and Kunwar Sri Harbhamji Raoji, a Deputy Commissioner in the Hyderabad Assigned Districts, was appointed Diwan of the State. The administration has been reformed, and in 1898, the Diwan was replaced by a Council under the general supervision of the Political Agent.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 65 (Internal), dated the 17th April 1895.

Jhalawar.

Maharaj Rana Zalim Singh succeeded to the Jhalawar State in 1875, on the death of his adoptive father, Maharaj Rana Prithi Singh. On attaining his majority in 1883, he was entrusted with full ruling powers, on certain conditions.

The Maharaj Rana soon began to ignore his obligations, and in 1888 he was deprived of all power, and the administration was entrusted to a Political Superintendent assisted by a State Council, until His Highness should give signs of reform. In 1890, Lord Lansdowne had to warn His Highness that a continuance of his attitude would necessitate consideration as to whether he should be allowed to reside in Jhalawar. In December 1892 His Highness was again entrusted with limited powers on conditions as before. His Highness was given full powers in June 1894, with the proviso that he was "not to alter or reverse any existing laws, measures or acts

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 164 (Internal), dated the 11th September 1894.

without the advice and approval of the Political Agent, and not to appoint as a member of his Council, or as his Diwan, any person to whose selection the Political Agent or the Agent to the Governor-General might see sufficient objection." In September 1895 His Highness again contravened the stipulations; and, after local enquiry, the Government of India ordered that he should be deposed and should thenceforth reside outside the limits of Rajputana and Central India.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 50 (Internal), dated the 18th March 1896.

The deposed Chief had no male issue, and had not adopted a son. With

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 179 (Internal), dated the 14th October 1896.

the exception of himself, there were no living descendants, natural or adopted, of Raj Rana Madan Singh, with whom the Treaty of 1838 creating the Jhalawar State was concluded, or of Raj Rana Zalim Singh, the famous Minister of the Kota State and the founder of the family. Accordingly it was decided to carry out the intention of the framers of the Treaties of 1838 with Kota and Jhalawar, and to restore to Kota, in consequence of the extinction of Zalim Singh's line, the ancient territory of that State, which had been incorporated in Jhalawar in 1838. The remaining portion of Jhalawar was to be constituted into a new State. The Chief was selected from a collateral branch of the family of Raj Rana Zalim Singh of Kota.

His Highness Sir Jaswant Singh Bahadur, G.C.S.I., Maharaja of Jodhpur, ^{RAJPUTANA—} died in October 1895. He was succeeded ^{ASSAM.} by his only son, Maharaja Sardar Singh, ^{Jodhpur.} aged 16. During the minority Lieutenant-

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 32 (Internal), dated the 12th February 1896.

Colonel Maharaj Dhiraj Sir Pratap Singh, G.C.S.I., C.B., continued to direct the administration, aided by a Council, and supervised the education of the young Chief. His Highness was invested in February 1898 with full powers.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 77 (Internal), dated the 26th May 1898.

His Highness Umed Singh, Maharao of Kota, who succeeded his adoptive ^{Kota.} father in June 1889 at the age of 16, was invested with full powers in December 1896.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 26 (Internal), dated the 24th February 1897.

In Rajputana, the famine of 1896-97 was confined to Jaisalmer, Bikaner, ^{Famine.} Bhartpur, Dholpur and parts of Marwar and Tonk. The Darbar made laudable and efficient efforts to alleviate distress, remissions and suspensions of revenue were freely granted, and relief works were opened where necessary.

PART II.

ASSAM.

In 1894 an expedition was undertaken against the Abor tribes on the North- ^{Abor Expedition.}

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 182 (External), dated the 3rd October 1894.

East of Assam in consequence of their having murdered three military policemen within British territory. The force accomplished all that was originally contemplated; but the Political Officer, Mr. Needham, discovered that the hostile villages had been largely assisted by Bor Abors from Damroh, the principal village in the Bor Abor country. It was then decided by the Chief Commissioner of Assam that Damroh should be punished. Owing to transport difficulties the bulk of the rations was left behind under a small guard. The force met with considerable opposition, and before they had been gone many days the ration guard were treacherously murdered and the rations looted. The force had therefore to return before reaching Damroh, but severely punished the villages concerned in the treachery. The Governor-General in Council was constrained to record an opinion that Mr. Ward, the Chief Commissioner of Assam, in sanctioning the advance on Damroh without the knowledge or approval of the Government of India, had exceeded his authority and committed a grave error of judgment. The Government of India attached the main responsibility for the massacre of the guard to Mr. Needham. The Secretary of State considered that this censure of Mr. Ward went beyond what the occasion called for, and that the main responsibility lay on the officer in military command rather than on the Political Officer. It was subsequently laid down distinctly that, in the absence of circumstances of extraordinary urgency, the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council should be obtained for all expeditions.

In November 1896 a raid was made on the north of Manipur. The raiding village was punished by a small force.

Another raid in November 1896 on the Lakhimpur sub-division was satisfactorily dealt with by the Military Police under Mr. R. B. McCabe.

ASSAM.
Manipur.

In 1896 the boundaries between the Chin Hills and Manipur and between Manipur and Burma were finally determined.

The sentences passed on some of the Manipur prisoners concerned in the rebellion of 1891 were revised. In 1895 Kula Chandra Dhaj Singh, the ex-Regent, and his younger brother Angao Singh, were released from Port Blair but required to reside at Hazaribagh: four others were set at liberty, but were not permitted to return to Manipur or Cachar. The cases of the other prisoners will be re-considered in 1901.

In 1895, on a review of the finances of the Manipur State, it was ordered that no charge should be made against the Darbar on account of the construction of the Mao-Manipur cart-road, but that an annual payment of Rs. 30,000 should be made from Manipur revenues towards the maintenance of the road.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 71 (External), dated the 24th April 1895.

This decision was not to affect the question of the maintenance of the Manipur-Jirighat road, towards which Manipur has to contribute Rs. 12,000 a year.

It was decided in 1898 to work the Manipur State forests on the Cachar border under the direction of the Forest Officer, Cachar, upon the same system as unclassified State forests in the Surma Valley, and to divide the gross income on produce between Government and the Darbar in the proportion of 25 per cent. to Government and 75 per cent. to Manipur. The arrangement to be in force for three years.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 154 (External), dated the 1st September 1898.

The last instalment of the indemnity fine of 2½ lakhs imposed on the State for the revolt of 1891 was paid off during the year 1895-96.

The minor Raja and his half-brother were sent, for education and training, to the Mayo College at Ajmere, and are reported to be happy and doing well.

Lushai Hills.

In 1893 a scheme was under consideration for the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Lushai Hills Districts into a single charge under the Chief Commissioner of Assam. The Bengal Government recommended that the matter should remain in abeyance for one or two years longer. The Chief Commissioner of Assam expressed his entire concurrence and the Government of India accepted the recommendation.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 66 (External), dated the 25th April 1894.

In September 1895 the Lushai Hills were formally incorporated in British India; the South Lushai Hills being included in the territories under the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and the North Lushai Hills in the territories under the Chief Commissioner of Assam.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 120 (External), dated the 25th June 1895.

A conference of frontier officers was held at Lungleh in December 1896 to discuss the general position in the Chin-Lushai Hills with a view to reducing expenditure.

In April 1898 the South Lushai Hills, with a tract known as Rutton Puiya's villages, including Demagri, in the Hill Tracts of Chittagong, were transferred to the Assam Administration. The Assam Frontier Tracts Regulation, 1880, was at the same time extended to the Lushai Hills.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 124 (External), dated the 25th August 1897.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 18 (External), dated the 3rd February 1898.

BENGAL.

The arrangements necessary for the administration of the Tributary Mahals of Orissa in consequence of the decision arrived at in 1888, that they were not

Tributary Mahals of Orissa.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 80 (Internal), dated the 13th February 1895.

British territory, were completed in 1894.

Sanads were issued to the Chiefs defining the conditions subject to which they were

to administer their States. The sanads formally recognise the several Chiefs as feudatories, and provide for the payment of tribute, the extradition of offenders, the administration of justice, and the management of the States generally. The powers of the Chiefs in criminal cases have been limited ordinarily to those exercised by Magistrates of the 1st class in British territory.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 91 (Internal), dated the 15th May 1895.

Cases in which Europeans are concerned, and the trial of heinous offences, have been reserved for disposal by the Superintendent

of the Mahals and his Assistant.

The State of Keonjhar, which was in an unsettled condition during 1893, was gradually reduced to peace and order, and the Bhuiyans tendered

Keonjhar.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 7 (Internal), dated the 16th January 1895.

complete submission to their Chief. The

question of personal services claimed by the Raja, out of which the disturbances had mainly sprung, was satisfactorily settled.

Disturbances took place in Nayagarh, one of the Tributary States of Orissa, in 1893-94, which necessitated the despatch of a detachment of Military Police under European officers. Order was restored, and the ringleaders and other offenders were judicially tried and punished. The Raja did not appear to be unpopular with the people, whose resentment was directed against his Manager, who was proved to have been guilty of extreme harshness, rapacity and abuse of power. The Manager was removed; and the ex-Diwan of the State, who instigated the rising, was banished. The Raja of Khandpara, another Orissa State, was clearly proved to have fostered the disturbances. He was required to pay the cost of the police operations and was severely censured. Raja Raghunath Singh of Nayagarh died in September 1897.

Nayagarh.

In 1894 the unfavourable condition of affairs in Daspalla, one of the

Daspalla.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 26 (Internal), dated the 6th February 1895.

Tributary Mahals of Orissa, attracted

notice. From the time of his accession in 1872, Raja Chaitan Deo Bhanj had failed to fulfil his obligations towards his subjects. The Government of Bengal at last recommended the temporary supersession of the Raja's authority by an Agent with full administrative powers under the direct control of the British authorities. The Government of India agreed. Raja Chaitan Deo Bhanj died in April 1897. Babu Narain Deo Bhanj, the only surviving brother of the Raja, was recognized as his successor.

It was decided in 1891, with the approval of the Secretary of State for India, that the Tributary Mahals of Chota Nagpur, which occupy a position similar to that of the Orissa Tributaries, should (with the exception of Porahat, which was confiscated after the Mutiny) be treated on the same footing as the Mahals of Orissa. The sanads to be granted to the Chiefs will take a similar form.

Chota Nagpur. Mahals.

BENGAL—BOMBAY
—BURMA.
Cooch Behar.

The finances of Cooch Behar were recently somewhat embarrassed. In 1895 the Maharaja received a loan of 3½ lakhs for the liquidation of his debts in India, on the understanding that the State authorities would practise economy and that His Highness would reduce his personal expenditure. Mr. C. C. Plowden, of the Bengal Police, was appointed Private Secretary to the Maharaja. The financial position is now fairly satisfactory, notwithstanding severe losses from the earthquake of 1897, and the Maharaja has made an effort to restrict his personal expenditure. His Highness visited England in 1894, 1896 and 1898, to obtain medical advice and attend to the education of his sons.

Secret despatches to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, Nos. 68 and 93 (Internal), dated the 25th May 1897, and the 23rd June, 1898.

Hill Tippera.

The Chief of the State of Hill Tippera, who enjoyed the title of Maharaja as a personal distinction, died in December 1896, and the succession of his eldest son as Raja was sanctioned.

BOMBAY.

Cambay.

The Special Political Officer who had been deputed in 1890 to restore order and introduce a better system of administration in the Cambay State, was withdrawn in April 1894 on the successful completion of his task, and the Nawab was restored to power.

Despatches to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, Nos. 51 and 105 (Internal), dated the 21st March and the 19th June, 1894.

Kolhapur.

His Highness the Raja of Kolhapur was installed in April 1894. In recognition of his loyalty and position, the restrictions imposed by the Agreement of 1862 were relaxed, and the Raja was granted plenary criminal powers.

BURMA.

Chinese Frontier.

When Lord Elgin arrived in India, negotiations with regard to the Burma-China frontier were almost completed, and in March 1894, a Convention was signed in London. The Convention defined the boundary between Burma and China, and contained provisions in respect to trade and commerce, the appointment of Consuls, and the connection of the telegraph systems of the two countries. Ratifications were exchanged in London in August 1894. It was agreed that pending delimitation, the *status quo* should be maintained, each Government continuing to control and administer the territory in its occupation.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 100 (External), dated the 12th June 1894.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 119 (External), dated the 10th July 1894.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 3 (External), dated the 9th January 1895.

In consequence of China breaking her engagements by alienating territory to France, the Convention of 1894 was modified by an Agreement, which was signed in February 1897. In accordance with Article VI of the Agreement, a Joint Commission was appointed to verify and demarcate the frontier. The Commission met at Bhamo early in December 1897. The demarcation of the section north of the Taping river was completed by sub-Commissioners in May 1898; but delimitation south of the Taping section, which was undertaken by Mr. H. Thirkell White, C.I.E., the British Commissioner, and General Liu, the Chinese Commissioner, made no progress owing to difficulties

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 7 (External), dated the 20th January 1898.

raised by the latter, who was not provided with suitable instructions, and BURMA. who advanced untenable claims. A few small fortified posts were erected within the administrative border of the Bhamo district by Chinese Shans, but they were easily ejected by the Bhamo Military Police, and the border was subsequently quiet. The Lieutenant-Governor of Burma recommended that the Chinese Government should be moved to take effective steps to prevent interference west of the provisional boundary and to punish those responsible for the aggression.

The Secretary of State was informed that the Government of India considered it an indispensable preliminary to the re-assembly of the Commission that it should be satisfactorily ascertained that clear and explicit instructions had been issued to the Chinese Commissioner, indicating the extent to which the Convention of 1894 was superseded by the Agreement of 1897, and requiring him, in case of doubt, to accept the English text and the English maps as indicating how the Convention and Agreement are to be interpreted.

It was accordingly ascertained that the Chinese Government understood the boundary defined by the Agreement of 1897 to be the provisional boundary, pending demarcation, and had promised to so inform the Viceroy of Yunnan. Her Britannic Majesty's Minister further informed the Chinese Government that if the Chinese Commissioner again proved obstructive, the British Commissioner would demarcate alone.

While delimitation was in progress last season, a Chinese official, with an escort, visited the territories within the Irawadi basin on the north of the administrative border of the Myitkyina district. It was suggested to the Secretary of State that the Chinese Government should be moved to abstain from any exercise of authority on the west of the range of mountains forming the watershed between the N'mai Kha and the Salween, and to at once formally agree to the recognition of this watershed as the frontier. The Lieutenant-Governor had proposed that a claim for compensation should be made upon the Chinese Government in respect to the cost of the measures which the aggression of Chinese subjects had rendered necessary on the borders of the Bhamo district. The Secretary of State was informed that the Government of India would not press the claim provided the Chinese displayed diligence and moderation in completing the demarcation, and would readily agree to entirely forego any demand if the Chinese Government accepted the suggestion to complete the settlement of the frontier by formally recognising the watershed between the N'mai Kha and the Salween as the dividing line north of the point from which the Agreement and Convention border commences.

Her Britannic Majesty's Minister at Peking was instructed to move the Chinese Government to formally agree to recognize the watershed between the N'mai Kha and the Salween as the frontier. Her Majesty's Government further desired the Government of India to be prepared, if necessary, to maintain effective control up to the watershed. The Government of Burma was informed accordingly.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 99 (External), dated the 30th June 1898.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 87 (External), dated the 9th June 1898.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 197 (External), dated the 27th October 1898.

BURMA.

A Convention in respect to the connection of the Burmese and Chinese telegraph systems was signed by Her Britannic Majesty's Minister in China and the Chinese Representative on the 6th September 1894, and through telegraphic communication *via* Bhamo and Momien was opened on the 26th March 1895.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 82 (External), dated the 16th May 1894.

Shan States and Shan Frontier.

During the past five years the peace of the Shan States has been practically unbroken, and their history has, in the main, been uneventful. In fixing the tribute to be levied in the Northern and Southern Shan States and in the Myelat during the five years, 1893—97, a very light assessment was imposed in order that funds might be available for expenditure on public works and the development of the States. In revising the tribute for the period 1897—1901, a small increase was ordered.

In 1894 an officer of the Burma Commission was appointed as Adviser to the Sawbwa of Hsi Paw, which is one of the largest and most important of the Shan States.

In 1894 also the appointment of an Assistant Political Officer in North Hsen Wi was created, with the object of putting a stop to the growing friction between the Sawbwa of that State and his Kachin subjects. The condition of Hsen Wi has since steadily improved. In order to afford clear evidence of British influence in the outlying circle of Kokang, a Military Police post was established there in 1896.

During the season of 1893-94, measures were adopted for demarcating the boundary between the States of Keng Tung and Keng Cheng, and for settling certain disputes between the Siamese and Keng Tung officials. After the Agreement of January 1896 with the French Government, the cis-Mekong portion of Keng Cheng was incorporated in the State of Keng Tung, where a permanent post was established and a British Assistant Political Officer stationed. Keng Tung is now on the same footing as the other Shan States which are part of British India.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 184 (External), dated the 10th October 1894.

With a view to controlling the Wa States and putting an end to Chinese aggression in and on the borders of Mang Lün, the despatch of an expedition into the Wa country was suggested in 1896. The proposal was negatived.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 1-C. (External), dated the 11th November 1896.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 131 (External), dated the 16th September 1897.

Kachins.

When in Burma in 1893, Lord Lansdowne approved of certain principles of policy to be adopted towards the Kachins. Those principles have since taken the form of the "Kachin Hill Tribes Regulation, 1895," which was amended in 1898. The Kachins within the administrative border are now as a rule well disposed and well behaved, and the civil officers move freely about the country with small personal escorts of Police.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 60 (External), dated the 3rd April 1895.

Chin Hills.

The principal military operation undertaken in the open season of 1893-94 was the final suppression of the Siyin rebellion. The complete submission of the tribe and the surrender of the leaders were secured. During the same

season a tour was made in the Nwengal country, when a number of guns were withdrawn: this completed the disarmament of the northern tribes. In the open season of 1893-94, the Thetta villagers surrendered all their fire-arms without resistance, and other tribes voluntarily followed their example. In December 1894, a battalion of Military Police, 600 strong, took over charge of the Northern Chin Hills from the regular troops previously stationed there. The Tashons and their tributaries, the Yahows and Whenohs, and the Naring group of villages were disarmed during the open season of 1895-96.

BURMA—CENTRAL
PROVINCES—MAD-
RAS.

By a Proclamation, dated the 6th September 1895, the Chin Hills were formally incorporated in British India and included in the territories administered by the Chief Commissioner of Burma. In July 1896 a Regulation for the administration of the Chin Hills was passed.

In January 1897 the troops in the Southern Chin Hills were replaced by Military Police.

CENTRAL PROVINCES.

A general failure of the usual September and October rains in 1896 caused distress in most of the Feudatory States of the Central Provinces. The scarcity was most serious in Khairagarh, Nandgaon, Chhuikhadan and Kawardha. The Chiefs and Superintendents of the distressed States successfully organised measures for famine relief.

Famine.

MADRAS.

The Madras Government were informed in 1894 that it had been finally decided that the Laccadive Islands are not British territory. The islands had been sequestered since 1875 for arrears of tribute and local opinion was strongly opposed to restoring them to native rule. The Madras Government were therefore instructed to induce the Raja, if possible, to voluntarily cede the islands, in return for remission of his debts and the grant of an allowance. In 1894 it was reported that the debt on the islands had practically been extinguished. The Raja declined, however, to discuss a cession. On the other hand, his incompetence and the ill-will of the inhabitants towards him rendered it impossible to restore control of the islands to him. The Madras Government therefore recommended annexation and the payment of liberal compensation. The Government of India considered annexation unjustifiable, and preferred that the existing attachment should continue, with a view to the reform of the administration and the restoration of the islands to the Raja's successor, should he be fit to rule. The Secretary of State concurred with the Government of India, except as regards the permanent disqualification of the present Raja. His Lordship desired the introduction of such a scheme of administration combined with arrangements for political supervision, as could be continued under the Raja's authority.

Laccadive Islands.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 38 (Internal), dated the 27th February 1895.

The Madras Government have recently reported that the present Raja is incompetent and that even an enlightened successor would meet with very serious difficulties in maintaining an efficient administration.

NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES.

Rampur.

In April 1894 the Nawab Hamid Ali Khan of Rampur was installed.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 156 (Internal), dated the 21st August 1894.

During the minority the State had been administered by a Council of Regency, latterly under the presidency of Colonel

Vincent. Under the new arrangements the Nawab became the President of the Council, and certain constitutional rules were laid down for its guidance. A resident Political Officer was also appointed to help His Highness.

The Nawab was invested with full powers in June 1896, when the Execu-

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 140 (Internal), dated the 21st July 1896.

tive Council was replaced by a single Minister, and the appointment of resident Political Officer was abolished.

CHAPTER V.

Miscellaneous.

PART I.

CEREMONIALS.

VISITS TO NATIVE STATES IN INDIA, INTERVIEWS WITH RULING CHIEFS, &c.

During his Viceroyalty Lord Elgin visited the Native States of Alwar (1896), Baroda (1896), Bhopal (1895), Bikaner (1896), Gwalior (1895), Hyderabad (1895), Indore (1896), Jaipur (1896), Jodhpur (1896), Mysore (1895), Nabha (1898), Patiala (1898), and Udaipur (1896); and met, either with full ceremonial or informally, seventy-one of the Ruling Chiefs of India. His Excellency also held two Grand Public Darbars, the first at Quetta, on the 7th November 1894, for the reception of Native Chiefs, Sardars and gentlemen of Baluchistan; and the second at Lahore, on the 30th of the same month, for the reception of Chiefs, Sardars and Native gentlemen of the Punjab. The subjoined list gives some particulars of these Meetings and Public Darbars:—

Meetings and Public Darbars.

Place where meeting or darbar took place.	Name of Chief.	Date of Chief's reception.	Date of His Excellency's return visit.	REMARKS.
Calcutta . . .	His Highness the Maharaja Sindhia of Gwalior.	26th Jan. 1894	The reception was an informal one.
Do. . . .	His Highness the Maharaja of Benares.	9th March 1894 .	13th March 1894.	
Do. . . .	Commander Colonel Tej Bahadur Rana Bahadur,* of Nepal.	13th March 1894	
Simla . . .	His Highness the Raja of Jind.	18th July 1894	Informal reception.
Do. . . .	The Nawab of Loharu .	14th Sept. 1894	Ditto.
Do. . . .	The Raja of Dhami .	19th Sept. 1894	Ditto.
Do. . . .	The Raja of Keonthal .	26th Sept. 1894	Ditto.
Do. . . .	The Raja of Bilaspur .	9th Oct. 1894	Ditto.
Sukkur (Sind) .	His Highness the Mir of Khairpur.	1st Nov. 1894 .	2nd Nov. 1894.	
Quetta . . .	His Highness the Khan of Kalat.	7th Nov. 1894 .	7th Nov. 1894.	
Do. . . .	The Jam of Las Bela .	Ditto	
Do. . . .	Native Chiefs, Sardars and Gentlemen of Baluchistan.	Ditto	Public Darbar attended by the Khan of Kalat, the Jam of Las Bela and a large gathering of the Sardars and Native gentlemen of Baluchistan. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India was also present. At this Darbar His Excellency the Viceroy invested the Khan of Kalat with the Insignia of a Knight Grand Commander of the Order of the Indian Empire, and presented khilats to the Khan and Jam and to the principal Sardars and Native officials.

Meetings and Public Darbars—continued.

Place where meeting or darbar took place.	Name of Chief.	Date of Chief's reception.	Date of His Excellency's return visit.	REMARKS.
Shikarpur (Sind)	Zamindars and other Native residents of Sind.	9th Nov. 1894	Informal reception.
Lahore . . .	His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir.	27th Nov. 1894 .	27th Nov. 1894.	
Do. . . .	His Highness the Maharaja of Patiala.	Ditto .	Ditto.	
Do. . . .	His Highness the Nawab of Bahawalpur.	Ditto .	Ditto.	
Do. . . .	His Highness the Raja of Jind.	Ditto .	Ditto.	
Do. . . .	His Highness the Raja of Nabha.	Ditto .	Ditto.	
Do. . . .	His Highness the Raja of Kapurthala.	Ditto .	Ditto.	
Do. . . .	His Highness the Raja of Sirmur.	Ditto .	Ditto.	
Do. . . .	His Highness the Raja of Mandi.	Ditto .	Ditto.	
Do. . . .	His Highness the Raja of Faridkot.	Ditto .	Ditto.	
Do. . . .	His Highness the Raja of Chamba.	Ditto	
Do. . . .	His Highness the Raja of Suket.	Ditto	
Do. . . .	Chiefs, Sardars and Native Gentlemen of the Punjab.	30th Nov. 1894	Public Darbar attended by the Maharaja of Kashmir, the Punjab Chiefs named above, and a number of Sardars and Native gentlemen of the province. His Excellency the Governor of Bombay, His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces and Chief Commissioner of Oudh, the Military, Public Works, Financial, and Home Members of the Governor-General's Council, and His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in Madras were also present.
Delhi . . .	The Nawab of Pataudi .	5th Dec. 1894	
Do. . . .	The Nawab of Loharu .	Ditto	
Do. . . .	The Nawab of Dujana .	Ditto	
Calcutta . .	His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore. .	21st Dec. 1894 .	21st Dec. 1894.	
Do. . . .	His Highness the Raja of Kapurthala.	28th Dec. 1894 .	29th Dec. 1894.	
Do. . . .	His Highness the Raja of Pudukota.	29th Dec. 1894	Informal reception.
Do. . . .	His Highness the Thakur Sahib of Gondal.	Ditto	Ditto.
Do. . . .	His Highness the Maharaja of Hill Tippera.	15th Jan. 1895	

Meetings and Public Darbars—continued.

CEREMONIALS.

Place where meeting or darbar took place.	Name of Chief.	Date of Chief's reception.	Date of His Excellency's return visit.	REMARKS.
Simla . . .	The Rana of Jubbal . . .	17th May 1895	Informal reception.
Do. . . .	The Rana of Hindur . . .	22nd May 1895	Ditto.
Do. . . .	His Highness the Maharaja of Patiala	Ditto	Ditto.
Do. . . .	The Rana of Dhami . . .	31st July 1895	Ditto.
Do. . . .	Nawab Vikar-ul-Umara, Minister of the Hyderabad State.	22nd Aug. 1895	Ditto.
Do. . . .	Ditto ditto	28th Aug. 1895	
Do. . . .	His Highness the Raja of Kapurthala.	13th Sept. 1895	Informal reception.
Do. . . .	The Nawab of Loharu	1st Oct. 1895	Ditto.
Do. . . .	His Highness the Raja of Sirmur.	2nd Oct. 1895	Ditto.
Do. . . .	The Heir-apparent of the Raja of Bashahr and <i>de facto</i> Ruler of the State.	7th Oct. 1895	Ditto.
Do. . . .	His Highness the Raja of Faridkot.	18th Oct. 1895	Ditto.
Agra . . .	His Highness the Maharaja of Karauli.	25th Oct. 1895 .	25th Oct. 1895.	
Do. . . .	His Highness the Maharaj Rana of Dholpur.	Ditto	Ditto.	
Do. . . .	His Highness the Nawab of Rampur.	Ditto	Ditto.	
Gwalior . .	His Highness the Maharaja Sindhia of Gwalior.	30th Oct. 1895 .	1st Nov. 1895 .	
Bhopal . . .	Her Highness the Nawab Begam of Bhopal.	4th Nov. 1895 .	4th Nov. 1895.	
Do. . . .	His Highness the Raja of Rajgarh.	Ditto	
Do. . . .	The Rao of Khilchipur .	Ditto	
Do. . . .	The Nawab of Kurwai .	Ditto	
Do. . . .	The Raja of Maksudargarh.	Ditto		
Do. . . .	The Nawab of Muhammadgarh.	Ditto	Received together.
Do. . . .	The son of the Nawab of Basoda.	Ditto		
Poona . . .	His Highness the Gaekwar of Baroda.	9th Nov. 1895 .	9th Nov. 1895.	
Do. . . .	His Highness the Raja of Kolhapur.	Ditto	Ditto.	
Hyderabad .	His Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad.	13th Nov. 1895	13th Nov. 1895.	
Mysore . . .	His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore.	21st Nov. 1895 .	21st Nov. 1895.	
Trichinopoly .	His Highness the Raja of Pudukota.	3rd Dec. 1895	Informal reception.
Madras . . .	The Nawab of Bauganapalle	7th Dec. 1895	
Calcutta . .	His Highness the Maharaja of Hill Tippera.	— Dec. 1895	Informal reception.

CEREMONIALS.

Meetings and Public Darbars.—continued.

Place where meeting or darbar took place.	Name of Chief.	Date of Chief's reception.	Date of His Excellency's return visit.	REMARKS.
Calcutta . .	His Highness the Maharaja of Bikaner.	The Maharaja visited Calcutta privately in January 1896.
Do. . .	His Highness the Maharao of Kota.	20th March 1896	Informal reception.
Simla . .	His Highness the Maharaja Sindhia of Gwalior.	10th July 1896	Ditto.
Do. . .	The Raja of Keonthal . .	} 22nd Sept. 1896	Ditto.
Do. . .	The Raja of Baghal . .			
Do. . .	The Nawab of Loharu . .	30th Sept. 1896	Ditto.
Alwar . .	His Highness the Maharaja of Alwar.	6th Nov. 1896 .	6th Nov. 1896.	
Ajmere . .	His Highness the Maharao Raja of Bundi.	10th Nov. 1896	10th Nov. 1896.	
Do. . .	His Highness the Maharaja of Kishangarh.	Ditto .	Ditto.	
Do. . .	His Highness the Maharawal of Jaisalmer.	Ditto .	11th Nov. 1896 .	Informal reception and return visit, the Chief being a student in the Mayo College.
Do. . .	His Highness the Nawab of Tonk.	Ditto .	10th Nov. 1896.	
Do. . .	His Highness the Raja of Manipur.	Ditto	Informal reception, the Chief being a student in the Mayo College.
Do. . .	The Raja Dhiraj of Shahpura.	Ditto	
Do. . .	The leading Istamrardars and Jagirdars of the Ajmere District.	Ditto	
Udaipur . .	His Highness the Maharana of Udaipur.	12th Nov. 1896 .	12th Nov. 1896.	
Jaipur . .	His Highness the Maharaja of Jaipur.	17th Nov. 1896 .	17th Nov. 1896.	
Do. . .	The Thakur of Lawa . .	Ditto	Informal reception.
Bikaner . .	His Highness the Maharaja of Bikaner.	21st Nov. 1896 .	21st Nov. 1896.	
Jodhpur . .	His Highness the Maharaja of Jodhpur.	24th Nov. 1896 .	24th Nov. 1896.	
Baroda . .	His Highness the Gaekwar of Baroda.	28th Nov. 1896 .	28th Nov. 1896.	
Surat . .	The Raja of Baneda . .	30th Nov. 1896	Informal reception at the Railway Station.
Do. . .	The Raja of Dharampur . .	Ditto	Ditto ditto.
Indore . .	His Highness the Maharaja Holkar of Indore.	2nd Dec. 1896 .	2nd Dec. 1896.	
Do. . .	His Highness the Raja of Dewas (Senior Branch).	Ditto .	Ditto.	
Do. . .	His Highness the Raja of Dewas (Junior Branch).	Ditto .	Ditto.	
Do. . .	His Highness the Nawab of Jaora.	Ditto .	Ditto.	
Do. . .	His Highness the Raja of Ratlam.	Ditto .	Ditto.	
Do. . .	His Highness the Raja of Sailana.	Ditto	
Do. . .	His Highness the Raja of Sitawan.	Ditto	
Do. . .	The Rana of Ali Rajpur . .	Ditto	

Meetings and Public Darbars—concluded.

CEREMONIALS.

Place where meeting or darbar took place.	Name of Chief.	Date of Chief's reception.	Date of His Excellency's return visit.	REMARKS.
Indore . . .	Thakurs* and Native Gentlemen assembled at Indore.	2nd Dec. 1896	* These were the Mediatized Chiefs of Panth Piploda, Jawasia, Piploda, Naulana, Sheogarh, Bhatkheri, Kalukhera, Narwar, Lalgarh, Barra (Bardia), Shajasta, Pathari, Bagli and Karodia.
Benares . . .	His Highness the Maharaja of Benares.	8th Dec. 1896 .	8th Dec. 1896† .	† Informal visit.
Calcutta . . .	The Raja of Jashpur . . .	22nd Dec. 1896	Informal reception.
Simla . . .	His Highness the Maharaja of Patiala.	13th May 1897	Ditto.
Do. . .	His Highness the Maharaj Rana of Dholpur.	22nd July 1897	Ditto.
Do. . .	The Heir-apparent of the Raja of Bashahr and <i>de facto</i> Ruler of the State.	11th Aug. 1897	Ditto.
Do. . .	The Rana of Baghat .	25th Aug. 1897	Ditto.
Do. . .	The Nawab of Loharu .	24th Sept. 1897	Ditto.
Do. . .	His Highness the Maharaj Rana of Dholpur.	5th Oct. 1897	Ditto.
Do. . .	The Minister of Tonk .	11th Nov. 1897	Ditto.
Calcutta . . .	His Highness the Maharaja Sindhia of Gwalior.	11th Jan. 1898 .	12th Jan. 1898.	
Do. . .	His Highness the Maharaja of Rewa.	Ditto .	Ditto.	
Do. . .	His Highness the Maharaja of Benares.	12th Jan. 1898 .	Ditto.	
Do. . .	His Highness the Maharaja of Gwalior.	15th Jan. 1898	Informal reception.
Do. . .	His Highness the Maharaja of Rewa.	Ditto	Ditto.
Do. . .	His Highness the Maharaja of Benares.	Ditto	Ditto.
Do. . .	The Raja of Kanker .	29th Jan. 1898	Ditto.
Do. . .	The Minister of Bhopal .	1st Mar. 1898	Ditto.
Do. . .	His Highness the Raja of Hill Tippera.	16th Mar. 1898	
Simla . . .	His Highness the Maharaja Sindhia of Gwalior.	9th & 13th May 1898.	Informal interviews for discussion of business.
Do. . .	His Highness the Maharaja of Patiala.	28th May & 20th August 1898.	Informal reception.
Do. . .	His Highness the Nawab of Bahawalpur.	8th Sept. 1898	Ditto.
Do. . .	The Nawab of Loharu .	29th Sept. 1898	Ditto.
Nabha . . .	His Highness the Raja of Nabha.	8th Nov. 1898 .	8th Nov. 1898.	
Patiala . . .	His Highness the Maharaja of Patiala.	Ditto . .	Ditto.	
Calcutta . . .	His Highness the Maharaja of Patiala.	27th Dec. 1898	Informal reception.
Do. . .	His Highness the Maharaja of Benares.	28th Dec. 1898	Ditto.

INVESTITURES—
SUCCESSIONS.INVESTITURES OF THE ORDERS OF THE STAR OF INDIA AND
THE INDIAN EMPIRE.

Lord Elgin, as Grand Master, held two general Investitures of both Orders at Calcutta, the first on the 7th March 1895 and the second on the 13th January 1898; and four local Investitures—namely, at Quetta on the 7th November 1894, at Gwalior on the 1st November 1895, at Allahabad on the 29th November 1897, and at Patiala on the 8th November 1898. At these formal ceremonials fifty two gentlemen, European and Native, were invested and decorated, including the following:—Their Highnesses the Maharaja Sindhia of Gwalior, the Maharaja of Patiala and the Maharaja of Rewa, the Hon'ble Sir Antony MacDonnell, K.C.S.I., and His Excellency General Sir George White, G.C.B., G.C.I.E., V.C., who were invested as Knights Grand Commanders of the Order of the Star of India; and His Highness the Khan of Kalat, the Hon'ble the Maharaja of Darbhanga, K.C.I.E., and His Highness the Maharaja of Benares, K.C.I.E., invested as Knights Grand Commanders of the Order of the Indian Empire.

His Excellency also held informal functions at Simla and Calcutta on the 15th August 1895, the 20th March 1896, and the 24th May and 22nd October 1897, for the investiture, respectively, of Surgeon-Major (now Lieutenant-Colonel, I.M.S.) G. Robertson, C.S.I., the Hon'ble Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Brackenbury, K.C.B., the Hon'ble Mr. J. Woodburn, C.S.I., and the Hon'ble Mr. W. M. Young, C.S.I., as Knights Commanders of the Order of the Star of India.

IMPORTANT SUCCESSIONS IN NATIVE STATES.

Bombay.

Chota Udaipur (Rewa Kantha Agency).—Area 873 square miles; population 98,637; revenue Rs. 2,30,600. Maharawal Shri Motisinghji Jetsinghji died in February 1895, and was succeeded by his son Fatehsinghji.

Khairpur (Sind).—Area 6,109 square miles; population 131,937; revenue Rs. 7,17,174. His Highness Mir Sir Ali Murad Khan, G.C.I.E., died in April 1894, and was succeeded by his son Mir Faiz Muhammad Khan.

Nawanagar (Kathiawar).—Area 3,791·3 square miles; population 370,611; revenue Rs. 24,85,549. His Highness Jam Shri Sir Vibhaji Ranmalji, K.C.S.I., died in April 1895, and was succeeded by his son Jaswatsinghji.

Central India.

Barwani (Bhopawar Agency).—Area 1,362·25 square miles; population 80,264; revenue Rs. 2,00,000. Rana Indarjit Singh died on the 3rd November 1894, and the succession of his son, Raghunath Singh, a minor, was sanctioned by the Government of India. Barwani was placed under British supervision during the minority of the new Chief.

Dhar (Bhopawar Agency).—Area 1,739·68 square miles; population 1,67,504; revenue Rs. 8,00,000. Maharaja Anand Rao Puar died on the 15th July 1898, and the succession of his nephew and adopted son, Udaji Rao Puar, was sanctioned. Udaji Rao is a minor, and proposals for the administration of the State are under consideration.

Jaora (Malwa Agency).—Area 872 square miles; population 112,280; revenue Rs. 9,60,000. His Highness Nawab Muhammad Ismail Khan died in March 1895, and was succeeded by his son, Muhammad Iftikhar Ali Khan.

Jhabua (Bhopawar).—Area 1,336·48 square miles; population 119,787; revenue Rs. 1,28,000. Raja Gopal Singh died on the 22nd January 1895. In April of the same year the Government of India recognised his adopted son, Udai Singh, as Chief of Jhabua, subject to the reservation that administrative powers will not be conferred upon him until he is considered fit to exercise them. His Highness was invested with powers on the 28th September 1898. SUCCESSIONS—
SALUTES.

Narsingarh (Bhopal Agency).—Area 720 square miles; population 112,427; revenue Rs. 4,50,000. Raja Mahtab Singh of Narsingarh, a Mediatized Chiefship, died on the 7th November 1895, leaving no lineal heir. Arjun Singh, a son of one of the late Chief's cousins, and a minor, was recognised as Chief.

Panna (Bundelkhand).—Area 2,568·33 square miles; population 500,000; revenue Rs. 5,00,000. Maharaja Lokpal Singh died on the 9th March 1898, and the succession of his son, Madho Singh, was sanctioned.

Sailana (Malwa Agency).—Area 500 square miles; population 29,720; revenue Rs. 1,50,000. Raja Dule Singh died in October 1895. His adopted son, Kunwar Jaswant Singh, was formally recognised as Chief of the State.

Samthar (Bundelkhand).—Area 173·74 square miles; population 40,637; revenue Rs. 4,00,000. Maharaja Chhatar Singh Bahadur died on the 16th June 1896, and his eldest son, Bir Singh Deo, was formally recognised as Raja.

Cochin.—Area 1,362 square miles; population 722,906; revenue Madras. Rs. 17,29,832. His Highness Raja Sir Sri Vera Kerala Varma, K.C.I.E., died in September 1895, and was succeeded by his cousin, Rama Varma.

Mysore.—Area 27,936½ square miles; population 4,843,523; revenue Mysore. Rs. 1,51,64,000. Colonel His Highness Maharaja Sir Chama Rajendra Wadiar Bahadur, G.C.S.I., died in December 1894, and was succeeded by his eldest son, Krishnaraj Wadiar Bahadur.

Bhartpur.—Area 1,982 square miles; population 640,303; revenue Rajputana. Rs. 27,13,501. His Highness Maharaja Sir Jaswant Singh, G.C.S.I., died in December 1893. He was succeeded by his elder son, Kunwar Ram Singh.

Dungarpur.—Area 1,447 square miles; population 165,400; revenue Rs. 2,01,732. His Highness Maharawal Udai Singh died in February 1898. He was succeeded by his grandson, Bijai Singh.

Jodhpur.—Area 34,963 square miles; population 2,528,178; revenue Rs. 41,57,000. His Highness Maharaja Sir Jaswant Singh, G.C.S.I., died in October 1895. He was succeeded by his son Sardar Singh.

SALUTES.

Additions to the Table.

The following salutes were sanctioned by Her Majesty in Council on the recommendation of Lord Elgin's Government:—

1. In August 1895 Her Highness the Maharani Kempananjammani Vanivilas Sannidhanna, C.I., of Mysore, was, in her capacity of Regent of the State, granted a personal salute of 19 guns during the minority of her son the Maharaja.

2. In December 1895 a personal salute of 11 guns was sanctioned for Sultan Fadthl bin Ali of Lahej.

SALUTES—
DIAMOND JUBILEE.

3. In January 1896 the personal salute of His Highness Maharaja Sir Madho Singh Bahadur, G.C.S.I., of Jaipur, was increased from 19 to 21 guns.

4. On the occasion of the commemoration of Her Majesty the Queen's Diamond Jubilee, a personal salute of 21 guns was sanctioned for His Highness Maharana Dhiraj Sir Fateh Singh Bahadur, G.C.S.I., of Udaipur.

5. In May 1898 two guns were added to the personal salute of 13 guns enjoyed by Raja Sir Hira Singh Bahadur, G.C.S.I., of Nabha.

6. On the 31st December 1898 a personal salute of 21 guns was sanctioned for His Highness the Maharaja of Travancore.

Extension of a Salute.

On the recommendation of the Government of Bombay, the salute of the Raja of Porbandar in Kathiawar, which had been suspended and subsequently restored with respect to British India only, was, in March 1895, restored within the province of Kathiawar also.

Lapses.

The following Chiefs, who had enjoyed personal salutes, died during Lord Elgin's Viceroyalty, and their personal salutes lapsed in consequence:—

1. His Highness Mir Sir Ali Murad Khan, G.C.I.E., of Khairpur (19 guns), died on the 2nd April 1894.

2. His Highness Jam Sir Vibhaji Ranmalji, K.C.S.I., of Nawanagar (15 guns), died on the 28th April 1895.

3. His Highness Maharaja Sir Jaswant Singh Bahadur, G.C.S.I., of Jodhpur (21 guns), died on the 11th October 1895.

4. Mir Sir Ali Khan, K.C.I.E., Jam of Las Bela (9 guns), died on the 14th January 1896.

5. His Highness Maharaja Sir Takhtsinghji Jaswatsinghji, G.C.S.I., of Bhaunagar (15 guns), died on the 29th January 1896.

6. His Highness Fadthl bin Ali, Sultan of Lahej (11 guns), died on the 28th April 1898.

DIAMOND JUBILEE OF HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN.

The occasion was commemorated in India by a Special Thanksgiving Service held at Christ Church, Simla, on Sunday, the 20th June 1897, which was attended by His Excellency the Viceroy, accompanied by His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and the Members of the Governor-General's Council. Officers of Her Majesty's services, Civil and Military, were invited to attend.

In view of the special circumstances of the year, Her Majesty was pleased to order that addresses should not on this occasion be received personally, and His Excellency the Viceroy was authorised to receive loyal addresses on Her Majesty's behalf. The decision was made known throughout India, and Lord Elgin publicly received at the Town Hall, Simla, on the 22nd June, deputations from forty associations and communities, bearing congratulatory addresses for transmission to Her Majesty. The ceremony was attended by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the Members of the Governor-General's Council, the Additional Members of the Council, the Right Reverend the Bishop

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 103 (Internal), dated the 7th July 1897.

of Lahore, and the Secretaries to the Government of India. It became known DIAMOND JUBILEE. that several Native Chiefs intended holding Darbars on the 22nd June 1897, and to these His Excellency the Viceroy addressed letters sympathising with

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 33 (Internal), dated the 17th February 1898.

them in the celebration with which they proposed to mark the occasion of Her Majesty's Diamond Jubilee. Accounts of the celebrations in Native States and elsewhere were forwarded to the Secretary of State.

Messages and addresses of congratulation from the Amir of Afghanistan, the

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 109 (Internal), dated the 21st July 1897.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 135 (Internal), dated the 30th September 1897.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 164 (Internal), dated the 16th December 1897.

Maharaja Dhiraj of Nepal, Native Chiefs and others in Native States, and from Foreign Territory, with those received publicly by His Excellency the Viceroy on the 22nd June, were laid before Her Majesty, and, in accordance with Her Majesty's directions, suitable acknowledgments were sent in each case.

In certain Native States some criminal and civil prisoners were released and the sentences of others were reduced. Some life-convicts from Native States were also released from the Andamans.

Clasps commemorative of the Diamond Jubilee were presented, in accordance

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 160 (Internal), dated the 25th November 1897.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 53 (Internal), dated the 21st March 1898.

with Her Majesty's commands, to the Native Chiefs and others who had received the Jubilee medal of 1887.

In view of this special commemoration, no Honours Gazette was published in connection with Her Majesty's Birthday; but a liberal distribution of British decorations and of Native titles was notified on the 22nd June; this, in the case of the former, being preceded by the enlargement of the two Indian Orders of Knighthood.

PART II.

IMPERIAL SERVICE TROOPS.

The following note on the progress made in connection with the organisation and training of the Imperial Service Troops has been furnished by Colonel Sir H. Melliss, K.C.S.I., Inspector-General, Imperial Service Troops :—

At the commencement of Lord Elgin's administration, the Secretary of State noticed that the efforts made by the Native Chiefs generally to render the forces which they have organised for Imperial defence as efficient as possible deserved the acknowledgments of Her Majesty's Government, and desired that some early opportunity should be taken of conveying to the Chiefs his warm appreciation of the steady encouragement which they were giving to the development of the scheme.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 188 (Internal), dated the 17th October 1894.

This message of appreciation was communicated to the Kathiawar Chiefs by His Excellency the Governor of Bombay, and to all the other Chiefs by letter from the Viceroy containing remarks suitable to the circumstances of each case. In order to mark the compliment conveyed, it was arranged that the letter should, wherever possible, be personally delivered on Her Majesty's Birthday.

Many letters were subsequently received expressing sincere gratification at the favourable comments made by Her Majesty's Secretary of State.

Throughout the administration of the Earl of Elgin the Native Princes and Chiefs of India have generally maintained their Imperial Service Troops in a state of efficiency as regards drill, equipment, transport and other necessities requisite for rapid mobilisation in case of war.

His Excellency has at different times reviewed all the Imperial Service Troops, except those of Kashmir, Rampur and the Kathiawar States. The Imperial Service Troops of the Punjab States took part in the assemblage held at Lahore in November 1894, when Lord Elgin visited that city, on which occasion nearly eighteen thousand troops were assembled. The Imperial Service Corps were formed in one Brigade of Cavalry and two Brigades of Infantry, and His Highness the Maharaja of Patiala commanded his Cavalry Regiment in person. In the following years the Viceroy also reviewed the troops of Hyderabad, Gwalior, Indore, Bhopal, Mysore, Jodhpur, Bikaner, Jaipur, Bharatpur and Alwar, and on all occasions the appearance of the troops was highly commendable. In 1894 the offer from the Muhammadan State of Maler Kotla took definite form, after some years of discussion as to what sort of force the State could best maintain. It was decided in that year to convert the existing force of the State into a double company of Sappers and Miners, such as that of Sirmur. The organisation proceeded rapidly, and now the corps is most efficient and did excellent work in the recent Tirah Campaign.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 30 (Internal), dated the 21st February 1894.

In 1895 Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India was furnished with a

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 148 (Internal), dated the 23rd July 1895.

In 1894 the Martini-Henri rifle was issued to the Imperial Service Troops.

statement of the approximate cost to each Native State of the corps which it maintains.

In 1895 it was decided to effect a change in the constitution of the Imperial Service Infantry of Kashmir, which up to that date had consisted of 6 battalions of Infantry of a strength of 600 men each. Two battalions have for

economy's sake been abolished, and the Infantry now consists of 4 battalions of IMPERIAL SERVICE TROOPS. 700 strong each, instead of, as heretofore, 6 of 600 each.

In this year also the transport trains of Jaipur and Gwalior were called out for Service in the Chitral Expedition. They left their States within a few hours of receiving the order to mobilise, without any desertion, and the work they did on the campaign and their excellent organisation called forth the highest praise from those under whom they served. A detachment of the 4th Kashmir Imperial Service Infantry and two guns of one of the Mountain Batteries accompanied Colonel Kelly's force moving to the relief of Chitral, and the difficult passage of the Shandur Pass. The head-quarters of the 4th Infantry (301 of all ranks) was in Chitral during the time the fort was surrounded, and on all occasions the Imperial Service Troops seemed to have acquitted themselves well. In the Tirah and Mohmand Expeditions the following troops were employed: Patiala, Jind, Nabha and Kapurthala Infantry Battalions, Sirmur and Maler Kotla Sappers, the Jaipur and Gwalior transport trains: while the 1st Regiment, Jodhpur Lancers, was in reserve at Rawalpindi. The keenest desire to join the field force was manifested in every State, and many were bitterly disappointed at not being able to go. Sir Pratap Singh of Jodhpur and the Maharaja of Patiala joined the Staffs of Brigadier-General Elles and Sir W. Lockhart, respectively. The regiments and transport corps behaved exceedingly well in the field, and were highly reported on by General Officers under whom they served; their fine discipline and absolute coolness in action were specially noted on.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 54 (Internal), dated the 28th April 1897.

A deputation consisting of the Commandants of Cavalry Regiments from the following States—

Patiala,	Indore,	Rampur,
Kapurthala,	Bahawalpur,	Jaipur (Transport Corps),
Jind,	Nabha,	Bhaunagar,
Hyderabad,	Bhopal,	Bikaner,
Alwar,	Gwalior (Cavalry and	Kashmir,
Bhartpur,	Transport Commandants),	

proceeded to England in May 1897 to attend the Diamond Jubilee of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress. This honour was well appreciated in the States and had a good effect on the officers who proceeded home, all of whom were deeply impressed by what they saw.

After the Chitral Expedition the Maharaja of Jaipur increased his Transport Corps by 100 more carts and 200 ponies; and Mysore is starting a Transport Corps on similar lines to that existing in Jaipur, and proposes to reduce the cavalry regiment now maintained from 600 to 500 sabres.

There have been further reductions made in the old armies of the Native States during the past five years, and excepting in Gwalior, Indore and Hyderabad, these forces may now be said to have no existence at all.

For some years the attention of the Government of India has been directed to the disciplinary law applicable to the Imperial Service Troops when on service outside their own States. It was finally decided to invite the States concerned to sign an agreement to the effect that under such circumstances the laws of

Resolution No. 3253-L, dated the 2nd October 1895, and Secret Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 1 (Internal), dated the 6th January 1897.

IMPERIAL SERVICE
TROOPS.

their States shall apply to their troops and be administered by British officers. Several States have already signed the agreement, and no difficulties are anticipated as regards the others.

The Secretary of State recently asked that the working of the Imperial Service Troops scheme might be reviewed as it had been under trial for some years. A reply was sent in the marginally noted despatch.

The table below shows the strength of the Imperial Service Troops.

Strength of Imperial Service Troops on the 1st October 1898.

Corps.	Authorised strength.	Strength on 1st Oct. 1898.	REMARKS.	Corps.	Authorised strength.	Strength on 1st Oct. 1898.	REMARKS.			
CAVALRY.				ARTILLERY.						
Kashmir Lancers . .	150	151		1st Kashmir Mountain Battery.	150	148				
Patiala Lancers (<i>Rajinder Lancers</i>).	600	589		2nd Kashmir Mountain Battery.	150	152				
Bahawalpur Lancers .	150	142		SAPPERS AND MINERS.						
Jind „ .	150	145		Sirmur Sappers . .	150	153	Includes 8 company drivers. Ditto			
Nabha „ .	150	143		Maler Kotla Sappers .	150	173				
Kapurthala „ .	150	141		INFANTRY.						
Faridkot „ .	50	48		1st Kashmir Infantry (<i>Raghu Fortab</i>).	702	700				
1st Jodhpur Lancers (<i>Sardar Risala</i>).	600	602		2nd Kashmir Rifles (<i>Body-guard</i>).	702	630				
2nd Jodhpur Lancers (<i>Sardar Risala</i>).	600	605		4th Kashmir Rifles (<i>Raghunath</i>).	702	685				
Alwar Lancers . .	600	580		5th Kashmir Light Infantry (<i>Rangol</i>).	702	696				
Bhartpur „ . .	500	475		1st Patiala Infantry .	600	593				
Rampur „ . .	300	297		2nd „ „ .	600	598				
1st Gwalior „ . .	600	585		Bahawalpur „ .	423	423				
2nd „ „ . .	600	585		Jind „ .	600	556				
Bhopal Lancers (<i>Victoria Lancers</i>).	500	416		Nabha „ .	600	587				
Indore Lancers . .	500	444		Kapurthala „ .	600	574				
Mysore „ . .	600	575		Faridkot „ .	150	149				
Hyderabad „ . .	800	768		Alwar „ .	1,027	995				
Bhaunagar „ . .	342	299		Bhartpur Infantry (<i>Maharaj Paltan</i>).	650	620				
Navanagar „ . .	150	101	To be raised to full strength when finances permit.	CAMEL CORPS.						
Junnagarh „ .	100	94		Bikaner Camel Corps (<i>Ganga Risala</i>).	500	597				
				TRANSPORT CORPS.						
				Jaipur Transport Corps.	780	1,200	600	731	1,104	606
				Gwalior	325	500	200	320	464	200

H. MELLISS,

Inspector-General, Imperial Service Troops.

LOCAL CORPS.

For some years past attention had been directed to the position of certain of the Local Corps maintained "under the orders of the Government of India;" and after correspondence with the Agents to the Governor-General in Rajputana and Central India, it was determined, at a Conference held in 1896 between the Viceroy, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Hon'ble the Military Member, to simplify the existing system. Accordingly—

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 159 (Internal), dated the 1st September 1896.

- (1) The Central India Horse,
- (2) The Malwa Bhil Corps,
- (3) The Bhopal Battalion,

- (4) The Deoli Irregular Force,
- (5) The Erinpura Irregular Force,
- (6) The Mewar Bhil Corps,

(7) The Merwara Battalion,

were placed, for purposes of discipline and efficiency, under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in India, and brought under the Indian Articles of War. The infantry of these corps have been granted the increase of Rs. 2 a month sanctioned for the regular infantry.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 22, dated the 29th January 1896. (From the Military Department.)

It was also decided at the time to revise the existing position as regards the Hyderabad Contingent, and the Resident at Hyderabad was directed to forward, through the Commander-in-Chief, all matters connected with the Contingent on which the orders of the Government of India are required, the Resident retaining his control over the Contingent precisely as before.

THAGI AND DAKAITI DEPARTMENT.

The crime of thagi in the ordinary acceptation of the word, *viz.*, systematic murder by strangulation by organised gangs of professional robbers, was stamped out many years ago. Occasional cases of thagi by poison still occur, but the Department is now principally employed in the suppression of dakaiti in Central India, Rajputana and Hyderabad.

In Rajputana and Central India the Department was remodelled in 1893 with a view to the systematic suppression of organised crime, subject to the conditions that the authority of Darbars should not be impaired in regard to the suppression of ordinary crime within their respective States, and that the position and powers of Political Officers must be upheld. Accordingly while the Department is subject to the General Superintendent for administrative purposes, its operations are locally controlled by the Political authorities, who are guided by the principle that, as far as possible, the force should be employed in co-operation with, and not in supersession of, the Darbar police. In the large and better-administered States, the Department ordinarily does very little except in inter-statal cases or serious mail-robberies. In the small interlacing jurisdictions of Central India, it is constantly employed.* It has also done good service in breaking up gangs of dakaitis in States such as Bhartpur and Dholpur.

* Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 39 (Internal), dated the 3rd March 1898.

THAGI AND
DAKAITI—
RAILWAY
JURISDICTION IN
NATIVE STATES.

In Hyderabad, where dakaiti was rife, the Department was re-organised in 1896.* The main principle is the same as in Rajputana and Central India, *viz.*, that the Department is to work in co-operation with, and not in supersession of, the State police, but by long established practice the Department has more authority in Hyderabad than in Rajputana or Central India.

Since 1893 the Department has also been entrusted with the supervision of measures for the reformation of criminal tribes in Rajputana and Central India.

* Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 49 (Internal), dated the 11th March 1896.

The Government of India have formulated† the principles on which these tribes are to be dealt with. The actual working of the system is left to the States themselves, and, beyond offering advice, the Department refrains from interference except at the request of the State or on the requisition of the Political Officer.

Central Special Branch.—The Central Special Branch, which is a part of the Thagi and Dakaiti Department, was inaugurated in 1887 with a view to keeping the Government of India informed of political agitation and anything likely to affect the public tranquillity. The Special Branch also sees that a watch is kept on suspicious characters, and on persons who have brought themselves within reach of the law. The Central Special Branch works in the main through the Local Special Branches attached to Local Governments, which in their respective provinces fill the same position that the central organisation occupies in relation to the Government of India.

The Central Special Branch has during the last two years employed a staff of detectives to investigate the illicit trade in opium between Native States and British India. It is hoped that, with the information so obtained, provincial administrations will be able to cope with opium smuggling within their own jurisdictions.

† *Vide* Chapter XIV of enclosure to Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 33 (Internal), dated the 20th February 1895.

Despatches to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, Nos. 62 and 168 (Separate Revenue—Opium), dated the 4th March 1896 and the 16th June 1898. (From the Department of Finance and Commerce.)

JURISDICTION ON RAILWAYS IN NATIVE STATES.

It has always been the practice of the Government of India to obtain from Native States cessions of jurisdiction on railway lands in their territory. This policy was re-affirmed in 1891, when it was made clear that, as soon as a railway becomes part of a continuous line of communication between Native territory on the one hand, and British or Native territory on the other, the Government of India must assume control of the railway, and, in order to exercise that control, a cession of jurisdiction must be obtained. In the case of purely local lines, the Government of India are willing to leave jurisdiction in the hands of the Native States concerned.

The surrender of "full jurisdiction" has always been held by the Government of India as conferring on them "the exclusive right, power and authority to administer justice, and to legislate for such administrations."

Secret despatch to Secretary of State for India, No. 192 (Internal), dated the 28th October 1896.

This question of jurisdiction came prominently to notice in connection with the arrest of Yusuf-ud-din—an employé of the Nizam's Government—on railway

Secret despatch to Secretary of State for India, No. 191 (Internal), dated the 28th October, 1896.

lands in Hyderabad territory, on a warrant issued by a Magistrate in British India. The legality of the arrest was questioned by Yusuf-ud-din, but the Punjab Chief Court decided against him. He then appealed to the Privy Council, and the Hyderabad Government took the opportunity of addressing the Government of India at length on the subject of jurisdiction on railway lands in Hyderabad. They held that the cession made by them was limited to railway purposes.

RAILWAY
JURISDICTION IN
NATIVE STATES—
TELEPHONE LINES
IN NATIVE STATES.

The Government of India were unable to take this view, which was contrary to their declared policy, as explained above, and Her Majesty's Secretary of State was addressed accordingly. It was admitted, however, "to be unwise to insist in the matter of jurisdiction on more than was really wanted," and the Government of India therefore declared themselves "prepared to arrange (in the larger States) that, where full civil and criminal jurisdiction has been ceded to the British Government over the lands occupied by a railway in a Native State, warrants issued by British Indian Courts shall not be executed on such lands against the subjects of the State in whose territory the lands are situated, and that such subjects charged with offences committed outside the State will only be liable to arrest and surrender under the usual extradition procedure as long as proper facilities for extradition are given."

Such a concession had, in the meantime, been temporarily allowed in the case of the Hyderabad-Godaveri Valley Railway and the Barsi Light Railway, pending a settlement of the general question raised by the Yusuf-ud-din case.

In the appeal the Privy Council decided, on the correspondence which passed between the Resident and the Nizam's Government in 1887, that the jurisdiction ceded by the Hyderabad State was limited to railway purposes only.

The views of the Secretary of State on the general jurisdiction question were "that the only position that would be found completely satisfactory for us to occupy on (those) railway lands would be one under which, though the sovereignty would remain with the Native State, the exercise of all the powers of sovereignty would be vested in the Government of India * * * , that the differential treatment of the protected States of India, in a matter of general policy like that under discussion, would lead in the end to greater difficulties," and that it was expedient "to place by general agreement the power of executing all arrests within railway limits in the hands of the railway police," who "would then transfer the accused person to the authorities entitled to receive and try him."

A form of cession of jurisdiction, calculated to secure for Government the desired powers, has been submitted for the approval of Her Majesty's Government.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 221 (Internal), dated the 29th December 1898.

TELEPHONE LINES IN NATIVE STATES.

The Secretary of State approved the principle that the general system of telegraphic and telephonic communications throughout India shall be under Imperial control; but, as a special concession, permitted a telephone line erected* by the Chief of Morvi to be worked in connection with a public tramway inside Morvi territory, provided the Chief conforms to any conditions imposed for preserving the private and local character of the telephone line.

* Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 161 (Internal), dated the 25th November 1897.

PART III.

BUBONIC PLAGUE.

Outbreaks of plague have occurred in the following Native States :—

Gwalior, Baroda, Hyderabad, Sirohi and Mysore.

Gwalior.—The village of Khandraoni, in the Gwalior State, was attacked in March 1897. The measures adopted to suppress it, under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel A. Crofts, I.M.S., were completely successful.

Despatch (in the Home Department) to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 16, dated the 1st June 1897 (paragraph 6).

Baroda.—The returns began to cause anxiety towards the end of April 1897, and stringent measures were taken to prevent the disease from establishing itself in Baroda city. The results were largely successful, but the epidemic is still felt in the districts of Baroda.

Hyderabad.—In January 1898 an outbreak of plague was reported in certain districts in the Hyderabad State. The measures taken under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Laurie, I.M.S., were remarkably successful. A fresh outbreak was reported in November 1898, and is receiving careful attention.

Sirohi.—Plague obtained a footing in this State in November 1897, but was completely stamped out by the end of April.

Mysore.—Plague was imported into the Mysore State in August 1898, and shortly became epidemic.

Countries outside of India also occupied the attention of the Government of India in connection with the plague.

On the recrudescence of plague in Karachi in April 1898, large numbers of people proceeded to Bela and Makran by land. Camps were established along the Las Bela frontier for the protection of Baluchistan, and the disease did not get across the border.

In view of the apprehensions expressed by Russia as to the risk of plague spreading to Russian territory, particular consideration was given to the question of precautions on the British side of the Afghan frontier.

The Amir of Afghanistan was informed that, in consequence of the presence of plague in Bombay and Karachi, pilgrimage from Indian ports to the Hedjaz had been temporarily suspended. His Highness promptly issued a notice throughout Afghanistan prohibiting any intending pilgrims from proceeding to India across the Afghan frontier.

The Persian Government suggested to the British Minister at Tehran that a British Medical Officer should be sent to Seistan ; Major Brazier-Creagh, R.A.M.C., was accordingly deputed to Seistan in April 1897, and stayed there for about six months.

Secret despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 168 (Frontier), dated the 22nd September 1898.

On the initiative of the Persian Government, it was decided to introduce quarantine arrangements at the Persian Gulf ports, and to intrust the working

of those arrangements to the British Residency Surgeon at Bushire. The Government of India lent the Persian Government the services of some Medical Officers for this purpose. BUBONIC PLAGUE—
PASSPORTS, ETC.

The Sultan of Maskat imposed quarantine against arrivals from Bombay and Karachi, and the Resident in the Persian Gulf was instructed to advise His Highness as to the rules to be adopted.

On hearing that the local authorities at Kashgar, at the suggestion of the Russian Consul-General, contemplated closing the trade route from Kashmir, the Viceroy telegraphed to Her Britannic Majesty's Minister at Peking that there was nothing in the situation to justify such a step. The Chinese Government issued instructions to the authorities in Kashgar to establish quarantine, if necessary.

PASSPORTS.

Her Majesty's Government ruled that persons naturalised as British subjects in India, and holding Indian passports, are not formally entitled to "protection" as British subjects, or as "British protected persons;" that the naturalisation granted to them in India does not extend beyond Her Majesty's Indian Empire; and that they are, therefore, only entitled, as a matter of

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 22 (General), dated the 10th February 1898.

courtesy, to the general good offices and assistance of Her Majesty's Representatives abroad. The forms of passport in

use for persons naturalised in India and the Colonies were accordingly altered, and the change was sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government with certain modifications.

REORGANISATION OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

The Secretary of State for India sanctioned certain proposals for the reorganisation of the Political Department. The principal objects in view are

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 156 (General), dated the 4th November 1897.

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 97 (General), dated the 30th June 1898.

the maintenance of a due proportion of Covenanted Civilians and the introduction of an improved system for the recruitment and training of junior military officers.

BRITISH PENSIONS OF OFFICERS SERVING IN NATIVE STATES.

A reference was made to Her Majesty's Government regarding the power of the Government of India to withhold, in whole or in part, the British pensions

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 124 (Internal), dated the 21st July 1898.

of officers serving in Native States.

The Secretary of State replied that the assumption of such a power, on grounds not connected with the pensioner's conduct, is open to objection. Government have, however, the power to prescribe the conditions on which officers may be employed in Native States. It is thus possible to regulate the remuneration which an officer may receive from a Darbar, so that his total emoluments, including his pension, will be commensurate to the duties of his office.

INCLUSION OF INDIA IN COMMERCIAL TREATIES WITH FOREIGN POWERS.

COMMERCIAL
TREATIES.

In 1898 the Government of India accepted the principle that India may advantageously be included in commercial treaties with foreign powers provided provision is made therein that —

Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 182 (External), dated the 18th October 1898.

- (i) the Government of India reserve the discretionary power to prevent any foreigner from residing or sojourning in, or travelling through, India without their consent ;
 - (ii) in regard to Native States, the rights of foreigners are subject to the same limitations as those in force as regards European British subjects ;
 - (iii) the right to appoint Consuls in India is restricted to the sea-port towns of the provinces under the direct administration of the Government of India ; and
 - (iv) the accession of India includes the territories of any Native Prince or Chief in India under the suzerainty of Her Majesty.
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